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A B S T R A C T
This thesis intends to explore the relation of 
tribe and empire in Baluchistan, as an interaction of 
distinct political entities., and also as an experimental 
confrontation between the opposed social and cultural 
norms associated with imperialism and tribalism. The 
discussion will start with a preliminary definition of 
tribal society in chapter one. This introductory section 
will also trace the evolution of local political 
structures in the historical context of tribal 
strategies to secure resources and capture local power, 
and the early influence of imperial forces in particular 
those of Persia, Afghanistan and British India^in re­
aligning tribal politics within the matrix of external 
empires, c u 1mi nat ing in the creat ion of the Br itish 
Baluchistan Agency of 1876, which set the larger
historical f ramework for subsequent po 1 .i t ica 1 pa11erns 
and trends. The second chapter will explore the 
imperat i ves of t he British i mper i a 1 .i nvo 1 vement i n 
B a 1 u c h i s t a n , a n d t h e i n t e r 1 o c k i n g a f t hi e politics o f t h e 
Great Game in Asia dur ing the ni neteenth century with 
local t r i b a 1 f a c t o r s , w h i c h 1 e d t o s i g n i f :i. c a n t
territorial restructuring of tribal homelands, at the 
expense of tribal ethnicity, and old established
p a 11 e r n s o f p o 1 i t i c a 1 1 i n k a g e s . I n t e r n a 11 y f o r
Baluchistan, the process of imperial penetration
entailed the political and administrative encapsu lation 
of a tribal society by an external and higher
po 1 i t ica 1 p o w e r C o n s e q u e n t  1 y Ba 1 uchistan became t.he
political meeting ground for cultural norms fostered in
contrasting social milieux. The tribal aspect of this 
equation is discussed in the third chapter in terms of
group identity, social exchange, and material assets, 
which sponsored a culture of conflict intrinsic to 
Baluchistan society. In imperial ideology, tribal 
turbulence was incompatible with political control and 
stable government. Thus the fourth chapter sets out to 
explore official British strategies designed to remould 
t r i b a 1 society in the colonial image of order and 
stability, and assesses the reaction of tribes to this 
exter na 1 man i pu 1 at. i on of their social or der , The f .i. f t h 
chapter concentrates on the economic aspect of imperial 
p e n et rat i on, b y s t u d y i n g t h e imp a o t of B r .i t i s h r e v e n u e 
policy on tribal land structures, levels of rural 
income, and their adequacy for material survival. This 
will be followed by a concluding section, dissecting the 
b a lance sheet o f emp i r e i n B a 1uchist a n , to see if t he 
i ntrusi on was mereIy an exercise i n t he strateq ic 
r est r uc: t ur i ng of a m i 1 i t ar y fr ont i e r , or1 a cat a 1 yst as 
w e 11 for new role definitions in tribal s o c i e t y , 
and a 11ered soc i a 1 percept i o n s .
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Introductory Note
This thesis is a specific case study of imperialism 
and tribalism in a localised area, reconstructed on the 
basis of historical data, and social structural models 
derived from anthrap o l o g y . In general, the
subject of British India’s tribal frontier, has been 
saturated with political analyses of the Afghan wars, 
tribal revolts, punitive expeditions, and British 
strategic manoeuvrings. Such approaches have brought 
tribal society into focus primarily through imperial 
lenses. Thus nineteenth century British writing on tribal 
Baluchistan mirrored the classic imperialist concern 
•for political mastery over ’s a v a g e ’ tribes, the need to 
civilise and use them in the equation of imperial power 
politics. B .i og rap h i es like T . H ■ Thor nton ’ s Sir Robert 
SandemannHis Life and Work on our Indian Frontier.and
J.J.M. Innes’s The Life and Times of General Sir James
Browne were exercises in image? building, corresponding 
to the Victorian ideal of the strong paternalist minded 
administrator, anchoring the discipline and culture of 
empire in the turbulent depths of tribal society. 
Similarly R . I» B r u c e ’s The? Forward Policy addresses 
itself to the main debate on the extension of the Indian 
frontier in the late nineteenth century, and interprets 
the imperial advance not just in mi 1itary-defence terms 
but as the progress of civilisation rolling back the
6boundaries of primitivism. Essent ially such writings 
constituted an ideological licence for empire, while the 
emphasis on personality and character created the heroic 
icons of imperial culture.
In later writings, Baluchistan was increasingly 
treated as a minor strand in the general history of the 
Indian frontier, perhaps because after the period of 
initial colonisation, the main political interest 
shifted to the North-West Frontier Province and 
Afghanistan which continued to provide violent 
spectacles of tribal militancy and conflict. C.C.Davies's 
The North-West Frontier depicts this marginal interest 
in Baluchistan, for after discussing very briefly the 
establishment of the Baluchistan Agency and the Sandeman 
system of g o v e r n m e n t , 1 he devotes the rest of his work 
to a study of the northern Pathan sector of the frontier, 
Afghanistan, and the impact of the Russian threat on 
British policy in general. D .K . G h o s e 's England and 
Afghanistan also restricts itself to a similar cursory 
treatment of proposals and events leading to the 
occupation of Q uetta.2 Lamforick's John Jacob of 
Jacobabad is essentially biog r a p h i c a l , and attempts to 
credit the Sind officials for the type of tribal 
administrat ion undertaken later in E-taluchistan.3 Other 
writers, like J.A.Norris, have discussed Britain's 
controversial interference with the Kalat State during 
the course of the first Afghan War . 4 Malcolm Yapp's
7Strategies in British India also offers an analysis of 
the Government of India's early involvement with
Baluchistan, in 1339, and makes the interesting point 
that from this period, Baluchistan claimed attention as 
a major strategic alternative in the scope it offered 
for direct control, to structure Brtish influence on the 
frontier, as insurance against the fragility of the 
Afghan buffer, and the misadventure of B r i t a i n ’s Afghan 
w a r .55
While the above works highlighted the strategic 
significance of Baluchistan, and placed it within the 
general context of frontier history, there was still a 
need for specialised studies on the area in order to 
bring into focus the regional structure of politics and 
society. Baluchi writings like those of M.S.Khan's
History of t h e  Baluch R a c e , and M.K.Marri B a 1o c h 's
Searc hlight on Baloches and B a l o c h i s t a n , concentrate on 
Baluchi activities in ancient Syria and Persia, tribal 
migrations and conflicts in medieval west Asia and 
Baluchistan, and conclude with brief comments on the 
British-Baluch confrontation in the early nineteenth
century. T .A .He a t hc ot e 's thesis, B a l uchistan and
British Policy was the first of its kind to concentrate 
primarily on the history of events in mid-nineteenth 
century Baluchistan. Although it limits itself to a purely 
political study, it does undertake a detailed
8examination of the Baluch tribal struggles between 
1857-1876, with a synchronous analysis of imperial policy 
priorities, as well as the cant, radict ions and rivalries 
between the provincial governments of the Sind and the 
Punjab, which exacerbated the internal crisis in Kalat, 
and set the course towards British occupation of 
Baluchistan in 1876. The main conclusion he draws from 
his study, is that while the occupation was officially 
presented as growing out of the need to re-order the 
internal tribal crisis in Baluchistan, in reality it
resulted from the British Government's desire to
strengthen its position against Russia in central 
Asia. **
As opposed to the primarily imperial focus in 
Heat h e a t e ' s t e x t , I nayatu 11a E-ia 1 uch ' s s t u d y , Greater 
Baluchistan offers a nationalist interpretation of 
Baluchistan's political identity and niche in history. 
The text attempts to reconstruct a national identity for 
Baluchistan on political and cultural criteria, which 
articulate a sense of alienation from the imperial 
process , and also consciously reject any common 
cultural ground with India. This nationalist
definition asserts that Baluchistan is physically more 
central Asian than Indian, ethnically Baluchis would like 
to be regarded as Arab, their language is Persian in
origin, while socially the tribal normative order
9Ba l u c h m a y a r „ distinguishes the Baluch -from the Hindus 
and Muslims of India.-7 Pol it ical ly9 I. Baluch claims 
Baluchistan was a sovereign state, and never vassalized 
by a foreign power. The spirit of independence survived 
in popular poetry, which was both anti-colonial and 
nationalist in outlook; conflicts with the British were 
extolled as patriotic acts. Between 1923-25, Baluch 
politicians translated existing national sentiments into 
a formal demand for a sovereign state of Baluchistan, 
which was aborted by the British and the leadership of 
the Muslim League on political grounds.® While the 
study has made a significant contribution to the 
understanding of regional politics in pre-1947 
Baluchistan, it has suffered from the malaise of 
interpreting past contradictions in mainly nationalist 
terms. Much of nineteenth century tribal politics 
in Baluchistan has been interpreted as nationalist 
inspired, without taking due account of the relationship 
between tribal behaviour patterns and the tribal 
political process itself. Moreover historically the 
notion of a sovereign Baluchistan is dubious, since the 
area acknowledged Persian supremacy in the eighteenth 
century; subsequently various districts paid tribute to 
the Afghan monarchy; and finally in the nineteenth 
century it came under British political and military 
occupation.
10
The particular study of Baluchistan undertaken in 
this thesis,, between 1876-1905, attempts to fill a 
chronological and interpretive gap in the study of the 
region as undertaken by Heathcote and I.Baluch. 
H e a t h c o t e ’s account concludes in 1876,, while I. 
B a l u c h ’s study focuses on the early history of 
Baluchistan, and the emergence of nationalist politics 
between 1919-1947. I have taken 1876 as the point of 
departure to begin this thesis, in order to bridge the 
continuity in narrative between the above mentioned 
works. It is also my intention to interpret the 
thematic content of the period as a dynamic exchange  
between the large political concerns shaped by the 
British Empire and specific tribal interests. Tribal 
reality stretched on the wider canvass of empire allows, 
the particular to be viewed in a varied and general 
contextual framework. Personality and politics, 
ideology and inspiration^ prompted the extension of 
imperial power and the structure of control in tribal 
lands. The kinds of images, themes, and motifs 
circulating in the imaginative and administrative field 
of empire are relevant for defining the hegemonic 
context within which tribal society had to readapt in 
the post 1876 period. My analysis consequently tries 
to depict the shape of this field, its internal 
constraints, its pioneering figures, and ideological 
canons, which extended a new political culture in the
11
borderlands. Imperial directives however had to contend 
with tribal reality in redrawing the political map of 
Baluchistan. Discussing the significance of this 
tribal dimension in the political restructuring of nine- 
century Baluchistan, I have explored tribal culture 
patterns and the social structure of groups based on 
strategies of conflict and co-operation, prior to the 
intrusion of any alien authority. The nature of the 
tribal societies and inter-groups relationships are 
essential for an understanding of the type of political 
control which evolved in tribal areas, which hinged on 
paramountcy being tempered by a large measure of tribal 
autonomy. This intersection of empire and tribes may be 
conceptualised in social science? terms, as one of 
encapsulation, with the political structure of the tribe 
be?ing "partly independent of, and partly regulated 
by , the larger encapsulating*imperial structure.
A distinctive feature of encapsulation as Nina Swidler 
has pointed out in her anthrapological study of the 
Brahui tribes of E^luchistan, is "that each political 
structure operates with different normative and 
pragmatic r u l e s " . 10 Within the constraints of such a 
model, consensus and control in E-iritish Baluchistan, 
must be perceived as types of political accommoclation 
negotiated between imperial authority and tribal 
society. While the empire sought to impose its order 
and ideology on tribal society, by co-opting tribal
chiefs to represent imperial interests, at the same time 
tribal leaders sought to exploit imperial resources to 
reinforce their status and power in the social system. 
Such perspectives have largely guided my discussion on 
the empire-tribe structure in Baluchistan. Assessing the 
social implications of this restructuring,I have analysed 
mutations in traditional tribal models adapting to alien 
political pressure. I have used two view points to survey 
the impact of imperial intrusions on the social symmetry 
of the tribal order. In the first instance I have
examined the interlocking of colonial administrative form 
with the tribal political structure, which I aim to 
show created ambivalence and ambiguity in tribal 
leadership roles, exacerbated internal conflicts in the
tribe, and instituted a new political framework which
left no legitimate space for tribal type violence
and military adventurism, causing ideological
disjunction and distortion of the tribal normative 
order. Secondly I propose to study the economic 
constraints which underpinned the social order, in terms 
of the colonial reorganisation of tribal landholding 
patterns, rent and revenue structures, which endorsed 
the powers and privileges of the traditional ruling 
elites, at the expense of ordinary tribesmen caught in 
the web of archaic custom and the new often inflated 
revenue demand imposed by the British.
By analysing the above aspects of the imperial- 
tribal encounter this thesis attempts to highlight the 
significance of the imperial era in shaping and 
influencing political leadership and the s o c i o ­
economic structure of late nineteenth century 
Baluchistan, which crystallised into an enduring, 
exploitative social pattern, persisting into modern 
times. Historically , the infusion of imperial politics 
in tribal society redefined Baluchistan to serve as a 
front for political ambition and expansionism. The 
imperial script reinterpreted tribal territorial and 
social diagrams, in order to legitimise external 
authority, and alter the strategic contours of India in 
the northwest frontier. The use of Etaluchistan*" s social 
and strategic resources to prolong the politics of 
conquest and empire was the leitmotiv of British
involvement in the region, and the accompanying 
imbalances in tribal society, part of the inevitable 
fall-out of the imperial experiment in drawing new 
boundaries of power.
The specific area under study in this thesis is 
limited to British Baluchistan, and the territories 
administered by the Agent to the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , known 
as the Agency territories. This directly administered 
part of Baluchistan, covered 46, 692 square miles, an
14
area about the size of Sind,. It comprised si:-; 
Districts — Quetta-Pishin, Sibi, Loralai, Zhob, Chagai, 
and the Bolan P a s s . 11 As the Political Agent in Sibi 
exercised political control over the M arri—Bugti tribal 
areas, these tribes have been included in the subject 
matter of the thesis. The decision to restrict the area 
of study in Baluchistan was dictated by lack of space in 
the current work. A detailed history of the Native 
States of Baluchistan requires a sepcw-ate thesis on its 
own. Secondly in the late nineteenth century,the directly 
administered districts of Baluchistan were central 
to imperial power politics and strategy options, and 
therefore of greater relevance in construing a history 
of the empire-tribe relationship in Baluchistan, forged 
in the wake of macro-political concerns and local 
tribal criteria. Greater political and administrative 
attention also ensured better documentation of archival 
material on British Baluchistan, which led me to 
undertake a sectional study of the districts on which 
adequate source material was available. Essentially 
the themes explored here, and the material accessible, 
suggested containing the field of research to the 
directly administered areas of Baluchistan.
T r i b a 1 Saci et y a n d 1 mper i a 1 Linkages in Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Century Ba l u c h i s t a n .
Locked in the bleak mountain and desert 
environment of India's northwest frontier, Baluchistan 
constituted a natural incubus for the survival of a 
tribal form of society, screened from the urban
influences of the Persian and Indian c i v i 1isat ions,
which encompassed it on the west and the east. In this
he?rmet i c ret reat of remote mount a .i n va 11 e y s , rocky 
escarpments, and sandy wastes, social existence was 
pa11erned on a ruIe of warrior chiefs, a militarised 
tribal structure?, and a predatory ideology, which
sanctioned violent options in the struggle for material 
existence on a poor economic base. The cultural 
m a r g i n a 1 i s m o f ■ t h e a r e a a 1 s o e? n s u r e d t h e p r i m a c y o f 
animistic beliefs and magic rites over Islam, which 
provided a veneer of religious orthodoxy, without 
displacing the corpus of ritual sanctions that imparted 
a mythical, phantasmic flavour to the spiritual 
p r eoc c up a t i o ns of t r i ba 1 soc .i et y .
Physi ca 1 Sett i nq
E m b r a c i n g t h e e a s t e r n t. i p o f t h e P e r s i a n p 1 a t e a u
and the westerly arc of the Himalayas , the Baluchistan 
landmass carries the scenic imprint of deserts and 
mount a i ns w h i ch i ntr u de on e i t he r s i d e . Desc r i b ing
B a 1u c h istan i n T h e  1 mper i a 1 G a z e t t e e r , Hughes Duller
wrote s
"The general outlook resembles that of the Iranian 
p 1 a t e a u ... Rugged, barren, sunburnt mountains, rent 
by huge chasms and gorges, alternate-? with arid 
deserts and stony plains the prevailing colour of 
which is a monotonous d r a b " , 1
The shifting desert front, separating Chagai District
from Afghanistan to the north and Persia to the west,
deludes the eye with its strange "moving sandhills ...
mirages-... and severe s a n d s t o r m s " . 32 Northeast from
Chagai the arid volcanic complexion of the country
transforms into the rugged mountainscape of the Quetta-
Zhob--Lora 1 ai region. Here the mountains of the Toba
K a k a r a n d C e n t r a 1 B r a h u i r a n g e s g i r d 1 e t h e Q u e 11. a - P i s hi i n
valley and serve as the boundary line with Afghanistan.
In this rocky terrain of vastly contrasting elevations,
valley bottoms lying below 3000 feet and mountain peaks
r i s i ng t o o ve r Q000 feet a bove sea 1evel, the Toba K a k a r
range? reaches spectacular heights of over 10,000 feet,
before dropping south westwards to continue as the Khwaja
A m r a n range. A c r a s s t h e K h w a j a A m r a n o f f s h o o t 1 .i. e s t h e?
K h w a j a k P a s s , t h e m a i n a r t e r i a 1 1 i n k between t h e Q li e 11 a
v a 11 e y a n d A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e h i s t o r .i c B o 1 a n Pas s
commanding the main approaches to India from central and
western Asia appears south of Que11a, in the high
mountains belonging to the Central Brahui range.3 
E a s t w a r d s f r o m Q u e tt a , t h e s p u r s o f t h e S u 1 a .i m a n range 
c o nst i t ut e the rnou n t a i notis bac k d r op) in Z h o b , Loralai , 
and Sibi. This mountain system consists of a main ridge 
running north-south, flanked on the east by parallel 
serrated ridges. To the north, narrow gorges and clefts 
in the mountains provide outlets to the Punjab. The 
highest point of the mountain chain, at 11,295 feet, is 
known as the Takht — i- S u 1 aiman (Solomon's throne), and 
serves as the focal point of Hindu-Muslim pilgrim a g e s . 4 
These mountains in northeast Baluchistan share the 
barrenness peculiar to the Western Himalayas, where 
rocky scarped inaccessible mountain faces alternate with 
long narrow valleys.
R .i ve r s d r a i n i ng this mou nt. a i n basin do not c a r r y 
large permanent flows of water. Heavy autumn rains 
usually create flash floods in river beds that for the 
rest of the year contain no more than shallow streams, 
that frequently disappear into the pebbly bottom, As one 
observer remarked* Baluchistan was a "land of
r ivers without water , of forests without trees. . . 1,5 
Among the rivers which carry any significant volume of 
water are the Zhob and Pi shin Lora, The Zhob River 
rises t o t he east of Pi shi n , and receives the dra i nage 
o f t h e T o b a i< a k a r r a n g e f r o m t h e n o r 1 1”). T o g e t h e r w i t h a 
smaller stream the Kundar, it constitutes the main water
18
reservoir in the Zhob valley. The Pishin Lora rises in 
the western slopes of the Toba Kakar range; it carries
the drainage of Quetta—Pishin and finally dissipates
into sand channels near Nushki. further south the Nari 
River drains Loral ai and Sibi.A
Climatic variables heighten the aridity of the 
land. The low humidity combines with great evapo ration
in summer, and a scanty rainfall to create a dry semi-
desert type environment. Lying just outside the monsoon 
belt the annual rainfall averages between 3 — 12 inches,7 
Temperatures fluctuate between extremes of heat and
cold. During summer the temperature climbs to 122°F. in
t he p 1ains of Sib i , wh i1e it p 1ummet s we 11 b e 1ow 
freezing point in winter ait northern hill stations like 
Ziarat.®
T h e d r y r o c k y t e r r a i n f r a m e s a b a r r e n 1 a n d s c a p e
w i t h a sp a r se veg e t a b 1 e c o ve r i ng , Up pe r va 11 eys ha ve
thin coverings of cedar, juniper, and dwarf palm, while 
the lower ones are covered with bushes and shrubs. Few 
large forest trees are? to be? f o u n d , and mountains in 
many place s st and bar e an d b row n . In 1887, Lor d
D u. f f e r i n , t h e I n d i a n V i c e r o y , travelling a 1 o n g t h e
B a 1uch i st a n f ro n ti e r , was s t r uck by its b 1e aknes s s "It
i s a w f u J. c o u. n t r y t o p a s s t h r o u g h -- b a r e and h i g h 1 y
m o u. n t a i n o u s , a n d e? m p t y o f e v e r y thing but desolation".9
This colourless parched up land only springs briefly to
life after sudden falls of rain, when as a Baluch
ballad describes;
"The heavy atmosphere laden with dust and haze is 
transformed into one of transparent c l e a r n e s s . ., 
the brown mountainside is c o v e r e d . ..with a bright 
green carpet, the dry water courses become 
flowing streams., waterfalls leap from the heights 
and...the shepherds stride along singing in front 
of t he i r f 1 oc: ks " ■ * °
Ethnological Composition and Ecological Adaptat ion
Baluchistan provides a social contrast of three 
major ethnic types - Pathan, B a 1uc h , and Brahui.
According to gazetteer information compiled in 1905- 
1907, the Pathans constituted the bulk of the population 
in Zhob and Lora la i. In Quetta as well., they formed 78 
percent of the population. By way of contrast, the
Brahuis living in the south earn part of the district
numbered only 8 p e r c e n t . 3-1 The? Baluch presence here was 
negligible, being confined to a few transient 
flockowning groups. However the Baluch commanded a 
stronger presence in Sibi, where they occupied the 
foot hills of t he S u 1 a i man Mounta i n s , a n d t he c a na 1 
t ra c t s i n Nas i ra b a d Ta h s i 1 .1* Here the y number e d a bout 
48,000, and the Pathans followed with 18,000.13 The
B r a h u i. s w ere a n i n s i g n i f i c a n t m i g r a n t group i n 8 i b .i , 
m e r e I y v i s i t i n g t h e p 1 a i n s i n w i n ter m o n t h s „ H o w e v e r 
the Brahuis commanded a majority in Chagai., where two of 
1 he i r ma i n t r i bes , the Mengals and t hie M u hammad H a s ni s
•I.* v/
nuffibered 4 , 600 and 4 , 300 r espec t .i ve I y , with local Ba 1 lic h 
groups adding another 3,500 to the total p o p u l a t i o n . 1*
The demographic balance therefore created a Pathan 
enclave in northeast Baluchistan. The sense of Pathan 
identity was strengthened by tribal tradition which 
looked back to Zhob as "the cradle of the Afghan 
race".13 Pathans have probably lived in the northwest 
frontier since the time of Herodotus, if the 
identification of his Paktyake with Pakhtuns is 
a c c e p t e d . T h e  original Aryan occupiers of northern 
India probably figured among the early ancestors of the 
Afghans. Subsequently as Greek, Persian and Turkish 
invaders passed through the frontier, sc?me of their 
n u m b e i- s m u s t h a v e i n t e r m i e  d with the local p o p u 1 a t i o n 
and br oadened the ethn i c i dent i t y of t he Pat han t r i b e s . 
Physically the Pathans conform to the Indo-Aryan racial 
t y p e 1"1' and their language F'ashtu is commonly regarded as 
a n e a s t e r n F' e r s i a n d i a 1 e c t «
Pathan genealogical memory offers its own version 
of the tribal past. Tradition traces descent to a 
p u t a t i v e a n c e s t o r G a i s b i n R a s h i d o f G h o r i n 
Afghanistan. Q a i s ’s ancestry is traced to Afghana, the 
desendant of Saul, the first king of the Jews. 
According to tradition, Qais travelled to Arabia and 
r e c e i v e d a b 1 e s s i n g f r o rn t h e l-i o 1 y F‘ r o p h e t . H e h a d t h r e e
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sans. Bar a ban., Ghurgusht, and Bait an, who became the
eponymous ancestors of the three* major branches of the
Pathan community,,1® In IBaluchistan the Kakars, Pan is, 
and Mando Khels., claim descent from Ghurgusht; the 
Tarins, Shiranis and Mianis are among those who trace 
their ancestry to Saraban; while the Ghilzais and
Suleiman Khels look back to Baitan as their early 
a n c e s t o r„1^
Spread across Zhob to Quetta-F'ishin, the? Kakars 
numbered 105,444 persons, representing 53 percent of the 
total Pathan population in Baluchistan, Among their major 
sections the? most numerous group, the Sanzar Khels
(64, 000) , i n h a b i t e d Z hi o b - 3 ° 0 1 h e r sections 1 i k e?
the? nomadic Sargharas and Targharas migrated from Zhob 
towards 0ue11a™F1 ishi n and Toba l<akar in search of ne?w 
pastures, and settled in their new locations by
t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A t a b o u t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e
Sanat i as (anot her Kakar sec t i o n ) also appear e?d as an 
estab 1 ished 1 ancl owni ng cornmuni ty i n 0uetta. 31 Among 
ot her i mportant Pat han groups m.i grat i ng to t he
Baluchistan border lands . were the Pan is who made their 
way from Ghazni and Peshawar to Sibi during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries;33 The? Tor and Spin 
Tarins also seem to have established themselves in Sibi 
a n cJ Q li e 11 a - P i. s h i n at t h e s a m e t :!. m e 3 3 T h e Ac h a k z a i 
Pathans s t r a t e g i c a l 1y situated on the Baluch-Afghan
bord0 r 1 a n d , migra10 d from thsir homeland towards t h 0
close of the eighteenth centu.ry,, One of their leaders, 
named Achak left Afghanistan with his followers, and 
mi grated to the Toba region of Baluchistan. By the 
nineteenth century, the Achakzais were in possession of 
the western part of Toba, known as Toba Achakzai, and 
t h e K h w a j a A m r a n R a n g e .i. n C h a man, as well as so m e 
additional land in Pishin.**
Synchronous with the emergence of a Pathan niche 
in northeast Baluchistan, Baluch tribes migrating from
western Asia successfully colonised parts of Sibi, 
Nushki, and the desert tracts of the Perso-Baluch
borderland,. The word ’Baluch'' implies nomad or
wanderer, and traditional accounts recall a migration 
from Aleppo in Syria, where before the Prophet's birth 
they lived in low hills surrounding the city.
S u b s e q u e n 1 1 y , w h e n Y a z i d t h b s  e c o  n d U m m a y a d C a 1 i p h 
fought wi t h Hazrat 1 mam Husai n , t he Ba 1 uchis who sided 
with the latter, fled eastwards after Husain's martyrdom 
in 680 A „ D „ to avoid Yaz id' s rosvenge„22* Moder n Ba 1 uchi 
schicd 1 a r s =. support an ear 1 y Syrian connection main 1 y on 
e n to m o 1 o g i c a 1 e v i d e n c e ., T hi e y point cd u  t that the 
names of present Syrians, such as A1 Marri and A1 Buledi, 
c o r r e s p o n d w i t hi B a 1 u c h n a m e s 1 i k e M a r 1- i 5 and B u 1 e cl i s . ® 6
01 h e r s  I i k e t h e Viet o r i a n e >; p 1 o r er T h o m a s H cd 1 d .i. c h
perceived a similarity between the Arabs and the? Baluch, 
s u. g g e s t i v e o f a c ammo n e t h n i c: o r i g i n . 22 ^ B u t
R. Burton, another nineteenth century traveller 
dismissed the Arab connection in favour of a Persian 
one,20 He was supported by M „L .D a m e s , a Baluchistan 
Political Officer who had studied the Baluch closely and 
cone 1udeds
"The Baloches ... were mounted archers like the 
P a r thians;... they had striped rugs and carpets - 
all char acter istics refer r i ng rather to Nort her n 
Persia than Arabia. When they came to close 
quarters they alighted and fought on foot, like 
the warriors of the S h a h n a m a . .. They are an open 
hearted race ... in religious matters they are 
free from fanaticism ... it would be hard to 
find a greater contrast than that which they 
offer to the intense., concentrated fanatical 
Arabs.
The Baluch language as well was a derivative from an 
a r c h a i c: f o r m o f P e r s i a n . 3 °
Historical sources also support the Persian 
connec t i o n „ F i r daus i ' s Shahnama suggest.s t hat t he 
Ba 1 uc his were or i g i nall y 1 ocat:ed near t he B 1 ack Sea,, 
and that they actually served in the Persian army under 
Kaikhusro, the sixth century ru.ler of Persia. But the 
r a .i. d i n g a c t i v i t i e s o f t hi e B a 1 u c h , f o reed t h e P e r s i a n r u 1 e r 
N a u s h e r w a n to lead a p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n a gainst t. hem,31 
which probably set in motion the first exodus of the Baluch 
f i" o m n o r t h e r n P e r s i a t o !< i r m a n . S u b sequentl y the c hanging 
political climate in central Asia forced the Baluch to 
migrate further east. The military power of the Ghaznavids^
foilowed fay the strong c e ntra 1 i s e d government of the 
Seljuk Turks, probably rendered the entire Kirman- 
Seistan region unprofitable for raiding and set in motion 
large scale migrations towards Baluchistan.. By the 
•fourteenth and fifteenth centuries some of the important 
Baluch tribes like the Marris and Bugtis had taken up 
permanent abode in the Sulaiman Mountains, bordering on 
Sibi; the Dombkis occupied outlying areas of the Sibi 
D i st r i c t ; t he Jama 1 i s and Umr an i s sett led in t he 
Nasirabad tract-3 ® Among the important tribes which 
settled on the western frontier along Chagai and Western 
Sinjerani country were the Rakhshanis, Sinjeranis, 
Daman i s , and Rek i s » 33
The t hi rd ma jor rac ia 1 t.ype i n the et hnic: mosaic 
of Baluchistan were the Brahui s., an enigmatic group 
bearing a strange linkage with the Dravidian population 
of south India. In the E n c y c 1 o i::» a e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , the 
wi- i t er on lv!ak r an st at ess " The anc i ent Dr av i d i a n s , of 
whom the Brahui is typical, still exist: in many parts 
of the? Makran districts which are assigned to them in 
H e r o d o t u s '!,3^ But Denys Bray in his ethnographic study 
of the Brahuis, found no particular physical resemblance 
w i t h t h e D r a v i d i a n s , y e t h e w a s f o r c e d t o c o n c 1 u d e t h a t. t h e 
Brahui language in its grammar and structure belonged to 
t he D r avi d ian language group „ 355
Br ahu i 1r i ba 1 t r ad i 1: ion, h a w e v e r , c 1 a i ms descent 
•from Mir Hamza, the P r o p h e t ’s uncle, who migrated -from 
Aleppo. Thus Brahuis trace their lineage -from the seven 
sons of Ghwaram, the son of Braho or Ibrahim, who was 
d e is c e n d e d a 1 m o s t .i. m m e d i a t e 1 y f i- o m t h e P r o p h e t " s u n c 1 e . 
Only the descendants of these sons are regarded as true 
Brahuis. They include the Ahmadzais, the ruling family 
in Kalat, and their collaterals, the Iltazais, 
Sumalanis, Kalandranis, Gurgnaris, Kamabaranis,
M i i- w a r i s , a n d R o d e n i s . 3 A H u g h e s Eu_i 11 e r s u. g g e s t s this 
nucleus of p u r e ’ Brahuis was drawn into Baluchistan 
from the west,-3'7 and that its leaders were successful 
enough in local tribal struggles to establish permanent 
p o 1 i t i c a I d o m i n i o n i n t h e p r e c i n c t s o f K a 1 a t . B u t f o r 
the remaining tribes, the generic term Brahui subsumed a 
wide assortment of ethnic affiliations. In Quetta, the 
ma i n Br ahu i t r .i b e , t he Ra i s a n i s , der i ved from an
0 i” i g i n a 1 A f g h a n n u c I e u s I o c a ted i n t h e T h a 1 Chat i a 1 i 
area. They are credited to have helped the Brahuis to 
acquire Kalat, in the aftermath of which they donned the 
Br ahui t i 1 1e and acquired 1 an ds i n 0 uetta.30 T he
nuc 1 eus of anot her Brahu. i group i n Q u e 1 1 a , the 
S h a h w a n i. s , h a d a m i x e d B a 1 u c h •-■ A f g h a n p e d i g r e e . 3 ^
1 n t e r e s t i n g 1 y i n C h a g a i , the p r e d o m .i. n a n t Z a g a r M e n g a 1
t r i b e s m e n (B r a hi u i s ) b e 1 i e v e d t h e y c a m e f r o m a d i s t r i c: t 
c a 11 e d Z u g hi u 1, si t u a ted so m e w h e r e in S a m a r k a n d i n 
c e nt !'• a 1 As i a . * ° Anot her nume r ous Br ahu i t r i be i n
western Baluchistan , the Muhammad Hasnis, could have a 
c 0 n t r a 1 A s i a n a r i g i n , s i n c e the y a re a 1 s o f o u n d 
extensively in Seistan, Luristan,, and at long the Helmand 
valley. Thus the Brahuis were a heterogenous group, 
composed from different ethnic strands drawn from the 
far reaches of western and central Asia, Afghanistan, 
and even India, if the Dravidian strain in their language 
is interpreted as some form of past inter1 inkage - a
ki n d of 1 mute wit n e s s 1 as Huq hes Bulie r w r i tes, "to
ethnical movements occurring before the rises of 
a u t h e n t i c h i s t o r y " . 4 1
Existing on the fringes of tribal society were a 
few minority groups like the Dehwars, Jats, and Hindus.
T h e D e h w a r s a p e a s a n t. g r o u p , w i t h a p r o b a b 1 e
Ta j i k /Per s i an bac kq r o u n d 1 i ved ma i n 1 y i n dehs o r
c o 11 e c t. i o n s o f m u d h o u s e s i n t h e Quetta region.42 T h e 
J a t. s 1 o c a t. e d i n S i b i a n d N a s i r aba d w ere a 1 s o 
c u 11 i v a t o r s , a n d n u m b e r e d a m o n g t h e e a r 1 y i n h a b i t a n t s , 
w ho wer e p r o b a b 1y conve r te d t o Islam by the m i g r at i ng 
Mus 1 i m t r i besme n . ^ 3 T he H i n dus who 1 .i ve d
u n der t r i b a 1 p r o t e c t i o n , served as traders a n d were 
d isp e i-sed in sca11e red settlements around the c o u n t r y.
d i s t r i b u t i o n s , a n d
B a 1 u c h , B r a I "! u i , a n d
i::. c o 1 o q i c a 1 A d a p a t a t i o n
A {".I a p t a t i o n s , t e r r i t o r i a 1
movements effective among the
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P a t h a n , c a n f: c:s r m e d t o a s p e c i f i c p a 11 e r n , w h i c h s hi □ w e d 
t hi e P a t h a n s 1 i v i n g rn a :i. n I y a s a g r :i. c u. 11 u r i s t s in One 11 a - 
Pi shin., Sibi;, and Z h o b ; the Baluch as landowners and
c l.i 11 i vators i n t hie p lains of Nasirabad, Sibi and 
Nushki; while the Brahuis seemed to combine a small 
degree of agriculture in the Quetta region and Nushki,
with pastoral pursuits in Chagai.
As the principal eco-type of northeast 
Baluchistan, agriculture absorbed a majority of the 
Pathan and B a 1uch tribes-The Census of 1911 showed 43 
percent of the Pathans as settled, with another 33
percent as partially settled. 43 Among the Baluch., 
except for t hie Mar r is and Bugt is, the remai ni ng 
t r i besmen i n Si bi were 1 arge 1 y agr icla 11ur i sts.46 Thie? 
m a j o r B r a h u i s t a k e i n t h e a g r o - e c o n o m y o f n o r t h e a s t 
Ba 1 lachistan, was ca nf :i. ned to t he 1 andhio 1 di ngs of ths 
S hi a h w a n i s a n d R a .i s a n i s in Q u e 11 a . ^
Agricultural landuse in Baluchistan was severely
hampered by physical factors- In Q uetta Pishi n , the main
constraints on agr icla 11ure stemmed f rorn the presence of 
1 a r ge mo la nt a i n t r ac: t s whi i c h c ou 1 d neve r be b r oug hit into 
c u 11 i v a t i o n . In o t h e r a r e a s 1 i k e Sibi and Z ho h , I a r g e 
stretchies of a 1 1uvia 1 land lay uncu 11ivated du.e to lack
of water- It seemed as if nature had conspired to
create a wasteland. As Denys Bray noted! "... often
enough nature is so perverse that where there is land, 
there? is no water, and where there is water there is no 
land" - *63
In this hard environment, tribesmen practised 
three types of cultivation - khu s h k a b a , dependent on 
rain or snow; s a i l a b h a , subject to flood cultivation; 
a n d a b i , which relied on permanent irrigation
from karezes,4*€p springs and streams.30 Despite the 
severity of its mountainscape, Quetta with its higher
rainfall (ten inches) annually!, and efficient kares 
irrigation., was the most populous and productive of the 
Baluchistan districts, with an average density of 
t w e n t y f o u r  persons to the square mile."51 For abi 
c u 11 i vat i o n , t r i besme n r e 1i e d on artificial i r r i g at i a n 
from wells, springs and kare z e s . Additionally for dry 
crop cultivation, lands in the Quetta region were 
usually embanked, the cultivated plots being known as
b a n d s . These bands were f i 11 ed with rai n or f 1 ood
water in the summer or winter, after which they were
ploughed and the seed was sown,52 But in other areas 
1 i ke F i shi n , S'i bi , and Z h o b , dry crop cu 11 i vation 
depended p r e c a r i o u s 1y on summer rainfall, except for the 
Nasirabad p 1 ains which benefited from the periodical 
i n n u n d a t i o n s o f t h e I n d u s R i v e r w h i c h si- u p p 1 i e d t h e h i g h 
1 eve 1 cana 1 s f rom June to September , 533 Two pr i nc ipa 1 
har vest s ;i r ah i (sp ring), and k har i f < a u t u m n ) , mar ked
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t h 0 a g r :i. c: 1.111. u r a 1 c a .1 e n d a r 5 t h e  f o r m e r p r o d u c e d b a r 1 e y 
a n d  w h e a t ,  t h e  m a i n  s u b s i s t e n c e  c r o p  of- t h e  r e g i o n ,  a n d  
t h e  l a t t e r  m a i z e ,  j u a r i , a n d  rice. C u l t i v a t o r s  h o w e v e r ,  
t e n d e d  t o  r e l y  m o r e  o n  t h e  s p r i n g  c r op, w h i c h  w a s  
r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  q h a t t a  f a s a l  o r  m a j o r  harvest:. 
T r i b e s m e n  r e l y i n g  o n  a g r i c u l t u r e  a s  t h e i r  m a i n  s o u r c e  
of  l i v e l i h o o d ,  w e r e  o f t e n  e x p o s e d  t o  h a r d s h i p  f r o m  
f l u c t u a t i n g  c r o p  y i e l d s ,  d u e  to t h e  e r r a t i c  w a t e r - s u p p l y .  
T h i s  o f t e n  c a u s e d  p e r i o d s  o f  a c u t e  s c a r c i t y ,  l i k e  t h e  
s p e l l  b e t w e e n  1S30--1S40, a n d  a g a i n  beat w e e n  1897-- .1.902„
F o r  m a n y  t r i b e s m e n  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  a g r o -  
e c o n o m y  s p e l l e d  a b e l o w  s u b s i s t e n c e  l e v e l  e x i s t e n c e ,  in 
w h i c h  t h e  m a i n  o b j e c t i v e  w a s  not t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  a
s la r p 1 la s b u t s u r v i v a 1 i t s e 1 f .
T h e p a s t o r a 1 s e c t o r i n B a 1 u c h i s t a n e n c o m p a s s e d t h e 
K a k a r  K h o r a s a n  t r a c t  n o r t h  o f  t h e  Z h o b  v a l l e y ,  A c h a k z a i
T o b a  in C h a m a n ,  t h e  M a r r i - B u g t i  c o u n t r y  in t h e  S u l a i m a n
h i l l s ,  a n d  m o s t  o f  C h a g a i  a n d  W e s t e r n  S i n j e r a n i  country', 
w h e r  e g r a s s  c o v e r  e d  h i 11 s w e r  e o n  1 y s u  i t a b  1 e f or r e a r  .i. ng 
1 i v e s t o c: k . H e r d i n g  a c t i v i t i e s w e r e c o n t  r o l l e d  b y t h e  
s e a s  o n a 1 c y c 1 e a s w e l l  a s t h e a v a i 1 a I:) i J. i t y o f w a t e r  a n d 
p a s t u r e .  T h e  M a n d o  K h e l  K a k a r s  a n d  t h e  H a r a m z a i  S a n z a r
K h e l s  w e r e  u s u a l l y  a c t i v e  in K a k a r  K h o r a s a n .  T h e y
m i g r a t e d  t o  t hie lap p e r  h i l l s  i n M a y , a n d  r e t u r  n e d  t o  t he 
Q u e t t a - P i s h i n  v a l l e y  in A u g u s t  t o  f i n d  f r e s h  p a s t u r e s  
a n d  w a t e r  h o l e s  w h i c h  t e n d e d  t o  be s c a r c e  in t h e
grasslands of Zhob.®* In the Toba plateau, the Achakzai 
n o m a d s s p e n t s e v e r a .1 mo n t h s (A p r i 1-October) t e n d i n g 
livestock, and engag i ny in a measure of k bushkaba 
cultivation during years of good snow and rainfall.®* 
Northeast of Sibi in the valleys of the Sulaiman
M o u n t a i n s , t h e M a r r i B a 1 u c h s c r a t c h e d a 1 i v i n g f r a m a
barren land, where only three percent of the surface was 
culturable due to lack of waiter. The? Mar r is lived in 
sma 11 nomad camp communi t ies, c i rc 1 i ng around t he?i r 
tribal area in relation to the availability of pasture 
and water. Even in good years the country offered no 
more than scattered pasture grounds®7 , and in years of 
drought when local resources contracted, they usually 
e n c r o a c h e d o n t hi e r e s o u r c e s o f n e i g h b o u ring t r i b a I 1 and s 
to survive.
In t h e we s t , de se rt t r ac ts a 1o ng C hagai
c o n s t i t u t e d t h e h u b o f p a s t o r a 1 act i v i t y H e r e
sandhills thickly sprinkled with bushes and vegetation 
formed a 1i f e 1i ne for t he fam i1ies and f 1oc ks of nomadic 
t i ' ibesmen „ "3a T he Zagar M e nga 1 Br ah la i s w ho o w ne d l a n d  
i n N la s h k i, t h e m o r e f e r t i 1 e c o r n e r o f t hi e D .i s t r i c t , 1 i v e d
b y b a r t e r i n g s u r p 1 la. s  1 i v e s t o c k f o r grain f r o m the 1 o c a 1
Eakhshani Baluch tribesmen, who were primarily 
c u 11 i v a t o r s » T h e M e n g a 1 s a 1 s o s p e n t t hi e m a j o r
p o r t i o n o f a y e a r , a n d i n t i m e s o f d r o u g hi t t h e e n tire
vear pasturing their flock's in Afghan Eeq i stan „ ^ i .. -
The pastoral nomadism of the Mengals was therefore a 
usefuI safety va 1 ve against the uncertain rai nfa 11 in 
western Baluchistan; it also allowed for co-operation
with the agricultural Rakhshani tribesmen;, minimising the 
dangers of niche competition and over exploitation of
local re sour ce s .
In the more? arid lands of Chagai and Western
Si njerani c o u n t r y , t he tr i bes subsisted almost enti r e 1y 
on pastoral ism,. As one nineteenth century account of 
the area described: "Camels,, donkeys, sheep., and goats,
thrive on its thorny bushes, grasses, and shrubs. Its
climate, its sticks, its sand and stones seem to suit
them and the inhabitants who are quite contented with 
their lot" ■<s,° The Baluch and Brahui nomads who 
inhabited this region usually herded their flocks in the 
hills to the northwests and they supplemented their 
pastoral incomes by cultivating a few acres near Chagai 
F o r t a f t e r t h e r a i n s A 1 T h e r e w a s n o m o n e y i n 
cir c u 1 at i o n amo ng t h e s e n oma d s , a nd all b us i ness 
t r ansac t. i ons wer e c on duc t e d by ba r t e r **52 The f e r t i 1 e 
w h e a t g r o w i n g d i s t r i c t o f G a r a m s e 1 :i. n A f g h a n i s t a n
offered a close and cheap market to the nomads for 
purchasing goods they requi r e d .A3 This easy access to 
grain across the border, also helped to perpetuate the 
nomad i c sc: heme of t r i ba 1 e y, i st ence i n west er n
B a 1 u c h i s t a n . M o r e o v e r t h e s i m p lie i t y o f n o rn a d i c 1 i f e
p a r 0 d m a t e r :i. a I d e m a n cJ d o w n t o t he mini mu rn . A s o n e 
report on the nomads of Chagai described: "Spring
brought with it immense swarms of locusts. The nomads 
found in these pests sufficient food to supply their 
wants.
The flock-owning industry turned primarily on the 
rearing of camels, horses, sheep and goats. Sheep were 
more valued than goats in the pastoral economy, as their 
wool fetched a higher price, usually between Rs. 3.3 
to Rs.22 per maund, as compared with g o a t s -" hair which 
retailed between Rs. 10 and Rs«8 per inaund.As G o a t s -" 
hair was used for making ropes, sacks, and tent flaps, 
while sheeps'' wool was used for making felts, cloaks and 
r u g s .
L i v e s t o c: k w a s f r e q u e n t .1. y o w n e d ta y o n e m a n o r a 
g r o u p o f m a 1 e s r e 1 a t e d a s b r o t h e r s s h a r i n g a n u n d i v i d e d 
patrimony. Work roles were determined by s e x and 
gener at i o n . A man wou 3. d see ta t he breed i ng and 
shea r i ng of f 1o c k s , w h i 1e a wornan w o u 1d pitc h t he t e n t , 
churn milk, and take the flocks out to graze,67 
01 d pi e o p 1 e a n d c h i 1 d r e n a s s i s t e d i n t h e 1 a 11 e r
activity. Only large herdowners could afford to 
hire shepherds whose wages were paid in kind, in the 
f o r m o f f o o d , c 1 o t hi e s , a n d a f e w 1 i v e s t o c k . 13
The su.bs :i.st.ence Ieve 1 t r i ba 1 economy c:ou 1 cl on 1 y 
support a low standard of material existence. The
infertility of the land was matched by a low density
of population. Quetta-Pishin had the highest density 
with twenty-two persons to a square mile, and Chagai 
the lowest with only one person per square m i I e . 
The majority lived in rural areas where they congregated 
in small villages of less than five hundred inhabitants. 
These villages were merely collections of mud huts,
which were evacuated in the summer when cultivators
encamped near their fields in blanket tents.-70 
G.N.Curson, later Viceroy of India, noted in his travels 
across eastern Persia in the late nineteenth century,
t h a t t h e B a 1 u c h v i 11 a g e w a s a " c 1 u s t e r o f s q u a 1 i cl h u t s
round a central keep or fort where the Khan Ctribal
chief 1 resides".-7* These huts were made from matted 
palm leaves in south and western Baluchistan; and in the 
colder northeast they were constructed with mud and sun 
dried bricks. Huts were shared with the
1 :i. v e s t. o c k b e I o n g i n g t o t. hi e families, an cl d o rn e s t i c
possessions were usually limited to a few felts for
bedding, skins for holding grain and water, and some 
w o o d e n b o w 1 s .-7 25 P u r e 1 y n o m a d i c tribes 1 i v e c J .i n m a t
tents made f rom g o a t s ? hai r which cou 1 d be? eas:i. 1 y
dismantled and carried as required.-73
The? underdevelopment of the? region was also
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marked by the scarcity of urban centres. In pre-British 
B a 1 u. e h i s t a rs, t h e t y p .i c: a .1 t a w n w a s o n 1 y t h e f o r t i f i e d 
stronghold of a tribal chief or community;, which served 
as a symbol of political dominance in the locality. 
Historically, the towns of Kalat., Quetta, Pishin and 
Sibi, developed as fortified military centres in a 
warring marchi and, scarred by the struggles for survival 
and power among rival tribal groups, and the violence of 
foreign imperial armies forcing a passage to India. 
Kalat, the centre of Brahui power in Baluchistan, was a 
typical fortified town, with mud walls, bastions, and 
mounted g u n s / 74 Between the fourteenth and eighteenth 
centuries Quetta and Pishin served as garrison towns -for 
the Afghans, Mughals, and Persians, as each group sought 
to control the frontier. */B In 1614, two English 
travellers visited Pishin; they called it Pesinga and
not e d t hat i t ont a i ne d a sma II far t and a " store 
o f s o 1 d i e r s f o r s e c u r i n g t h e w ay". B y t he mi d -•
eighteenth century Quetta passed under Brahui control, 
w h i 1 e F' i s h i n r e v e r t e d t a t h e s t a t u s o f a n A f g hi a n
depiendency» 7^ Li ke the ot her Ba 1 uchistan t o w n s , ear 1 y
references to Si bi descr i be i t as the fortif ied cap i t a 1 
o f S e w i s t a n < p r o b a b I y a H i n d u k i n g d o m w h .i c h p r e d a t e d 
t h e t r i b a 1 m i g r a t .i o n s ) , w h .i. c h u 11 i m a t e 1 y c o n v e r t e d i n t o 
t he s t r o ng ho I d o f I oc a 1 Pat ha n t r :i. bes . ^ Q Cent r a I t o 
these militarised centres was the c h i e ftain’s fort, 
about which Cur z on wrote:: "In Persia, a fort is
-wJ
s e I cl a rn m a r e t h a n a r e c: t a n g u 1 a r walled ericlo s u r e with 
f 1 anI-: i ng t o w e r s . In E*a 1 uchistan it has more t he 
appsarance, except for its material, of a medieval 
Eu. rop ean k eep, hav i ng 1 ower wa 11 e d c o lirts and a 1 ofty 
central tower with a watch turret above a ll".79 
T he j u x t a p osi t i□ n o f fort and village was the 
t r i b e s m a n ’s architectural imprint on a desert and 
mountain environment.
T r i ba 1 St r uc t. ur~ e ••■ Ch i ef dom and Co n f ede r axc v ,
P i vo t a 1 t o t he soc i a 1 des i g n in E«a 1 uc h .i st a n was 
the tribal structure;, which evolved along different 
lines among the Baluch and Brahui on the one hand., and 
t h e P a t hi a n s o n t hi e o t h e r » T h e B a 1 u c h a n d B r a h u i 
o r g a n i s e d i n t o c e n t r a 1 i s e d c h i e f do m s , which 1 a t sr 1 i n k e d 
toget hier t o f or m a c:on feder ate st. ri.icture, app rox i mat i ng 
a rudimentary regional polity.. The Pat ha n tribal 
scheme was acephalous in concept, and
internally segmented on the basis of lineage. Moreover 
among Pathans there were no trends to evolve a pan-- 
t r i b a 1 union 1 i k e t hi e c o n f e d e r a t e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i r 
Baluch and Efrahui counterparts.
The tribal chiefdam was probably conceived in 
v i o 1 e n c e , A m o n g t h e B a 1 u c h , a s s o c i a t. i o n s :i. n c 1 a n 
organisations or bo 1 a k s , based on familial ties, 
represented the earliest recorded form of social
gro upings.6S° Bu.t the pressur0s of migration, and
thie searc ity □ f mater ia3. resaurc0 s in Baluchistan forced 
Baluch, Brahui and P a than groups into conflict relations 
•for territory and survival. This warring environment 
created the need for strong leadership, based not only 
on age and clan relations, but on competence and the 
need for conti n u i t y . C o n s e q u e n 1 1 y c Ians r e g r o u p e d 
around leaders who were successful in the course of 
conflict and the acquisition of territory. During this 
transitional phase old clan names were submerged; the 
term bo 1 ak bec:ame obsolete by the close of the 
eighteenth century, and in its place emerged the turnan 
representing the new composite Baluch tribe drawn from 
the amalgamation of clans and leaders.81
As t h0 t r i ba 1 s 1 1-ucture crysta 11 i zed under
external pressure, among the Baluch and Brahui, it
assumed the form of a military style command unit, based 
on a hierarchy of sections and leaders, geared to
m o b i 1 i s e i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n , T h e s e c: t o r a 1 p 1 a n o f
the tribe rested on a hierarchical arrangement of
sect i o ns wh i c h were not f unct i ona .13. y equ i v a l e n t . At t he
highest level of segmentation., the section was termed as 
t a kka r in Baluch and Brahui; below this level, 
ca m 0 t he subs0 ct i o n , k riown as sha 1 war i n Br ahu i and 
12.bsl.li * n B a u f~ h 5 a n d t h e m i n i m a 1 1 i n e a g e g r o u p a t
the lowest end of the tribal scale was called oira
i n Brahui and p aro i n Ba 1 u ch
T h e p i r a o r p a r o , r e p r e s e n t e d t h e e ;•=: tended f a m i 1 y 
g r o li p ;1 c o n s i s ting o f t h e e ,'l. d e s t living m a 1 e and a 11 h i s 
descendants; family members were responsible for the day 
to day production of subsistence goods. Above this 
level, the s h a 1war was composed of a number of kindred 
groups of agnates, occupying a common area, based on 
patri liny and pat r i - local i t y .633 Here group cohesion 
invoked the brother— brother bond as well as lineal 
f a t h e r -- s o n s olid a r i t y . hi e rn b e r s of the gro u p w ere 
required to be close collaborators in subsistence 
activities. The extended family and agnatic kin group 
tended to regulate access to the material resources of 
t hi e h o u s e h o 1 d e c o n o m y 1 i k e c u 11 i v able 1 a n d and d o m e s t i c 
herds.
A t t h e 1 e v e 1 o f t h e t r i b a ]. s e c t i o n itself, 
membership was ascribed by a share in the section's 
landed estate. Such shares were granted to male 
m e m h e r s o n 1 y , o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r a g n a t i c s t a t u s a s 
p a t r i 1 i n e a 1 cl e s c e n d a n t s . B u t a t t h i s s u p e r s t. r u c t u r a 1 
1 eve 1., whier e st r ateg ic dec i s i ons were t a k e n , b a 1 1 1 es 
fought , a 11 iances p 1 edgecl and c o -operation effec:ted to 
e n s u r e t h e f u t u r e o f t h e t r i b e , c o h e s i o n b a s e d o n 
p a t r i 1 i n e a 1 d e s c e n t w a s f o r c e d t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e 
principle of political union based on contract, and
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i d e o 1 og i c: a I c □ m m i t m e n t t o t h e g o o d a n d ill o f t. h e tribe. 
This wa.s mi r rored i n t he coneess i on of t riba 1 membership 
to alien groups without agnatic status, on the basis of 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 c o n t r a c t bet wee n 1 e a de r a n d -f o 11 o wer. 
Joining a section in war for a share of the booty, or 
s i m p 1 y m o v i n g o n t o folia w a m o r e s u cc.es s f u 1 1 e a d e r , 
were standard ways for aliens to become incorporated in 
a different tribe. The newcomers were called hamsayas 
(sharers o f t hie s h a d e ) and requ i red to i dent i f y w i t h t he 
common political interests of the tribe, namely the 
corporate b 1 ood feud 1 iabi 1 ity. But aff i 1 i at ion
involved subordination to the group leader; the term 
hamsaw a implied an alien would receive protection, but 
he would have to place his services at the disposal of 
hi s protec t o r „ In this manner t he crucial st r u c t u r a 1 
p r i nc:: i p 1 e of t hie Ba 1 uc ii/Br a hli i t r ibe came t o be 
e s t a b 1 i s h e d , n a m e 1 y t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e s e c t i o n 
members to the leadership?- After a trial period, the 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 adm i ss i on of t hie a 1 i e n was sea 1 e d by g i v i ng 
him a share in the tribe's landed estate and a woman in 
marriage,0® This gave the new member a vested interest 
i n s u. s t a i n i n g t h e m a t e r .i. a 1 r e s o u r c e s o f t. h e tribe.
A complement of political offices and leaders 
exercised control over the sections and subsections. In 
the scaled leadership scheme of the tribe, authority 
devolved from the sardar or chief at the head of the
whole tribe., through the section leader termed wader a
in Baluch, and mi r in Brahui, to the motbar or
headman o-f t he subsect i o n „ The of f :i. ces o f sardar as
w e 11 as t hat of w a d e r a /m AX. wer e heredi tary „3 &
Customarily the c h i e f ’s near relatives assisted in tribal
ma nageme n t , f or m i ng a r u 1 i ng c auc lis i n t he t r i b e .
C o n s e q u e n 1 1y the chief"s section or sardar — k h e l*
e v o 1 v e d i n t o a s m a 11 a r i s t o c r a c: y w i t h i n the tribe,
»
enjoying special status and privilege in the system.
The -figure of the tribal chief dominated the 
socialscape. His authority reached into most spheres of 
tribal life. To ordinary tribesmen the chief"s person 
'was specially sacrosanct;, invested with divinity, and an 
oath on his head or beard was the most binding of all 
o a t hi s t a k en in t h e t r i b e « 3 3 A r m e d w i t h s u p e r n a t li r a I 
a1.11- i b u tes, t he t r i ba 1 chi ef f unctioned as t h& u 11 imate 
arbiter in society, settling disputes, imposing life 
sentences, and fines, from which there was no 
a p p e a 1.3 ** T h e c o r p u s o f c: u s t o m a r y 1 a w 
provided him with guidelines, and section leaders could 
give him advice, but the verdict was his decision., and 
n o a p p e a 1 s w e r e a 11 o w e d a g a i n s t i t . The c h i e f s  
privileged s tat las was underwritten by an economic order, 
which a 11 owec:! him to hoId in addition to his □ rdinary 
share in the tribal land, a special share in the centre 
of the tribal area known as sardari baksh. Moreover on
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the accession of a new chief he was allowed to inherit 
a n e x t r a s h a r e o f t h e p a t r i m o n y . A p a r t f r o m 1 a n d e d
wea 11 h t he c h i ef was e nt i 1 1 ed t a c ha r a. k or o n e --f ou r t h
of the value of the thing in dispute,, for all cases 
w h i c h c a m e b e f a r e h i m f o r s e 1 1 1 e m e n t . Traditionally h e
received one sheep or goat from every separate flock of
•f or t y as dan or of f er i n g . He a 1 so r ece i ved a
contribution in cash or kind on ceremonial occasions of 
births and marriages of ordinary tribesmen „ *s>°
B y i t s prer o g a t i v e s , 1h e c h .i eft a i n c y n o t only
distanced itself from the bulk of common tribesmen, it
also grew sufficiently in stature to exercise effective 
c o n t. r o 1 o v e r t. h e c hi a i n o f s e c o n d a r y .leaders in t h e
tribal system. Although section leaders part i c .i pat. ed
in corporate decision making with the chief, through 
I- e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n t r i b a 1 c: a u n c :i. 1 s ^ :l-, t h e i r m a i n 
f u n c t .i o n w a s to i n t e r p a s e a c h a in of o f f i c i a 1 s be 1: w e e n 
the chief at the head of the tribe and the lower sections, 
ready to car-ry out his .i nstruct. ion s „ For the chief „ t.hey 
w e r e u s e f u 1 t o o 1 s f o r c .1 a m pin g c o n t r o 1 s o n t h e t r ibe.
T h e m i r o r w ader a c o n t r o 11 e d a n e n t .i r e s e c t i o n 
in the same way as a chief presided over a tribe. He 
participated in strategy making and settled disputes, 
for a propartionate fee, at the sectional level. He was 
assisted by another official figure the mukaddam
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who was responsible for collecting the -fighting men of a 
s e c t i o n p r i o r t o a p r eclat o r y e x p e d i t i o n, in re t u r n for 
which he was allotted a special share of the plunder 
k now n as qu 1 . 3 Among t. he Ba 1 lic h t he r e was a not her 
official - the r a h z a n i he held a hereditary office., 
accompanied all military expeditions and functioned as 
an e e c u t i o n e r  whose pr i mary duty was to puni sh any 
deserter f rom t he bat1 1ef i e 1d -<r''3
The wadera and mukaddam communicated with
tribesmen through the headmen or m o t b a r s , who controlled 
the various subsections. Denys Bray observed that the 
m o t b a r , "...is the mouthpiece of the mukaddam and
w a dera among the tribesmen under him and is responsible 
f oi- t he e Kec ut i a n of t he i r i nst r uc t i ons, 1194 TInus i f a 
f i ne was imposed on t he t r i b e , the motbar w o u 1d be 
r e s p o n s i b 1 e f o r c o 11 e c t i n g t h e a m o u n t owed b y his g r o u p 
a n d d e 1 .i v e r i n g t h e s u m t o t h e wad e r a . ^  T h e p o s i t i o n 
° mot bar t ended to be h e r edit a r y, but an i n c o m p e t e n t 
headman cou 1 d be di smi ssed by common consent „ hie was 
responsible for the behaviour of his pha 11 i or pa.ro, 
settled local disputes., and referred unresolved cases to 
t li e w ader a for dec i si ons „ ^ **
A rn o n g t h e B a 1 u c hi a n d B r a h u i t  h e r e f o r e , t h e t r i b a 1 
scheme of merging sections with ranked offices inserted 
a c h a i n o f c o m m a n d t h r o u g hi t h e p o 1 i t i c a 1 s p i n e o f the
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1 1" ibe. The t r i ba 1 str uc t li r e eff ec ted w hat M . Sa h 1 i ns has 
described as a 1 a system of chieftai n s h i p , a hierarchy
0 f Hi a j o r a n d m i n o r a li t h o r i. t i e s h o I d i n g f a r t h c 3 ver m a j a r 
a n d m i n o r rs la b d i v i s i o n s o f t h e t r i b e s a chain a F 
command linking paramount to middle-range and local-level
1 ea de r s , a n d b :i n d i ng t he h i nte r land ham let to the
st r at eg i c he .i g ht s „ "
A m o n g t h e B r a h u i s politica 1 organisa t i o n a s s li m e d a 
p a n -1 r i. b a 1 d i m e n s ion, wit hi t hi e e v o 1 u t i o n o f a 
confederacy or an alliance of tribes in the seventeenth 
century. This superstructural development probably owed 
its inception to the early inter-tribal wars for 
su rviva 1, and the need for c:oh e re nt se 1 f- definition a nd 
c o -or di nat i on to ensure t he f:liture of the t r i bes 
a g a i n s t t h e t hi r e a t o f i n t r u. s i v e i m p e r i a 1 p o w e r s, 1 i k e 
the Mughals, the Persians, and the Afghans who sought to 
w e 1 d t h e f r o n t i e r t C3 t hi e i r e m p i r e s » T h e t e r r i t o r i a 1 n u c 1 e u 
o f t he confederacy was laid by early chi eft ai ns 1i ke Mi r 
Ahmad I (1666-1695) and Mir Abdullah (1715-1730)., who 
consolidated their hold on Kalat and expanded into Kach 
G a n d a v a , whieh was acqui red in b a 1 1 1e f rom the K a 1horas
o f 8 i n d 63 „ s u. b s e q u e n 1 1 y N a s i r l< h a n I (1750-1793)
a c q li i r e d 0 u e 11 a ;1 a n d t h r e w t h e c o n f e d e r a c y o p e n f o r 
m e ffi b e r s h :i. p t o B a 1 la c h t r ibe s 1 i k e t h e M a g a s s i s a n d 
J a m a 1 i s . ^  ^  S t r a i n i n g u n d e r t h e p r e s s la r e s o f m i g r a t i o n 
a n d n i c h e c o m p e t .i t i o n , B a 1 u. c h g r o u p s . j o i n e d t h e
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c a n f e d e r a c y , h a p :i. n g t a s h a r e i n i '[.'5 growing r e s □ u. r c e s .
Moulded in a warring environment, membership in 
t h e c o n f e d e r a c v t li r n e d o n a s y s t e m o f m i 1 .i t a r y
combi nat i□ n s known as EalJLav shar i k . Member t r i bes
were grou.ped i nto two dastas or d i v is ions. Each t r i be 
within the division was required to furnish specific: 
quotas of armed men to the confederacy, proportionate to 
their numerical strength. In return for the supply of 
armed men, each tribe received a share of the 
t.he confederacy .1 ands» 1 °°
The focus of inter-tribal loyalty and leadership 
was t he Kha n a f: K a 1 a t , t he r u 1ing title a ssume d by t he 
e a r 1 y f o u n id e r o f t h e c o n f e d e r a c y M i r A h m a d a n d h i s 
successors, who belonged to the Ahmadzai sub sec: t i. on a F 
t h e M i r w a r i (B r a h u i ) t r i b e . 1 <:> 1 T h e K h a n o f K a 1 a t 
exerc ised domi nance i n t Ine s y s t e m , by his presi dentsh:i.p 
of the royal durba r , which served as a high court of 
j u s t i c e f o r s e 1 1 .1 i n g i n t e r - 1 r i b a 1 d i s p u t e s , a n d h :i. s 
formal right to confirm each new succession to the 
c h i e f s h 1 p . 1 ° H  o w e v e r , d e s p i t e t h e s e p r e r o g a t i v e s t h e 
Khanship typified an arrested form of central authority. 
Significantly., the internal government of a tribe 
remained the exclusive political preserve of the chief, 
in which the Khan of Kalat exercised no control. 
Essentially, the confederacy served as a communal
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platform for regulating the external affairs of the 
t !•- i b a 1 f r a t e r n i t y . E v e n a t t h i s 1 e v e 1,, i n t h e c o u n c i 1 s 
of the confederacy, the Khan was required to act in 
c o n c e r t w i t h t hi e t r i b a 1 c h i e f s to determin e s t r a t. e g i e s 
relating to war,, alliance and the distribution of 
r esou r ces - As C . H . M a s s o n , a n i net eent hi cent ur y 
traveller in Baluchistan^ noteds"Nothing of importance 
was to be undertaken without the concurrence of these 
S ar da rs, w h o p osse ss i ng an i n f 1ue nc e amo ng t h e tr i bes 
independent of the Khan could at pleasure withhold their 
s u p port " « 1 ° 3 T h e c o n f e d e r a c: y s t r u c t u r e w a s t h e r e f o r e 
dominated by sovereign tribal groups, standing equally 
and severally under the formal paramauntcy of the Khan 
of Kalat, The inability of the tribes in the 
c o n f e d e r a c y t o s u p e r s e d e 1 o c a 1 c 1 e a v a g e s , e x c e p t f o r 
military purposes, underscored the strength of 
segmentary d i v is i ons af t he i n f rast ructlir e , composed of 
self-centred local groups, which strained against higher 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 u n i o n , a n d e f f ec: t i ve 1 y i n h i b i t e d t hie 
d e v e 1op men t a f a fu 11 fledge d r egional p o 1i t y ,
T hi e w o r 1 d o f t h e c o n f e d e r a c y a n d c h i e f d o m ,
0 r g a n s i s e d u n d e r p o w e r f u 1 c h i e f s a n d p r i m i t i v e 
nobilities, was underpinned by rank and privilege, Eu.it
1 n retur n f or r a n k , titles and p o 1i t ica1 submission of 
section members, the leadership echelon in the tribal 
s t r u c t l i  r e h a d t o  r e c i p r o c a t e b y e n s u  r i n g the s t. a b i 1 i t y
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of the group, as well as adhering to a chart of 
mandatory expenses. Stability implied a consensual 
style management of disputes by the section leader, as 
well as protection of the material interests of his 
g r cd u jo in the w i d e r t r i b a 1 c o n t: e x t - I n a bill t y t o a c h i e v e 
11 "i e s e s t a n d a r d s . w o u 1 d d e v a 1 u e t.h e s e c t i o n lead e r i n t h e 
opinion of the tribal chief. Similarly a chief without 
ab i 1 i ty to car ry t he t r i be wou. 1 d have little i nf 1 uenee 
in the confederacy. The other area of obligations 
turned on expenses related to adjudication duties,. The 
chief*, in particular, was required to extend hospitality 
to all who came on business, and the claims on his purse 
were often so pressing that he had to pawn his wife's 
jewe 1 1 ery to rneet t h e m . 1 °* Simi 1 ar 1 y the Khan a f Ka 1 at 
had to bear the full financial cost of litigants, while 
d i sp e ns i ng j ust ice i n t he r oya 1 dur bar . 1 c>53 But su.c h 
expenses were also strategically motivated to strengthen 
t h e lea d e r s h i p •" s i n f 1 u e n c e o v e i- c o m sn o n t r i t:< e s m e n „ 
A c c o r d i n g t a D e n y s E’ r a y , h o s p i t a 1 i t y w a s t h e k e y t o t h e 
c h i ef s •" . ext r aor d i nar y hold on t he t r i besmen. " Hold out 
a joint"., Nasir Khan of Kalat. would say, "and the 
B r a h u i s w .i 11 f 1 o c k t o y o u f r o m a 11 s i d e s '1 * ° A
I n c o n t. r a s t t o B a 1 u c h a n d B r a h u i c h i e f d o m s , t: h e 
Pat han tribal scheme envisaged a decentralised 
s t r u. c t u. r e , i n w h i c h s m all 1 o c a 1 ? a u tonomo u s g r o u p> s 
claimed primacy at the expense of weak higher level
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organisations- The Pat han tribe represented a 
constellation of communities composed of several 
i n t e r na 1 1 y seqme nt e d p at r i 1 i nea 1 descent. g r oup s or k he 1 s 
Theoretically defined a khel consisted of all the local 
descendants of a named a n c e s t o r , from which the group 
received its name- In practice however, the term had a 
wide application, being used to denote groups at all
1e v e 1s of s eg me nt a t i□ n „ G roup s and su b d i vi s i ons we re 
defined by three main criteria: descent, a working
alliance, common ownership of territory and co-
r e s i d e n c e » A t t h e 1 o w e r 1 e v els o f s e g m e n t a t i o n ,
membership to groups was determined by patrilineal 
descent and agnatic kinship. A typical group at this
level of segmentation (termed k h e 1/zai in The
B a l uchistan Census Report, 19 0 1>, comp r i sed members
1 .i v i n g i n c 1 o s e p r o x i. m :L t y t o e a c h o t h e r and s ih a r .i n g 
common rights to water and pasture lands based on ties 
of ag nat i c 1 i neage,. Be 1 ow t his 1 evel was t he kahol or 
e x t e n ded f am i 1 y g r oup c o ns i s t i ng o f r e 1 at. e d ma I es and 
t h e i i- f a m i 1 i e s ? i n h e r i t a n c e o f p r o e r t y t h r o u g h the 
ag nat. i c 1 i neage was app 1 i c able at this 1 eve 1 of 
s e g rn e n t a t i o n 1 ° T h e s e p r 1 m a r y s e g m e n t s w e r & 
s 1 1- u c t u r a 11 y a n d f u n c t i o n a 11 y e q u i v a 1 e n t . T h e r e was n o 
hierarchical status differentiation between these 
commun i t i e s , wh I ch t ended t o f unc t i on as econo m i c::ally
self sufficient groups, thereby minimising the need for
collective exchange. The atomistic social scheme
promoted a sectarian attitude in political behaviour. 
The main focus of political loyalty was the groups
co 11 ect i ve comb i nat i oris of g raujos far the purposes of 
offence or defence were episodic, as the membership 
dispersed once the objective was secured.
On the level of major segments and apical 
ancestors of maximal groups (also termed as k h e 1? , 
mem be rship wa s de t e r m i ne d h y re sidence i n a c ommo n 
I oc: a 1 i t y and 1 i a b i 1 i t y f o r blood f eud, de s p i t e t r i b a 1 
assertions of union through agnatic kinship. In the 
unsettled environment of Baluchistan, the need to 
maintain numerical levels in a tribal section, would 
have forced new admissions to the tribe based on 
political contract.. Thus a Pathan section often 
a bso r be d a liens w ho we r e k now n as m i n d u n s , 1 °f:3 a n the 
b a s i s o f t h e i r pa r t i c i pa ting i n t he goo d and ill o f t he 
tribe. Ev i dence of such assimilation may be observed in 
the accretion of the Dumar group to the Kakar Pathan 
complex, despite their original B a 1uch identity-10^
In time the political admission would acquire a 
genealogical graft and contribute to the fiction of 
common descent. In effect the kh e I was more like a 
political party rather than a superstructure of lineage 
relations based on common descent.
H .1. I I the political scheme generally, leadership
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in a Pathan tr ibe had to be asserted in the s y s t e m , not 
i n he I- i t e d as a b i r t h r i g h t . T he r e w ere no he r e d i t a r y 
leaders dominating the politicalscape. As The Census of 
1901 observed: "Among the A f g h a n s . .«though leading
m e n » „ „ ex .i s t i  t i s mor e di f f i cli .11 to fi nd t hern. There 
i s c o n t i n li a 1 c h o p p i n g and c h a n g i. n g , the w e a k g i v i n g w a y 
before the strong,, and the apt before the in e p t " 110 In 
this competitive arena two types of leadership
flourished - the mal i k and k h a n ,. A ma 1 i k was ustially
the off ic ia 1 headman of a community or 1 a c a 1 descent 
g r oup , Tr ad i t i ona 11 y he was:- t he mout hp i ece of sue h a 
group., and offered guidance in local a f f a i r s , 111 But he 
exercised no mandatory powers., and group compliance with 
h i s d i r ec t i ves was cJ i sc: r et i ona 1 ■ The position coul d 
pass by descent from father to son., or it could fall by 
t r i b a 1 cho i ce o n t he a b 1est member of the g r o u p .
Customar i 1 y mal i ks en joyed no spec ia 1 pr i v 4.1 e g e s , 0 n 1 y 
1 a t. e r. u n de i- B r i t i s hi r u 1 e , the p o s i t i o n bee a me 1 u crative 
o w i n g t o g o v e r n rn e n t a 11 o w a n c e s f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
assistance, 1 122
The office of khan operated at the level of major 
segments; there was no central, unifying leader for the 
e n t .i r e t r i b e , F o r i n s t a n c e t. hi e K a k a r t r i b e w a s d i v i d e d
into four major sections  Sancar Khels, Sanatias,
Targharas, and Sargharas - each of which functioned under 
a separate chief or k h a n Since? the khanship was not a
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hereditary privilege, every aspiring khan had to prove
h i s c o m p e t e n <:: e a s a 1 e a d e r b y m a !• i n g o t h e r s follow him; 
he i nduced comp 1 iance by e e r t  i ng his prowess as a 
warrior, spiritual leader;, or a bit of both. For a 
leader to capture the internal power structure through 
mi 1 itary success was particular 1 y re w a r d i n g , f:or as 
Sah 1 i ns desci- i bess "lv!i 1 i tar ism... gives scope to t he 
p e r so na 1 ac h i evement of p owe r H i-ewar d i ng wit h f oliower s 
t h o s e w h o c a n r e w a r d f olio w e r s " 113 F o r t h e s u c c e s s f u. 1 
contender, the status of khan unlocked the door to 
p r i vI 1e ge an d au t hor i t y in the system. It was c u st oma r y 
to set apart a portion of the triba 1 land for the kh a n s 
personal use; he was also entitled to a fifth of the 
plunder looted in conflict. and a special contribution 
in cash or kind during marriage ceremonies or the 
1 amb i ng s e a s o n . x 1 But t he k han had t.o manage hi s 
wealt h st rat egi c a 11y ; some of it was calc u 1at e d 1y
d i sbur sed in or der to put its recipient s under 
obligation to him., and thereby tighten his grip on the 
commun i t y . This was c r i t i ca 1 f or count er act. i ng t he 
u. n d e r 1 y i n g f 1 u .i. d :i. t y o f 1 e a d e r s h i p r o 1 e s i n t h e t r .i. b a 1 
st r uc t u r e „ 1-1 owever , dur i ng t he 1 i f et i me of a successf u 1
k h a n , his aut hor i ty was f i r m . As Denys B r a y , noted^ : 
the authority of a Pathan chief was "...paramount, to 
t h w a r t i t w a s t a i n c u r t h e c o r p o r a t e d i s p 1 e a s u r e o f 
the tribe. He decided questions of peace and war, and 
assumed the lead in the field".11*
51 at. us an d h i er ac hy amang Pathan t r i b e s was also 
h i st or i c all y i nduc: ed by cont ac t w i t h ne i g h bauri ng 
i m p e r i a 1 po w e r s 11 k e Persia a n d A f g h a n 1st a n , w h o c h o s e? t o 
cont ro 1 an outer de?pendency 1 i ke Ba 1 u c h i stan through 
c 1 i e n t t r i b a 1 lead e r s . A 11 u d i n g t a this p r o c e s s H Li g h e s 
Duller wrote:"From the sanads in posses sion of various 
persons in Zhcb and Thai Chotiali, it appears to have 
been customary in the times of the Emperor Nadir Shah 
and Ahmad Shah, for men of influence with their fellow 
tribesmen to be selected to conduct the affairs of
particular groups. Once selected their power was
u p h e 1 d and s t r e n g t h e ned b y t h e s u p p or t of r o y a 3.
autho r i t y . " 11* Thus the Jogezai chiefs of Zhob exerted 
control over the Sanzar Khel Kakars, partly on the
strength of the title 'Ruler of Z h o b 7 , granted to their
founder leader, named Bekar Nika, by the Afghan monarch
A h m a d S h a h D u r r a n i . 117r
The sectoral scheme of groups and leaders which 
d e f i n e d B a 1 u c h , B r a hi u i , a n d P a t han t r .i b a 1 s t r u c t u r e s , 
wa s a 1so hu11 res se d by c u st om a n d co nvention,
I n h e r i t a n c e r u. 1 e s a n d m a r r i a g e c o n t r a c t s w e r e
particularly critical in underwriting political status 
and landholding in the tribe. In the patriarchal design 
of tribal society, inheritance was strictly confined to 
male a g n a t e s . 113 Nomen were excluded from inheriting 
1 a n d t o e n s u r e t h e i r e c o n o m i c s u Li a r d i n a tion i n a m a 1 e
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dominated society;, and also to prevent land from passing 
out of the w o m a n p s natal group or tribe into the new one 
she entered on her marriage- The property of • a 
t ri besman w i t hout m a 1e he irs always passed to t he 
chief; female dependants were only entitled to 
maintenance from the property - 1<5> This helped to
•f u r t h e r c o n s o 3. i d a t e t h e c h i e f ’s p o s i t i o n a n d p o w e r i n
t h e t r i b a 1 s y s t e m .
Marriages were perceived as contracts, intended to 
reinforce internal political hierarchies, and also to
r e g u 1 a t e m a t. e r i a 1 r e s o u r c e s o f the group- B a 1 u c hi a n d 
Brahui tribes were typically endogamous; marriages with
agnatic: first cousins was the preferred norm- 130 Chiefs 
preferred to marry close relatives, because such an 
a r r a n g e m e n t s a t i s f i e d i d e a s o f t h e i r o w n n o b i 1 i t y a n cl 
ma i nta i ned t he st ructur e of e 1 i t. ism- Among Pat hans 
marriages were treated as commercial decisions, with a 
daughiter being so 1 d to tIne groom who offered the highest 
price. 121 For Pat han chiefs the question of status; also 
counted „ I n or der to ma i nta i n t heir soc i a 1 d i stance
from common tribesmen, chiefs would not give their
d a u g In t e r s i n m a r r i a g e t a o r d i n a r y t r i b e s m e n « 135 32
Thie i deo 1 og i ca 3. moori ngs of t r i ha 1 soc i ety r est ed 
in the political principle of good and ill’, on the? 
b a s i s o f w hi i c In t r i b a 1 p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n f r o n t e d e a c In o t h e r
not mere 1 y as dist i nct bu.t opposed interests, each body 
\ 1 o o k i n g t o m ax i m i s e i t s p o s i t i o n a t t h e o t h e r ’ s e x p e n s e -
F o i" c e w a s t h e t r a d i t i o n a 1 m e d i u m f o r c o n d u c t i n g 
compet i t i on and con f 1 i ct i n soc iety,, t hereby c r e a t i ng a 
f e r t i 1 e g r a u n d f o r long - standi n g host: i 1 i ties o r f e u d s t o 
t ake r o o t „ Vi o 1ent i nterac t i on a 1 so fed on t he concep t 
of izzat (male honour) and sharm (shame) which made it 
mandatory for a tribesman to take violent revenge in a 
s i t u. a t i o n w hi i c h t h r e a t e n e d t a t a r n i s h his h o n o u r , 1 i k e
the murder of a close kinsman or the shame of having an 
adulterous wife. In each case only the exaction of a 
counter-life would vindicate the v i c t i m ’s honour in 
society- The nature of such reprisals not only 
p e r p e t u a t e d r e p e t i t i v e v i o 1 e n c e i n s o c. i e t y , b u t i t a 1 s o 
i deal ised force as a medium for wi nni ng soc ia 1 statu.s 
a n d p u b I i c e s t e e m - T h is in t u r n g a v e t r i b a 1 s o c i e t y a 
culture code which endorsed physical prowess and the 
reprisal psychology of feuds and raids- As a nineteenth 
c e n t u r y B r i t .i. s h o b s e r v e r n o t e d a b o u t t r i b e s m e n s " „ » „
marauding expeditions have a great charm for them---In 
the case of adultery they are u n a p p e a s a b l e - - - Blood for 
b 1 o o d i s a m a 11 e r o f h o rn o u r - " 152 3
R e 1iQion and R i t ua 1
In the tribal mind Islamic faith co-existed with a 
spontaneous vein of magic and ritual practice designed 
to influence the course of people and events,through
i
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imagi nary communication wit h the s u p e r n a t u r a 1 - Islam 
probably touched the tribal world through migration and 
c o n q u e s t T h e  Ba 1 uch migrat i ng f rom t he Muslim Middle 
East and the borders of Persia must have served as an 
early conduit -for Islamic precepts, A parallel process- 
contributing to the Islamic genre in Baluchistan, was 
t hi e e x p a n s ion o f t h e M u slim e m p i r e -•• s t a t e s , M u g hi a 1, 
Persian and Afghan in turn towards the Indian s u b ­
continent. During the period of Mughal dominion in 
India, Si bi was a revenue pay i ng district of t he emp i r e , 
while the Baluchis and Brahuis were enrolled as tribal 
a u X ilia r i e s i n the I m p e r i a 1 a r m y . 132 * T h e i m pi e r i a 1 ~ 
t r i ba 1 ne^xus cou 1 d have spur red a f resh po 1 i t ical 
Impulse for the adoption of Islam by tribesmen, seeking 
a measure of accommodation with the empire; a shared 
religious identity could have been perceived as a bridge 
towards that end. Subsequently the century long 
connection with the Afghan Empire, starting from the 
t i me of A hmad Sha h Dur r a n i ( 1 7 5 7 1 790) , and t hie 
s u b s e c:j u e n t c o 1 o ri i s a t i o n o f n o r t h e a s t B a I u c h i s t a n b y 
P at hi an tribesmen-^ contributed still further to thie
Islamic direction of society. The period of Mughal and 
A f g hi a n i m p e r i a I :i. s m i n B a 1 u c hi i s t a n c o u 1 d ^ ^  ^
released sectarian impulses, encasing tribal Islam in 
Sunni wrappings. As a sequel to thie migrat ions and 
conquests whichi re-routed Islam from western and central 
As i a t o Ba 1 uc h i st a n , t hie emer gence of the Br ahu i
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confederacy in the seventeenth century, pro vided a state 
p 1 at Foi" m f or t he new religion- R » Sout hey, comp i 1 er o f 
The Baluchistan Gazetteer of 1891, noted that the 
t r a n s f e r o f p o w e r f r o m H i n d u r u 1 e under the? Sewahs in
!< a 3. a 1 , t o M u s 1 i m E! r a h u i t r i b e s , u. n 1 e a s h e d a p h a s e o f
f orc i h 1 e conver s i ons to Islam,, x ^ 55
But while the force of tribal and imperial 
politics planted Islam firmly on the tribal soil of 
Ba I uc ii i st.an, popu 1 ar adherence t:o the new re 1 .i g j. on was 
never more than skin deep- As Denys Bray observed:
"--.with the vulgar mass Islam is merely an external 
badge that goes (fctekwardly with the quaint bundle of 
s u p e r s t i t i o n s w h :i. c hi hi a v e t h e m i n t hr all"- 1 T h e t. r i b a 1 
perception of Is1 am was limited to the belief in a "God, 
a Prophet, and a Day of Judgement"- They knew there was 
a Q u r a n , b u t w e r e i g n o r a n t o f i t s c o n t e n t. s - T h e
p r a c t. i c e o f t h e F a i t h =, b a s e d o n p r a y e r , f a s t i n g ,
p i 1 g r i mage a nd a I ms g i v i ng ? was mut ed - 1257 
The responsibility for praying was often collectively 
transferred to the tribal chief- Commom tribesmen were? 
also inclined to share the religious beliefs of the 
chief- "Put me down the same religion as the chief", 
w a s a f r e q u e n t r e s p a n s e f r o m t h e m , d u r i n g t h e c e n s u s 
operations. 12!S
Veneration for the chief seemed to have devalued
•..J ...I
the role of mul 1 ahs and sayi d s the two categories of 
sp i r i tua 1 1 eadership i rs Is 1 amic soc iet ie s . Mul 1 ahs were 
r e q u. i r e d t o t e a c h t h e y o u n g , a n d p r e side o v e r d o m e s t i c 
ceremonies, for which they received payment in kind. 
But they were excluded from decision making in tribal 
councils. "The power of a mulla", as the Brahui put it 
1 s h o u. 1 d r e a c hi a s f a r a s t h e m o s q u e " a n d n o f u r t hi e r . 1 r,TJ v
Sayids were more? socially esteemed as descendants 
of t he Prophet., and mi racle wor kers. Accredited with 
super natura1 power s « say i ds and sometimes she ikhs, 
were requ.i red to term i nat.e droug hi t , and bring
down t he r a i n s ; cure m i1 d e w , dr i ve out 1o c u s t s , and
make trees yield fruits by magic spells and 
incantat ions» 13° In return for thei r mi raculous
se r v i c e s , say i ds we r e u.sua 11 y g i ven a share i n t hie
gr oup s 1 and and water r e s o u r c e s A  she? i k hi won 1 d 
receive a share of the agricultural/pastoral produce, 
f or hi is service. 131
A t t hi e hi e a r t o f t r :i. b a 1 r e 1 i g i o n , hi o w e v e r , w a s t h i e 
worship of p i r s (saints) and their z i arats (shrines).
S hi i- i n e s w o u 1 d b e c: 1 u 11 e r e d w i t h pieces o f w o o d , h a :i. r , 
clothes, and horns of wild animals, in order to interest 
the particular saint in a c h i l d ’s welfare, or bring good 
s p o r t f o r t h e h u. n t e r » 13 25 iv1 a n y (j f t hi e s hi r :l. n e s w e r e 
dedicated to saintly ancestors, like the ones
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consecrated to Sanzar Nika, pro-genitor of the Sanzar Khel 
Kakars, or Bhawalan, ancestor of the ruling family in 
t hie Marr i tr :i. !::<e , who were credited w i th d ivine 
p ow e r s . 133 T h e c u 11 o f t hi e s h r i n e w i t h i t s r i t u a 1 
prayers and offerings s y m b o 1 ised the triba 1 need to
c o n s t r u c t a n i m a g i n a r y w o r 1 d o f s a i n 1 1 y b e i n g s i  m b u e d 
with magical properties, capable of influencing the 
sequence of events in the real world.
In the tr i ba 1 mind t:herefore re 1 igion and r it:ua 1
were emblematic of magical communion with the unseen
world of natural forces, as insurance against the
uncertainties of earthly existence.
Tri ba 1 P o 1it i cs and Imper i a 1 L i nkaqes
C o m ill a n d i n g t h e so u t h w e s t a p p r o a c hi e?s to India, 
Baluchistan functioned as a marchiand in the imperial 
scheme of the Mug hi a 1 s , Persians, Afghans, and the 
B r i t i s h , I m p e r i a 1 a u t hi o r i t i e s t e n d e d t o v i e w t hi e I o c a 1 
tribes and chiefs as useful instruments for moulding
i n d i r e c t r u 1 e i n a p o o r , a n d f a r f 1 u n g , b u. t
strategically vital region of their domains. While such 
a strategy gave the tribes some access to imperial 
resources, it also €c.mre  ^ the dependence of the region 
on external imperial interests, enmeshing tribesmen in 
f o r e i g n war s a n d r i v a 1 r i e s , Inevitably t hi i s u n eve i"i 
exchange stirred the tribal brew of dissent, rebellion,
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and alliance as the tribes ajusted to imperial realities.
The early growth of the K'alat confederacy mirrored 
t he me r c urial r e 1 at i onship bet wee n i nt. r us i ve imper i a 1 
p a w e r s a n d t h e B a .1 u c h - B r a hi u i t r .i b e s m en, The e a r 1 y 
Khans of Ka 1 a t , between 1 6 6 6-1714, combi ned a po 1 icy of 
subservience to the Mughal Empire with an aggressive 
zeal for raiding Zhob, Bor i , and Thai Chotiali, in 
order to stamp their authority on the local s c e n e , 134 
The decline of Mughal power in the eighteenth century 
seemed to loosen the shackles of imperial control 
further. Mir Abdullah Khan (1714-1730), started the 
struggle for the acquisition of Kachhi from the Kalhoras 
o f S .i n d . H i s s u c cess o r M i r M u h a b b a t (:L 730- :l. 750) , 
however, had to contend with the forces of Nadir Shah, 
e n r o u t e to the .i n v a s i o n o f India in 1739. T h e K a I a t 
r u 1 e r s u b m i 11 e d t o N a d i r S h a h a n d t h u s e n s u r e d t h e s u r v .i v a 1 
of t he conf e d e r a c y . The next ru 1 er of !<a 1 a t , Mi r
Muhammad Nasir Khan I (1750 1793), continued the Persian
a 1 1 i a n c e w hi i 1 e i t w a s p r o f i t a b 1 e „ 1-1 e cemented t h e
alliance by contributing tribal forces to Nadir Shah's 
army., and received the title of Beqlar Beg i (Chief of 
Chiefs) from the Persian m o n a r c h . 13* But on Nadir 
Shah's death in 1747, Nasir Khan I transferred his 
a 1 1 eg i ance qu i ck 1 y to t he po 1 i t i ca 1 camp of Ahmad Shah 
Durrani who assumed power in Afghanistan in the same 
year, and proceeded to weld an Afghan Empire on
the ruins of the Persian one. For Kalat. the immediate 
•f rui t.s of the Af:ghan a .11 ianee, contracted i n i747/ 1748, 
was t he acquisi t ion o-f Quet1a f rom the local Pathan 
tribes. But in return the Khanate had to pay an annual 
t r i bute o f R s . 2000 to A f g hani s t a n ? and mai nta i n one 
thousand soldiers at the court of Oandhar. The price 
was too high for Nasir Khan, who revolted against the 
A f g h a n y o k e t e n y e a r s 1 a t e r i n :L 758.. I n t h e s a m e ye a r 
t h e r e w a s a n i nc o n c 1 u s i v e m H i t  a r y c o n f rontation b e t w e e n 
the two powers., which led to the formulation of a new 
T r e a t y . T h e t e r m s o f t hi i s T r e a t y f r e e d K a I a t -f r o m 
paying tribute to Afghanistan, and restricted the 
contribution of soldiers to select c a m p a i g n s .13A The 
new settlement still left Kalat within the political 
o r b i t o f A f g h i a n i s t. a n , b u t. t h e t i e s w e r e n o w m o r e t e n u o u s 
and fragile..
L i k e t hi e !< a 1 a t K h a n a t e , t h e P a t h a n t r .i b e s o f 
Ba 1 u.chistan were caught in the currents o-f imperia 1 
expansion which swept across the frontier. Historically 
Pat ha n p o I i t i c: s was sq uee z e cl bet ween t he demands of 
i ill p e r i a 1 p o w e r s , M u g hi a 1, F' e r s i a n , a n d A f g hi a n , in t u r n , 
w h o w i s hi e d t o u s e n o r t hi e a s t B a 1 u c: hi i s t a n a s a c o r r i d o r t o 
India, and the local tribal need to exist as independent 
units. These divergent interests were reconciled by the 
tribes entering into tributary relations with imperial 
p o w e i- s , i n r e t u r n f o r w h i c hi t hi e y w e r e g i v e n p o 1 i t i c a 1
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•freedom at the local level, The Mughal Emperor Akbar 
e si t r acted t r i but e -f:r om t he 1 oca 1 Pat han t r i bes of S i b i 
Pi shin, and Quetta., which usually took the form of grain 
contributions, as well as a quota of horses and fighting 
men for the imperial a r m y . 13'7 In the seventeenth 
century, these areas were caught up in the rivalry 
between the Mughals and the Safavids in Persia for the 
control of G a n d h a r . 13® Local governorships
in the region still remained under tribal control, 
subject to Mughal authority. But in the period after 
1712, a s M u g hi a I p o w e r d e c 1 i n e d , t h e r e we r e t r i b a 1 
revolts against imperial control. The chiefs of the 
P a n i t r i b e s .i n S i b i e m b a r k e d o n s u c h c o n f r o n t a t ion, 
which proved unsuccessful and only depleted tribal 
resources, so that Sibi fell victim to Nadir Shah's 
forces, and for a time became part of the Persian 
E rn p i r e . 13 ** B u t t h e c o n n e c t i o n w a s s h o r 1 1 i v e d , f o r s. o o n 
after Ahmad Shah Durrani's accession in 1747, Afghan 
supremacy became the new imperial script in Baluchistan.,
A hi m a d S h a h f o 11 o w e d a c a 1 c u 1 a t e d s t r a t e g y o f p 1 a n t i n g 
P a. t h a n t r i b a 1 c: h i e f s a s h e a d s o f 1 o c a 1 g o v e r n m e n t , o n t. h e 
b a s e is o f p o I i t i c: a 1 1 o y a 11 y , e t h n i c t i e s , and k .i. n s h i p
s o 1 i d a r i t y , 8 i b i w a s r e s t o r e d t o t h e g o v e r n o r s h i p o f
the Barozai subsection of the Pani tribe on condition 
of loyalty to Ahmad S h a h . 1*° Similarly the Batezai 
Pathans were installed as governors of P i s h i n . 1^ 1 In 
neighbourinq Zhob, the local Jogezai chief was given
60
t h e t i 1 10 R u 10 r o f Z h o b ‘ b y A 1“ mad S h a h , 1 * a
as a mark of imperial favour and patronage, calculated 
to bind the local leadership close to the Af g han 
political s y s t e m . The chiefly section of the Achakzai 
P a t h a n s , w h o w e r e s t r a t e g i c a 11 y s i t u a t e d i n the B a 1 u c h ••• 
A f g h a n b □ r d e r 1 a n d , w e r e ' A b dal s , a n d t h e r e f o r e 
collateral descendants of the ruling dynasty in 
Afg h a n i s t a n . 1*3 The structure of local government in 
northeast E*aluc hist an, therefore, mirrored the close 
1in k ages bet ween t he P a t ha n 1eadership a n d A fg han 
i m p e i“ i a 1 p o w e r .
On the eve of the nineteenth century therefore, 
the political scene in Baluchistan was marked by the 
d i v i d e h e t w e e n t h e con f e d e r a c y o f B a 1 u c h / B r a h u i t r i b e s ,
and the Pathan tribal complex of segmented nuclear
un i t s I m p e ]•■ i a 1 i nt r usi ons spar ked tens i a n , but on 
b a 1 anc e t he tribe s app ear to have opted f a r
c o 11a b o r a t i o n E  s s e n t i a 11 y t h e t r i b e s b a r t e r e d
sovereignty for local autonomy., the strength of which 
v a r i e d a c c o r ding t. o t h e p a w e r o f the i m p e r i a 1 c: e n t r e . 
This interflow of imperial and tribal politics traced 
its own distinctive pattern on the event horizon of the 
borderland; as Walter Fairservis described!
"Each petty chiefdom had its own border refuge 
area, a ’land of insolence', over which ... 
it extended control. The chiefdom in turn was 
tenuously connected to the empire. Weakness at
any political centre led to the repudiation of 
treaties a nd a clr i ve f or 1 oc:a 1 ant onomy " 1 **
Early in the nineteenth century, as the shadow o-f 
Afghan rule waned on the frontier, the new force of
B !- i t i s h i 1T1 p e r i a 1 i s m t o u. ch e d t h e tribal w o r 1 d » B y t h e
mid nineteenth century, the frontiers of British India
h a d a d v a n c e d t o t h e P u. n j a b and S i n d „ A s the e m p .i r e 
matured, the political emphasis shifted from acquiring 
power to preserving and defining it in an international 
c a n t e t . T h e h e a t e d s e a r c h f o r s t rat eg i c f r o n t i e r s a n d
political boundaries in the late nineteenth century
point to this turn in British policy making. One
immediate effect of this political turn was to suck the
marginal tribal belt on the? northwest frontier into the 
vortex of British imperial tensions and conflicts-
The seeds of tension had incubated for half a
centu.i'y i n t he t rou.h].ed po 1 i t ics of wester n Asia. I n 
particular, the? decay of Turkey and Persia gave Tsarist
E u s s i a t h e k e y s t o a n A s i a t i c e m p i r e . B y 18 2 EJ E u s s i a n
forces had detached Georgia from Persia, and threatened to 
over r un Const ant i nop 1 e , t he hear t of t he 011omatn 
E[ m p i r e - l m A s T u r k e y a n d P e r s i a w e r e pro g r e s s i v e 1 y 
dismantled., the Russians seemed set to cast their 
political net deeper into central and southern Asia. 
General Paskievitch, the architect of Russian successes 
against Turkey and Persia^encouraged the idea of conflict 
i. n A s i a ? a n d t a 1 k e d ope n 1 y o f t h e c o m i n g w a r w i t. h 
Bi- ita in.1** In Ang 1 o -• I ndia this raised t he spect re of
a Russian threat to imperial survival, which haunted 
t he o f f i c i a 1 m i n d f or most of t he c e nt la r y . A 1 a r m i st s 
viewed Persia and Afghanistan as possible venues for the 
s p r e a d o f R u s s i a ^ s i m p e r i a 1 d e s i g n t o t h e v e r y 
borders of India itself- Officials close to the Persian 
scene, like John Malcolm, who had served as British envoy 
i n T e h r a n i n 1800 a n d 1810, f e a r e d t h a t w i t h o u t B r i t i s h 
aid the Persian court would drift into dependence on 
Russia, impairing Britain's imperial standing from the 
11Ar ax es t o » » „ t he Ga nges " „ 0t her s .1 i k e A 1 e xander
B u r n e s , B r i t i s h e n v o y a t. I< a b u 1 i n .1837, a d v o c a t e d s li p p o r t 
f o I- t hi e B a r a k z a i r u ler Do s t M o h a m m e d , s o a s t o interpos e 
a friendIy united A f g h a n i s t a n . as a credible buffer 
against hostile combinations from the w e s t . 1 4 B . But an 
a 11 i a n c e w i t h D a s t M o h a m m e d c o u 1 d h a v e p r e j u d i c e d 
Britain's Sikh alliance, since the Barakzai ruler had a 
serious dispute with the Sikhs over the possession of 
P e s h a w a r « 1 '+c? U n w i 11 i n g t o j e a p o r d i s e t h e S i k h a 11 i a n c e , 
Lord Auckland, the Governor-General in 1837, and his 
Chief Secretary, William Hay Macnaghton, favoured the 
scheme outlined by Claude Martin Wade, Military Governor 
in Ludhiana, to depose Dost Mohammed, and set up in
his place, Shah Shuja, the ex Sadozai monarch (the
grateful beneficiary of a British pension since 1809), 
in order to implant a puppet regime in K a b u l .lso As the 
British army of invasion set out in 1838 to rearrange 
Afghanistan, it passed through Baluchistan, and came
:!. r11o conf r ont at i on wit h 1 oca 3. t r ibes.
The collision course started with tribal raids on 
El r i t. i s h s u p p 1 y c o n v o y s a s t h e y m o v e d t. h r o u g hi t h e B o lan
Pass into Afghanistan- As the problem of tribal raids
festered, it gave an opportunity to Macnaghton^ now
acting as British envoy in Kabul and in charge of 
directing political affairs in Quetta, to embark on the 
a d v e n t u r i s t c o u r s e o f d e p o s i n g M e h r a b K hi a n o f K a 1 a t , a s 
the covert author, in his view, of tribal violence 
against the Br it ish„ 1551 British forces were used to 
d e p o s e M e hr a b Kha n ,a n d S h a h Maw a z K h a n a rival sc i o n of 
t h e r u 1 i n g d y n a s t y , w a s p 1 a c e d o n the t h r o n e - 185 s 
M a cna g h ta n t he n proc eede d t o c o nf i sc ate p r i v 1 1eg e d 
1 a n d hi o 1 d i n g s a f t h e t r i b a 1 c h i e f s t o r e - d i s 1 1- i b u t e t hi e m
f r
a m o n g t hi e s u p porters o f hi is o t h e r p r o t e g e in
A -F g h a n i s t a ri, S h a h S hi u. j a B  u. t t hi i s led t h e t r i !::■ e s t o 
r e v o 11 , s t o r mi K a 1 a t , and d e p o s e S hi a hi N a w a z i n f a v o u r o f 
Nasir Khan 111-'3 The violent turn of events in Kalat 
p> r o v e d t h a t M a c n a g h t o n ' s p a 1 i c y w a s a r o p e o f s a n d „ T h e 
Government of India now intervened to retrieve E<r:i.tish 
Interests from local mismanagement. James Out ram,
Political Agent in Lower 3 i n d ^  was instructed to draw up 
a settlement with the new ruler in Kalat., A Treaty was 
a c c o r d i n g 1 y c o n c 1 la d e d o n 6 0 c t □ hi e r 1841, w h i c h !•" e s t o r e d
some lost territory to Kalat, but the new Khan alienated 
control over foreign policy to the British, and also
h 4
gave them the right to station troops anywhere in 
Ba 1 uchi st.an» -1-53
The Treaty o-f 1841 started the process of
t r a nsform i ng Ka 3.at into a client state of the Indian 
E m p i r e , w h i 1 e i t. s m i 1 i t a r y c 1 a u. s e s s t. a k e d a u t t h e f u t u r e 
use of Ba 1 uchistan as a 1 au.nching pad for an act ive 
t r a n s horde r policy. B u t t h e n e w Gove r n c* r -- G e n e r a 1 i n 
.1.8 4 .1.,, E 11 e n b a r o u g h w a s 3. e s s i n c 1 .i n e d t o risk in v o 1 v e m e n t
in the trans Indus, and for more than a decade the
Baluchistan option remained in deep freeze. In the
meant i me t he f ront i er e p e r  ienced s i gni f i cant c hanges.
In .1842 Dost Mohammed recaptured his throne in Kabul,
a n d B u r n e s a n d M a c n a g h t o n w e i- e m u r d e r e d „ B r i t i s h 
r e v e r s e s i n A f g h a n 3. s tan w e r e p a r 1.1 y o f -f s e t b y t h e 
occupation of Sind in 1843=, and the annexation of the
Punjab in 1849. As a result of these moves the borders
of India now touched on Baluchistan, erasing its 
po 1 i t ica 1 marg i na 1 ism, and drawi ng it i nto the or bit of 
A n g 1  I n d i a n s f e a r s a n d f i x a t i o n s o n i m p e r i a 1 s u r v i v a 3. „
Active interest in the Baluchistan frontier, was 
rekindled in the wake of the Crimean War of 1354., which 
seemed to flash the familiar British nightmare of a 
Russian advance towards the Dardanelles, Persia, India and 
C h i n a C  h a r 1 e s W o a d , P r e s i d e n t o f t h e E< o a r d o f C o n t r o 1;! 
was concerned that Russian intrigues with Persia aimed to
/ nr*OJ
destabilize? the tribal belt along Baluchistan's western 
b □ r (d e r 1 a n d s „ T o e  a u n ter this da n ger, h e b e 3. i e? v e d t hi e
Khan o-f Kalat should be strengthened by British
resources, and interposed as an effective barrier 
a g a i n s t j;:) □ s s i lo 1 e P e r s i a n e n c r o a c h m e n t s f r o m t h e w  e s t 125 25 
Dalhousie, Governor-General at the time, was instructed 
to implement the new requirements, and he accordingly 
transferred the task of detailing a new agreement with 
Kalat, to John Jacob, Military Governor of Sind, who was 
closer to the 1o c a 1 scene.
W i t h a s t r o n g s ense o f i m perial m i s s i o n , J a c o b
be 1 i eve d t hat '1The r ed 1 i ne of Engl a nd on the map " , 
c o u 1 d o n 1 y b e k e p t b y o c c u p y i n g " p o s t s i n a d v a n c e o f 
it. " A new Treaty with Kalat, he felt should be the 
f i rst step in the di rect ion of acqu.i r i ng cont ro 1 over
Quetta, thus permanently securing the Herat Qandhar
line from any danger in the west,. But he was forced to 
t r i m h i s o b j e c t i v e s t o m e e t r e q u i r e m e n t s in Lon d o n , 
where the aim was to turn the Khan of Kalat into a 
reliable political ally rather than to sjji-'ze his 
t e r i- i t o r y .
The Treaty Jacob negotiated with Kalat in 1854 
not only retained the clamps of political and military 
control, instituted in the 1841 agreement, but it also 
inserted a new financial grip by giving the Khan of
Kalat a personal subsidy of Rs.50,000 per year,, for the 
pu.rpose of polio i ng 13a 1 uc h i stan , and ra i s.i ng an army to 
q u e 11 P e r s i a n i n r o a d s f r o m t he west. 137 T h e
c o nseque nces of t he f i na ncia 1 o 1 au.se wer e om i nous f or
tribal politics. For the first time one of the Kalat Khan 
cou. 1 d ra i se a standi ng army w i t hout contr i butians f ram 
t: h e t r i b a 1 c h i e f s . N a s i r K h a n u s e d t h e British s u b s i d y
to start the nucleus of such a mercenary army, and his 
successor Khudadad Khan who assumed power in 1857, used 
the military weapon, to restructure? the monarchy" s 
re 1 at ions with the tr i ba 1 c h i e f s . In 1857 the tr i ba 1 
chiefs encircled Kalat, in order to put pressure on the 
m o n a r c h t o d i s b a n d t h e a r m y . B li t K h u d a d a d K h a n o p t e cJ 
for confrontation by ordering his troops to open fire on 
the assembled g r o u p s . 185 s This marked the end of the 
traditional consensus between the monarchy and the 
tribal aristocracy, which had supported the Kalat 
confederacy, and the scene was now set in Baluchistan 
for more than two decades of internal conflict, which 
u 11 imate 1 y de 1 i vered the country to foreign cantro 1
In the ear 1y years of the crisis British policy 
t o w a !•" d s B a I u c hi i s t a n w a s 1 a r gel y d i c t a t e d h y S i n d S  i r 
William M e r s w e t h e r , Commissioner in Sind, 1857, adhered 
to the policy enshrined in J a c o b 1’s treaty of controlling 
Baluchistan through the Khans of Kalat, propped up by 
British support. Sind gave direct military assistance
to the Khan o-f Kalat. Henry Green., Political
Su.per i ntendent i n Upper Si n d , ass isted t he l<han o-f 
!<a 1 at to crushi t he rebe 11 i ons i n 1857 and then aga i n i n 
1 8 6 5 6  6 ■ B u t t h e t r i b a 1 c: h i e f s w e r e r e s i .1 i e n t.; the y 
deposed Khu da dad Khan for a brief spell in 1863., and
s t a r t e d t o p r e p a r e f o r a n e w r e b ell i o n i n 1Q 6 9.. 1 ”5 9 In
the meantime the Khan of Kalat retaliated by
c o n f :i. s c a t i n g the r e v e n u e - f r e e h o 1 d i n g s o f t h e t r i b a 1 
ch.i.ef s » Bu.t thie K h a n p s assanIt on chief 1 y pr i v l e g e s  
only escalated the conflict, and the growing violence 
became a g raveyar d far Merewet h e r Js Baluchistan p o 1 icy.
As the? crisis deepened in B a l u c h i s t a n ? a new
.i n i t i a t i v e e m e r g e d f r o m a p o 1 i t i c a 1 o f f i c e r o n t h e P u n j a b
•f: r o n t i s r q h e w a s F< o b e r t S a n d e m a n , D e p u t y C o m m i s s i o n e r o f
/ /
Dera Ghaci Khan in 1866, Originally a protege...--' of John 
Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, 1853-1859, 
Sandeman had little in common with the conservative 
traditions of the Punjab school. Unconvinced by the 
thes i s of ? m a s t e r 1y i nacti v i t y ’, whi c h frowned on any 
extension of power .i n the? trans-Indus, Sandeman believed 
i n d r a w i n g t h e I n d i a n f r o n t i e? r a s f at r o u t w a r d s a s 
possible. He believed such a strategy would create the 
p o 1 i i: i c a 1 s p a c e f o r i m p e r i. a 1 i s m t o g r a w o n t h e s u b - 
continent, and survive the threat of external challenge,
But t hie p ur suit of d i s t a nt Fr on t i e r s was a I so a k i nc:l 
of political journey to achieve personal ends.
Unadministored tribal territory across the Indus.- was
v i r g i n 1 a n d f o r r e w i - i t i n g p e r s o n a 1 p o 1 i t i c a 1 r e p u t a t i o n s
and realising dreams of personal power., all in the name 
of emp i r e - S a n d e m a n p s strategy i n B a 1uchistan was an
e x p o s i t i o n i n this 1 i n k age b e t w e e n i m p e r i a 1 i. d e o 1 o g y a n d 
and persona 1 .i n t e r e s t , which fue 11 ed successive waves of 
Bri t ish expansion i nto t r i ba 1 terri tory on the Indus 
front ier.
S a n d e m a n "s opportunity to carve a niche for 
h i mse 1f i n B a 1uc hi st an politics occurr ed i n 1866 ? when 
1 1"! e lv! a r r i t r i b e n o m i n a 3.1 y s u b j e c t t o t h e K han o f l< a 1 a t „ 
carried out a big raid in the Harrand Dajal District of 
Dera Ghazi Khan. Subsequently as Sind and Kalat 
c o n f e s s e d t h e :i. r i n a b i 1 i t y t o c o e r c e t h e M a r r i t r i b e ,
Sande man assumed the i ni t i at .i ve to c 1 amp c:ontro 1 s on 
bo r de r v i ole nc e . Hav i ng t houg ht f u 11 y det a i ne d some of 
t he I-1 ar r i rai ders as hostages :l n Harrand, Sandeman 
■forced t he i r c h i ef 03haz zan Khan to attend a t r i ba 1 
c a n f e r e n c e i n M i t h a n k o t e H  e r e =, h e a d j u d i c a ted o n 
d i sp ut es bet ween t he Ma r r is and ot her bo rder t r i b e s , and 
instituted a small levy service for the Marri tribesmen., 
i n o !•■ d e r t o s a f e g u a r d t h e s o u t h P u n j a b f r o n t .i e r . 1 ° A s 
m o 151 s t u d e ri t s o f t h e fro n tie r have p o :i. n t e d o u t ,
Sa n dema n s  measu r es of 1B66 ma r k e d t he beg i n n i ng o f 
the concept of tribal control associated with his name 
i n Ba 1 u c h i s t a n . But t here were a 1 so other imp I i cat i ons
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in Sandeman ' s policy- By entering into independent
p o 1 .i t i c a I r e 1 at i o ns w i t h t he Ma r r :l s H Sandeman was i n 
f a c t b !- i d g i n g t h e p o 1 i t i c a 1 d i s t a n c e b e t ween his o w n 
position as a mere voyeur of events in Baluchistan, to 
assu.m :i. ng act i ve o' i r ect i ona 1 con1ro 1 over a t r :i. be at odds 
with the Kalat Government- The Harris were an early 
example of how Sandeman would use the conflict between
the Khan of Kalat and the tribes, to establish a
p e r s o n a 1 r a p p o r t w i t h t hi e 1 e a d i n g r e b e 1 chiefs b y 
e ricour aging t he i r c a u s e , and t hereby aiding t heir 
detachment f rom Ka 1 a t - Imp1ic i t in such a poIicy was 
the emasculation of central authority in Kalat, and the 
erosion of Sind's control in B a 1uch tribal affairs.
S i n d ? si- B a 1 u. c: h i s t a n p o 1 i c y w a s n o t j u s t u n ci e r 
pressure from Sandeman.. In 1869 the new Superintendent 
of the Upper Sind Frontier, R.B. P hay r e , departed from 
h e r e w e t h e r 's official line to agree instead with 
S a n d e m a n 's asser t i on t hat t he Khan of K a 1 at was usi ng 
B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e t o s u b v e r t t h e c o n f e d e r a c y a n d t h e 
p owe r s of t he t r i ba I c h i e f s . 1A 1 Even mor e om i. n i ous 1 y 
•For Sind perhaps. Lord Mayo's Government in Calcutta
became increasingly sceptical of M e re we t h e r 's political 
judgement,. "As far as I can judge " stated Mayo, " the 
p r o b a b i 1 i t y o f t r u t hi lies m o r e on S andeman' s is i d e t hi a ri 
the other". 1&S1 The first evidence of this shift in 
onf i dencs was seen i ri Febr uar y 1871, when a conference
was summoned o-f the Punjab and Sind officials, an the 
subject of tribal control along the frontier., Here the 
rnanagsment of t he !iar r i -18u.g t i t r i bes was t r ansf er r ed t.o 
Sandeman, under the? nominal supervision of Sind. The 
s u m o f R s . 3 2 „ 040, s e t a s i d e f o r e m p 1 o y i n g t h e s e t r i b a? s 
on patrol duty, was to be paid, in the name of the Khan 
o f l< a 1 a t . 1A 3 B u t t his o n 1 y k e p t a 1 i v e t h e f i ct ion o f 
t h e K h arts a u t h o r i t y w h i 1 e t r a n s f e r r i n g real c o n t r o 1 t o 
Sandeman. Mayors encouragement also led Sandeman to play 
f cdr higher stakes in Ka 1 at po 1 it ics. In 1871, he pai d 
Imam Baksh Khan the Mazari chief in Dera Ghaz i Khan 
R s . 600, f or openi ng comrnu.ni cat ions between Bakht iar Khan 
Barakzai of Sibi, reputed for his hospitality to rebel 
B r a h u .i. c h i e f s „ 1 *•’ 'v S :i. n d o f f i c i a I s w e re q li i c k t o p o i n t 
cd ut t ha t S i b i h a d n o t h i n g  t o do w i t h S andema n •" s ow n 
borders,. And there was even local speculation that 
San ciema n ha d deve 1 oped a vest ed i nt e r est. i n k eep i ng t he 
tribal conflict alive, in order to "ultimately get 
c h a r g e o f t h e c o u n t r y " . •1-A 55 11: a p p e a r e ci a s i f S a n d e m a n
w a s t r y i n g t o r e w r i t e K a 1 a t p o .1 i t i c s o n h i s o w n t e r m s ; 
to motivate the rebel chiefs to look for an external 
answer to their problems.
However before Sandeman 
of managing the Marri tribes, 
i n B a 1 u c h i s t an, a s a res l i 11 
i nt roduced by t he Khan of
c o u 1 d i m p 1 e m e n t t h e p cd 1 i c y 
a fresh rebellion broke out 
o f t hi e n e w 1 a n d p o 1 j. c y 
KaIat dur i ng 1870 -18 7 1 , t o
confiscate further lands from the tribal chiefs. This 
provoked further hostility , swelled the ranks of the 
rehe 1 c h i ef s , a n d by 1872 t hie 1 a11 e r wer e i n cont r o 1 of 
sout he r n Ba 1 uc h j. st a n and Que11 a . 1A& Moreove r .,
Sandemands policy of support for the tribal chiefs in
opposition to the Khan., bore fruit at this stage as the
rebels refused to make any settlement without the 
presence? of official B r i t i s h mediators.
Mayo was sufficiently perturbed about events in 
Baluchistan, to observe that the money poured into the 
country had "produced very poor fruit". In 1872
he s ummo ne d a n ew c on ferenc e of Sin d a nd Pu n j ab officials  
a t J a c o b a b a d t cd r e s o 1 v e t h e B a 1 u c h i s t a n q u e s t i o n . 
According to the new British terms of peace, the chiefs 
were to receive their confiscated lands back again., on 
condition they abstained from rebellions, and the Khan 
of K a 1 at wouId fo rego c ompe nsa t i on f o r a 11 da mages
incurred., and receive in return the allegiance of the
c h i e F s a n d t h e g i f t cd f o n e 1 a k h o f r u p e e s f r o m t h e
B r i t i s h . *A S a n d e ma n s  i n f  1 laence was c l e a r  i n  t h e
settlement which acknowledged the tribal chiefs as party 
to an international agreement on their own right, distinc:- 
from the Khan of Kalat. For the Khan the terms were 
less promising. Elevation of the chiefs had devalued 
his own worth,, and seemed to leave him stranded as an 
obsolete relic of S i n d ’s mistaken policy. He felt
betrayed as there seemed no prospect of help from his
f o r m e r a 11 i e s t cd c  r li s  h t h e r e b e 1 s » The s e 1 1 1 e m e n t o n I y
served to embitter the Khan, and the post-Jacobabad
s c e n e i n B a 1 u. c hi i s t a n w a s d o m i n a ted b y h i s a c t i v e
host i 1 :i. t y t cd t hie Br i t i shi w h i c h fou.nd exp r ess i cdn i n 
b o r d e r r aid s c a 1 c u 1 a t e d t o hi a r a s s the Indian f r o ri t i e r , 
and the plunder of merchant caravans which brought trade
to a standstill in the Bolan Pass. Amid all this
animosity, the Jacobabad settlement became a dead
let t e r ; t h e B r i t i s hi a g e n t w a s w i t hi d r a w n f: r o m K a 1 a t ., a n d
b y 1 874 W i 11 i a m M e r e w et her ^ p rev i ous 1 y t h e !< h a n ’
s t a u. n c h e s t a 11 w a s a d v o c a t i n g his d e position. 1
As Br i t a i n s  i nf cdr ma 1 st r uc tlir e of i nf 1 uenc:e 
crumbled in Baluchistan, new events in central Asia 
threatened to turn the tribal crisis into an emergency 
Against the odds of climate and geography., Russia had 
u. s e d the d e c a ci e s a f t e r t h e C r i m e a n W a r t cd a c cj u i r e a 
large s 1 i c e o f c e n t r a I Asia, s t r etching f r o m t hi e m o u t h 
of the Sir Darya to TransCaspia. By 1876 the
steppe country of the Kazakhs, as well as the Khanates
0 f K h i v a , B o k hi a r a , a n cl K h o k a n cJ, w ere d e s i g n e d i n t o t hi e 
imperial landscape of Tsarist R u s s i a . 1,70 As the
1 n ci e p e n d e n c e o f c e n t r a 1 A s i a m e 11 e ci i n t o f i c t i o n 
the future of Merv and Herat in particular engaged 
British minds. A Russian presence at Herat would press 
uncomfortably close to Afghanistan, Herat also commanded
the shortest route to India, via Qandhar, the BoI an 
Pass and Quetta. In -Fact Quetta was only twenty miles 
■from the Bo I an Pass leading towards Qandhar, Two main 
strategic considerations flowed from Q u e t t a 7s geo- 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 1 o c: a t i o n . T h e f i r s t -> a s p o i n t e d o u t b y Pi e n r y 
Green., was that Afghanistan would act as Russia's 
c a t s p a w , and occupy Que11a in order to frustrate British 
a rn b i t i a n s a n t hi e f r o n t i e r . 171 I n t h e s e c o n d i n s t a n c e 
it was argued that Britain could pre-empt any such
danger from developing by moving Indian troops to 
Quetta. This would enable her to intercept any hostile 
m o v e m e n t o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m H e r a t , 1 o n g b e f o r e i t c o u 1 d
t h r e a t e n I n d i a „ A s George P o m e r o y Coll e y , M i .1 i t a r y
Secretary to the Viceroy in 1876 stressed with
Quetta properly militarised "all the armies of Central 
Asia could not take it, as it commands a flat and
absolutely shelterless plain for miles a r o u n d , " 172 To 
close the gateway of Herat therefore, Baluchistan had to 
be transformed into a British enclave. Yet in 1874 
B r i t i s hi f o r t u ri e s i n B a 1 u c h i s t a n w e r e a t t h e i r I o w e s t 
ebb. The Khan of Kalat had moved into open hostility 
against the British, and tribal raids on the Sind 
■F r o nt. i e r we nt u nc: hec k e d . T he sy nc hir o nous deve 1 opment of 
the tribal crisis in Baluchistan, and the Russianization 
of central Asia encouraged official opinion in India to 
view the two problems in an inter-related context. The 
Governor of Bombay, voiced the general fears " Is it
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wise.,... considering the progress of events in 
Central Asia., that the country immediately
before us should be torn by factions, and be the prey of 
t h e fi r st st ro ng p owe r that shouId choose to sieze 
i t " . * ^
Calcutta and London had different answers to the 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 q u e s t i o n p o s e d o n t hi e f r o n t i e r « L o r d 
Noi"t hibr ook, as I nd i an Vicer oy at t he time, was r ea 11 y 
averse to taking any firm action. Unaffected by the
Russo--phobia of Anglo-India, Northbrook observed:"I feel 
no alarm so far as the safety of India is concerned, I
d o n t e x p e c t t h a t w e s hi a 3.1 h a v e t o e n c o u n ter another
Xerxes, or leave our bones in an Afghan T'hiermopy 1 a e ",
Nor t hbr ook • s pass i ve st y 1 e , h.owever , was out of st ep , 
w i t h t he po 1 i t i c a 1 t emper of t he new Tor y Ca b i net i n
I.. o n d o n , 1 e d b y D i s r a e 1 i a n d S a 1 i s b u r y , w ho we r e
dete rmi ned t o put Bri t ai n bac k on the map of cent r a 1 and 
s o u t hi w e s t A s i a « T h e i. r a 11 i t u d e b r e a t h e d n e w 1 i f e i n t o
o 1 d a r g u m e n t s a b o u t R u s s i a n a m b i t i o n R  e r s i a n
d u p 1 i c i t y , a n d A f g h a n t r e a c hi e r y , w hi i c I"i f o r m e d t h e si t a pie 
of Anglo-Indian debate. Forward minded men like Bartle
Frere, Governor of Bombay, .1.855 1867, and Henry
R a w 1 i n s o n , ii e m b e r a f t hi e I n d i a C o u n c i 1, 1 8 7 7 1 8  78,, c o u 1 d 
address their views to Salisbury's receptive ear,
Frere advocated the immediate occupation of Q u e t t a , 1"^ 55 
while Rawlinson went further and proposed a move to
H e r a t . 17*’ As Secretary of State for India, Salisbury 
favoLired the Quetta option, for the steady flow of 
f o r w a r d p r o p o s a 1 s con v i need h i m o f t h e c: r i t i c a 1
significance of Baluchistan as the link pin between
c e n t !" a 1 A s i a a n d I n d i a - T h is 1 e d h i rn t o w r i t e t o 
Nort hbi•"o o !••: s "It is on the road f rom Herat that our eyes 
should be f i x e d . » »", 177 and that the British ought to 
be as ready for a military march to "Quetta or Herat 
a s t h e P !•" u s s i a n s w e r e for" a nr a r c h t o P a r i s . " 1 70
Under pressure to take some action in Baluchistan, 
Northbrook adopted a scheme floated by Sandeman and 
t h e P u. n j a b G o v e r n m e n t t o re-establish o r d e r :i. n
Baluchistan., The pith of this plan was that instead of 
b o 1 s t e r i n g t hi e a u t hi o r i t y o f t hr e K hr a n o f K a 1 a t , t h e 
B i" i t i s hr G o v e r n m e rr t w o u Id n o w b y p a s s hr i nrr, and a r r i v e a t 
s e p or a t e u n d e r s t a n d i ng s w i. t h t he t r i b a 1 chi e f s „ T hr e nrr a n 
entrusted with the mission was Robert Sandeman. In 
November 1875, Sandeman set out on his first mission to 
Baluchistan, with instructions to separate the Marri- 
B u g t i t r i b e s f r o m K a 3. a t ? s c o n t r o 1, a n d p 1 a c e t h e m u n d e r 
t hr e a u t hr o r i t y o f t hr e D e p u. t y Co m m i s s i o n e r , D e r a G hr a z i 
Khan; the Khan of Kalat was to be divested of all 
responsibi1 ity for keeping the Bolan Pass open, while 
1 o c a I t !•' i b e s n e e d e d t o k e e p t h e r o u t e a p e n w o u 1 d b e 
b r o u g hr t u n d e r d i r e c t p o 1 i t i c a I r e 1 a t i o n s w i t hr t hr e 
British Government; and finally Sandeman would
a d j u d i c a t e o n t hi e d i s p u. t e s b e t w e e n t h e K h a n o f K a 3. a t a n d 
the tribal chiefs. •t7<5> It was a controversial mission, 
geared to curtail the tribal jurisdiction of the Kalat 
State, detach geo-political areas like the Bolan Pass 
i m p o r t a n t i n B r i t i s h s t r a t e g i c calc u 1 a t i o n s , a n d 
f i n a 3. 1 y t o i m p o s e t. hi e p r i n c i p 1 e o f B r i t i s h p a r a m o u n t c y 
on the internal framework of tribal politics.
S a n d e m a n s  m i s s i o n , hi o w e v e r , p r o v e d a b o r t. i v e o w i n g 
to op p os i t i o n f r am S i nd of f i c i a 1 s ; lvlerewet he r q uest i o ne d 
his authority to arrive at a solution of the Baluchistan 
crisis without t he corisent of the Si nd Commi ssioner . •t®° 
This rift in official attitudes prompted the Khan of 
Kalat to refuse to negotiate with Sandeman while his 
authority remained undefined. As a result, Sandeman 
withdrew from Baluchistan without accomplishing his 
objectives. But Sind paid the price for its 
obstruction, as the Viceroy decided in the aftermath of 
t he cont roversy to d i vest S i nd o f all respons i b i 1ity f a r 
Baluchistan affairs, which were now transferred to 
A.A.Munroe , Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the 
Punjab. Northbrook also empowered Sandeman to lead a 
second m i ss i on to Ba 1 uc h i. stan a I ong the lines of the 
first o n e . 1® 1 This was the Viceroy's last act to 
contain the Baluchistan crisis. He resigned soon 
afterwards, and the story of the second mission 
unfolded in the wake of the new religion of empire and
n a t i o n p r e a c hi e d b y D i s r a e 1 i a n d S alia b u r y .
C ent r a 1 to D i sr a e 1i's a mb i t i o n o f rea sserting
power in the east was the rectification of India's
nort hiwest f ront i er , i n or der to bring Herat and Oandhar 
l i nder Br i t ishi cont ro 1. It. was a scheme for wh:i.oh hie 
needed to install a British agent in Afghan territory, 
and station troops in western Afghanistan. Aware that
such a policy would stir controversy in the frontier, he 
chose the volatile Earl of Lytton as the new Viceroy for 
India. "Had it been a routine age", he explained to 
S a 1. i s b u. r y f 1 w e m i g h t h a v e m a d e , w h a t m .i g h t b e c a 11 e d a 
more prudent selection, but... we wanted a man of 
ambition, imagination, and some vanity and much will- 
a n d w e h a v e g o t. h i m . " *•m 32 T o D i s r a e 1 i ' s v i s i o n o f 
dominating Afghanistan, Salisbury added his own 
perspective of controlling Quetta and the Bolan Pass, 
calculated to expose west Afghanistan to British
m i 1 i t ar y p ressur e , t hus r educ i ng Kabu 1' s barga i n ! rig 
power with the Government of India. "If Baluchistan is 
well in hand", he observed, " the importance of the Amir 
to us is terribly d i n f i i n i a h e d " A n x i o u s  to exploit 
the Baluchistan card, and impatient of the recurring 
tribal conflict there, Salisbury came to believe that a 
political solution was required along the lines of a 
covert British occupation of the country. He wrote to 
Lytton in May 1876s " I t  is a pity that the British
boundary opposite to Jacobabad was not pushed to the 
foot of the hills... I suspect that the only effective  
cure for Khelat disturbances will be that we should 
u n d e r t a !•■: e , f o r a n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e K h a n ' s 
name,, to keep order up to the foot of the hills and 
perhaps up the pass as well",, 104
L y 11 o n c a m e o u t a s V i o e r o y t o I n d i a i n 1S 7 6, w ell 
versed in Disraeli and Salisbury's political message, 
and filled with the purpose of "not merely scratching 
t h e b a c k o f R: u. s s i a n p o w e r , b u. t o f d r i v .i. n g i t c 1 e a n o u. t 
of Central Asia", 3355 Lytton was determined not to 
h u m o u r t h e A m i r o f K a b u 1 w i t h a r m s a n d m o n e y u n 1 ess hi e 
agreed to the presence of British Agents in Herat and 
□ a n d hi a r , P a r t o f L y 11 o n ' s s e c r e t i n s t r u c t i o n s i n v o 1 v e d 
a political mission to Kabul, in order to force the Afghan 
to accommodate British strategic interests. But its 
proceedings were to be screened by a secondary mission 
to Kalat,, both to cover up the possibility of fai fvure 
i n K a b i.i 1 , a n d also t o r e s t r u c t u r e B r i t i s h i n f luence in 
Baluchistan, in order to intimidate Afghanistan and make 
t h e A m i r m o r e p 1 .i a n t t o B r i t i s h t e r m s , L e w i s F:' e 11 y w a s 
selected to head the Afghan mission, which if it went 
wrong was to be converted into the Baluchistan 
mission.
But Lytton was unable to work his particular
strategy =, because Northbrook re-fused to recall 
Sandeman's mission to E«aluchistan. Under the 
circumstances the original idea of sending a mission 
to Kabu. 1 and Ka 1 at had to be abandaned. Interpret i ng 
Nor t h b r o o k s  act as a deliberate conspiracy to cripple 
his "freedom of action and ju d g e m e n t " , 1®'3' Lytton 
r e 1u c t a n 1 1y agreed to S a n d e m a n 7 s mission, while nursing 
his own misgivings that the Baluchistan mission would 
prejudice the Amir against British intentions on the 
frontier, 1(5,63
Sandeman''s second mission set out in March 1376,
T h e s i g n s w e r e o m i n o li s f o r t hi e K hi a n of K a 1 a t . At t hi e 
very start of the mission, the rebel chiefs communicated 
to Sandeman:" If you want to settle this country, you 
must either annex it or depose the K h a n " , 1 G3<5> This 
a11 i t ude of t he tri b a 1 c h i efs v  i rt ua 11y m i r rored t he e nd 
o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a 1 c o n federate s 1 1- u c t li re in B a 1 u c h i s t a n . 
In their rejection of the Khan of Kalat's authority, the 
chiefs were opting out of the indigenous skeletal, 
state structure, which had evolved in the eighteenth 
century, in favour of a new colonial future within the 
o r b i t of the E< r i t i s h E m p i r e „
As the tribal chiefs served formal notice on the 
Kalat Government, Sandeman proceeded with the task of 
dismantling the monarchy without any fear of internal
so
apposition- The terms of reference he drew up for the
Baluchistan Settlement foreshadowed the political
sentence on the Khan of Kalat''s future- As a
preliminary measure,, Sandeman moved that the
Br i t :l. sh Gover nment wou 1 d i n f l it ure ass ist t he Khan of
K a 1 at to m a i n t a in hi s a u. t. h o r i t y i n a man n e r c o n s i s t e n t
w :i. t h t h e r i g hi t s o f his s l i b j e c t s - Add ;i. t i o n a 11 y t h e
tribal chiefs were to be treated as a separate group in
their relations with the British Government., and their 
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privileges protected in f u t u r e . 1*90 In this manner 
Sandeman inserted two sources of control on the Khan of 
K a l a t ’s independence;; namely., the B r i t i s h Government and 
t he r esusc i t at ec:l p ower s of the tribal chiefs. As Ly 11 on 
remarked, that the message implicit in Sandeman :'s 
political rest r Lie tLir i ng was that the Khan should 
" place his throat in the hands that are itching to 
throttle h i m " . 1*91
I n A u g u s t 1876 S a n d e rn a n s o u. g h t t. o f o r m a 1 i s e 
British influence in Baluchistan, by issuing a 
F:’r oc 1 amat ion which decreed the Government of India as a 
p e r m a n e n t c o u. r t o f a p p e a 1 i n a 1 1 c i v i 1, f i n a nc:ia I P a. n d 
revenue cases between tribesmen t h e m s e l v e s . 192 It was a 
measure designed to remove "the last vestige" 1 *93 of the 
K h a n ’s independence, and it even embarrassed the
Government of India. Lytton set out the opinion of his 
Council:;" We are not prepared. ... to weaken ostentatiously
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the i ndependence of any f ronti© r p r inc© who is 1o y a 1 to 
lasu " 1 <5>^  Lytton was worried that. S a n d e m a n s  hartdicraft, 
in Baluchistan would feed new suspicions in Kabul about 
British intentions on the f r o n t i e r ? and Sandeman was 
instructed to modify the P r o c l a m a t i o n . 195
The objectives of the second mission were fin-ally 
wrapped up in the Treaty of 26 Decsmber 1876, which 
Lytton and the Khan of Kalat signed at -Jacobabad. Both 
in foreign policy and internal government the Khan 
accepted British direction. The Etritish Political 
Agency was re-established in Kalat to guide civil 
administration, and also to function as the highest court 
of appeal in disputes between the Khan and the 
c h i e f s . 1,6 The rephrasing of terms of control already 
ag r eed on ear 1 i er was Sa n d e m a n ? s on 1 y concess i on to m a !-■:e 
the occupation less obstrusive. In reality the
independence of Baluchistan was now a mere fiction, and 
t he K han a t r ap p e d c: r eat ur e i n t he c i r c 1 e of Br :i. t i sh 
power. Descr i bi ng t he def eated Khan of Ka 1 a t , Ly11on 
wrote;:" He has the furtive face and the rest, less eye of 
a 1 i 1 1 1 e h u. n t e d w i Id be a s t w h i c h h as 1 o n g 1 i v e d in da i 1 y 
danger of its life".197
T h e p o 1 i t i c a 1 k n o t a r o u n d Baluchistan w a s 
tight©ne d st ;i. 11 f u r t her by the st at i on i ng of t r oop s i n 
k e y s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s 1 i k e G l i  e 11 a a n d K a 1 a t „ H o w e v e r
i n o r d 0 r to a v o i cl d iplomati c c 0 n 0 u. r 0 , L y 1t o n i n s t r u c 1 0 d 
Sandeman to elicit a request from tribal chiefs for the 
presence of British troops in Baluchistan,. The Viceroy 
wrote-? s''We must not seem to be forcing the presence of 
British troops on the territory of a reluctant but a 
helpless p r i n c e ”. flo unobtt-u«ve <vU,+aHj presence. . . n
Baluchistan was a way of masking the new extension of 
British power in southwest Asia, to make it less 
objectionable to Russia, Persia, and Afghanistan, and to 
provide a platform of tribal support for the occupation 
to placate critics of the Forward Policy. Salisbury in 
p a 1-1 i c u 1 a r . felt t he m i 1 i t a r y prsse n c e s hi a u 1 d b e k e p t 
quiet, for "publicity with notoriety",, would be 
prejudicial to his talks with S c h o u v a l o f f , the Russian 
envoy at the Constantinople Conference <1876) to discuss 
the Turkish problem. 1,5,9 But the forward nature of the 
fi'i a v e t o B a I u c hi i 51 a n w a s d i f f i c u 11 t o c o n c e a 1.. A s 
The Times pointed out that the advance would "produce 
0ve nts necess i tat ing i n the i r t urn , the adaption of 
s t i 11 m o r e v i g o r o u s p r e c a u t i o n s " „ ^  0 0
By entering Baluchistan, Britain turned a new 
corner in frontier history. In the game of conquest and 
empire with Russia, the Treaty of 1876. redefined 
Ba 1 uc h i st a n as I n d i a " s st r at eg i c e y, t e r na 1 f r o nt i 0 r , and 
t hi 0 p !■• o hi a hi I e c o m b at z o n 0 o f f u t u r e mil i t a r y 
confrontation. The principle of the advance into
Baluchistan was distilled from half a century of 
political argument over strategic and imperial 
priorities in the trans-Indus zone. in 1854 the policy 
o f .i. n t e r f e r e nee i n !< a 1 a t h a d s o u g h t t o e s t a b 1 i s h a 
c 1i ent government 1o y a 1 to Bri t i sh interests. But t his 
had undermined the Khan of K a l a t ’s authority over his
subje c t s 3 alienated him from the support of powerful
tribal chiefs, and provoked rebellion for more than two 
dec a d e s D u r  i ng t h i s per .i o d of dest ab i 1 i zat i on ,
British power^ although informal., tended to be drawn in 
to fill the vac:c:uurn which it had helped to create. At
the start of 1870 the-? ref a re? a reappraisal of British
p o 1i c y i n B a 1u ch ist a n wa s di c t at e d by the f a i1ed
experime nt in i n farma 1 in fIue nce, as well as other p oi nt s
o f pi r e s s u r e s t e rn m i n g fro m t h e g r o w i n g n e u. r o s e s a b o u t 
R u. s s i a n p o w e r a n c! t. h e s t r a i n s o f a c o n s c i o u s c o m m i t m e n t. 
to a maoro vision of emp i re. I n re 1 at ion to the
problems posed, the Treat;/ of 1876 sought to alter the
terms of the imperial--tribal equation in Baluchistan by 
e x c hi a n q i n g t hi e p r i n c i p 1 e o f i n f 1 u e n c e f o r p a r a m o u n t c: y 
a n d o c c: u p a t i a n .
In Baluchistan, Sandeman had effectively released 
imperial expansion from the shackles of the old informal 
s y s t e m r e s t i n g o n i n f 1 u. e n c e , t o t hi e n e w g r o u. n d o f 
po 1 i t i ca 1 cont ro 1. Blit i n achiev :i. ng this e n d , the 
po 1 i t i c a 1 cont oui- s  of tribal Ba 1 uc h i st an under went
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critical changes. The emasculation of the monarchy, in 
p a r t i c u 1 a r , r e m o v e d t h e o v e r a r c h i n g c: a n o p y o f t h e 
confederate structure which had promoted a measure of 
pan- 1 r i b a 1 consciousness in soc iety. As the m o n a r c h y , 
t. h e f o r m a 1 s y m b o 1 o f unit y i n E a 1 u c h a n d B r a h u i s o c i e t y 
dec 1 ine d li n de r t he we i g ht of t h e B r i t i s h c o n nec t i g n , t he 
p o 1it i c a 1 or der f r ag ment e d into multiple c e n t res of 
power, localised within individual tribes. Such a 
society inevitably left its political centre exposed to 
capture by interested foreign powers. The Treaty of 
1 8 7 6 ^ in effect, exploited the political schism between 
t he Khan of l<a 1 at and t he t r i ba 1 chiefs to cent re 
Bri t i sh par amountcy i n t he p o 1i ti ca 1 heart of Ba 1uchi st a n . 
In this new architecture of power, Britain occupied the 
commanding height at the apex of the political pyramid; 
the tribal element at the base was reserved to flesh out 
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f imperial c o n t r o 1 „ T h e h e i r a t :i. c:
relation between empire and tribe was formalised in 
a n i n t e r n a 1 r e a 1 i g n m e n t o f p o w e r , g e a r e d t o r e d e f i n e 
the role of the tribal chief not just as group leader, but 
as a collaborator with British imperialism, its main 
protector and patron under the terms of the 1876 Treaty, 
against any expansionist ambitions revived by the Kalat 
monarchy., The Treaty deliberately redrew the internal 
b o u n d a r i e s o f p o 1 i t i c a 1 p owe r i n B a 1 u c h i st a n i n f a v o u r 
of the tribal chiefs, at the expense of the Kalat 
Khanate, to foster a politically loyal local elite, with
in the permanence of empire. 
I o c: k e d i n t o t h e imp e? r i a 1 s y s t e m
through self interest, could be trusted to <2tYCuLctX^. .
f ect1 Yte 1/ t h e m e s s a g e o f e x t e r n a I c o n t r o 1 i n t rib a 1 
society. For the? British, the Treaty of 1876 
was the vital key to future political dominion in 
Baluchistan.
a vested interest 
T h e t r i b a 1 c hi i e f ^
The Treat'/ of 1876 therefore carried a double 
edged significance. It was at once an expression of 
British imperial power in Eurasia, and marked the 
definition of a new area of paramountcy on the Indian 
border. Also as Sandeman must have foreseen, the Treaty 
p r ov i ded t he bone stru c ture for a future Bi- it i sh 
Baluchistan, even as it extended British I n d i a ’s 
strategic and psychological frontiers against Russia.
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Chapter II
E-ilueprints and Boundaries; Baluchistan 
Restructured 1876-1905-
The Treaty of 1876 uncovered in Baluchistan 
virgin ground for the exercise of imperial options, 
promising new boundaries of power, even while harbouring 
seeds of future tension for a tribal society caught 
in the toils of colonial rule. Threads from past 
problems like the dystopia of Russian power and the 
vulnerability of empire still continued to pattern the 
texture of British involvement in Baluchistan, 
consciously twisting the imperial-tribal nexus into ever 
closer political knots. Held as insurance for Britain's 
imperial future in the Indian sub-continent, tribal 
Baluchistan came to function in the late nineteenth 
century, as a new balancing ground between the demands 
of empire and tribes. The imperial—tribal exchange, 
set the stage for a redistribut ion of territorial and 
e t h n o - p o 1itica1 resources which led to the emergence of 
British Baluchistan. This structural mutation created in 
turn new relations of power between imperial authority 
and tribal society, and the nation states of Afghanistan 
and Persia, who were caught up in the changes altering the 
balance of power on the Indian frontier, during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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The Russo Afghan Threat and Etailuchistan R e s t r u c t u r e d .
Despite the Forward Party's optimistic prediction 
that E^aluchistan would be the new promised land of 
political and strategic rewards, initially the move to 
Quetta opened a Pandora's box of comp 1 ications for the 
British. It proved impossi ble^ as Salisbury had 
to take up the Baluchistan option without attracting 
political attention. In London at the Admiralty,, 
Northbrook moralised if it was "proper reward for the 
loyalty of the Khan to annex any part of his territory 
at a l l ? 1' 1 For C» LL Aitchison, the departing Secretary 
of the Foreign Department, the acquisition of Quetta was 
emblematic of a critical dysjunction between ethical 
imperatives and official policy: "Political morality",
he wrote to Northbrook "seems utterly cast to the 
winds".22 For others as wel l? the move to Quetta seemed 
to breach political and psychological boundaries on the 
frontier. Neville Chamberlain, Resident at H y d e r a b a d ^  
feared that any move to Quetta would open "a new set of 
relations or complications, the end of which is quite 
beyond our calculations".3 The Times commented 
pessimistically that the move to Quetta had "deeply 
offended the Amir, and had done more than anything else 
to throw him into the hands of the Russians. It was the 
turning point of our Indian policy - the final 
abandonment of masterly inactivity".'* In fact the 
militarisation of Quetta not only laid the ghost of
S3
Afghan imperialism in Kalat politics, but it also 
fuelled fresh fears in the A m i r ’s mind. A nervous Amir 
confided to the Turkish mission which visited Kabul in 
1877s "The English have encroached upon my 
p oss e s s i o n s . ..» Quetta has been taken as a permanent 
military station by them without my consent, according 
to what rules of friendship , and in accordance with 
what T r e a t y ? 1,55
Unsettled by the British presence in Quetta., the 
Amir initially tried to set on foot a tribal conspiracy 
to regain freedom for the region. He tried to goad the 
Kalat ruler into action, by exhorting him as a Mussalman 
Prince to reject money from the kafirs (infidels) and 
throw the Treaty of 1876 to the wind.'6* The Khan was not 
averse to indulging in such a gesture, but the plan was 
still born as the Efaluch and Brahui chiefs refused to
join him., and jeopardise their recent gains in the 
Treaty of 1876.^
Foiled in his strategy to destabilize the British 
presence in Baluchistan, the Amir provocatively 
received a Russian mission in Kabul, but refused entry
to a British one led by Neville Chamber lain.e This 
temporary Russian bend in the A m i r ’s policy was only
insurance against the aggressive turn in Elritish activity
on the frontier. As Northbrook pointed out, the military
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build up on the Indian border could have appeared to the 
Amir as an intention to "interfere in Afghanistan, if 
not to attack h i m " . ^
For Lytton however, the Amiris overt hostility, 
provided a legitimate cover to exercise certain p r e ­
determined options in the Indo-Afghan borderland™ 
Lytton devoted an unusual amount of time 'to frontier 
policy, and was intent on extending the Indian border 
deep into the heart of tribal country across the Indus.
He was irked by the legacy of •’masterly inactivity*’, which 
he felt had only hemmed in imperial expansion, behind 
self-styled fences of non-interference in trans-frontier 
politics. Criticising the Indian frontier for stopping 
at the Indus, he wrote: "It was not a strong line,
except in the sense that a prison wall is strong to the 
prisoner... it left our boundary peculiarly exposed to 
inroads and insults, while limiting our power for 
external influence and c h a s t i s e m e n t " . 10 The Viceroy 
believed that British inaction had allowed islands of 
tribal anarchy to fLOcd' -Fr&d on the mainstream of 
political life in the borderland. Masterly inactivity 
had misguidedly sought to buy Afghan support with guns 
and money, without considering that "the Afghan will 
take any amount of money you like to give him, but he 
will... give you nothing in r e t u r n " . 11 The end result.
y
it seemed to Lytton^was that British political interests
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were left hostage to the caprices of the Amir, "the 
barbarian prince of a turbulent state". 1=3
Working on the supposition that the Afghan 
alliance was a liability, Lytton chose to dismantle it 
by weakening it as a political force on the frontier. 
Dismemberment and annexation of Afghanistan to India 
were ruled out by the lack of financial and military 
resources to sustain such ventures, and the only 
feasible plan left was to convert the tribal zone on the 
borderland into a militarised sector under British 
c o n t r o l . 13 This would erase the last remaining traces 
of Kabul's political writ on tribal lands, and also give 
India the much coveted scientific frontier. The 
existing frontier he felt was honeycombed with passes 
held by tribesmen whose support for British power was 
uncertain. Whether these tribes were to constitute a 
"bulwark to our power", Lytton observed, "or a thorn on 
our sides depends on whether the predominant influence 
is exercised from Kabul or... by ourselves".
Lytton's dual strategy to emasculate Kabul and 
lure the frontier tribes into the British net received 
unexpected help from the Amir himself when he rejected 
the British mission. By this act the Amir gave Lytton 
the excuse he had wanted to negate the Afghan alliance. 
Lytton had only refrained from making such a move because
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of opinion at "home of some secret determination" on 
his part to annex territory. 1SS The Amir's rebuff 
conveniently released the brake of English liberal 
opinion on Lytton's action. He correctly judged that 
the Afghan attitude had alienated a large cross section  
of political opinion, even those of his opponents. 
Lytton could now declare that he would not allow the 
Amir to fall under hostile influences "A tool in the 
hands of Russia I will never allow him to become. Such 
a tool it would be my duty to break before it could be 
used ".
□n this imperious note, Lytton despatched forces 
across the frontier into Afghanistan on 21 December 
1S7S. After Afghan reverses when Amir Sher Ali fled 
from Kabul in December 1878, Lytton telegraphed London 
that it was necessary for military objectives to occupy 
Jallalabad, detach the Kurram valley and F'ishin from 
Afghanistan. 1-7 When the new Amir Yakub Khan negotiated 
the Afghan surrender by concluding the Treaty of 
Gandamak, 1879, Article IX restored Oandhar and 
Jallalabad to Afghanistan, but not the Districts of 
Kurram, F'ishin, and Sibi. The limits of these Districts 
were to be eventually defined and they were to be 
treated as Assigned Districts, for the moment not 
"permanently severed from A f g h a n i s t a n " . 1® This informal 
control in F'ishin and Sibi gave E-fritish Baluchistan its
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early contours, and established the cornerstone of 
Lytton's alternative imperialism in the political 
restructuring of tribal lands, to break free from the 
Afghan connection.
Immediately after acquiring Pishin and Sibi, it 
became the object of British policy in India to convert 
the temporary nature of these possessions into a 
permanent political arrangement. Thus the Government of 
India emphasised to the Secretary of State that a 
permanent extension of the Indian frontier to Pishin 
would place E-tritish "military outposts within striking 
distance of Kabul and K a n d a h a r " . I n  a similar vein 
Alfred Lyall^ Secretary to the Foreign Department, 
pointed out that the possession of Pishin and Sibi gave 
Britain the command it was looking for in south 
Afghanistan. He wrote:
"We took Pishin and Sibi because those two 
districts appeared to give us the necessary foo t ­
holds? Pishin covered Quetta, and flanked all the 
roads to Kandahar and India. Sibi commanded the 
Harris, pressed the Afghans back from the Baluch, 
and was of great importance in view to our 
communications with Dera Ghazi Khan". ao
The rectification of the Baluchistan boundary to include
Pishin and Sibi was therefore designed to alter the
balance of power on the frontier, by giving the Indian
Empire a new strategic stranglehold over Afghanistan's
southern approaches.
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In order to cement the newly acquired tribal 
enclave to the imperial edifice, Lytton directed local 
British agents to cultivate tribal chiefs and headmen 
with "handsome presents" and "cordial assurances", to 
impress tribesmen that their interests would be better 
served by deserting the Afghan standard for a British 
one, 221 In Baluchistan itself, Lytton could depend on 
strong support from Robert Sandeman, appointed Agent to 
the Governor-General in 1876, to steer imperial control 
through the untried course of a newly occupied tribal 
country. Sandeman believed as firmly as the Viceroy in 
an imperial solution for the tribal problem; he was 
quite explicits
"The greater number of tribes we are able to bring 
under our influence..,bound to us.through their 
own interests .».the better it will be for our 
G ove r n m e n t " . 2522
In order to bind tribal allegiance to the E-tritish 
standard, Sandeman exploited existing divisions in 
tribal society. The fall-out from the tribal chiefs 
rebellion, 1857-1876,33 for instance still continued 
to disturb Sibi. During the period of rebellion, the 
Barozai chiefs of Sibi had provided shelter for rebel 
Brahui chiefs. The Amir's interest here was to keep 
Kalat weak and divided by keeping the rebellion alive. 
After 1876, the Khan of Kalat plotted his own revenge by 
trying to subvert the local Afghan leadership in favour 
of his own prote/cj£\ Sarbuland Khan, head of a 
particular section of the Barozai s a r d a r - k h e l . But in
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return For K a l a t *5 patronage, Sarbuland Khan had to give 
strategic information on the location of livestock to 
the predatory Marri tribesmen- At the Khan of K a l a t ’ s 
instigation., the Mar r is carried out damaging raids in 
Sibi, which led to the widespread abandonment of fields 
and villages.31^  The local economy was paralysed and 
Sibi dried up as a source of revenue for the Amir- The 
Khan of K a l a t ’s revenge was now complete- But the 
long suffering tribesmen of Sibi now approached the 
Baluchistan officials for help, referring to the fact 
that the Marris always returned goods taken from 
areas under British protect ion.:,B55 But Sandeman would 
not interfere to resolve the problem., for the purpose 
of British policy at this stage was to impress on 
tribesmen the difference between the protection given to 
those in alliance with the British, and those who were 
subjects of the Amir, and therefore excluded from 
protection.26 The point of this strategy was to create 
a ?tribal nee d ’ for British rule , as a kind of local 
insurance against ever having to return Sibi to 
Afghanistan. For F'ishin., Sandeman could argue that the 
local tribes had aided British forces during the 
campaigns of 1878-79, and to retreat from the District 
now, would expose local tribesmen to the A m i r ’s 
reve n g e .32 7r
But S a n d e m a n ’s attempt to anchor tribal society
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safely in the political moorings o-f E^ritish rule, 
threatened to slip loose as a fresh crisis enveloped 
Afghanistan;, ending in the massacre of the E<ritish 
garrison in Kabul on 3 September 1879. Military defeat 
followed* and in Baluchistan the first casualty was the 
frontier railway through Pishin. Work was halted on the 
line as there were no troops to spare for its 
protect ion.2213 As the situation deteriorated on the 
frontier* in England Beaconsfield’s Government was 
succeeded by G l a d s t o n e ’s Liberal Ministry in the spring 
of 1880, and Lytton departed from India* conscious that 
his imperial vision had fractured on the hard surface of 
Afghan resistance.
The new Liberal Government seemed poised to shake 
out the cobwebs of the old Forward Policy on the Indian 
frontier,. Lord Hartington* the new Secretary of State* 
argued the case against retaining Pishin and Sibi:
"The chief objections I take to be the considerable 
force and expenditure which would be required 
even for this limited extension of our frontier* 
and also the temptation to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan, which would be 
caused by our proximity to Kandahar* and by the 
facility of advance upon it".:z*3>
H a r t i n g t o n ’s original proposal to withdraw the 
imperial boundary behind Sibi and Pishin* soon choked on 
the thorny corpus of opposition views maturing in 
India. Paradoxically Lord Ripon the new Liberal Viceroy 
in India was most at odds with H a r t i n g t o n ’s
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determination to erase the scientific frontier in Sibi 
and F’ishin. In this respect Ripon believed in the 
argument.., that some degree of territorial control was 
required over Afghanistan to monitor K a b u l ’s political 
line on the frontier. He wrote:
"If we retain Pishin and keep our hold on the 
Khojak Amran Passes, we shall be within striking 
distance of Kandahar, in a position from which we 
can sei ze it at any time... I believe that the 
retention of a position from which we could 
dominate Kandahar without occupying it would tend 
greatly to keep the Amir in friendly relations 
with us ".30
The hold on Pishin was therefore calculated to keep the 
Amir on a firm political leash, and retain strategic 
control in the Baluch-Afghan borderland. Ripon was 
criticised for attempting to save "a shred of the 
scientific, frontier having let the substance g o " . 31 , ,
Ripon himself admitted that a permanent British presence 
in Sibi and Pishin was intended to appease a section 
of military opinion, which really favoured a move beyond 
Pishin and Shorawak to Kelat-i-Ghilzai and the line 
of the Helmand.33 To such forward minded men Pishin 
and Sibi were not just far away places on a map; they 
were symbols of prestige and the imperial image. As 
Frederick Haines the Commander-in-Chief maintained^ 
retreat would be construed in India as a sign of 
"weakness of will or military p ower".33 Rawlinson 
typically warned that by retiring Britain would 
abdicate her position as a first rate Asiatic power, and 
must be content "hereafter to play a very subordinate
9 7
part in the history of the world".34
From the heart of the disputed areas Sandeman
wrote that the prospect of withdrawal "sent a cold
shudder through my frame and made me tremble for our 
future influence on the Frontier".3 * He also stressed 
the balance of power dimension to Ripon : "...the
possession of Fisheen and Sibi, would act so to speak as
a buffer between the Khan of K a l a t 9s people, ourselves 
and the Afghans".36 Sandeman was clearly anxious not 
to contract the margins of his new provincial charge for 
the sake of Liberal scruples about a frontier extending 
deep into tribal territory.
Despite these mounting objections, Hartington 
still hoping to withdraw from Pishin, reiterated the 
"strain on ...military and financial resources" attending 
its occupation.3-7 But Lytton dismissed the point by 
arguing:"The possession of empire must always be an 
expensive privilege. E<ut the loss of empire may be a 
ruinous disgrace; and the safety of India is worth more 
than a few pieces of silver. We cannot haggle wih 
dest i n y ".30
Caught in this labyrinth of political speculation 
the future of Pishin and Sibi eluded a clear cut 
settlement. The Government of India advised by Alfred
9 8
Lyall, now Secretary in the Foreign Department, played 
for time, and informed London that the two areas could 
only be given back to the Amir "whenever we leave 
Quetta",3^ and that pledges of protection to tribesmen 
on the frontier should not be jeopardised by a sudden 
retreat.40 On L y a l ^ s  advice the political titles of 
Sibi and Pishin were left deliberately vague; fhe Amir 
was to be excluded from any future discussion 
on the sovereignty of these areas, because Lyall Felt 
this would weaken E<ritish claims to the titles of the two 
areas.41 In this way he hoped to keep open the option 
of annexation at a future date, while leaving a loophole 
for retreat , should the Baluchistan experiment prove 
untenable. In effect he was putting the scientific 
frontier, in the Sibi “Pishin sector on trial, before 
making the final decision.
In view of the Government of India's stand, 
Hartington was forced to postpone the w i t h d r a w a l . ■*:2 As 
the advocates of retention correctly judged, the passage 
of time would only draw the places closer to India, 
and consign the idea of retreat to a mere footnote in 
history. In 1881 The Government of India sent a map to 
England, in which Thai Chotiali was marked as included 
within the boundary of British Assigned Districts, and 
they submitted revenue reports on the Districts of 
Pishin, Sibi, and Thai Chotiali.^-3 For all practical
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purposes therefore, the dialogue between London and 
Calcutta closed with the establishment of a new British 
controlled enclave on the Baluch-Afghan borderland. Thus 
the early contours of British Baluchistan were traced 
against a political backdrop of divided opinions and 
uncertain minds.
As a result of the forward move to Pishin, India’s 
strategic frontier crept further northeast to the 
pi- ecinets of the Zhob valley, which gave access to the 
Gomal Pass leading into Afghanistan. Tribal valleys 
and strategic mountain passes were the desired props for 
supporting British India’s imperial frontage. In 
consequence both the Zhob valley and the Kakar tribes 
who lived in the area, became valued commodities on the 
imperial scales, as the strategic significance of the 
Zhob-Gomal route became increasingly clear. The
Pioneer M a ll, quoting Sir Thomas H o 1 d i c h , a Victorian 
authority on boundary making, wrote about the Zhob-~ 
Gomal routes "This route is the most important and 
probably the easiest on our whole North West Frontier. 
For hundreds of years past it has been the F’owindah 
highroad between India, Afghanistan, Khurassan, and 
Kandahar. Yet up to date the course of the great Gomal 
highway into Afghanistan is marked on our maps by 
conjectural 1ines".
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In Baluchistan, Sandeman was keenly aware that the 
opening of Zhob would reset the margins of frontier 
control deep into the tribal territories of the north­
east and complete the encirclement of Afghan power. As 
early as 1879, when the British army was moving through 
Kakar country into Afghanistan , Sandeman had speculated 
on permanently controlling the area. The acqui sition of 
Pishin brought this objective closer. As he explained 
to Alfred Lyall: "Having possession of the Pishin
District will enable us to do what we like with the 
Kakar tribes, whereas had we been cooped up in Quetta we 
could only have got at them at the greatest disadvantage 
through the A m i r ’s Government".43 Here Sandeman was 
reviving L y t t o n ’s old concept of structuring frontier 
policy on direct relations with the tribes, rather than 
relying on the Amir as an effective broker of British 
political interests in tribal t e rritories.44
Addressing himself to the imperial minded, Sandeman 
described Zhob as the key to Baluchistan; a controlling 
.influence in Zhob would open the Gomal Pass, and give 
the British command over all the approaches leading from 
Afghanistan to the Derajat.1*'7'
The instability of local tribal politics gave 
Sandeman an initial opening to interfere in Zhob. 
Historically Z h o b ’s tributary relationship with 
Afghanistan had fed violence in the local system, as
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the Amir used the* Kakar tribesmen to keep the frontier 
destabilized when it suited his purpose. In 18*79 the 
Kakars had joined the A m i r ’s forces against the British 
army of invasion in Afghanistan. Subsequently as the 
Indian frontier crept up to Quetta, Pishin, and Sibi, 
and the prospect of defeaiting the E-iritish militarily lay 
buried in the dust of the Afghan wars, the Amir 
escalated his policy of creating tension in 
Baluchistan. In 1880 a section of the Kakars rebelled 
against the passage of the Qandhar railway through 
their valleys in the Chappar Mountains, and killed a 
British officer H.L.. Showers.49 The violent action of 
the Kakars was probably the A m i r ’s reply to the frontier 
railway which threatened the heart of southwest 
Afghanistan. Violence continued to spark, as Kakar 
tribesmen raided military outposts near Thai Chotiali, 
Kach, and Duki, all through 1883-1884, causing loss of 
ammunition and men guarding the s tores.550 Sandeman 
linked this militant outburst of Kakar xenophobia to the 
maverick figure of Shah Jahan, the local Kakar chief, 
"whose whole prestige", he wrote, "rests on his violent 
hatred of and active opposition to u s " . 531 And behind 
the scene of local violence Sandeman detected the hand 
of the Amir. He wrote to Ripon early in 1883 that 
emissaries from Kabul were circulating letters among the 
Kakars of Pishin and Zhob, to set up local governments 
under Afghan c o n t r o l .32 And for Sandeman the Afghan
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propaganda seemed to succeed when one of the Pishin 
Kakars killed a troop follower. He wrote:"This is the 
first act of real enmity that has occurred."B3
For Sandeman the opposition between British and 
Kakar forces articulated the unreso lved cont.radiction 
between imperial order and tribal anarchy. He wrote:
"They have always shown hostility to British rule. 
This feeling has its origins chiefly in a spirit 
of fanaticism peculiar to all Pathan tribes ... 
and perhaps to some degree also in the dislike 
all wild tribes have, at seeing a strong 
government inimical to evil doers, established in 
their midst".55'*
But more than a confrontation of cultural norms, such
violence also challenged the exercise of force majeure
on which any structure of foreign rule must depend for
survival. Alive to this danger, Sandeman proposed a
punitive expedition to Zhob in 1884,5355 to root out Kakar
hostility, and prevent the further spread of local
violence, which would only corrode British political
control in Baluchistan.
In the Foreign Department the Kakar problem was 
dismissed as trifling, but a punitive expedition to Zhob 
was sanctioned in reponse to Sandeman'1 s request.®6 
Since the tribal issue was of marginal concern, the 
moving cause behind the official decision to act in 
Zhob, may be traced to the new points of pressure 
developing in central Asian politics. In March 1884,
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the Russians occupied and annexed the oasis of Merv, 
bringing their imperial frontier to the brink of 
contact with Afghanistan- To many British observers,
Merv was the psychological ru.bicon in Russia's century 
long march towards India- Blackwoods Magazine warned 
that through Merv, Russia " could bring the Cossack
within sight of India, the 'garden of the east', and the 
cynosure of Russia's unwavering policy for a hundred and 
fifty years".57 In Parliament, Lord Salisbury declared 
that the crisis in Merv had touched the very heart of 
imperial prestige, that "impalpable influence"... without 
which even strong frontiers and impregnable fortresses 
would "dissolve and c r u m b l e 1'.50 This flood of alarmist 
opinion inevitably washed up the debris of the Liberal 
Government's policy of retreat on the frontier- Members 
of the Forward School felt their moment had come again 
in Indian politics, and old priorities like the 
scientific frontier and Qandhar railway were re-injected 
into the mainstream of political discussion. The idea 
of a military rail link through Baluchistan to dominate 
southern Afghanistan gained ground as the most feasible 
counter to Russia's domination of Merv. The Times 
attempting to steer government policy onto the old 
tracks of the abandoned Qandhar railway quoted 
Rawlinsons"The railway was the most efficient arm of 
defence hitherto deviled against Russian aggression, far 
more efficient than the conquest of Cabul, or the
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establishment in power of a friendly Amir, for its 
effect when completed would have been to transfer our 
military base from the Indus to within 350 miles of the 
threatened point of attack namely H e r a t " . !3<5> At about 
the same time, news that the Russians planned to 
complete the Askabad Railway to Merv and the Qxus by the 
summer of 1885 increased pressure on the government to 
invest in strategic projects in India which would match 
those of their Russian rivals in central Asia. The 
expected change of course occurred with a government 
announcement in June 1884, that the present position of 
the Qandhar railway would be extended from Sibi to 
Pishin and Quetta along the Harnai road, and the new 
line was to be renamed the Sind-Pishin R a i l way.*0 In 
Baluchistan itself, the railway acted as a touchstone 
for drawing the Zhob tribes within the imperial orbit. 
For now the Kakar problem could no longer be viewed as a 
routine trouble spot on the tribal map, since the Zhob 
valley dominated the northern approaches to the? Pishin 
railway, and continuing Kakar militancy could make the 
project an expensive mistake for the government. 
As the local factor of Kakar violence fitted into 
the imperial equation, Sandeman could write with 
confidences "The opportunity is now most favourable for- 
settling with the K a k a r s , and I think the Government 
will act unwisely, if with the railway under 
construction, they neglect the opportunity to do so. It
is not so much with the object of punishing for the past 
as settling for the future that I propose the 
expedit ion" . **
The Zhob expedition started out on 15 November 
1884, with a mixed military and tribal escort. As the 
marching force reached the outskirts of Bori, the 
F'anezai, Sarangzai, and Dumar Kakars submitted to 
British terms without opposition. Inside the Bori 
valley, feuding patterns dictated the choice of alliance 
or hostility with the British. Thus victim groups like 
the Hamzazis and Mando Khels opted for British 
protection, against predatory tribes like the Musa Khels 
and Kibzais, who on their part held aloof from negotiating 
with Sandeman-** Across the E<ori valley in Zhob itself, 
Shah Jahan the rebel leader absconded across the border 
into Ghilzai country, to escape the reach of the 
advancing force. But this only helped Sandeman to 
rearrange Zhob politics without any challenge from 
local tribes who were now virtually leader less. 
Sandeman was further aided in his task, by the feuding 
divisions within the Jogezai sardar-khel (the ruling 
family in Zhob), which allowed him to splinter the Kakar 
apposition at the leadership level, before any new 
aspirant stepped into the position vacated by Shah Jahan. 
In line with this divisive strategy, Sandeman offered to 
recognize Shahbaz Khan ( a nephew of Shah Jahan and
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leader of the Ishak-Kahol faction among the Jogezais) as 
the new chief of Zhob, and promised him future support 
in leadership contests against claimants from the rival 
N a w a b - K a h o 1 faction. In return Shahbaz would be 
expected to function as a politically loyal and 
dependant client of the British Government, and severe 
all political links between Zhob and A f ghanistan.*3 
Predictably for Shahbaz Khan the lure of chiefship was 
worth more than the new adjustments required in Zhob's 
external relations with Afghanistan, and he opted for 
co-operation with Sandeman. His decision also dismantled 
any residual opposition among tribes like the Musa Khels 
and Kibzais, who now felt unequal to the task of 
continuing their struggle against the British unaided by 
the Zhob Kakars in their r e a r „**
With the tribal surrender underway, the expedition 
was brought to a close, by a formal admission of British 
supremacy from the chiefs and headmen in Zhob and Bori. 
Fines were paid and hostages taken from tribesmen as 
human deterrents against future threats of violence.*55 
The mission was acclaimed in the Anglo-Indian press as a 
very great success; as T he Pioneer Mail observed:"The 
whole Kakar countryside has been brought under 
subjection and a powerful tribe has learnt that the 
Sarkar Anqrez is a reality and not a myth".** There 
was also satisfaction that yet another section
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of the unexplored tribal frontier was now open for 
political observation. Historically, Sandeman's success 
in planting imperial supremacy on Kakar soil altered 
the traditional mould of local politics, by terminating 
Zhob's past linkage with Kabul, and instituting in 
its place a new p a t r o n - c 1ient relationship between the 
Indian Empire and tribal authority. He had manoue vred 
Zhob successfully out of the Afghan orbit to the British 
one, and the next forward move by Russia could even make 
it the western arc of the scientific frontier, which 
would claim new urgency in the aftermath of Merv.
It was not long before the disparate threads of 
central Asian politics knotted into a new crisis along 
the Russo-Afghan border. M e r v 's capitulation to Russia 
had left Afghanistan's northwestern frontier 
particularly vulnerable to external attack or 
e n c r o a c h m e n t „ Consequently, Britain suggested and 
received assent for a joint Anglo-Russian Commission to 
delimit Afghanistan's northern boundary, in the hope of 
committing the Tsar's Government to an
international line which would mark the southern limit 
of Russian e x p ansion.*7 While the work of boundary 
delimitation was in progress , Afghan troops clashed 
with Russian ones at. Panjdeh, in northern Afghanistan on 
31 March 1885 and lost the position to Russia.*3 
Panjdeh brought England and Russia to the brink of war.
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The? pacifism of the Liberals appeared obsolete in the
cold real it'/ of Russian mi 1 itar isat ion of central Asia.
By the middle of June, Gladstone asked Parliament to vote
on war credits, and the Cabinet decided that a Russian
move to Herat would be treated as a cassus be 11 i.
"The frontier of the future", Lord Kimberley, Secretary
of State for India asserted, "must be a military one".'70
In India, The Englishman reported "The shadow of war is 
stealing on us fast".7’1 And from Quetta a cor respondent 
wrote:" We are on tiptoe of expectation here with regard 
to a forward move? on Herat . . . our nerves are. . . jumpy. 
Russia has encroached quite far ... any further advance 
may cause us to lose something more tangible than 
prestige".7’* But the idea of war which beguiled the 
minds of politicians and public alike, proved illusory 
by the end of June 1885, when the Russians prepared to 
accept arbitration, and the Afghans agreed to abandon 
Panjdeh in exchange for Zulfikar.7’3 But Panjdeh 
remained a critical pointer to British weakness in Asia. 
There was need for a new image and a fresh appraisal of 
strategic priorities. The first indication of change 
was the defeat of the Liberal Party in the 1885 
elections, making way for the new Conservative 
Government to reassess the balance sheet of central Asian 
politics.
By 1885 it was axiomatic to any scheme of imperial
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defence that the security of India was not pri marily an 
internal issue, but an external one linked to the 
political challenge of Russian imperialism in Asia. Men
like Sir George Chesney, Military member o f  /the
Viceroy's Council liked to talk of a "day of trial", 
when India would have to face an antagonist supported 
"by the hordes of Central Asia, and equipped with all 
the warlike appliances of a first class European 
power".74 Dn the same note The Times urged the 
government not to slacken for a moment the construction 
of the scientific frontier, which would require not one 
"hillside" from the Amir, but only the courage to "take 
possession of strategic possessions now lying absolutely 
at the mercy of the first come r".755 Responding to the 
clamour for an extended frontier, Sal 1sbury,the new British 
Premier, dismissed as perilous the fortress Indus 
theory, which he feared would make the Indian plains the 
future theatre of war, and also the notion of a fortified 
base at Herat which he felt would overs tretch Indian 
resources.7* Instead Salisbury favoured a militarised 
Baluchistan as the key to India's defence requirements.
He observed:
[iikj
"There are p l a c e s ^  Quetta, the Khojak Pass and 
Ka n d a h a r ... and somewhere in that part of the 
country I b e l i e v e , ..w i 11 be found in future ... 
the centre? of the defence works which we? must 
make to sustain our power... Let. no desire to 
balance? the budget... to respect the
susceptibilities of the tribes around 
u s . ..p r e v e n t ...giving security to that vast 
front ier"„77
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The scientific -frontier presupposed a political 
border land, stretching beyond the administered realm in 
India, where British paramountcy and influence would 
prevail. In official estimations British dominance in 
this outer zone, which included Baluchistan and
Afghanistan, was scarcely less essential for 
Britain's position in India, than its "predominance in 
Baroda or Hyderabad".7® But this blueprint for extended 
influence posed a problem, for the outer frontier did not 
really coincide with the zone of absolute control. 
As Viceroy, Dufferin^uneasy about the government's hold 
on the outlying borderland, wrote to Cross, Secretary of 
State for India:"The worst of it is that our nervous 
tissues extend a good deal beyond the limits of our
material and military jurisdiction ".7<5> A way out of the 
dilemma was perceived in a planned expansion of arterial 
railroad links covering the far flung Baluch-Afghan
borderland, which would provide a permanent structure 
for British influence in the region, and complete the 
political encirclement of tribal groups, whose lands 
dotted the imperial circuit, traced by the scientific
frontier. This blueprint for power and control in 
tribal country owed much in concept and execution to the 
Military. At the close of 1SS5, the Indian army had a 
new Commander--in-Chief, Sir Frederick Roberts.
On paper Roberts favoured the Hindukush as India's 
northern border; in practice, such a high risk concept
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was untenable, and he settled for the narrower 
alternative of dismantling the independence of 
peripheral tribes on the western margins of Afghanistan, 
thereby staking out these lands as the conflict zone of 
the future. Rejecting the Indus line of defence as 
insular, Roberts argued for a 'continental' approach 
to India's defence needs. The term 'continental' 
subsumed wide ranging military measures , calculated to 
give the Indian army an increased capability for 
offensive action along the Quetta-Qandhar—Herat route. 
In line with this strategy, frontier fortifications were 
to encompass an outer barrier of protective works at 
select points, backed in the rear by a series of heavily 
armed cantonments, completely equipped with the material 
of war, and forming the immediate base for a British 
force acting against an invading army. The inner and 
outer lines were to be connected with railways and 
military roads on the one side, and on the other side 
with the great network of railway communications in 
India.00 As a footnote to the military theme Roberts 
touched on the corrective impact of railroad penetration 
on the f rontie r , w h i ch w o u 1d a 11ow for better i nt e r n a 1 
control, and help to chisel away the non-conformist 
edges in tribal social patterns.01
In Baluchistan, the new defence strategy spurred a 
programme of railroad developments, which led to fresh
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territorial readjustments. If Quetta was to function as 
the base for a forward move towards Qandhar, she needed 
supporting lines of communication with Sind and the 
Punjab. The Sind-Pishin Railway afforded linkage in the 
south with Sind, but there was still need for better 
communication with the Punjab- Thus in the spring of 
1885, the Foreign and Military Departments of the 
Government of India worked out the route for a new 
military road, which was to leave the Punjab at Fort 
Munroe, proceed north westwards through Khetran country, 
and then curve in a westerly direction through the E-tori 
va\ 11 ey to Pishin.®*
The road^which cut across the homelands of the 
Kakar Pathans in Bori, and the Khetran Baluch, just 
across the Dera Ghazi Khan border, inevitably placed the 
political future of these groups in the balance. 
Sandeman predictably raised the old spectre of tribal 
violence to argue for British control in E-tori, without 
which he insisted he could not ensure the safety of the 
new road.®3 He had support from Roberts, who painted 
out that a move to Bori would centre British power in 
the tribal heart of northeast Baluchistan! " We could 
eventually.... be in a position to control Zhob politics 
and command the Gomal Pass without losing touch with 
t he Mar r i s and other B a 1uc h t r ibe s ... it is most 
desirable that our frontier should be advanced so as to
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include Bori".0'* Under pressure from Roberts and 
Sandeman, E-tori became part of British administered 
territory in Baluchistan, confirming the relentless 
logic of the Forward policy, intent on plucking the 
scientific frontier from the depths of tribal territory.
A Bori type solution for the Khetran valley proved 
marginally more difficult to achieve. Here Sandeman had 
to run the gauntlet not of tribal hostility, 
but opposition from the Punjab. The Punjab which had 
already lost its frontier status when the Indian 
boundary moved up to Quetta, was unwilling to concede 
further ground to the Baluchistan Agency, and used the 
mak i. ng of t he new r oad to claim cont ro 1 over t he 
Khetrans, as a buffer to force Sandeman as far back as 
possible from the Dera Ghazi Khan borders. The question 
of control was further complicated by the fact that the 
Khetrans sustained a wide network of social and economic 
linkages with the Punjab and E-taluchi stan tribes. 
Kinship ties existed with the Leg hair is on the Punjab 
side and the Bugtis in Baluchistan.OKS Their main market 
of exchange was in Dera Ghazi Khan, but feuding 
relations existed mainly with the Mar r i and Kakar 
tribes of Baluchistan.OA The feuding perspective 
allowed Sandeman to stress the danger from tribal 
frictions to the safety of the new road as it skirted 
the south eastern sweep of the Khetran vail ley. Raids
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and counter-raids by the Marris and Kakars had
desolated the area. The Khetrans did not participate
directly in violent duels, but they received stolen 
property and gave asylum to raiders who plundered on their 
behalf.®'7'. In order to dismantle this structure of
violence, Sandeman believed that he should manage the 
Khetrans in addition to the control he already exercised 
over the Kakars and liarris; to hand over the Khetrans to 
the Punjab would only fragment government authority and 
impair control over the tribal complex entangled in raids 
and reprisals. As he wrote to the Foreign Department, 
"One political officer can best manage contending 
factions or tribes, because he can so to speak knock 
their heads to gether".00 For the Government of India, 
law and order had a higher priority in a frontier region 
like Baluchistan, over ethnic factors like kinship ties 
and trading exchanges. In 1887 therefore it sanctioned 
the incorporation of the Khetran valley in the 
Baluchistan Agency.®*7 The decision interposed a new 
administrative divide across tribal territory,
interrupting the free flow of inter-tribal linkages 
between the Khetrans and the Punjab tribes, and 
restricting their access to the markets of the Punjab. 
Apart from the tribal perspective, by underwriting this 
new expansion of the Baluchistan frontier, the 
Government of India seemed set to enter the expansionist 
course uncovered by Sandeman in the borderlands.
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Implicit in such a policy turn was S a n d e m a n ’s evident 
success in eclipsing the political ascendancy of the 
Punjab in frontier affairs- Lord Connemara, Governor
of Madras, 1890, emphasised the point to the Viceroy:
" Indeed S a n d e m a n ’s policy is based upon progressive 
influence over the tribes, and it would be inconsistent 
now to allow the Punjab Government to build up any wall 
of difficulty between Sandeman and the future".90
The new imperialism of roads and railways which 
had probed deep into tribal Baluchistan on the northeast, 
shifted focus after 1886 to the western borderlands of 
Afghan-E-faluch country. Emblematic of this political 
drive was a strategy which sought to convert the Sind- 
Pishin railway into an instrument for shaping a new
balance of power on the west, structured on the
miltary dominance of Qandhar, and the domestication of 
the B a 1uch~Afghan border tribes. In the political
stocktaking after Panjdeh, Herat had given place to 
Qandhar as the realistic forward point of British
resistance to Russian advances. Dufferin made the point 
clear to the Military: "It would be far more to our
advantage to tempt the Russians to drive us out of
Candahar than for us to embark on the converse operation 
against them at Herat".*91 But Dufferin had to contend 
with Afghan opposition to any scheme for a British
presence in Qandhar. To circumvent this problem.
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D ufferin^ in concert with Roberts and C h e s n e y , came out 
in favour of extending the Sind— Pishin rail line from its 
existing terminus at Gulistan, through the Khwaja Amran 
Range to New Chaman on the Afghan side of the border. At 
Chaman all the rails, rolling stock, and other material 
known as the 'Candahar res e r v e 7, would be stored in 
complete readiness, to begin at a moment's notice the 
extension of the Sind—Pishin-Chaman line towards 
Qandhar.*952 The new military leverage over Qandhar was 
designed to facilitate the pursuit of an attacking 
trans frontier policy. Dufferin wrote to Salisbury:
"The moment we pass the Khwaja Amran range with a 
tunnel... in order to carry our railway twelve 
miles further towards a point which leads 
no where, it becomes evident that our policy is 
no longer that of guarding the entrance to our 
own, , house,, or , making a, temporary excursion
beyond, but that we are contemplating a permanent
advance into foreign territory, in accordance 
with the ideas of the Forward school as opposed 
to those of Lawrence and his adherents".*93
In this political spring of the Forward movement, 
Roberts and Sandeman carried the imperial manual into 
still unclaimed tribal tracts. R o b e r t s ? keen to 
tribal resources to secure British control of the 
Kabul-Qandhar line, envisaged a contact zone " between 
India's present and proposed frontier, where the tribes 
would be prepared to accept British influence".*9**
Permanent occupation executed with a bold front was his 
political solution for the tribes in the intermediate
zone.98 In Baluchistan the? dynamics of this policy drew 
the British Government to the last stretch of the tribal
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tableland in Zhob, where the Saran Kakars had so far 
escaped the net of formal control. Focusing attention 
on Zhob as a catchment area for trapping tribal
resources to strengthen the sinews of empire, Sandeman
urged how necessary it was to be in touch with local
tribesmen, "to prevent our enemies using the Ghazni-
Candahar line as a base of operations against India," 
and "the greater number of tribes we are able to bring 
under our influence, and the nearer we can get to Ghazni 
with them...the better...it will be for our 
Government".9'8’ The imperial interest in cementing Zhob 
to British India arose from the need to plug the only 
discernible gap in the Kabul-Qandhar line of defence, 
namely the Gomal route to Ghazni. While control 
of the Khyber arid the Bolan covered the main approaches 
to India from Kabu 1 and Qandhar, yet as The Erig 1 ishman 
pointed out, the possibility remained "of an enemy 
occupying a base at Ghazni, between the two great cities 
of Afghanistan and striking at the unguarded centre of our 
line through the Gomal pass".*9'7' The solution seemed to 
lie in the occupation of the Zhob valley, which 
stretched in an east-west direction to the rear of the 
Sulaiman Range, giving command of the Draband, Gomal, 
and Toehi passes on the Afghan side, while itself being 
easily accessible from Quetta. "The Gomal route", The 
T 1mes observed, "abuts on the Ghazni road from Herat to 
Cabul, and should enable an adequate force in occupation
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of the country near Appozai Cin the Zhob valley] to cut 
an invader's communication between the two Afghan 
fo r tresses".*9C3
Sandeman had already cleared a passage to Zhob by
the Kakar expedition of 1884-1885, in the course of
which the anti-British members of the sardar-khel had
been purged from the tribal power srtucture, and
^ <
leadership conferred on Sandeman's p r o t e ^ ^  Shahbaz 
Khan.*9*9 On his own initiative Sandeman had buttressed 
this structure of indirect influence by subsidizing the 
local chief with R s . 1000 per m o n t h . 100 But this 
model of internal control in Zhob started to fracture at 
a critical time in the post-1885 period, when the swing 
in favour of the Forward Policy required a major re­
alignment of tribal politics with British India. Even as 
the strategic value of Zhob climbed the imperial scales, 
the fragile strands of British influence in the valley 
were about to snap, as a new power struggle broke out 
for the leadership of the Kakar tribes. Shahbaz Khan, 
the British appointed leader, found his authority 
challenged by Dost Muhammad, leader of a rival faction
in the sardar-khel . As the conflict progressed through
1886— 1887, Dost Muhammad skilfully inflicted violence on 
Kakar groups which traditionally supported Shahbaz Khan, 
with the object of weaning them away from old 
loyalties. The success of Dost Muhammad's
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strategy progress!vely devalued Shahbaz before his own 
tribal audience and also caused destruction of life and 
property in Z h o b . 101
The destabilization of the Kakar enclave 
was S a n d e m a n -’ s opportunity to re-open the question of 
permanent occupation in Zhob. Pressing for a second 
punitive expedition, Sandeman warned that prolonged 
unrest in Zhob could create a corridor of violence 
stretching from Pishin to the Afghan border, and the 
only solution guaranteed to safeguard British strategic 
interests in Baluchistan was to transfer the Kakar 
tribes to his j u risdiction.102 Sandeman could count on 
support from the Military, while the wider strategic 
significance of Zhob in giving access to the Gomal Pass 
and Ghazni led the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne^to extend his 
approval.. The Viceroy felt he could risk another 
mission to Zhob, if it would open the Gomal Pass for 
trade and military purposes. To allow tribal
misdemeanour to close the Gomal was in his view a 
"confession of impotence utterly unworthy of a great 
p o w e r " . 103 He wrote to Cross, Secretary of State for 
India, that before he left office, he wished to see a 
good road made through the Pass without tribal 
op p o s i t i o n . 10*
Sandeman and George Stuart White, Commander of the
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Zhob Field Force , started out on the new expedition in 
November 1889. The show of military strength soon led 
Kakar groups like the Hamzazis, Kibzais, and Musa Khels 
to make separate submissions to Sandeman. In Zhob 
itself, t he approach of the troops alarmed Dost 
Muhammad, the principal offender and other minor
headmen in his camp, who fled north across the border 
into Thanishpa. This allowed Shahbaz Khan to reassert 
his leadership over the Zhob Kakars with British
support. To gild the reality of the military
occupation, and secure tribal consent for the 
pacification of Zhob, Sandeman promised financial 
assistance to bolster the authority of the chief and 
headmen. In return he found the headmen willing to
petition the British Government, to take them and their
country, under "protection and administration, and 
station troops at such places in Zhob as they deem
f i t " 1 oss
In Zhob, Sandeman provocatively occupied Appozai as 
his headquarters, a strategic position which dominated 
the Gomal Pass, and the whole F'athan country of semi- 
independent tribes,in order to blunt the edge of Afghan 
ambit i o n i n t he a r e a . L o c a 1 Ma ndo K h e 1s , Waziris, and 
Shiranis were e-ach gi ven service ta the va 1 ue of Rs. 25, 000 
to keep the pass open. On paper it seemed as though Sandeman 
had achieved the objectives of securing control in Zhob
121
and opening the Gomal Pass. The Secretary of State noted 
optimistically* "I have no doubt that the success of the 
arrangements will materially promote the pacif ication of 
the whole b o r d e r " « 10A But this was the first real 
trial of Sandeman's policy in the Pathan country around 
the Gomal. Compliance was not the tribal watchword 
here, and early in 1890, the Kidderzai section of the 
Shirani tribe rejected the a r r a n g e m e n t s ^  Sandeman had 
just made in the G o m a l . 10-7
The defiance of the Kidderzais blacklisted them in 
Sandeman's book. He preferred to hold them responsible 
fo r ma ny of t he raids per pet uat e d on t he bo r de r wi t hout 
any conclusive proof, and in April 1890 he broached 
the idea of a punitive expedition against t h e m . 10® 
While the proposal was being considered, the Kidderzais 
offered their own terms of submission in June. They 
wanted the British to repeal the tax on imports and 
exports which had been levied in lieu of a fine of 
R s . 10,000 imposed after the expedition of 1 S 8 9 . 100 
But Sandeman preferred to ignore the tribal terms of 
submission, and continued to press for a punitive 
expedition to coerce the tribe and secure the route 
between Appozai and the Derajat. Lansdowne bowed to 
pressure and sanctioned the expedition in August 1890, 
"not so much on its merit", as he confided to James
Lyall, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, but because 
he CSandeman3 is "difficult and dangerous to 
t h w a r t " .110
As military coercion followed, the Kidderzais had 
to pay a new fine and agree to the establishment of 
posts in their country. In the aftermath, George 
Stuart White, Military Commander of the expedition, 
marched troops to the top of the mountain, known as the 
Takht-i-Sulaiman [Solomon’s thronell, imbued with holy 
significance for local tribes, in order to teach a 
"useful lesson to the p e o p l e " . 111 But the ascent 
of a sacred peak, intended to intimidate the tribes, 
could only be a recipe for deep resentment. As Lord 
Northbrook observed: "The officer who went up to the top
of the Throne of Solomon was not governed by the wisdom 
of Solomon in that o p e r a t i o n " . 1132 The India Office was 
critical of the Kidderzai expedition and believed that 
by rejecting tribal overtures for peace, the Government 
of India had lost moral ground on the f r o n t i e r . 113 Even 
R.I. Bruce, Commissioner of the Derajat, and S a n d e m a n ’s 
loyal henchman, warned Sandeman that military coercion 
would only win the? temporary submission of the 
Shi r a n i s .1 1 + .
The? controversial treatment of the Shirani tribe 
continued even after the expedition. Anxious to
pre-empt the almost inevitable bid from Sandeman for
management of the whole Shi rani country, the Punjab
Government proposed a division of the tribe for
purposes of control. The fact that there was a
mountain range separating two sections of the Shi rani
-fhcct
t r i b e ^  ■ the Barghas and Larghas, and/sinternally their 
constitution was segmented in the decentralised 
tradition of the F'athan tribal structure, forming an 
aggregate of "rude independent ... republics", was 
enough just ification for James Lyall to recommend the 
political separation of the groups under different 
admi nist rat ions, of E-ialuchistan and the Punjab, insisting 
it would not disrupt the Shirani tribe . 11=5 But the 
argument carried the hallmark of using the evidence of 
spatial sepou-ation and internal segmentation to deny the 
Shi ran is their corporate identity as one tribe. 
Lansdowne himself was doubtful whether "the 
distinction between the two sections is sufficiently 
substantial to warrant their being placed under separate 
administrations" . 1 But he conceded the point; the 
Barg has were transferred in 1891 to the control of the 
Baluchistan Government, and the Larghas were left to the 
Punjab. Tribal unity was sacrificed, and partition endorsi 
to satisfy the self-interested motives of the Punjab and 
Baluchistan Governments competing for local power.
S ande m a n ’s successive missions in 1809 and 1890
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also raised the question about the political -future 
of the tribes in the Gomal Valley, i.e. the Nando Khels, 
Waziris, and Ghilzais- James Lyall was anxious to
secure control of the "Gomal valley highway" as "a 
buffer between Sandeman and the Waziris", if the 
arrangements by which the Punjab controlled the latter 
were to last-11'7’ But Sandeman argued that the
conservative style of the Punjab Government would limit 
its i nvo 1 vement i n Waz i r i af f ai r s d:0 ■ t he
protection of the Gomal Pass, leaving their conduct 
beyond that point unchecked. "If Baluchistan posts are 
on the Gomal River", Sandeman pointed out, "the Punjab 
officers will be compelled to keep the Waziris in order,
because there would be complaints from my officers if
they did not"-11®
As a result of the conflicting views of the Punjab 
and Baluchistan, the Government of India was under 
pressure to opt for caution or adventure on the 
frontier. Lansdowne had little faith in the Punjab; he 
observed!
"I have no doubt that the regions lying beyond the 
Gomal pass could not be conveniently controlled 
from Lahore.-.The nomad hill tribes which 
frequent the borderland have to be kept in order, 
and must also be protected from Waziri raids 
f r om the countr y no rt h of t he Gomal R iver „ Far 
this purpose the caunt ry must be ef ■f ect i ve 1 y 
policed and the easy going ways of the Punjab 
Government are by no means suited to such a 
t a s k " . 11’*
The Government of India also persuaded itself that the 
e s c a 1 at i on of t he Russ ian t hr eat , t he passage of t he 
trans-Indus railways, and the decision of the Military 
authorities to meet an external foe beyond the Indian 
frontier, made "it absolutely necessary to abandon the 
policy of non-intervention in the affairs of frontier 
t r i b e s " . 120 The tide of political opinion was 
distinctively in S a n d e m a n ’s favour, and in the spring of 
1891, the Government of India decided that the Gomal 
river between Kundar Domandi and Kajuri Kach, should be 
considered as the boundary between the Baluchistan 
Government and the tribal country supervised by the 
P u n j a b . 121 Sandeman had gained control of the tract 
between the Kundar and Gomal river valleys, which Lyall 
had wished to interpose between the jurisdiction of the 
Baluchistan Government and Waziri country. At the same 
time the tribal margins of the Baluchistan Agency were 
stretched still further by the incluson of the Mando Khel 
and Suleiman Khel Ghilzais within its political 
c h a r g e . 122
Sandeman ’s political dictation on the frontier 
not only restructured Baluchistan, but it also caused 
new complications between the Government of India and 
Kabul. The emasculation of Afghan power which was part 
of Sa n d e m a n ’s Baluchistan thesis was not lost on the 
Amir. The occupation of Zhob had effectively corroded
1 nc
J. .c. u.*
the Amir's sovereign relations with the Kakars, and 
infringed on Afghan territorial limits. As the Amir put it
"I used to think that Russia was our enemy; but the 
British Government having encroached upon our
territory from both sides., have taken possession
of the Gomal and Khojak r ange".123
The matter of allowing Sandeman to open relations with
the Gomal tribes was particularly controversial - As
James Lyall pointed out, the Amir regarded all the
Suleiman Khel Ghilzais as his subjects; therefore to
allow Sandeman to give tribal service to the Khoidad
Khel in the Gomal Valley implied that the "Khoidad Khel
are lost to the Amir, and a leak established in the
soundness and allegiance to him of other Ghilzai
t r i b e s " . 124 Lyall's forebodings were now justified- On
the one hand the Amir now consistently, accused the
B r i t :i. s h of tre a c h e r y an d a g g r ession in dur b a r and
privately; and on the other he exacted vengeance on the
S u 1e i man K he 1s for pariey i ng with t he British, by
dismissing their leading men from his s e r v i c e . 1*® These
unfortunate victims of 'Sandernan i s i n g ' t he G a m a 1, were
now as James Lyall described "beggared exiles whom we
s h a l l . .. have t o sup p or t wi t h su bst a nt i a 1
a 11 owa nc es " « 132■A
S a n d e m a n 1 e f t t hi i s m a i n n e g a t i v e in his p o 1 i c y , 
namely the hostility of the Am i r^  to haunt the Indian 
frontier during the closing stages of his own office .in
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1892, and that of his successor James Browne who took 
charge of the Baluchistan Agency in 1893. The 
new belligerence of the Amir was evident in the movement 
of troops to Tirah in Ghilzai country, even while 
Sandeman was engaged in the Gomal mission of 1890. 
Through 1891 and 1892 the Amir stepped up the blockade'? 
of new Charnan, terminus of the Sind-Pishin railway, 
preventing the entry of supplies from the Afghan 
s i d e . 1* 7' Tension continued to mount on the frontier, 
when early in January 1893, the Governor of Qandhar 
threatened to occupy Toba with Afghan troops. By 
occupying Toba the Amir hoped to put pressure on the 
Achakzais of Toba, to worry and threaten the line of 
railway from New Charnan to Qilla Abdulla, besides 
plunder!ng in Pishin itself. On 27 January 1893, James 
Browne telegraphed s"Everything points to the? amir's 
intention of asserting himself as defiantly as possible 
in the districts surrounding Pi shin... concent rat ion of 
troops, towards the southeastern frontier, is causing the 
people to be l i e v e . ..that friendly relations no longer 
exist between him and the Government of India". 1520 The 
Amir also increased pressure on other parts of the 
Baluchistan frontier. He sent troops to Wano and 
Zarmelan on the northeast edge of the Zhob District, 
wh i c h caused 1o c a 1 u nr e s t , and i nci t ed Waziri r a ids on 
British posts. 1S2<3* If the tension was not defused, 
Bruce, Commissioner of the Derajat, warned it would undo
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all the work in Zhob and the G o m a l . 130
By 1893 the British were reaping the controversial 
political harvest of the Sandeman era. The E<aluch-~ 
Afghan borderland looked increasingly insecure, and 
rumours of j 1 had were rife in A f g h a n i s t a n . 131 Moreover 
the application of the Forward Policy outside the limits 
of Baluchistan, in Miranzai country and the Kurram 
Valley had left other Pathan tribes like the Afridis and 
Waziris edgy and s u s p i c i o u s . 132 The Commander-in-Chief^ 
musing on the steady progress of the Indian frontier 
towards the Hindukush-, was concerned that the "storm 
may overtake us before we can do anything to strengthen 
that f r o ntier".133 As a preliminary, an understanding 
with the Amir was essential to lower the temperature an 
the frontier. In 1893, therefore the Viceroy sent 
Mortimer Durand to Kabul to reach an agreement with the 
Amir on the definition of the Indo--Afghan boundary line. 
According to the terms of the Durand Agreement, the Amir 
relinquished claims on Charnan and Chagai on the 
Baluchistan side, and agreed not to interfere? in Swat,
C hi t r a 1, B a . j a u r , and most of W a z i r i c ou nt r y , in ret ur n 
for the Birmal tract of land, a higher subsidy, and 
fresh armament s u p p l i e s . 134 This arbitary disposal of 
tribal territories by the Amir and the British was 
resented by tribesmen whose homelands were involved. In 
p a r t .i c li 1 ar t he v i o 1 at i on of et h n i o boundar i es by t he
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Durand Line in Waziristan and the Mohmand country
stoked trouble for the -future. 1355 There was a -feeling 
ama ng t he t r i bes t hat t he Am i r had sold t hem out.. 
Violence brewed , as the Mahsud Waziris destroyed the 
British boundary camp in Wano, in 1895, and only two 
years later in 1897 there was a general tribal uprising 
on the -frontier -from Tochi to the Malakand.
The* rebellions melted the early euphoria
evoked by SandemaiVs Baluchistan policy. Observers like 
Alfred Lyall^who had pointed out in 1890 that it was 
"unnecessary to let the Baluchistan Agency put its 
outposts so far, and the eventual result would be seen 
i n t.he acce 1 erat ion of the forwar d m o v e m e n t , and in 
imprudent dealings with the Waziris which might create 
further friction", 13<fe found their position vindicated 
by the turn of events on the frontier. The Government 
of India was accused of having been "captured by a 
little clique of military gentlemen, inspired with a 
desire for wild schemes of annexation, and animated, 
above all things, by a thirst for medals and 
decorat ions" „ 13-7 Linking the tribal backlash to the
aggressive restructuring of the frontier in the imperial
vision of Roberts and Sandeman, Northbrook argued that 
tribes watching the annexation of Zhob, saw Waziristan 
being subjected to the same process, and forts dotting 
the Samana Ridge and the Malakand, were left feeling
cornered and encircled, and they reacted with 
violence. 138 As another critic: pointed out, -from the 
tribal perspective the Forward Policy threatened to 
"raise their p u r d a h , which it has been a point of honour 
with them for ages to keep d o w n " . 139 Exposure to 
imperial order inevitably interrupted traditional tribal 
pursuits like "robbing, taxing, or blackmailing 
...caravans",140 which fostered animosity and created 
the ingredients for conflict. In the post mortem after 
1897, Sandemanism was virtually put on trial, and found 
wanting especially in the F’athan tracts of the northwest 
frontier. The official consensus now aimed to confine 
the Sandeman system to Baluchistan, and "not harshly 
seek to introduce the Southern system under the more 
difficult conditions" of the nor t h . 141
Conceived in the heat of the Russo-phobia of the 
1880s, Sandeman's political text perhaps suffered from 
the myopia of treating tribal resources primarily 
as raw mater i a 1 for building imper i a 1 d e f e n c e s . In 
cutting out the contours of British Baluchistan from the 
old map of Kalat and Afghanistan, Sandeman was led by 
the imperial perspective. By forcing back the margins
of semi-independent tribal territory, Sandeman aspired
to restructure the balance of power on the f r o n t i e r ,
based on the domestication of the tribal front, and the 
devaluation of Afghan power. The move to Quetta,
Pishin, and Sibi sketched a forward boundary, which not 
only gave British India new corridors of access into 
Afghanistan, but also instituted arteries of Etritish 
control in tribal territory in opposition to the 
sovereign claims of the Amir- It was a provocative 
strategy, replete with echoes of the old Lytton-- 
Salisbury formula to emasculate the Amir and reduce him 
to irrelevance in imperial c a lculations.142 Reacting to 
the extension of the Pishin railway through the Khwaja 
Amran Range, the Amir had said that the Etritish were 
holding a pistol to his h e a d . 143 The passage to Zhob 
and the Gomal, threaded Sandeman's ambition to extend 
the political limits of his own Agency and suppress 
Punjab's influence over frontier tribes, with the external 
imperative of dominating the Zhob ■••■Gomal route to Ghazni, 
pointing at "the heart of A f g h a n i s t a n " , 144 to tighten 
the frontier of ■’pressure' designed against Kabul.
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be defined by a final frontier, while the political 
barometer in central Asia continued to feed new 
st rat eg i c tensions i n t he Eta 1 uc h A f  g han bor der land.
In the evolution of Sandeman's E-tal uchistan, 
however, Etritish policy did not turn just another corner 
in the political chase to mend frontiers and sustain the 
empire; it also entered a new course of rewriting the 
imperial linkage with tribes in the radical language of 
Sandemanism, which spelled the end of non-intervention, 
and exposed increasing tracts of the frontier to 
external penetration. As part of the forward surge, 
tribes were merged in the imperial scheme, boundaries 
revised, forts militarised, and tribal service 
distributed to enforce political subjection. For some 
tribes like the Khetrans, Shiranis, and Suleiman Khel 
Ghilzais, the reality of the imperial experience 
contradicted old ethnic affiliations and threatened 
tribal cohesion, as the priorities of British rule took 
precede?nee in the guise of protecting a military road, 
or securi ng a sens i t i ve border. But as imper ia 1ism 
retextured the tribalscape in Baluchistan, it exported 
"fear and s u s p i c i o n " 14=5 to the rest of the frontier, 
causing it to overheat in 1897. Yet while the tribal stor 
engulfed the? frontier in 1897-98, Baluchistan remained an 
oasis of calm. This encouraged Bandsman's apologists to 
c 1 aim that the rebe 1 lions on 1 y ref 1 ected the imperfeet
Sandemani sat ion of the F'athan tracts. 146
However despite the acrimony of the debate, the 
political turbulence and controversial footnote to his 
work, Sandeman had altered the frontier map in a 
definitive manner; as tribes and territories were 
detached from Kabul's political orbit, between 1879- 
1896, the outline of British Baluchistan took shape on 
the frontier as a threat and warning to the Amir, and 
beyond him for psychological effect on Russia, the 
ultimate raison d'etre for such radical readjustments.
T he Persian Factor and Realignment of West Baluchistan
While the* Afghan element in imperial strategy was 
the mainspring for defining British Baluchistan in the 
northeast, in the west the margins of the province were 
set in the political context of Russian mastery in 
Persia. For most of the nineteenth century, the danger 
of Persia offering the Tsarist armies an alternative 
bridge to India had inspired tension, without actually 
i n f 1ue nc i ng the ba s is o f Ind i a 's defence st r uc t ur e , 
which rested uneasily on a fragile Afghan platform.
Meanwhi 1 e Persia had dr i fted into unsuccessfu 1 conf 1 ict. 
with Russia over land claims, which left the Tehran 
Gover nment wi th the u n p a l a t a b 1e resi due of m i 1itary 
d e f e a t a nd t er r itori a 1 hum i1i at ion. But i n the Iong 
decades between 1830-1870, the Government of India
1 1"apped i n i ts tortuous cour se of creat i ng an A f g h an 
buffer in the north, proved inept in exorcising the 
Russian danger from Persian precincts. The Etritish 
continued to support Afghan claims to Herat in opposition 
to Persian demands? and in 1872 F. J. Goldsmid, the* 
British arbitrator settling the? disputed Seistan frontier 
between Persia and Afghanistan awarded Seistan Proper to 
the Shah, but left Outer Seistan including the sluices 
of the canals, which irrigated Persian territory^ in 
Afghan hands, much to the displeasure of the 
Pers ians.147
At the Foreign Office, Lord Salisbury was 
uncomfortably aware that Britain's Afghan policy was 
driving "Persia into the arms of R u s s i a " . 148 Moreover 
half a century of strategic investment in Afghanistan 
had only locked the* Government of India in a mercurial 
relationship with Kabul. Chronic dissatisfaction with 
the Afghan alliance, together with the tension generated 
by Russia's extension of power in central Asia and the 
projected Khorasan Railway, forced Britain to scan the 
the Persian horizon more closely for new strategic 
opt i o n s « 0 ff icia1s p r e d i c t e d that t he K ho r as a n
province of Persia would be the next target of Russian 
expansion, in which case "Russia would replace Persia as 
the neighbour of A f g h a n i s t a n " . In 1889 Russian
Consular Agents were established in Meshhed and Nasirabad
which hrought the Russians disturbingly close to what 
Britain regarded as India's outer zone of defence 
stretching across the rim of southwest Baluchistan- The 
Consul at Meshhed actively promoted Russian interests to 
elbow Etritish influence out of south Persia. A British 
newspaper correspondent reported:
"It is strange and somewhat humiliating.,, to find 
ourselves so thoroughly displaced in these 
southern districts where the sea coast offers us 
such a foothold;, and where a little activity 
could have planted our prestige firmly in the 
minds of the governing and trading c l a s s e s " . 1® 0
Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine stressed the point more
d r a matically2 "The Czar has now got England by the
throat in the east., and can tighten the grip as
occasion may r i s e " . 1® 1 It was the need to counter this
attrition of British influence in southern Persia., which
brought western E<aluchistan into imperial perspective.
Henry Drummond Wolff, British Minister in 
Tehran, 1888., proposed the construction of a strategic 
railway from Baluchistan to Seistan, which would give 
Britain the benefit of a military corridor leading to 
the heart of southern P e r s i a . 1®* The railway was 
conceived as an instrument for effecting the partition ■ 
of Persia into Russian and British spheres of influence. 
As Wolff wrote to Sal isburys"If we secured our selves in 
the south it w o u 1d matter 1ittie what 1 0 0 k p 1ace in the 
n ort h " . 1®3 Believing that the Baluchistan rail link 
w o u 1d mateh the a h owj A ambition of > Russian
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railway makers and reduce the Shah's -fear of Russia,, he 
a d d e d 2 "I wish it were possible to make the Baluchistan 
line The Shah does not think the Quetta line near 
enough to oppose Russia successfully but this line would 
equal if not over trump the TransCaspian". 1!5A
Salisbury was sufficiently disturbed to write to 
the Government of India?
"There is a defect or gap in the plans which your 
Government has been forming and carrying out for
some years for the defence of the North West
F r o n t i e r ... the point about which I am anxious is
P e r s i a . >. The Russian forces provided with sea and 
railroad passage, lie along the whole line north 
of it... Its powers of resistance are...very 
s m a 11...Persia will not resist without 
encouragement. The only encouragement that is of
value is support in troops, and money, and 
munit ions of w a r . Any such support is out of the 
question now on account of the distance such 
assistance would have to cover...It is only by a 
railway from the sea, whether it starts from 
Quetta or Gwadur, the distance could be covered, 
and the possibility of assistance to Persia on 
the part of the Indian Government could become 
one of t he e 1 ements " . 1S5S5
In India op i nion was di vi ded on the prospect of 
pursuing a new Persian policy in the sandy wastes of 
Baluchistan. George Chesney, Military Member of the 
viceroy's Council was supportive. He believed that the 
TransCaspian Railway had increased Russia's strike 
capab i 1 i ty at Her a t , to def end which E<r i ta i n wou 1 d now 
h a v e t o m o v e li p 1 a r g e r f o r c e s b y railway. xss 
Frederick Roberts, the Commander— in-Chief, favoured the 
idea of a railway commanding Seistan, but in the 
immediate context: he regarded the Charnan extension^more
vital for the defence of Q a n d h a r . X!rs'7’ The Government of 
India was less enthusiastic. Duffer in considered it 
s p e culative,1 while Lansdowne believed that Drummond 
Wolff was " bored to extinction and...driven to take up 
schemes...he has lately been pressing so hard ...Many of 
these schemes seem to be quite visionary, e.g., that for 
a railway through Persia to Quetta. I have told him
there is no prospect of our being able to pay for such a 
line or to guarantee it ". 1
From his local vantage point in E*aluchistan, Sandeman 
believed that the intended railway and the interests it 
harboured mirrored the policy of the future. By 1891 
the tribal and territorial resources of northeast 
Baluchistan had been optimised to give India a frontier 
line which would dominate? Afghanistan. In Zhob and
Charnan, Indian borders now touched Afghan country, and 
as Sandeman himself admitted  ^  the effect of this
restructuring had been "to offend the Amir of
Afghanistan, and cause him to doubt the honesty of 
our actions with regard to his k i n g d o m " .1AO As new 
strat eg i c opti ons d r i e d up i n the nor t heast, t he 
neglected Perso-Baluch borderland, and in particular 
Seistanyclaimed attention as the field of future political 
exp 1 orat i o n » The Sei st:an cor r i dor to India's wester n 
approaches was an unstable tribal zone-?, ripe for the 
further penetration of Russian influence from the north.
Th£? Times warned that if Russia reached Seistan before 
Great Britain, "a more serious blow will have been dealt 
at British influence in the East...than would be involved 
in the capture of Balkh, or the fall of H e r a t " . 1**1 To 
resolve the dilemma, The Pioneer Mail advocated the 
construction of a strategic r a i 1way through the Ba 1uch 
desert from Quetta to Seistan, pointing out that "...a 
powerful British force in Seistan would ... strengthen 
Afghanistan, secure Herat, and ...menace P e r s i a . .. the 
subservient ally of our great rival in A s i a " . 1**38
This renewed interest in Persia at the end of the 
1880s, appeared to Sandeman as a useful turn for 
unlocking the political isolation of tribes and
districts trapped along Baluchistan's semi desert
western front, and for converting this sector into the 
hub of E*ritain's future Persian policy. In 1891 he 
wrote to Drummond Wolff that the Baluchistan Office 
should be empowered to open direct relations with the 
Persian Prince Governor in K i r m a n , 163 ostensibly to 
examine new trade routes, but really to structure 
British interests in the region on a local tribal 
platform. Sandeman aimed to run a strategic road 
through western Baluchistan, leading to the heart of 
Persian Seistan. And control in the tribal country
pierced by the road would be achieved not by "the 
c on st ru c t i on of fart s but by t h e c o ns i st e nt organisation
of the tribes and their gradual incorporation under our 
a u t h o r i t y " „1
The tribal scene in western Baluchistan was ripe 
for external manipulation. Here the? local Gitchki chief 
who administered Kej-Makran and Panjgur on behalf of the 
Khan of Kalat was embroiled in a destructive feud with 
Nauroz Khan, chief of the Nausherwanis, which resulted 
in the disruption of local government and halted revenue 
c o l l e c t i o n . 1AS Tribal misgovernment was Sandeman's cue 
to intervene in local politics. In 1S91 Sandeman went on 
a mission to west Baluchistan, and appointed a British 
official aid the Gitchkis in local government
on behalf of the Khan of K a l a t , 1*’*’ but really to start 
uOstfng the of British control in the region.
Sandeman's interventionist strategy also aimed to 
close the tribal borders of west Baluchistan to Persian 
influence. The main tribal arm of Persian power in the 
r eg ion was t he Mans her wa n i c h i e f . Be i ng a r eci p i e nt 
of Persian m o n e y , Nauroz Khan cou 1 cl afford to remain aloof 
from Sandeman's overtures, and fund the long drawn feuds 
which sapped the strength of his tribal r i v a l s . 1*’7'
The anti-British attitude of the Nausherwanis led Sandeman 
t cd w r i t e 2 " „ . t h e y a r e n o w n o t o r i o u s 1 y u n d e r the i n f 1 u e n c e
of Persia, and all they do is known to if not directed 
by t he P r i nce Go ve r no r of K irman". x Pe r s i a a b v i ous 1 y 
believed that keeping this tribal belt in a state of
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permanent anarchy was her best insurance against British 
encroachments from the Baluchistan side. The parameters 
of the Persian-1 r i bal problem in west E<aluchistan led 
Sandeman to suggest solutions at two levels. First 
he pressed for British support for tribes intimidated 
by the rise of Nausherwani power. Secondly he? 
proposed the delimitation of the Perso-Baluch borderland 
into spheres of official influence., in order to break the 
flow of trans-border communications, isolate the 
Nausherwanis on the Baluchistan side of the border, and 
force Nauroz Khan to a "proper sense of his duty " 
towards the B r i t i s h . 1***7
But Sa n d e m a n ' s st r at eg y t o r e - order t he tribal 
scene in the? west proved stillborn, as the Government 
of India viewed it with scepticism. Cunningham, 
Secretary to the Foreign Department, voiced the general 
suspicions "Sir Robert wants to take the authority of 
the Khan into his own hands, and to cripple the Etritish 
Gover nment by i nconven ient ob 1 i gat i ons " . 1 ° The Br i t i sh 
Charg' e d'Affaires in Tehran was also directed not to 
entertain Sandeman's p r o p o s a l s , 171
Blocked by the Government of India, Sandeman 
turned for support to Salisbury . Using the presence of 
R u s s i a n S u r v e y 0 f f i c e r s i n S e i s t a n t o h i g h 1 i g h t t h e 
strategic signifance of the region, he pressed the
141
p c:> i n t , a bout t he g i- eat i mp ar t a nce of 1' t a k i ng a rail way 
as far as we can through a friendly country towards Merv, 
so as to give confidence to the people of south Persia 
and all concerned with her as well our own Baluch chiefs 
and people on that f r o n t i e r 1“/2 Sandeman's attempt 
t cd draw west Baluchistan into the imperial
fold was also dictated by the desire to balance 
the importance of the Persian and Afghan frontiers in 
Indian defence strategy. Like the restructured 
northeast, Sandeman believed his blueprint for control 
in the west, would bring the 'forgotten Perso-Baluch' 
frontier back into the mainstream of imperial debate. 
The Tim e s endorsed Sandeman's scheme to revitalise 
British influence in "Seistan - the watchtower of 
Baluchistan and K h o r a s a n . ..the route through 
southern Baluchistan ... will undoubtedly some day claim 
attention as the likeliest line for the future railway 
to India".17,3
But Sandeman was unable to influence the Government 
of India to embark on the Seistan railway scheme. His 
successor in 1893, James Browne^also believed such a line 
was of paramount necessity. Despite such pressure from 
local officials,the Foreign Department decided to concede 
only a modest project of opening a disused caravan track 
between Seistan and Baluchistan, as a less expensive way 
of threading British interests in south Persia. In 1896
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the Secretary of State sanctioned the opening of the 
Nushki-Seistan trade route, 175 The? new commercial 
artery was conceived as an experimental run to test 
dif f erent policy opt ions. At one level it was viewed as 
a preliminary measure to decide the future opening of 
the Seistan railway. But the ulterior motive^as Dennis 
Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab pointed 
out^was that of "checking Russia in her advance towards 
Southern Persia, and primarily to Seistan, and further 
of obtaining for ourselves, if possible, a position in 
Seistan, when Persia falls to p i e c e s " . 17A The immediate 
fall-out from the passage of the new route was the 
delimitation of the Perso-Baluch frontier from Jalk to 
Koh--i--Mal i k Siah, and the Afghan-Baluch sector from 
Domandi on the Gomal River to Koh-i-Malik Siah, 1T','ra to 
formalize spheres of influence and redefine political 
s o v e r e i g n t y in tribal t r a c t; s i - e q u i r e d f or the s a f e 
passage of the road.
Redrawing the western frontier was politically 
controver s i a 1 $ it disrupted patterns of tribal activity 
and also raised the question of their future status in a 
zone staked out for promoting imperial interests. In 
the Baluch-Afghan sector, the first part of the boundary 
line from the Sarlat hills to the sandy edges of 
Regie-tan inserted a new political divide between the 
Barech Afghans now left on the Afghan side of the line,
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a n d t he Ra k hs ha n i and Me ng a 1 tribes., confined t o t he 
Baluchistan side of the line,, The new political marker 
promised better protection for the cultivated lands of 
the* Rakhshanis and Mengal5, who had suffered in the past 
from the plundering raids of the Efarech Afghans, But at 
the same? time? the new boundary line* stopped short of 
including the traditional grazing grounds of the pastoral 
Mengals within the limits of Baluchistan. This left 
the grazing rights of the Mengals undefined and
unprotected;, subject to the whims of the Amir, The
pastoral economy of the tribe was more vulnerable now to 
trans-frontier political tensions.
The other key adjustment in the frontier with 
Afghanistan was the inclusion of Chagai within 
Baluchistan. Wedged between Kharan on the one side and 
Afghanistan on the other, Chagai extended from Nushki to 
the Persian border. The Amir regarded Chagai as the key 
to the control of the Helmand basin, and in 1804 he had
occupied it with his t r o o p s . 180 In 1893, however, he
relinquished Chagai to the British, for territorial 
concessions in other parts of the f r o n t i e r , 1® 1 In 1896 
the change was implemented and Afghan troops withdrew 
from Chagai, For the local Sinjerani tribes, this 
removed the weight of the Afghan occupation which had 
pressed heavily in terms of revenue payments to Kabul 
and other dues on trade and merchandise. But the*
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respite was short-lived, for the British reinstalled 
Ali Khan Sinjerani, the former chief who had lived in 
exile during the Afghan occupation, in. . n his position 
as head of the Sinjerani tribes in Chagai, And his 
return was marked by the revival of old chiefly 
privileges in the form of grain contributions and other 
dues from t r i b e s m e n , 1®* which merely traced an 
alternate pattern of exploitation in the space vacated 
by t he A f g h a n s .
The more controversial part of the boundary 
alterations, however, occurred in the Perso-Baluch  
sector. T.H. Holdich the British Boundary Commissioner, 
aspiring both for Persian approval and a strong natural 
feature like a mountain range* for his line, shifted the
f ro n t i e r f rom K o h - i Malik Siah t o t he Ma shk e 1 R i ve r
considerably eastwards from P e r s i a . 103 In the event the 
line dissected the tribal territories of groups like the 
Damanis, Rekis, and Rinds, who were now left on either 
side of the boundary line. The Rekis a poor nomadic 
tribe of camel breeders suffered material loss. 
Their date groves (20,000 trees), one of their principal 
assets was abandoned to Persia, As a sop? to Reki 
suscept i b i 1ites, they were promised be11er protect ion 
against Damani raids, but in the event this proved to be 
a paper promise, and they remained as vulnerable as 
ever on the borderland. This led one of the Reki chiefs
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to complain, that ever since the demarcation o-f the 
boundary line, the? Rekis and Damanis have been at feud 
due to the indiscriminate transfer of tribal resources 
from one group to the o t h e r . 104 Essentially the line 
could not serve as stopcork to check the flow of 
trans-frontier tribal violence, as it abandoned key 
positions like? Mirjawa commanding the southern gateway 
to the Perso-Baluch borderland; this left frontier 
tracts wide open to raiding forays from tribal bands 
operating out of the Persian side of the border. The 
line was also drawn too close to the trade route, leaving 
Persia in control of the springs of water on the hills 
commanding the trade ro u t e . 1355 Critics also insisted 
that the boundary line should have been drawn further 
west since the Persian Government, had proved itself 
"incompetent to maintain order in these lawless Perso- 
Baluch inarches". 106 The infra-structure of local 
violence implied that the new boundary would not mirror 
a new divide between past anarchy and future order.
Synchronous with the impact on tribal lands and 
resources, the boundary line effectively altered the 
strategic map of west Baluchistan. The frontier 
rectifications redesigned the balance of power, and 
exposed a new seam of imperial options. In particular 
t h e s e pdL r a t i o n o f Chagai f r o m A f g h a n i s t a n u n 1 o c k e d n e w 
political a n g 1e s . E xp and ing on th e st rat eg i c v a 1ue of
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Chagai, A.M. McMahon, the British Commissioner for the 
de 1 imitat ion of the Afghan-Ba 1 uc:h boundary line, 1896, 
wrote; "Situated as it is on the edge so to speak of 
a difficult desert it closes the various roads which 
converge here from Helmand and Persia on Nushki and 
Q u e t t a " . 187 Chagai was the valuable inter-connecting 
strip between Nushki and the Persian border, and 
therefore vital for the passage of the trade route and 
the extension of new economic and political linkages 
with Seistan. As the Government of India observed; "The 
chief value of the country CChagaii lies in the trade 
route by which it is traversed - a route which is likely 
to be of much prospective importance, as it will form 
t h e e a s i e s t and most cl i r e c t line o f comm u n j. c a t i o n s 
between Quetta and Eastern P e r s i a " .100
T he new bo r de r a 1so helped to i n s u 1at e t he 
E<aluchistan tribes from trans-frontier political 
influences. This was particularly important for 
i n s t i t u t i n g c h e c k s o n a m b i t i o u. s g r o u p s 1 i k e t h e 
Nausherwanis of Kharan who were not averse to colluding 
w i t h t he Pers i ans or Af ghans to keep) t he t riba 1 f r .i nge 
destabilized through the prosecution of private feuds, 
in exchange for money and local p o w e r . 189 Eiut as one 
official described, the effect of reconstituting Chagai 
as a zone of British influence, was to bind the 
Nausherwani chief with a "band of iron all along his
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northern border", thus completely shutting him from 
Afghanistan. 1<70 Further south along the Perso-Baluch 
sector Nausherwani territorial claims were disallowed 
with the same purpose of isolating Kharan from Persian 
influence1*71 . Baluchistan's western border was 
therefore intended to function as a screen to intercept 
the flow of subversive impulses from outside.
The strategic definition of Chagai encouraged 
McMahan and Webb Ware, in charge of the newly opened 
trade route, to press for direct administration in the 
region. McMahon argued with some truth that the 
Sinjerani chief was too weak to serve as a reliable prop 
for indirect rule; to allow him to govern Chagai would 
be to abandon the region to "anarchy... encourage wholesale 
encroachment by Kharan on the south and the Afghans on 
the north, and effectively close the new Persian trade 
route to Nushki ". 1 This provoked critics of the 
Baluchistan Government to retort that its officials "have 
always displayed an almost passionate desire to bring 
u n d e i- a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e v e r y w i 1 d t r a c t o f c o u n t r y t h e y c a n 
get hold o f ". 1 <5>3 From the heat of the debate, a 
compromise was gleaned by appointing a British Political 
Agent to supervise and direct the Chagai chief in the 
i n t e r n a 1 m anage m e n t. of the d i s t r i c t . 1*74 T h u s a 
Br i t is h bac k e d tri b a 1 r eg ime w a s p 1a nted in C ha g a i, an d 
the new status of Chagai as part of the Agency
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tei-r i tor ies, admini stered under t he execut i ve or ders of
t h e A gent t o t h e G o v e r n o r G e n e r a 1, c o n f i r med i t s
reconstitution as a finger of British territory in the 
t r i b a 1 h e a r 1 1 a n d o f w e s t B a 1 u c h i s t a n -
After Chagai attention shifted to the political 
picture in N u s h k i * the starting point of the new trade 
route to Persia. Political reorganisation geared
towards annexation was difficult, for Nushki was part of 
the Kalat State, and a take over scheme threatened to 
embroil the British in violation of sovereign rights 
held by a client state. McMahon and Webb Ware believed 
they could unlock the problem by exposing K a l a t ’s 
sovereignty .<*-£;■ more nominal than real,. The local 
t ri b a 1 scene was anarchic and t he K h a n 's aut hor i ty 
nebulous enough to support an annexationist thesis. The 
Khan of Kalat,purely interested in revenue receipts from 
t he reg ion^ had a 11owed i nter-tr i b a 1 violence to go 
largely unchecked. McMahon consequently reported that 
"petty intrigues" had reduced the? "community to the 
condition of a set of miserable village curs, who snarl 
and growl at each other. ..They unite only to bully thee 
weaker k a f f i 11 as as they pass through N u s h k i " . 1^*
Such a state? he? warned^would only endanger the future of 
t h e t !- a d e r o u t e „
Despite? pressure from McMahon to alter the status-quo
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i. n Nus hk i , Lo r cl E l g i n ’s Gove r nme n t ^ being mor e i nt e r est e d 
in political expansion along the northwest -frontier, 
defei"red i15.: dec ision on a f i na 1 so 1 ut ion for Nu s h k i . In 
the meantime., the local British A g e n t , Webb Ware, left in 
charge of the trade route;, us cad his official position 
to start the erosion of the Khan of K a l a t ’s formal 
authority in Nushki. He actively encouraged the tribes 
to bring their disputes to him for settlement., and 
reported with self-satisfaction;"During the halts I made 
at Nushki, I have been able to settle a large number of 
oustanding land and blood claims inhabitants of the
district... now refer the most trivial cases for my 
decision". 1<5>A But at the same time the large balance of 
unresolved cases and the birth of new feuds, gave him 
ground to writes "Under the present regime, Nushki can 
ne i ther be pac if i e d no r can it prosper", a nd t he o n 1y 
realistic course was to offer the Khan of l<a 1 at a quit 
rent for his rights in N u s h k i . 1^  He was supported by 
Hugh B a r n e s , Agent to the Governor-General i n 
Baluchistan, 1897, who added that the Khan was fond 
enough of money to overcome his reluctance to 
a 1 ienate the Distr ict. 1 <5>6a
C o n v e n i e n 1 1 y f ■o r t h e B a 1 u. c h i s t a n G o v e r n m e n t , t h e 
new b i d f or Nushk i coinc i cled w i t h a c hange of V iceroys.
I n 1 8 9 ,  Lor d E 1 g i n was rep 1 aced by Curzon as the new 
V iceroy, whose 1 o n g -standi ng i nterest in F:‘ersia promised
new official support for the political reconstitution of 
western Baluchistan. There was less reluctance now to 
enter into new political territory. As the Government 
of India stated:"The work of administration cannot be 
undertaken without an extension of r e s p o n s i b i1ity,which 
is not measured by the expenditure in money necessary to
keep internal order, but by other and far reaching
considerations of imperial pol icy"« Even the
Foreign Department 5 usually sceptical of Baluchistan 
proposals now murmurmed that the annexation of Nushki 
was in the imperial interest. As Cunningham,
Secretary to the Foreign Department, re i t e r a t e d : " As I 
am inclined to share the belief that the new route is a 
matter of imperial concern, I do not wish to be
understood as definitely opposed even to annexation 
Cof N u s h k i 3".300
W i t h t he p o 1 i t i c a 1 c 1 i m a t e in I n d i a. m o v i n g i n
favour of imperially determined territorial mergers,
t here on 1 y rerna i ned t he sma 11 obstacle of t he Khair 5 
apposition to alienate Nushki. But as a client state
supported by British power, and with a poor record of 
.i n t e r n a 1 c o n t r o 1, K a 1 a t w a s ill equipped t o t h w a r t 
B 1- i t i sh des i g ns on Nushk i . The l<han of !<a 1 at now under 
i ncreas .i. ng p ressure f 1 -orn Ba 1 uch i. stan au.t hor i t ies f or 
administrative incompetence and negligence in Nushki, 
and perhaps seduced by the prospect of receiving more
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money from the quit-rent than the revenues he usually 
obtained, finally relinquished the District to the 
British in 1899 for an annual sum of Rs. 9 0 0 0 . 3801
By acquiring Nushki and Chagai Britain gained 
an uninterrupted political corridor stretching from 
Quetta across west Baluchistan to the Persian border. 
There was official optimism that the political changes 
i n t he west would g i ve B r i t a in new 1 ever ag e in 
the domination of Persia and Afghanistan. As Webb Ware 
out 1 i neds
"Prior to 1897 India was cut from Persia as
completely as China is from Japan..-and Russia 
had entered on a policy which had for its 
objective the complete subjugation of Khorasan 
and the overawing of Afghanistan... With the 
opening of the Nushk i~-Seistan trade route al l 
this has been changed,, and the Persians are now 
awakening to the fact that the Indian Empire 
1 i e s i m m e d i a t e 1 y o n t h e i r b o r d e r s 11. 32 ° 52
The intended advertisement of British imperial 
p o w e r i n t h e r e s t r u c t u r e d B a 1 li c h i s t a n b o r d e r 1 a n d f o la n d
its mark in Russian circles. At A s h k a b a d , The
Ti-"ansCasp ian Review responded^
"The Northern Baluch desert has become full of
life, and where mercantile movement hardly 
e i s t e d ,  t here is now ready to enter i nto ex istence 
a n e v e n i- o a d f o r t h e i n s i n la a t i o n o f English goods 
into the very heart of the Iran t a b l e l a n d . ..More 
important is the political meaning of this road... 
An English fortress has risen on the very 
frontier of Persia, connected with Quetta by 
a road, which though only at present fit for pack 
animals will of course soon be made first a 
carriage road and then a railway, and then of
c o u r s e , the English art i11e r y ... w h i c h w i11
d e c o r a t e t h e !< o h i M a 1 .i k S :i. a h will g i v e g r e a t
weight to the utterances of the English ministers
But apart from a certain psychological and 
propaganda value? it was not cl oar if the-? Baluchistan 
trade route had found its real mark of arresting the 
progress of Russian power in Persia- Perhaps provoked 
by the new trade route^Russia merely increased her grip 
on Persia between 1895-1900. In 1895-1896 Russia forced 
Persian officials to impose a customs tariff of five 
percent on all British goods in the TransCa.sp.ian 
region.2204 But despite the tariff,, the value of trades 
on the? new route climbed from one and a half lakhgof 
rupees in the first year, to twenty lakhs in 1902- 
1903. ■‘2°S5 This was good for local trade, but it did 
nothing to re 1 a R u s s i a s  gr ip on Persia. Thus by t he 
end of t he ce nt u r y , Russia n enginee r s were su rvey i ng 
south Persia for a new railway to the Gu.If.®0A At the 
same time Persia contracted a loan from Russia as 
a. result of which Russia became her sole cr editor.®07 
Musing on the upward curve of Russian influence in 
P e r s .i a , G e o r g e H a m i 11 a n , Sec r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r I n d i a , 
reflected that the use of the Baluchistan option merely 
t h r e a t e n e d t a d i s s o 1 v e t. he r e s i d u. e o f Per s i a n 
independence, without actually arresting the spread of 
Russian power. He wrote to Curzons "I never like 
embarking on a policy which necessitates fighting 
against the stars in their courses. Do what we like we 
cannot prevent the inf1uence af Russia increasing in
Dismissing Hamilton's negative prognosis, C u r z o n 7s 
belief in deserts as useful frontiers 22°c? led him-to 
favour the reconstitution of arid west Baluchistan into 
a militarised marshland, for defence? needs and to subject 
south Persia to British control. Rejecting the view that 
the Russians would march down the Toehi or G o m a l , Curzon 
viewed Seistan as the key to imperial defences. Seistan 
commanded the approaches from Khorasan to the Gulf, it 
dominated the exposed southern flank of Afghanistan, and 
was therefore crucial for retaining control of the 
Herat-Qandhar line.2210 "Situated at the point 
of junction of the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan, and 
Baluchistan," Curzon concluded, "the future? of Seistan 
affects the destinies of all three c o u n t r i e s " . ® 11 Led 
by this view, Curzon believed that the strategic 
potential of west Baluchistan should be maximised by 
converting the trade route into a railway beteen Quetta 
and Seistan^ it would serve as British India's insurance 
against the possible menace of a Russian railway through 
southeast Persia to the? G u l f . ® 122 As he put its " I 
would sooner have a railway from Quetta to Nushki than 
I would have a dozen lines in the Trans-Indus 
sect ion" . 2213
Curzon's intended railway was a new version of 
the old scheme floated in 1890 by Drummond Wolff,
S a 1 i s b u r y , a n d S a n deina n . 2214 B u t its o b j e c t i v e w a s
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be110 1- defined, and the target area of inf 1 uence was 
narrowed to the south eastern corner of P e r s i a , ® 1* 
adjoining Baluchistan; there was also less emphasis on 
saving all of Persia from the grip of Russia. The Quetta 
railway was primarily conceived as an instrument for 
securing sectional control of Persia; its aim was; purely 
to acquire strategic command in a cross-section of 
Perso-Baluch territory, identified in C u r z o n 7s revised 
text as the future path of enemy intrusions into India. 
The eclipse of Persian independence^which was implicit in 
C u r z o n 7s Seistan scheme, was approved by George Hamilton; 
he wrote to Curzon: "As regard your view that a break up
of Persia would not be to our disadvantage, I agree with 
with you, but we want some? time. . . " . ® 1^
Critics of the scheme? of course, wondered if the 
presence of R lassia in Se.istan wouId add so much to 
British difficulties, as to justify dragging a train 
across a useless desert, which left in its desolate state 
would deter any invader.®17 But the Foreign Office was 
convinced of the need to restructure? the balance of 
p o w e r o n t he Pe r so-B a 1uc h horderland i n t h e Br i t i s h 
imperial interest. In 1902 a secret conference at the 
Foreign Office concluded: "We s h o u l d . ..steadily prepare
f o r a n oc c upat io n o f Se i st an by ext ending the railway 
b e y o n d N u. s hi k i a n d p u. s h i n g o u r t rade". ® 1 T h e I n d i a 
Council was persuaded to accept the Baluchistan railway.
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and communicating this consent to Curzon in 1902,
Haimi 1 ton noted wi th sat isf act ion t hat this "transaet ion
w o u 1d p rao t i c ally s e t tie ou r c 1aim to Persian 
Seistan".2119 Brit a irv s Ba 1 uc h i st an policy had now 
edged suspiciously close to an informal north-south
partition of Persia, defining Russian and British
spheres of influence respectively. In Par 1iament, Lord 
C r a n b e r ; ^ ,  suiiimed up the spirit of the new policy! "We
are anxious for the integrity of Persia, but we are
anxious far more for the balance of power."a 2 °
With the completion of the Quetta-IMushki railway in 
1905, the chapter on political reconstitut ion in west 
Baluchistan came to a close. Between 1890-1905, the 
western marc hi and was redefined in the imperial interest 
to distance the political influence of Persia and 
A fg hani st an f r om t he B a 1uchi st a n f r o n t i e r . The 
trade route and the railway were stepping stones in 
a 1 ate :i. mpier ia 1 bid to grasp Persian S e i s t a n . The 
Russians described the Quetta railway as "the first 
section of the grea.t iron road which is eventua 11 y ta 
connect Quetta with Seistan, and thus to bring the
British on to the flank of the probable route of
R u s s i a ■’ s rn a r c h t o India". s 331 In the p r o c e s s o f 
des i g n i ng a new ba I a nc e of p ower i n t he west, a sem i 
d e s e r t z a n e o f f I u i d b o u n d a r i e s a n d n o m a d i c t r i b e s w a s 
transf ormed .i nto a m i 1 i tary cor i~ i dor to f ac i 1 itate
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a g g r0 ssiv0 a c t i o n i n P0 r 3 i a i f n00033 a r y „ Tribal
complexes and territories necessary far the imperial
scheme were detached from Persia and Afghanistan to give 
Baluchistan a new strategic profile. Client tribal 
leaderships were planted in Nushki and Chagai to cheeky 
any k&&ti .react i ons to the injection of British power 
i n t he r eg .i o n » Tr i ba 1 home 1 ands of g r oups like t he 
Mengals and Rekis were divided by new boundaries;, and
artificial political barriers inserted to disrupt
traditional patterns of migration and economic 
subsistence. In Nushki and Chagai tribal rivalries and 
unrest were? reinterpreted to promote the idea of imperial 
control as a moral exercise to save tribesmen from the 
anarchy of their social system., But the reality of 
cqIo n i a I B a 1 u c h i s t a n w a s 10 s s r e a s s u r i n g , f o r t. h e 
r e d r a w i n g o f i m p e r i a 1 f 1- o n tier s f o r c e d i t w i thin the 
vortex of the Anglo-Russian conflict, and exposed tribal 
homelands as battlegrounds for external powers,, In the 
west now as in the northeast, the imperial motive had 
p e r m a n e n 1 1y a 11ered t he old t ri b a 1 map of Ba 1uc h i s t a n „
E s s e n t i a 11 y s t r u c t u r e d f r o m t h e c: o n t r a c t i o n o f t h r e e 
state boundaries Kalat, Persia, and Afghanistan, the 
genesis and evolution of British Baluchistan in the late 
n i n e t e e n t h i c e n t u r y m i r r o r e d 1.1" \ e c e n t r a 1 c onfl ic t 
b et we en E n g 1 a n d a n d Ru ssi a fo r ma st e r y i n A s i a , w i t h t he 
inevitable sacrifice of tribal resources at the altar 
o f p o 1 i t i c a 1 i m perialism.
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Chapter 111 
Custom and Conflict in Tribal Society
The process of political expansion in Baluchistan;, 
brought in its train the complex problem of internal 
control. Here the crux of the problem lay in the 
militant organisation of tribal society, where feuds and 
raids constituted legitimate channels for directing 
competitive political and economic activity. Moreover, 
in the imperial climate of late nineteenth century 
India, the increasing identification of good government 
with the ideal of order, focused attention on violence 
a s t h e are a o f t r :i. b a 1 1 i f e , m o s t in need o f r e formin g
attention. A preliminary analysis of violence
in t r i b a 1 g roup r e 1a t i o n s i s t he r e fo re essential in 
order to appreciate the social dimension of the 
administrative problem in Baluchistan., and the challenge 
which the tr .i ba 1 process spe 11 ed to the nascent colonial 
reg i m e .
History and ethnology offer initial clues to the 
resilience-? of violence as a sub-culture in Baluchistan. 
Migrating Baluchi tribesmen from west Asia brought to 
Baluchistan a tribal structure based on a military 
division of sections and .'Leaders, oriented towards group 
survival in unsettled conditions. Raiding tactics
perfected by the nomadic Baluch became an integral part 
of their survival strategy in the new land. The Baluch 
word tuman (tribe) was a relic of their warring past.
As Denys Bray pointed out:
"The very name t u m a n , t he Tu r ki s h tuman 
•"the ten thousand". almost seems to imply...a 
tribe? on the war path, warring first with the 
alien people that stood in its way, and warring 
later with any rival tuman that disputed its 
s p o i l s " . 1
Responding to the pressures of alien migration and niche? 
competition the Brahuis perfected a military confederacy 
which served as an instrument of war, and helped to 
carve out the Kalat State in the conflict ridden 
environment of eighteenth century B a l uchistan.2 
Both militarised tribal form and confederacy structure 
moulded society as a bat t 1eg r o u n d , where violent 
competition was the gateway to material rewards.
In the? matrix of influences which shaped a militant 
tribal society., the Pathans added their own esoteric 
flavour of non-conformism and rejection of central 
authority. The nuclear Pathan tribe with its 
tradition of dissent and rebellion against intrusive 
foreign powers,3 mirrored a commitment to political 
aggression and independence even at the point of the 
sword. As the Government of India o b s e r v e d :
"The Pathan tribesman is unstable and anarchic by 
n a t u r e ; i nt ole r ant and r e s i st ant t o c o n t r o 1 i n 
any f a r m by out s i de aut hor i ty -- As i at i c no 1 ess 
than European; on his own ground probably the 
finest minor tactician in the world , careless of
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his own and other p e o p l e ’s lives and prone to
fanat ic: ism" . *
Historical experience therefore defined the 
tribalscape as a competitive arena, where the strategic 
use of force was pivotal in the master plan of success 
and survival. The militant inheritance from the past 
thrived in the ecological sterility of the? region. The 
unproductive, arid mountain environment of Baluchistan 
imposed its own restrictive influence? on tribal social 
patterns and norms. Here limited amounts of arable land, 
scarcity of water, and low population density- 
constrained the production of wealth, and created an 
endemic insufficiency of material products in the 
regional economy. The economics of scarcity created 
the dynamics for violent interaction between 
groups, competing for access to limited
resources.
Like other tribes existing under marginal social 
conditions in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, conflict among the Baluch, Brahui and Pathans 
turned on a set of material choices dictated by the 
nature of environmental resources available to a tribe. 
In Somaliland for instance, the lack of water ensured 
that a typical cause of armed conflict among pastoral 
Somalis was a dispute over access to a well.® 
Similarly E.Peters in his study of the Bedouins of 
C y r e n a i c a c o n c 1 u cl e s t hi at re 1 a t i o n s o f hi o s t i 1 i t y w e r e a
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a product, of the semi-desert environment, where arable 
land, pasture and water were in low s u p p l y .A Friction 
over preferential access to these limited resources led 
to loss of life and permanent hostilities, which were 
deliberately sustained as a pretext for continuing the 
essentially economic struggle to control land and water 
resources.7 In Albania and Kabylia as well, Black-
Michaud argues, .... the lack of land resources and
water constitute the limiting factors, which result in 
social tension and group friction.63
As in Cyrenaica or Somaliland, the picture of 
conf 1 ict i n Ba 1 uchist.an was drawn an the canvas of 
economic marginalism. Here the tribal economy survived 
on a fragile balance between a low yielding agricultural 
sector and a supplementary pastoral section. The ag ro­
economy suffered acutely from infertile soil conditions 
an d a n e 1u s ive r a i n f a 11, whi ch made d rought a n d scarei t y 
f a m i 1 i ar t hemes i n t r i b a 1 1i f e . ** M i g r at ions and
pastoral incomes were the only safety valves against 
famine. In the tribal economy, sheep and goats had a 
special survival value as they stood between "large 
numbers of the? papulation and starvation or wholesale 
e m i gration".10 Where the dividing line was paper thin 
between survi va 1 and ext i nct ion, .i n t e r g r o u p  relat ions 
were characteristically determined by competition and 
c o n f 1 i c t f o r p r e f e r e n t i a 1 a c c: e s s t o sea r c e material
16 :i.
resources.
Inter •group rivalry was usually expressed through 
specific forms o-f retaliatory violence, typically 
labelled as feuds and raids, A raid was usually a 
•finite act of hostility, operated for immediate
political effect, or to enlarge the material holdings of 
a group by removing assets from a weaker group, By
contrast a feud mirrored relations of permanent
hostility, free from time constraints, which could 
freeze acrimonious group relations- for decades. The 
specific material premises of group feud relations
differed in relation to local ecologic«.l variables, which 
dictated the ratio of agricultural/pastoral resources in 
the tribal economy, and the availability/non­
availability of permanent sources of water. The spatial 
distribution of these factors, which operated with 
greater or lesser intensity in a particular micro-area 
usually determined the lifespan of individual feuds. 
The historical literature of nineteenth century 
Baluchistan shows that tribes with a higher proportion 
of dependence on pastoralism, without access to permanent 
sources of waiter, such as the Harris and Bugtis in the 
northeast, were more frequently at feud with 
ne .i g h bou r i ng t r i b e s , in o r de r to e x pan cl t he i r ow n 
limited natural r e s o u r c e s . 11 At the same time the
a b s e n c e o f 1 o n g damaging f e u. d s among t r i b e s 1 i k e t h e
prosperous, sedentary Kasis and Durranis living in 
the -fertile belt near Quetta, suggests that 
the accumulation of wealth tended to deter the 
prosecution of economic feuds, which only drained 
e x i st i ng resour c e s .
But the purpose of feuds was not just limited to 
redressing economic imbalances in tribal lifestyles . 
The significance of feud in the political process 
stemmed from its use as a mechanism for sustaining and 
renewing hierachical divisions based on rank, status, 
and t he p r i vl leges of h o 1d i ng off ice in t he t r i b a 1 
system. Factors of rank and privilege stimulated 
endemic rivalry in the leadership echelon, aspiring to 
higher levels of political office associated with the 
graded order of tribal sections. This also gave rise to 
sectional and subsectional confrontation, determined by 
the political status of such groups in the system, derived 
f r om asc r i p t i ve mem be r s h ip in t he particular g roup of a 
tribal chief or section leader. Articulating competing 
interests inherent in a ranked society, the political 
feud in Baluchistan sustained relations of hierarchy 
which defined the structure of groups and leaders.
Feud and the Tribal Str u c t u r e .
The economic and military viability of tribes, 
sections, and subsections, determined their function as
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participant units in the process of feuding conflict 
and rivalry. In Baluchistan, the institution of
patrilineal inheritance, combined with limited arable 
land and other ecological constraints;, militated for 
a high degree of agnatic co-operation. The minimal c o ­
operative unit in the economic field comprised those 
agnates who held a patrilinealy inherited share in 
communally exploited resources. This unit functioned as
a minimal self help group, sensitive to any injury
inflicted upon one of its members, as this would reduce 
its working capacity. In the event of a loss of 
life, tradition allowed the decea s e d :'s immediate male 
relatives to extract some form of vengeance from the 
k i 1 1 e r ’ s g r o u. p e i t h e r i n the f o r m o f a n o t her 1 i f e o r 
equi va 1 ent mat.er ia 1 compensation. 135 Thus pr imary 
responsibilty for vengeance d e v o 1ved on the murdered 
m a n ’s relations., who were grouped in the lower levels 
of segmentation in the tribal structure, namely the 
p 11"a/pai-o of t he Baluch/Brahu i t r i b e s , and t he kahol 
of the Pathan tribe. If this group failed to take 
revenge, the responsibility would be assumed by the 
agnatic subsection or the s h a 1war in the Baluch and 
B r ahli i t. r i ba 1 st r uc t u r es; 13 i n t he Pat ha n tribe t h i s 
unit would correspond to the secondary level of 
segmentation., above the level of k a h o l , whose members 
1 .i v e d i n close p r o x i m i t y t o e a c h o t h e r a n d s h a r e d r i g h t s 
in water and pasture based on ties of agnatic lineage.14
In the case of blood feud the vengeance liability was 
incurred collectively by the offender's group. Vengeance 
could be extracted by taking the life of any male member 
of the offender's kin group such as father, brother or 
cousin. 1=5
A strife situation could escalate to higher levels 
when the victim and killer's groups were not
component units of the same sectional division, so that 
any instance of unavenged death at the lower echelons of 
the tribal structure imparted a vengeance liability to 
major sections. Similarly hostilities on an inter­
tribal scale, based on the positions of killer and
v i c t i m i n ri v a 1 t r i bes 1oc k ed in confIi c t , w o u 1d far ce 
t he t r i be to emerge as t he vengeance unit. The 
operation of the vengeance principle implied that the 
v i r u s of o ne mu r de r c on 1 d c 1 a i rn multiple lives, a n d 
ramify through society. As the? Baluchistan 
C e n s u s R e p o r t □ b s e r v e d s
"...if the murdered man is of a different tribe to 
the murderer, the feud may be taken up by the 
whole of the two tribes, each of which may again 
be joined by other tribes, so that a small spark 
may soon set a large c o n f l a g r a t i o n  ablaze. 1116
Social Premises of Group C o n f l i c t .
As a violent corrective for social injury, the 
o r i g i ns o f g r oup c onf 1 .i c t m i r r or t he br ea k dow n i n p a11 er n 
of exchange between families and sections. Breaches in 
contractua1 r e 1 ationships 1ike bride-price and marriage 
were common catalysts of violent apposition. In the
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domestic economy of primary tribal groups, bride— price 
constituted a cash transaction beween two families, 
according to which a daughter was sold by her male 
guardians for an adequate sum of money., varying from 
Rs»500-Rs.3000, as well as other assets like live-
s t o c k , 17 Bride price was therefore a source of
income for the family group., and any breach of contract 
could involve pecuniary loss. The transition from 
cu.stom t o conf 1 i ct may be traced t h rauh t he c ha ng i ng 
relationship between two families of Aliani Marris.
In 1886 one Shahani Aliani Marri agreed to marry 
the sister of one Jamo Aliani Marri on the understanding 
that he was to give Jamo his sister in return and 
R s „ 10 0 i n a d d i t o n . S h a hi a 1 i paid the h r i d e ~ p r ice a n d 
married J a m o -" s sister who died soon afterwards. Jamo 
now demanded the completion of the contract and asked 
Shahali to g i ve him his sister in marriage. But 
S hi a hi a 1 i r e f u s e d t o do so u n t i 1 J a mo r e t u r n e d the R s . 100 
he had paid as bride-price.13 In effect the contract 
h a d misca r r i e d ., d e p r i v i n g t h e par tic \ p a n t s o f t h e 
material benefits they had expected from it. To prevent 
the half--enforced contract from being buried in Shahali ps 
refusal 1 to give his sister in marriage., Jamo murdered 
S ha\ ha 1 i, as a means of i nt e ns i f y i ng the st r ugg 1 e to 
gain the rest of his share. J a m a ’s act earned the 
attention of the Marri j i r q a < a council of tribal
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e .1 d a rs) „ w h i c h o r d e r e r d J a rn o t o p a y c o m p e n s a t i o n t o
S h a h a l i ’s family, but allowed him to take S h a h a 1 i ? s
sister in marriage. But Shabalins killing had 
activated the vengeance principle in the tribal 
scheme,, and in 1893 Jamo was murdered in retaliation 
by two Aliani t r i b e s m e n . 19 Here the economics of 
br ide--pr ice had provided the sub-text for violence in 
the form of reprisal killings. But hostilities
were not re-cycled to prolong the -feud, as the
award of compensation and fines by a j i r q a 
plugged any further haemorrhage of human and material 
resources in the social system accruing from this 
particular case of b r i de-p r i ce an d vendet t a .
Even more than br i de--pr ice, in tribal society, 
relations of inequality between men and women provided 
the raw material for violence touching on adultery and 
revenge killings. In tribal society women were accorded 
no rights or responsibilities; a minimat 1 nurnber of 
i n t e racti o ns we r e voluntar y on h er part, inequality was 
max i ma 1, She was used i n soc i ety to fac i 1 i tat e sac :i a 1 
transactions between men, which involved selling her in 
m a r r i a g e „ at s w e 11 h e r u s e i n c e m e n t i n g m a r r i a g e 
alii a nce s , In t hi s s o c i a 1 c onc ep t w hi c h v i e w e d women 
a c o m rn o d i t i e s j, t hi e rn at i n f u n c tion at 1 u s e o f w o m e n w a s 
perceived in terms of their labour value in the tribal 
h o u s e h o I d , a n d t heir at b i 1 i t y t o p r o v i d e d e s c e n d a n t s ,
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who would ensure the survival of the group as a viable 
socio-economic unit- As a tribesmen put it:"A wife does 
more work than a couple of bullocks and with luck will 
breed enough to pay for her bri de-price thrice over"-'20
The social exploitation of women was dramatically 
sy m b o 1i sed i n t he t r i b a 1 concept of i zzat and s harm- 
honour and shame which presupposed that the attribute 
of sharm or sexual shame was latent in all women, but 
it impinged directly on a man's izzat or honour when a 
wife or sister was guilty of committing adultery- Such 
a view perpetuated the fiction that women were no ri­
per sons ; t hus their conduct was judged not in relation to 
themselves, but the men - husband, father, brother, - to 
whom they belonged. Any attempt on the part of a woman 
to break free from this pattern of bondage, as for 
i n st anc e t h r oug h a d u 11 er y to an alternative 
relationship, exposed her to the s t e e 1 edge of tribal 
vengeance?- The denunc i axt i on f or adu. 11er y usually 
devolved on the husband!! in his absence the
responsibility passed to his agnates or her own natal 
g r CD u. p - T r a d i t i o n a 11 y a h u s b a n d h a d the r i g h t t o k ill t h e 
adu 11erer and adu 11.eress, in vindication of his own 
p r est i ge and ho nou r , without d r aw i ng on h i m s e 1f any 
reprisal for such an act- But if he? preferred, he could 
t a k e c o m p e n s a t i o n f r o m t h e s e d u c e r , w h i c h w a s u s u a 11 y 
a cash sum varying from Rs-300 to Rs. t, 500,
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cl 0 p e n d i n g o n a b i 1 i t y t. o p a y „ A f t e r t a k i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n 
t h 0 h Li b a n d custom a r i 1 y d i v o r c e d his wife, w h o w a s t h e n 
turned out of the district, and consigned to the care 
of a headman, in another district,, The latter would 
keep her, until he could sell her in marriage again. He 
would then deduct the cost of her upkeep from the bride- 
pr ice, and the ba 1 ance wouId be returned to her former 
h u s b a n d .52 35 A t r i b e s w o m a n w a s v .i. r t u a 11 y s e n t e n c e d i n 
her lifetime to be a mere "drudge about the house, a 
beast of burden on the march, in the courts a
chattel in dispute, and too often a thing of
d i shonour " , -23 The tyranny of male dietat ion^and t he 
violence it spawned, attested to the strength of 
machismo and material cupidity in tribal attitudes,and 
the ready use of force to arrest any mutations in 
traditional sex determined role definitions and status 
symbols,
Inter 1 ace d wi th t he r i tu a 1 vi o 1e nc e of t r i b a 1
c u s t o m s , was eco na m ic f r i c t i on bet ween fam i1i es
and groups over access to grazing g r o u n d s , water and 
land which often resulted in bloodshed. The scope and 
s c a 1e of such vi o 1e nc e ma y be i nfer r e d f r om specific 
c a s e s t u d .i e s » In 1889 i t w a s r e p o r t e d f r o m Q u e 11 a - P i s h i n 
t hat two f atri i 1 i es of Bat e z a i Pat ha ns q ua r r e 11 e d about 
c: ame 1 s g r a zing o n c e r t a i n 1 a n ds, as a r e su 11 of w h i c h 
one life was lost. A local .j i rqa awarded a cash
:l. 6?
compensation of Rs.2,800 to the victim's family, which 
p r event ed f urt her v i o 1 e n c e . A' . I n  Au.gust 1891, t her e 
w a s f i- i c t :i. o n b e t w e e n g r o i.i p s o f t h e A 1 i k h e .1 M u s a k h e 1 tribe 
i n t h e Z h o b D i s t r i c t , a v e r g r a z i n g r i g h t s , w h c h 1 e d t o 
several injuries. Subsequently however, the conflicting 
parties ended the dispute by accepting fines of R s - 100 
each for the damage calised„ 2 S . This wou. 1 d suggest that 
g r o u p s a t 1owe r 1e vels of s eg me n ta t i on were un w i1 1 i ng t o 
engage in long term destructive feuding rivalries over 
e c o 1 cd g i c a 1 e s s e n t i a 1 s t y p i f i e d b y I i v e s t o c k a n d past u r e 
grounds. Another case of limited violence occurred in 1893 
when some Utmankhei graziers clashed with Luni pastoralists 
over the use of a certain pool of water in Luni territorial 
1 i m i t s . ft f i g hi t e n s u e d and s e v e r a 1 m e ri w e r e w o li n d e d „ T h e 
case was referred to a local j :i. r ci a for settlement, in 
t h e c o * .a r s e c :> f w h i c h . t h e Ut ma n k h e 1 s a g r eed to give 
si teen sheep to the L...unis as compensat ion, and 
entreated the Luni chief to rest the? quarrel. Both 
parties were satisfied, and the case was c l o s e d . B u t  
t he ter ms of t he s e 1 1 1 ement had a 11 owed t he Lun.i ch i ef 
to score a political point, namely ownership of the 
water; at the same time the submission of the Utmankhels
was an admission of the superiority of the Lunis in bi.
lateral relations between the two groups. A surrender on 
the political front was probably dictated by the need to 
avoid an escalation of the conflict over scarce resources 
like water; where aggression had not succeeded, perhaps 
submission would give the Utmankhels some use of the water.
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The Spatial and Economic Mould of Inter-Tribal Conflict
As opposed to the defensive economic strategy of 
primary segments, external relations between tribes as 
corporate groups were dominated by conflict for 
limited material resources, particularly in the less 
fertile , semi-arid z anes of B a1uch i s t a n „ Here feud 
oriented aggression was primarily rooted in tribal 
territorial expansionism and the economics of scarcity. 
The northeast area of the Sibi District, stretching 
across the Bori valley and the Thai Chotiali plain to the 
foot of the eastern branch of the Sulaiman hills, 
mirrored in particular the linked problems of material 
deprivation, land struggles, and tribal violence. Here 
Pathan tribes like the Lunis, Shadozais and Tar ins, c o ­
existed with the Marri, Bugti, and Khetran Baluch. Both 
environmental factors and the state of political 
relations between neighbouring tribes were critical in 
shaping the local pattern of group interaction. The 
i ntens i t y of t he economi c pr esslir e on eac h t r i b e , 
combined with a process of selective political 
bargai ni ng to create a networ k of inter- 1r i b a 1 a 1 1 iances, 
w h i c h d e f i n e d the f e li d i n g / n o n - f e u d i n g relationship 
between one corporate group and another.
Luni tribal territory situated on the northern 
edge of this zone, included 1,920 square miles. Of 
this total area Luni pastoralists utilised only 400
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square miles, while cultivators limited their efforts 
to the area around the Anambar River, and a few 
settlements in Thai Chotiali.27 The scarcity of water 
was one factor in the under-utilisation of land 
resources. Efut in addition there was a political 
reason, notably a state of permanent hostility, between 
the Lunis and their neighbours the Harris and Kakars, 
which laid waste parts of former Luni territory. The 
enmity was rooted in a long-standing struggle for the 
acquisition of land dating from about 1850. In the course 
of the conflict the Lunis lost formal control of areas 
like E-iagao and Chamalang, which bore the brunt of Marri 
and Kakar ravages, and turned into violent wa site lands, 
where no marv’s life was safe.20 Ultimately, 
the hard-pressed Lunis, who continued to lose ground, 
w e r e d r i v e n b a c k t o t h e p 1 a i n s o f T h a I C h o t i a 1 i, w hi e r e 
they secured their lands by concluding a 
political contract with the locally dominant Shadozai 
tr ibes.
Shadozai domi nance was st ruct u r e d on t hei r cont r o 1 
of the waters of the Thai River . They had purchased 
shares in the river water, from the original owners the 
Spin Tar ins, who had been forced to sell their 
controlling interest in the waters, to meet a higher 
revenue demand imposed on them by the Afghans in the
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eighteenth century.29 As a resuIt of the dea 1, the
Shadozais prospered from the higher crop yields of
the irrigated sector, while the Tar ins became victims of
a low yielding insecure rain crop sector subject to
frequent scarcity- The depressed Tar ins were forced to
hire water from the Shadozais, and eventually
became tenant cultivators, in an area where they had
*
once enjoyed proprietary privileges- The social
inequality fostered by the possession/non-possession of 
permanent water in turn locked the Shadozais and the 
Tar ins in a hostile and violent relationship- As one 
nineteenth century report noted! "These water sales 
have been regretted ever since and have been the cause 
of a life long feud beween the Tar ins and Shadozais which 
has caused much rioting and bloodshed"-30
T h e S h a d a z a is j i n ter n a 11 y h a r d pressed by t h e .i. r 
q u a r r e 1s w i t h t he Ta r in s , a n d ex t e rnally e x posed t o 
danger from predatory raids p a r t i c u 1a r 1y by the Marris 
who were extending their depredations in the Thai region, 
found a convenient ally in the retreating Lunis to shore 
u p t h e i r d e f e n c e s « 31 T h e S h a d a z a i -- Luni alii a n c e 
therefore matured under pressure, as a form of insurance 
t o s ur v ive t he t ri a 1s of a s 1 1 - i fe t o r n society- Mor e 
spec i f i c a 11 y i t wats a i med aga i nst t he f ea r of Ma r r i 
aggression, which overshadowed the troubled tribal scene 
i. n n o r t h e a s t Ba 1 u c h i s t a n -
Marri aggression was a product of social-structural 
p r e s s u i - e s » B y t h e t u r n o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a 
superior fighting capability (the c 1an numbered 5000 
armed m e n )? 3^ i nc r eased p o p u 1 at i on gr owt h , and pressur e 
on tribal lands, created the ingredients for aggressive 
expansionism- Central to this expansion was the need to 
stretch the internal tribal economy, through the 
occupation of more than one micro-ecological area, for 
in Marri country the struggle to survive was more severe 
than most. As one description noted!
"A more miserably supplied and inhospitable 
country does not exist except of course 
uninhabited deserts. The culturable ground does 
not exceed three percent of the area, and 
although the soil in some places seems rich, the? 
great scarcity of water prevents proper advantage 
be i ng taken of it"-33
The material compulsion to expand was matched by an
a na r chi st t ri b a 1 p syc h e - Thus the Ma r r i s cont e nde d s
"We are the enemies of all our neighbours- We do 
no good to any one, nobody wishes us well, let us 
t hen a f ford every e n c o u r a g e rn & n t t o s 1 1- i f e arou n d 
us, let us give? passage through our 
country to anybody who seeks it to injure 
anot:her , which ever side is i n jured or
destroyed matters not to us in any case we shall 
b e t. h e w i n n e r s » " 3 *
M a r r i t r i b a 1 t e r r i t o r y i t s e 1 f w a s t h e h e r i t a g e o f a 
warring past- Kahan, Philawar, Misau were acquired from
the Hassari is between 1759-17805 Quat Mandai and Badra were 
w o n f !•" o m t h e P a n i P a t hi a n s b e t w e e n 1839-1S 42, followed 
by possession of the Kohlu valley from the Zarkhun 
Pat h a n s . The resi dlae of this expansionist course was
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Bu.t i n the late ni ne t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  ? t h & s c o p e  for
e xp a ns :i. on na r r owe d as t he sp r ea d of B r i t i s h  power
on the frontier,, s e a l e d  the P u n j a b  an d S i n d  borders,
t h e B o 1 a n Pas s a n d m o s t o f S i b i , a g a i n s t li a r r i
dep r e dat i o n s . I n 1881 the p a s s a g e  of t he  Sin d P i sh i n
r a i l w a y  e n c l o s e d  th e M a r r i s  on the w e s t , a n d  g a v e  th e
B r i t i s h b e 11 e r a c c e s s t o M a r r i c o u n t. r y „ The  M a rr is w e r e
now cornered, and S a n d e m a n  r e f l e c t e d  that th e p r o c e s s  of
e n c i r c l e m e n t  by t r o o p s  and r a i l w a y s  must hav e been  "a
g r e a t  and s u d d e n  sho ck to a w ild a nd  u n c i v i l i s e d
t r i b e " i 3 * In e c o n o m i c  t e r m s  the new border c l a m p s  on
Mar r i act i vi ty r e d u c e d  an a 11er nat i ve s o u r c e  of i n c ome
f o r t h e t r i !:) e b a se d o n p 1 u n d e r f r o m r a i d s M  o r e o v e r ,
thi s extra  s o u r c e  of r e v e n u e  s t a r t e d  to c o n t r a c t
at a time when t h e r e  was a p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h
in the tribe., w i t h  n u m b e r s  incr easin g f ro m 9 , 5 7 8  in 189.1
<|('lC>Wl'k tk£.
t o 20, 391 by 1901 - 3 '7 Th i sA i nc r e a s e ^ p r e s t u  r* -v* y-esour c e s  9 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the p a s toral  sector. H e r e  t'he c o m m o n  
o w n e r s h  ip of patsture g rolinds e n c o u r a g e d  a po 1 icy of 
maxiffia1 ext ract i an by i ndi v i d u a 1 her downers;
s u. c h c o m m u n a 1 u s e 1 e d t o o v e r e x p 1 o i t a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s 
a s t h e p a s t o r a 1 s e c t o r hi a d t o b e a r t h e e v e r i n c r e a s i n g 
b u r d e n  of human pre ssure, linked to the r i sing 
d e m o g r a p h i c  curve. T h e r e  was al s o  s ome t r a n s f e r  of
p astora 1 lands to the agr icu 11ura 1 sector, to meet. the
c u s t o m a r y r e q l i i r e m e n t o f a p p o r t i o n i n g equal s h a r e s i n 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  lands to e v e r y  new mal e  m e m b e r  in the
t r i b e .3 3 T h e s h r i n k a g e 3 i n a r e a c o u p 1 e d w i t h t hi e 
increase in grazing rights, overstretched the resources 
of the pastoral lands, and herders were forced to 
prospect for grazing outside Harri territorial limits, 
w h i c h p 1- o v o k e d f r e q u e n t c 1 a s h e s w i t hi n e i g h b o u r i n g t r i b e s .
For the Harris expansion eastward was no longer 
viable, as the British occupation of Sind and the 
Punjab had closed these traditional avenues of plunder. 
Encroachment southwards was blocked by the Bugtis, 
another tribe experiencing similar pressures, and with a 
fighting strength comparable to that of the Harris. The 
Mar r i --Bugt i relationship centred on competitive rivalry 
f or rea 1 ist ic as 1:5ets suchi as 1 :i. vestock , to be acquired 
from each other through the periodic deployment of 
force. But it was also customary for the two tribes to 
u n i t e a t i n t e r v a Is to c a r r y o u t j o i n t raids a g a i n s t. 
n e i g h to o u r i n g t r i b e s , A t s u c h p e r i o d s t h e c o m p e t i t i v e 
basis i n t hei r re 1 at .i.onship was subordi nated to t hie 
common purpose of successfully plundering adjacent 
territories in order to supplement thei r m a r g i n a 1
economies. Between 1860 1B80, the Harris and Bugtis
r a i d e d P u n j a b , S i n d , K a 1 a t , a n d t h e n e i g h b o u r i n g h :i. 11 
t !- i b e a m o n g w h o m t h e y s p r e a d ’1 d e s o 1 a t i o n a n d t e r r o r ' ’, 
w o r k i n g i n c o n c e r t a n d s h ar i n g the spoils.3** T h e li a r r i - 
B u g t :i. r e 1 a t i o n s h i p t h e r e f o r e r e f 1 e c t e d the e q u a 1 
p o 1 .i t :i. c a 1 a n d m i 1 i t a r y b a 1 a n c e b e t w e e n t h e t r i b e s , w h i c h
I T  // O
p r 0 c 1 i.i cl e d t h 0 0 m e r g e n c e o f a d a m i n a n t ~ s u b a r cl i n a t e
structure in bilateral relations.
Una b 1e t□ ma ke a ny hea dway aga i nst t he Bugtis, t he 
m a t e r i a 11y hard-pressed Marris turnsd thei r a11ent ion to 
the militarily weaker F'athan tribes in the north, like 
the Lunis. The Marris opted for confrontation by 
regularly encroaching on grazing grounds wedged between 
Marri and Luni permanent settlements. The Lunis always 
resisted such advances, in order to defend their 
proprietary claims on the grazing grounds and to 
protect their livestock from thieving Harris. Luni 
resistance usually provoked retaliatory violence from 
t he lvlar r is, and t he story of t he tribes pr ior to Br i t ish 
occupation was one of "raids and caunter-rai d s " “*0 When 
the British occupied Thai Chotiali in the early 1880s, a 
cavalry detachment was placed between Marri and Luni 
t r i b a 1 ter r i t o r i e s t o p r eve nt t he feud be ing ac t iva ted, 
I n 1888 t hi e P olitical Agent e v e n d r e w a line a c: r o s s t h e 
g r azi ng g r ou n d s , dema r c a t i ng respective pa st o r a 1 
spheres for the tribes:-. But it proved to be a paper 
1 i n e , as t he Mar r i s repeated 1 y c: rossed i t , to graze t he.i r 
flocks on the Luni side of the border. This aggression 
bred new rows between the tribes, as-; a result of which 
two Lunis were killed in 1895„^ 1 The Man-is were again 
ordered behind the boundary line, which hugged the south 
eastern rim of the Chamalang valley, virtually excluding
the Marris from using the resources of the valley. A 
section of the Harris, however^ requested permission to 
enter the Chamalang valley as they were reluctant to 
return to t he i r own t r i b a 1 count ry owing to d e p 1eted 
r e s a u r c e s a n d o t hi e r u n r e s o 1 v e d f e l i d s w i t h neighbouring 
tribes. But the Luni chief refused permission, and the 
E-fritis hi a u t h o r i t i e s d i d n o t i n t e r f e r & with his 
decision. 4a Unused to respect i ng artificial bou ndar i es 
the Harris soon crossed the line of sepetrat ion and r e ­
entered Luni country. The Lunis reacted swiftly and 
killed two Harris. The Harris retaliated with greater 
force, raiding their country and killing fourteen Lunis,
I n t u r n t hi e Lun i s k i 11 e d anot h e r F i v e Harris.43
The Mar r i --Luni feud was particularly significant 
for showing the progression of an old tribal feud in the 
n e w p o 1 i t i c a 1 c o n t e x t o f c o 1 o n i a 1 r u 1 e . F r o m t hi e t r .i. b a 1 
point of view imperial control hi aid brought in its train 
c 1 osed front iers and exc 1 udecl zones - to thie Marr is the 
C hi a m a 1 a n g 1 i n e w a u 1 cl h a v e a p p e a red a s y e t a n o t h e r 
restr ict ion , contract i ng t hiei r economic opt ions still 
•f: u r t hi e , I n t hi e c a s e o f: t h e M a r r .i s f o r w h o m a r a id wa s 
oft e n a n ec o nom .i c safet y va 1 v e , a ncl feud a language 
to keep open the struggle for resources, restrictive 
b o u n d a r .i. e s were a t hi r e a t t o o Id s u r v i v a 1 tec hi n i q u e s 
p e r f e c: t e d t h r o u g h cl e c: a c.1 e s o f conflict. To t h e m 
Chamalang was a line of surrender, the loss of grazing
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rights in a valley where they had enjoyed such 
privileges by" right of force ••■• hence the repeated 
acts of baundary vio 1 at ion to s.ignify dissent. Conceived 
as a mechanism to impose seperat ion and control, 
the line divorced itself from the true reality of the 
Marri blueprint to survive in adversity, and 
therefore served as a flashpoint for renewed violence♦
The close linkage between territorial feuds and a 
poor economic base was also pivotal to the violent and 
unstable social scene in west Baluchistan. In the
bleak semi--desert environment of Nushki and Chagai, 
described as the haunt of "broken clans and wild 
robbsrs",44 and numerous Baluch and Brahui nomads "who 
...scratched the barest existence from the soil",'*® 
land ownership depended on the precarious sanction of 
f orc:e. The ebb and f 1 ow of t r i ba 1 c a nf 1 i c t dictated 
t e r r i t o r i a 1 h o 1 cl i n g s a n d s o c i a 1 status. F o r t u n e s
wer e made and unmade t hrough t he feudi ng 
p r o c e s s , a s t: h e r e 1 a t i a n s h ii p b e t w e e n t h e M a n d a i Baluch 
and Rakhshani Baluch illustrates. The Manda is were the
0 r i g i n a 1 1 a n c i h o 1 d e r s o f N u s h k i , b u t g e n e r a t i o n s of
1 n t e r t r i b a 1 q u a r r e 1 s h a d d e c i m a t e d t h e i r n u m b e r s , and
u 11 i mate I y t hiey were unab 3. e to hold t he i r own
ag a i nst t he i- a i d i ng i nc:ur s i ons o f t he Bar ec h Af g hans 
•f: r o m n e i g h b o u r i n g S' h o r a w a k » T o i m p r o v e t h e i r o w n 
defences they enlisted the assistance of the Rakhshani
1 79
who lived nearby in Kharan. The M a n d a i  Rakhshani pact
se r ved the p ur pose af keep i ng t he Bar ech out o f 
Nu.shk i . A But in the aftermath the Rakhshanis
proceeded on a course of land app rop r i at ion, "regardless 
of the feelings of their h o s t " ^  This usurpation of 
land c a u  Sect . feuding violence between the two tribes, 
in the course of which the Main da is lost increasing ground 
to the Rakhshanis. Thus when the British acquired the 
a d rn i n i s t: r a t i o n o f N u s h k i i n 1899 the y f o u n d t h e 
Rakhshanis as the principal landholders of the district. 
Coupled with the loss of land, the Man da is ail so lost 
their political! identity, as they were forced to merge 
with another branch of the Rakhshanis — the Jamaldanis - 
.i n oI-der to su.r v.i. v e „ * Thius t he verdiet of violence 
had installed a new landowning group in Nushki on the 
p o 1i ti ca 1 ru i ns of t he old Manda i p r op r i e t o r s .
I n t he? f 1 u i d t r i ba 1 scene of west Ba 1 uc:h i s t a n , 
h owever, the Raikhshanis soon had to defend their new 
lands against the influx of the nomadic Zagar Mengal 
1 1- i b e s m e n :i. n t o N u s h k i . T h e Z a g a r M e n g a 1 chief
or .ig i na 11 y held land i n Ka 1 a t . But Mehr ab !<han of
Kalat had given him a few shares in the waters of the
l< a i s e r s t r e a m i n N u s h k i . S u b s e q u e n 1 1 y the M e n g a 1 c h i e f
decided to concentrate his holdings in Nushki, and 
surrendered his property in Kalat in return for
additional shares in the Kaiser stream.49 This was
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f g 11 owed by 1 ar gescale lienga 1 migrat ions i nta Nushk i , 
where they met resistance from the Rakhshanis. But the 
liengals out numbered the Rakhshanis seven to one, and 
ultimately secured valuable water-rights in the Kaiser 
s t r e a m , a n d at 1 s o t o o k p o s s e s s i o n o f: t hi e c lea r a 11 u v i a 1 
pi at in lands known as the dak country, extending from 
Shorawak to Nushik i „ Irac i rig t he 1 i nkage between lienga 1 
landed power and the feuding process,, Webb Ware, the 
British Political Agent for west Baluchistan, wrote in 
1899s "The liengals from time to time added to their 
possessions... largely by forcibly exacting compensation 
for bloodshed in the frequent quarrels which followed 
t hie i r ar r i vat 1. The dak which this tribe claims come 
under this c a t e g o r y " . “JO But there was scope for 
compromise, since the liengals were a primarily pastoral 
t r i b e a n d i t w a s n o t i n t hi e i r p at r t i c u 1 a r i n t e r e s t t o 
dispossess the Rakhshanis completely. The nomadic liengals 
p r e f e r r e d to b a r t e r t h e i r s u r p 1 u s livestoc k f o r g r a\ i n 
rather than engage in cultivation themselves; it 
therefore served their purpose to allow the Rakhshanis to 
survive as cultivators in lands which they had not taken 
for their own use. The differing needs of the pastoral 
liengals and the agrarian Rakhshanis allowed for c o ­
operation on the basis of resource sharing, thus muting 
the friction and breaking the flow of violence in inter- 
t r i ba 1 relations,,
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Further west from Nushki, in the more arid lands of 
Chagai and Sinjerani country the scarcity of resources 
e n c cdu ag e d c omp e t i t i o n r at he r t he n c o o p e r  a t i o n i n 
tribal relations. In Chagai for instance, migrating 
Sinjerani tribesmen took possession of the land south 
of the Lora Hamun by forcefully dispossessing the 
o r i g i n a 1 S a y i d o w n ere.551 T hi e c r :i. t i c a 1 I i n k a g e
between the exercise of force and group survival, also 
set in motion destructive feuding currents in 
neighbouring Western Sinjerani country. In this semi- 
desert tract, Reki tribesmen eked a living from 
camel breeding, date groves, and patchy cultivation. 
Tradit: ional ly the Rekis protected these assets by 
evolving conflict and co-operation strate gies with 
n e i g hi b o u r i n g t r i b e s . W edged between the m a r a u din g
Damanis of Bar had and the aggressive Nausherwanis of 
Kharan, the Rekis survived by contracting defensive 
alliances with the Rakhshanis of Nushki and the 
Sinjeranis of Chagai.85:3 With the Daman is the Rekis had 
a competitive relationship which turned on the 
possession of date graves along the Perso-Baluch 
f r o n t i e r . T h e d a t e h a r v e s t w a s a c r i t i c a 1 s u r v i v a 1 
f a c: t o r i n t h e n o m a d i c e c o n cd m y o f both tribes. T h e 
D a m a n i s w i t h a p r e d a t o r y r e p u t a t i a n 1 j. k e t h e M a r r i s not 
only raided date groves in Reki territory, but also 
captured some of them located in M a k s o t a g , G a z a i , and 
G a r a n i „ 3 T h e s e 1 o s s e s pro v i de d t. he r a w m a t e r i a 1
for a long drawn blood feud between the tribes, for the
R e k i s v i e w e d t h e g r o v e s as e c o n o m i c a n d c u 11 li r a 1
t er ri t o r y , provi d i ng income and bear i ng imprints of 
their way of life. As one of t h e  Reki chiefs regretted 
t h a t w i t h t h e d a t e g r o v e s a 1 s o d. \ ^ o~ ^  p "old
g raveyards, fo r t s , and... k a r e z e s , belonging to t he 
Rekis, s i t u a t e d  close t o  the date groves. The two
tribes have a standing blood feud on account o f  t h i s
p r o p e r t y  ". 554
Already hard-pressed by the Damanis^the Rekis also 
had to fight on the political front against the 
Nausherwanis of Kharan. In his bid to win political 
c o n t rol o v e r M a s h k el, w h i c h w a is p art o f R e k i t r .i b a 1 
t e r rito r y n e a r K hi a r a n , t h e N a u s h e r w a n i c h i e f r e g u. 1 a r 1 y 
sought to impose dayak or tax on the R e k i s , which the
latter always refused to pay. This led to permanent 
f r i c t i cd n b e t w e e n t h e t ribes, an d in 1886 the c o n f 1 i c t 
took a more serious turn, when the Reki chief M i r  Sabik 
was killed by the N a u s h e r w a n i  chief's brother. This 
c onvert ed t h e -str ug g 1e i nt o a blood feud, and left the 
Rekis permanently embittered against the Nausherwanis. 
Even in 1902, the memory of this injury was sufficiently 
fresh to induce a subsequent Reki leader to assume an 
1 i r I"ec:onc i 1 i ab 1 e a11 i t u d e 1', towar ds the Nausherwan i
While material insufficiencies fuelled fundamental 
conflicts for survival on the economic plane, there were
also areas of political strife in tribal life, where
chiefs and section leaders competed for power and
privilege in the system. The structure of graded
s e c ti on s an d r a n ke d leade r s i n the tribal sc heme 55 ^ 
of Baluchistan encouraged competition for high office 
which was the key to status., power, and wealth in 
the system,
Ran k a n d R i v a 1rv - the Id i om o f Political Feud
The politics of power usually turned on the 
rivalry to acquire central control of the tribal 
apparatus. Such a struggle could be expressed informally 
t h I- oug h t he sec t i o n 1 eader e x p an d i ng his ow n po 1 i t i c a 1 
r o l e w i t h i n t h e t r i b e a t t h e e x pens e o f t. h e c h i e f , o r 
as a formal bid for the position of chiefship itself,
T he fir st mode 1 is bo rne out by the i nt e r n a 1 co n f 1i c t 
pc^tterTvwhich destabilized the Marri tribe from 1876-1900.
J. n t he li i e r a r c h i c f o r m of t he Ma r r .i t r i b e , t he chief 
was dominant, but the second tier leadership^comprising 
.i n f 1 u e n t i a 1 s e c t i o n 1 e a d e r s a n d in p a r t .i c u 1 a r t h e 
w a z i r or prime minister®7 , zealously guarded its 
powers, and exploited any signs of weakness at the 
centre to increase its share in tribal management,
Unt i 1 1876, t he chi ef ship of t he Mar r i 1.1- i b e , under
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Ghazzan Khan, a recluse and a fakir had encouraged the ?
w a z ir Sher Muhammad and other group leaders to exercise 
increasing influence in the tribe. But in 1876, Ghazzan 
Khan made way for a new chief Meherulla K h a n , who 
reversed t he oId trend by assumi ng the act ive managcement
0 f t h e t r i b e a n d curtaili n g t h e i n f 1 u e n c: e o f a m b i t i o u s 
liea dme n . I n p a r t i c u 1 a r he d i sc ont i nued t he of f i ce of 
w a z i _ r , , a n d  made a permanent enemy of Sher Muhammad. 
Deprived of his position of power and status, Sher 
M u h a m in ad retalia t ed b y i n trig u i n g against Me h e r u 11a K h a n 
to discredi t his funet ion as an effect i ve chief. 
Meherulla Khan replied in a similar manner against Sher 
Muhammad and the Langav subsection to which he 
belonged. In 1880 when the telegraph wire was cut in 
Tha I Chot. i a I i , at t he .i nst i gat .i. on of t he Mar r i c h i ef H ,
1 t was ostens i b 1 y made to appear as an of f ence comm i 11ed 
by the Langavs. Subsequently Sher Muhammad staged cattle 
thefts along the borders of Sibi and blamed it on the 
Marri chief.
But as the conflict settled into the cycle of 
reta 1 .i at or y vi o 1 ence, i t soon i mp i nged an Br i t i sh 
interests. The Marri tribe was strategically situated 
t o c o rn m a n d t h e m a i n 1 i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n between Sind 
and the Bolan Pass, the Thai Chotiali route from the 
P u n j a b a n d t h e N a r i r o u t e t o H a r n a i. C u 11 i n g t h e 
wire in Thai Chotiali therefore, threatened British
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1 :i. n e s a f c: a m m u n :i. c a t i o n a s m u c h a s i t s e r v e d t hi e
political purpose of the chief in the conduct of his
i nter na 1 feud. Simi 1 ar 1 y t he »o c-ic4.g j r i of cattle 
thefts evoked o 1 d memor ies of thie hruisi ng pa11:ern of 
Marri raids along the Dera Ghazi Khan borders. Thus 
Sandeman wrote with some concern to Alfred Lyalin
! 1Thie !iarr i clan especia 11 y will requi re a f irm 
controlling hand if we desire to avoid coming to 
an open rupture with them. Even before the 
Kandahar defeat they' were giving trouble on the
Sibi frontier and lately carried off 400 plough
tau 11 oc k g r a z i ng bet wee n Sibi a n d T hu 11 i e " „ <f!>°
Thus the politics of feud interlocked with the problem
of structuring imperial control in Eta luc hist an.
I n :L £383 w h e n S h e r M u h a rn m a d p a s s e d a w a y , hi i s 
brother Mir Hazar Khan assumed the feuding mantle,, and 
pursued the conflict with renewed vigour. But some
0 f t hi e v i o 1 e n c e i n t hi i s I a t e r period w a s i n t e r n a 1 i s e d , 
possibly to avoid open confrontation with the British;
1 t w a s a f o r m o f: t r i b a 1 c o n e s s i o n p e r h a p s t o i m p e l- i a I 
s  u p r e m a c y , w i t hi o u t s u r r e n c:i e r :i. n g t h e p o 1 i t .i c a I r :i. t u a 1 s 
w ! "1 i c hi s hi a p e d t h e i r i d e n t i t y a n d his t o r y . Mir H a z a r 
Khan's aim to subvert the authority of the chief., was 
helped by the fact that Meherulla Khan's health started 
to decline towards the close of .1.885., and he became less 
active in the management of the tribe. By .189:1.-.1.892 as 
the author it'/ of the chief started to slip at the 
cen t r e , feuds between fam i I :i. es and group s went 
unchecked, while the tribal j i rq a seemed unable to
impose dec isions,A1 As the c h i e f 's author ity 1ooked 
i nc reas i ng 1 y fra i 1, M i r Hazar Khan successfu 11 y 
i ncreased his own fo 11 owi. ng i n the tribe. I n 1892 the 
D e p U t y Com m i s s i o n e r f o r T h a 1 C h o t .i a 1 i r e p o r ted;
"Matters recently reached the stage when Mir Hazar 
and all the headmen of the tribe were on one side 
with t.he actua 1 contro 1 of the tribe in their 
hands, while on the other hand Nawab Meh erulla 
K h a n s t o o d p r a c t i call y alone and u n s u p p o r t e d « H e 
held merely nominal control of the tribe and was 
rapidly 1osi ng the i n f 1uence with which old 
feu d a 1 fee 1 i ng ha d i nvest e d t he G ha z n i 
chief s h i p 11. ASS
F u e 11ed by ambition an d revenge, t he feu d ha d 
festered long enough to fracture the internal cohesion 
of the tribe » By devaluing the chiefship, Mir Hazar 
Khan had virtually avenged the original dismissal of his 
brother from the position of waz i r ,63 and skilfully 
usurped a position of dominance in the tribe. The 
internal para.lysi.Ei of tribal functions was also intended 
t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e r e c o u 1 d b e n o s e 1 1 1 e m e n t o f t. h e M a r r i 
p r o b 1 e m wit h o u t a c c o m m o d a t i n g t h e p o 1 i t i c a 1 a m b i t i o n s o f 
Mir Hazar Khan, in this way he left no option open 
for the Marr i c h i e f , and the Br it ish, but to reinstate 
him as waz_i_r if they wished to term.i. nate thie corrosive 
r i v a 1! - y w e a k e n i n g t h e p o 1 i t i c a 1 s y s tern. H . W y 1 .i e , 
Officiating Agent to the Covernor-Genera 1 in 1898, 
judged Mir Hazar Khan as "an ambitious and clever man; 
he does not wa nt t he c h :i. ef ship , but he does want p owe r , 
honour and rewards, and the chief is very suspicious 
of him".64 For Wylie, the only course seemed
a p p e a s e m e n t .i f political e q u i 1 i b r i u m was to be r e s t o r e d 
in the tribe. On 20 June .1.898 he settled the dispute, 
on terms which allowed Mir Hazar to function as waz i r . 
But the truce was short-lived,, In August 1898, the Marri 
chief reopened the confrontation;, by accusing Mir Hazar
0 f p o i s o n i n g h i s s o n . A s t h e p o 1 i t i c a 1 c o n f 1 i c t n o w 
seemed set to enter a blood feud course, the Baluchistan 
G o v e r n m e n t; j u d g e d that t h e M a r r i t r i b e c o u 1 d n a t s ex" v e 
as a common platform for two antagonistic leaders, and 
still survive as a unit. Since a chief was the 
h i st o r i c a 1 f i g u r e of aut. ho r i t y i n t he t r i b e , Wy 1 i e 
preferred to invest British support on behalf of the 
Marri chief. Mir Hazar was deemed expendable, removed
f r cl'm t. he pos i t i o n o f waz i r ;1 and bar r ed f rom i nter f e ring
1 n t he Ma r r i t r .i b e . <6>® I hu.s t he Ma r r i chief" s b id to
emascr.u I a t e sec onda r y .1 eade r s i n t hie t r i b e , and expand t he 
role of the chieftaincy, was endorsed by colonial 
strategy; the? chief was now poised to turn die: tat or.
The drive for sectional autonomy and repudiation 
of central control was often a prescription for feuding
v :i. o 1 e nc e , as i n t hie case of t he Rust om z a i Bar a z z a i
conflict. The Rustomzais and Sarazzais were sections of 
t hie Raisani Br ahui t r i b e . The chief of t he Barazzai
section was traditionally chief of the Raisani tribe. 
But the Rustomzai leaders were also able and determined 
figures who exercised influence in the Khan of Kalat"s
For a brief spell in the
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troubled period between 1857 1876, the Rustomzai chief
had even cont ro .1 i ed t hie Ra i san i tr i be as a whole?..
P e r h a p s t h i s t a s t e of p o 1 i t i c: a 1 p o w e r , c o u p 1 e d w i t hi t h e 
location of the Rustomzais in Quetta., far from the main 
1 oc uib o f Ra .i. sa n i powe r i n Kac h h i , f lie 11 ed sepctr at i st 
aspirations in the leadership to redefine its tribal 
i dentity on more i ndependent 1 ines- In .1.876 the
Rustomzai leader, Mir Habib Khan made a formal bid for
separation by claiming the title of sardar in relation 
to t he Rust o m z a i s , assert i ng his exo 1 lisive contro 1 
over t.he section, and re ject i ng t he aut hor i ty of t he 
Raisani chief over the Rustomzais in Quetta.67
The Raisani chief reacted with violence to the
R listomzai threat to nar row his jur isdict ion in the 
t r i b e „ I n 1877 w h e n Mir All y a r K h a n i n h e r i t e d t h e 
leadership of the Rustomzais from his uncle Mir Habib, 
the Raisanis pursued an aggressive policy' of usurping 
Rustomzai r ights i n 1 ands near Quetta, whi chi const i tu.ted 
p a r t o f 11") e 1 a t e M i r Id a b j. b s  1 e g a c y t o h i s s e c t i o n »
S u b e q u e n 1.1 y i n 1886, t h e R a i s a n i c h i e f d e m o 1 i s h e d A 11 y a r 
l< h a n 7 s f o r t i n !< a n a k , w i t h s u p p o r t from □ 1 i v e r Bt » Jo hi n
then acting Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan,
Ons Rustomzai tribesman even shot a Raisani near
Qu e t t a . <£,B In the meantime the tribal j :i. r q a decided
t hat A 11y a r 7s cI a im to t he ti 1 1e of sardar was i 1 1 e g a 1 
for one tribe could not have two chiefs- Sandeman
18?
endorsed the decision, but Allyar Khan refused to accept 
t he ver d i c t and he was i mp r isoned - A^ But hie was 
subsequently released, and in 1895 when some old 
u r e s o 1 v e d 1 a n d c: a s e s c a m e u p f o r settle m e n t b e t w e e n t hi e 
g r o u p s , v .i o 1 e n c e f 1 a red a g a i n . R u s t o m z a i lands
suffered damage and enc raachment and Aliyar Khan fled to 
Afghanistan. But in IB?7 he decided to return, and take 
revenge for the damages suffered by the Rustomzais. 
Local British officials took the threat seriously enough 
to send a cavalry and infantry detachment to the border 
fourteen miles frorn Guetta.7°
An unresolved feud therefore served as a 
m a i n s p r i n g f o r v i o 1 e n c e i n s o c i e t y , and .i m p o s e d a n 
expensive burden on limited local resources. Hugh Barnes, 
Agent to the Governor-General in 1897, judged that it 
w a s i n t h e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t t o f o r c e a s e t1I e m e n t o f t hi e 
f e u d . T h e r e f o r e rn o v i n g a w a y f r o m t hi e e a r 1 i e r E-i r j. t i s h 
pos .i t i on of p rov i d i ng unequ i voca I suppor t f or t he Ra i san i 
chief, in order to keep the tribe from developing fissive 
strains, he offered Allyar Khan the restoration of his 
lands, and the title of sarbar of the Rustomzais, 
p< r o v i d e d h e m a d e a f o r m a I s u b m i s s i o n a c k n o w 1 e d g i n g t hi e 
Raisani chief's overall title to the headship of the 
R a i s a n i t r i be.71 T h u s A 1 1 y a r K hi a n w as g i v e n the 
substance of power, while providing a face saving 
formula for the Raisani chief to preserve his own status
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in the tribe. The end result balanced sectional 
a u t o n o m y w i t hi t h e p r i n c .i p 1 e of p o 1 i t i c a 1 c e n tralisatio n , 
to redefine the Raisani tribe, as a broad arena where 
competing interests and ambitions could be accommodated, 
wi t hout des t r oy i ng the h o 1i st i c f r amewo r k of the tribe.
Leadership as a competitive commodity also 
st imla 1 ated feuding r i va 1 r ies in Pathan tr ibes, The mai n 
function of feud in the political context of the Patnan 
t r i be was t o i mpose a for m of t ac t i c a 1 st r at i f i cat i on 
on a I-e 1 at i ve 1 y f 1 u i d power st ructure. S i nce t he 
chiefship was not hereditary, the object of political 
rivalries was usually to capture the central leadership 
of the tribe. The feuding history of the Jogezais of 
Z h o b m i r r o r e d t h i s t y p e o f r i v a 1 r y f o r i n t e r n a 1 p o w e r .
The Jogezais were a subsection of the Sanzar Khel 
Kakar tribe. In the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali they 
acquired a special status, when the Afghan monarch 
started the custom of appointing one of their members as 
chief or "Bads hah of Z h o b 7. It was also c las ternary for 
Kakar tribes outside Zhob to offer allegiance to the 
Jogezai chief, "to join his standard at his bidding".'725 
As a t i 1 1 e t:o power .i n the Kakar wor 1 d , t he headship of 
the Jogezais invited keen competition and was the 
ma i nsp r i ng of feud i ng d i v i s i o ns amo ng t he Joge z a i
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sardar-khe 1 (r u 1i ng f a m i 1y g r o u p ). The most destruct ive 
of these feuds started in 1854 when Rashid Khan, the 
existing chief passed awav, and his son Shahbaz Khan was 
o u s t e d f r o m t h e s u c c e s s ion by a n o 1 d e r c o u sin S h a h J a h a n . 
T h i s u s u r p a t i o n o f p o w e r b y S h a h J a hi an split t h e 
sardar--khel i nto two rival fact ians - Mawab Kaho 1 to 
which the new leader belonged, and Ishak Kahol to which 
his disp osses s ed r i v a 1 b e 1o ng e d „ 7 3 In t he years w hi ch 
followed, Shah Jahan proceeded to consolidate his position 
by courting Afghan support and joining the Amir's war
against the British in 1879 1880. He also manipulated
tribal support by establishing a reputation as a fak i r 
or ho 1 y mirac 1 e wor ker , and became a cult f .igure 
comb i n i ng t hie r o 1 es of " p r op hiet, p r i e s t , and k i ngmaker 
of the Zhobwals".~'r*
I n 1874 t hi e f a c t i o n a 1 r i v air y e n t e r e d a m o r e a c t i v e 
cycle, when Shah Jahan quarrelled with the Luni chief
0 v e r the p o s s e s s i a n o f 1 i v e s t o c k . A11 e m p t i n g t o e rn b r o i 1 
Shah Jahan in deeper conflict, Dost Muhammad a member of 
the Ishak Kahol faction supported the Lunis against 
Shah Jahan. When violence broke out between the groups, 
Dost Muhammad suffered the loss of an eye. In revenge 
for his injury he murdered Jullundar, Shah Jahan's 
eldest son.73 A political feud was now transformed
1 r11o a b 1ood f e u d , i nvok i ng the operati on of b a d a 1 t he
Pathan ideology of counter revenge,, In 1906, the Nawab
K a hi o 1 t o o k i t s d u e r e v e n g e b y m u r d e r i n g B a n g a 1 K h a n , t h e
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1 s hhak Kaho 1 1 ea der i n or der t o avenge t hie mur der of 1874, 
and a later attack (in 1906) which had wounded Muhammad 
Akbar, leader of the Nawab Kahol group,. But this did 
not terminate the destructive history of the feud. As 
an off icia 1 source noted in 1916s 1'Dur ing thiis t ime 
the feud between these two branches, the Ishak Kahol and 
Nawab Kahol, continues, and is not dead up to the 
present"-
Feudi ng rivalries, however, left an embattied 
tribal structure, essentially more vulnerable to 
external pressure. Thus in 1884, when Sandeman needed
t o s t r u c t u r e B r i t i s h .i n f 1 la e n c e i n Z h o b , h e c o u I d
s p I i t K a k a r o p p o s i t i o n b y s u p p o r t. i n g S h a h hi a z K h a n t o
regain the position of chiefship from his old adversary 
Shah Jahan. The success of this strategy was apparent 
in the elimination of Shah Jahan from Kakar politics,
the institution of Shahbaz Khan as the new chief loyal 
to Sandeman, and the collapse of Kakar opposition to the 
r e d e f i n i t. i o n o f Z h o b a s a B r i t. i s h s p h e r e o f i n f 1 la e n c e . 7 "7 
But Shahbaz's artificially constructed leadership was 
challenged by his cousin Dost Muhammad, who mobilized 
neighbouring Kakar tribes in 1887 to embark on a violent 
crusade to capture the chieftaincy,. This encouraged San deman 
to intervene again in Zhob politics in 1889, on behalf 
of Shahbaz Khan, and thereby to sustain the model of 
chieftaincy he had instituted in 1884.
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I n a c:o 1 on:i. a 1 context , t herefore, t he p racess of 
feud corroded tribal cohesion, and unlocked the door to 
e x t e r n a 1 d o m .i. n a t i o n . A s e a c h f e u d s t i in li 1 a t e d a n e w n .i c h e 
of violence in society, it invited imperial censure, and 
an externa1 p o 1i t i ca 1 s o 1ut ion to the p rob1ems of 
leadership. This in turn forced a change in the 
q u a 1 i t y o f t h e 1 e a d e r s h .i p . I n a p u r e 1 y t r i b a 1
milieu, a feud would function as a competitive medium to 
test the me111 e of aspiring leaders. A victo rious 
chief would be an ideal type tribal figure, combining 
superior physical prowess with the tactical skills 
n e e d e d to s u r v .i v e i n a h a r d envi r o n m ent, B u t 
i nte rve n ti o n b y a fo r e i gn p owe r, like the British, 
usually blunted the edges of competition, and imposed a 
type of leader, not necessarily the most able in tribal 
management, but one who would be amenable to external 
dictation, Even where the operation of the hereditary 
p r i n c i p 1 e e n s u r e d t h e 1 i f e o f t he? traditio n a 1 c h i e f , t h e 
r e s o 1 l i t i o n o f p o 1 i t i c a 1 f e u d s accord i n g t o B r i t i s h 
formulas whittled^ the independent function of the 
t r i b e , a n d its c cl p a. dt y f o r s e 1 f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n „
While feuds dominated the centre stage of the 
tribal scene, there were other more limited forms of 
violent exchange like raids. The politically motivated 
raid was Lisually an appendage of power struggles within 
a particular tribe. As the history of internal feuds in
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the Marri and Kakar tribes,7® have shown that raids 
w e i" e l i n d e r t a k e n t o e x t e r n a 1 i s e t hi e c o n f 1 i c t , wit h t In e 
specific purpose of discrediting the leadership of 
existing chiefs. The loot from a successful raid was 
a 1 s o c a 1 c: u 1 a t e d t o a p p e a 1 t o t h e a v a r ice o f t r i b a 1 
members, and buy additional political support for the 
pa r ti c u 1 a r sec tion 1ea de r e ngaged in feu d i ng con f 1 i c t 
with the tribal chief.
A p a r t f r o m t hi e i r p o 1 i t i c a 1 u s e?, raid s a 1 s o 
constituted a mechanism for balancing the tribal 
economy. The tribes largely engaged in raiding activity, 
such as the Marris, Bugtis, and Achakzais also occupied 
the most barren areas in Baluchistan. Confined to 
settlements in unproductive arid mountain valleys, such 
tribes found it convenient to augment the income of the 
tribal economy by raiding the territories of more 
p i " o s p e r o u s t r i Id e s , 1 i k e the s e d e n t a r y T a r i n s and
Shadoza i s . In t he choice of booty t he hi g h i ncidence of 
cattle 1 i f t i ng po i nted to t he p r i macy of t hie economi c 
mot ive in rai ding v i o 1e n c e . y<9„ The se mi- nomadic 
lifestyle of the raiding tribes also gave them an edge 
in terms of mobility over their sedentary victims. In 
times of drought the scale of raiding activity increased 
as a measure to level the effects of loss through 
natural causes. For instance the Marri tribe registered 
a low crime rate for 1901-1902, while the following year^
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□wing to drought and the influx of Afghan herders into 
B a 1uchi st a n , whi ch fu rt he r strained local pastoral 
resources, the Marris under pressure rapidly increased 
t. h e s c a 1 e o f c a 1 1 1 e 1 i f t .i n g . ® ° T r i b a 1 r a i d s t h e r e f o r e 
underlined the dependence of many marginal communities on 
breeding and pasturage as their main source of 
1 i v e 1 i hi o o d , a n d 1 i f t i n g lives t o c k w a s a m e a n s o f
ensur i ng the cont i nuous c i r c u 1 at ion of wealth i n the
specific currency of the pastoral community.
For tribesmen therefore, feuds and raids typified 
a spectrum of strategic choices on the political and 
economic front, pursued through the rituals of 
reta1 i atory vi o 1enee. The adhesia n to soci a 1 v i o 1ence 
d i ct at ed i n t u.r n a cu 11 ur e c:ode, wh i c h paid par t i cu 1 ar 
homage to the exercise of force as an expression of high 
a nd her oi c m a s c u 1 ine c ourage.
T h e I d e o 1 o q y o f V i o .1. e n c e
S u p e r :i. m p o s e d o n t h e s o c i a 1 s t r u g g 1 e o f f e u d s a n d
raids was a symbolic struggle for the n o n - r e a 1istic prize 
of ho nou r as conceived i n t r i ba. 1 c u 11 u r e . I zzat 
(honour) and sharm (shame) conceptualised the two 
p o 1a ri ti es in thi s sys tem of thoug ht.. Hon o ur r epresent ed 
a p o s i t i v e m a 1 e a 11 r i b u t e s y n o n y m a u s w .i t hi m a 1 e p r o w e s s , 
aggression,, and physical force,, The archetypal warrior 
hero praised in Baluch heroic ballads made explicit the
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1 i n !■•' a g e b e t w e e n v i o 1 e n c e , f o r c e , and t h e f a 1 k model o f 
honour,. Eulogising a particularly militant leader of 
the Bijarani Marris. . the nineteenth century named 
K a r a m K h an, a B a 1 li c h ballad Si si '£
"The Marris are stronger than any other men.
K a r a m 1< h a n i s fie r c e , a n d u n t i r i n g , h e r a i n s
blows on his enemies, and brings them down in one
shot like a wild she?ep. "rai
T h e t w o rn a i n s o u r c e s of de f i 1 em e n t o f h onou r w e r e 
male cowardice and female s h a r m . Male cowardice was 
1 i nked w i t h the i nabi 1 i t y t o per f or m f eat s of p hys i ca 1 
prowess. As a British observer noted: "The Baluchis
have? the utmost contempt for.... anyone who cannot ride a 
horse properly or use a sword" .0=2 Desertions in the 
ba1 1 1 e f :i. e 1 d a 1 so ear ned the st i gma of social shame and 
moral censure. Predicting a shameful end for some 
warriors who had deserted their leader in a battle, a 
Ba 1uch baliad prophesied:
"The cursed cowards fled., abandoned their friends 
and companions. They shall sit with shame in the 
assembly and feed on carrion and unlawful meats,
because they remained alive after their leader
was slain."®3
The second source of threat to male honour was 
synonymous with female shar~m, which was act ivitated in 
the adultery syndrome, when a woman's infidelity required 
the husband/father/brother to take drastic blood revenge 
to restore the honour and status of his agnatic g r o u p . ® 4
Mi thin this concept of honour therefore, violence 
operated as a socially legitimised medium for the
a c q u i s i t i □ n o f s t a t u s a n d m e r it. 8 □ c i a .1 c r e d i t w a s 
acquired through the successful deployment of force, 
which formed the basis of an honourable reputation. 
Equally the failure.:: to undertake reprisals
demonstrated w e a k ness, and inv□1ved the loss of honour 
and status. A social code which enshrined the values of 
i z zat and sharrn i nevi tab 1 y fostered a menta 1 
commitment to violence-: and reprisals. In effect., the
diale c t i c of ho nour consti t u t ed t he nexus between 
violence as a system of thought and as a system of 
act ion
Despite the ideological and social bias 
r e t a 1 i a t o r y v i o 1 e n c e , t h e t r i b e s held i n r e s e !•" v e a 
s y s t e m of mater i a 1 c omp e nsa ti ons t o t e r m i n a t e con f 1i c t , 
w h i c hi bee a m e o p e r a t i v e a t: s p e c i f i c j u n c t. u res o f
n u m e r i c a 1 cl e j: 1 e t i o n , i n t r a g r o u p w e a k ness a n cl m u t u a 1
e x h a li s t i o n a m o n g f e u d i n g c o m b a t a n t s .
Systems of Compensation
The award of compensation to end hostilities was 
acceptah 1 e , i f t he vict im7 s group was too weak .i n tern'is 
of man power to continue the struggle. As a Gazetteer 
noteds
"In p r e  British days if the parties were of equal
posi t i on and i n f 1u e n c e „ b 1ood had to be avenged 
by blood ; but if the relations of the deceased 
were weak, the matter could be compromised by the 
payment of compensation. 1103
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A n a t hi s r s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h c o m p e n s a t i o n c o u I d r e s o 1 v e a 
c o n f 3. i c t w a s m u t u a 1 e x h a u s t i o n a F t h e c a n t e s t i n g 
.i ndi vi duals. As t he Bi luchi nama descr ibeds
I
' A s 1 o n g a s t h e y d o n t g e t t i r e d o f: f i g h t i n g t h e y 
wont regard what any one says to t h e m . .. peace is 
e Ffec t e d whe n bot h p a rties hav e i t ou t wi t h o n e 
another and then arrange a peace? when peace is 
a r r ang ed b y c o m p u 1s io n it will not be 1o ng 
1 ast i n g . "
The translation of revenge into a scale of
mater i a 1 i ons won Id g i ve an i nt r i ns ica 11 y weaker
vie t i m s  g r o u p i rn m u n i t y f r o rn c o li n t e r r e p risals, w h i 1 e 
t h e m a t. e r i a 1 i t em s o F c o rn pens a t .i o n won 1 d b o 1 s t. e r t h e 
group economy. Compensation was paid in kind, which 
included la nd, 1 ivestock, and a few girls for the
injured group? or an equivalent was paid in cash and 
k i n d , t h e a m o u n t s v a r y i n g f r o m R s . 200 t o R s . 2500 . , 63 ^ 
a m o n g o r d i n a r y B a 3. u c h a n d P a t h a n tribes m e n ? i n t h e 
Sibi a re? a of Baluchistan. By way of contrast.,,
compensat. ion rat.es for the 1 ife of a rel ig ious 3.eader 
or a member of the s a r d a r - k h e l were double the amount 
p a y a b 1 e for a n o r d i n a r y t r i b e s m a n 3 ® , r e f 1 e c t i n g 
the grip of status and hierarchy in social 
r e 1ati o n s .
The right of arbitration lay with tribal chiefs 
a n d s e c t i o n 1 e a d e r s f  o r w h i c h t h e y r e c e i v e d a f: e e 
ca 1c u 1 ated on a percentage share of the object in 
d i s p u t e . 3 R e 1 i g i o u s 1 e a d e r s a 1 s o p 1 a y e d t h e r ole o f
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mediators for which they would be given a sheep or goat 
as fees.90
The s y s t e in a f c o m pen s a t i o n t h e r e f o r e w o r k e d a s a 
p rotect i ve p r i nc ip 1 e to prevent t he ext i nct ion of weaker 
groups. It balanced the negative logic of revenge 
envisaged in the feuding principle, and gave the 
c o n t e s t a n t s a c h a n c e t o s u r v i v e t h e i r h o s t i 1 i t i e s . T h e 
co-existence of peaceful compensation with feuding 
v i o 1 ence m i r r ored t hie imper at i ves of su.r vi va 1 and 
destruction in a tribal society imprisoned in a marginal 
ex .ist e n c e , where material depr i vation was t he noi-m , and 
even the loss of a human life could be mit igated by a 
cash sum.
W h i 1 e c a n f: 1 i c t a m o n g t r i b a 1 g r o ups w a s r o o t e c! i n a 
par t .i cu 1 ar sa c i a 1 env i r o n m e n t , t her e was a mor e
enigmatic expression of violence typified by fanatical
k i 11 i n g s o f n o n I s 1 a m i c i n d i v i d u. a Is. A c o m p 1 e x o f
religious and psychological motives dictated such acts, 
known as qha z a , which seemed to elude any rational 
1 o q i c .
Ghaza and the Violence of Mar t y r d o m .
Du r i nq an ac t of ghaza , a f anat .i. c ^  dr :i. ve n by
s p i r i t u a 1 f r e n z y , w a u 1 d s elect a non - Islamic: h u m a n
target and kill him, in order to ensure his own death as
a shahid or martyr in the cause of Islam. The 
concept of shahadat (martyrdom) related to the Islamic 
precept., which allowed a Muslim to take up arms against 
the unbeliever, purely for the sake of religion, and 
s u !'" r e n d e r h is 1 i f e i n the fight. T r i b a I b e h a v i a ur in
t h i s field was based on t hie Khu 1 s a , a text book
described in a Punjab r e p o r t , aSi be.ir\<^  of "unknown origin, 
r e p u d i a t e d b y r e a 1 M u h a m m a d a n d o c t r i n e b u t s u m m .i. n g u p 
unfortunately all the theology known to the? t a 1 i b or 
bor deI- mu 11 a " .<5> 1 The bool-:: c □ nf i r med the a11a i nment 
of shahadat for any misguided tribesman who lost his
o w n 1 i fe in retu r n fo r the m u r de r of a n infidel.
T he hi s to ry of ghaza i n B a 1uc h i st an shows t he 
ch :i 11 i ng popu 1 ai- i t y of Chr i st i a n s , H i n d u s , and S i k hs as 
the targets of fanatical attacks. In 1879, a small
P a t h a n b o y o f e .1 e v e n s t a b b e d a S i k h s o 1 d i e r with a
chiopper, and disp 1 ayed a white Arum 1 i 1 y , emblematic of 
Muslim martyrdom. In 1892, a girl in Thai Chotiali 
near 1 y k illed a Si khi sent r y , and g 1 or ied in the a c t . ^ ^ 
Later in 1899 a Marri fanatic killed a European guard.In 
19 01, a H a m z a z i f a n a t i c n a m e d D o u 1 a t m u r d e r e r d C a p t a j. n 
Johnstone.^ Civi I Surgeon, Loralai .‘5>3 The fanatics 
confessed to "having seen blood" and being led
by the compulsive ritual violence dictated by the cult 
of g h a z a .94
I n a tri ba 1 c u l t u r a 1 envi ron m e n t , qhazi sm a 1so 
a p p e a 1 e d t □ t h e h e r o i c e? .1 e m e n t i n p o p u 1 a r i m a g :i. n a t ion. 
Ac a soldier of Islam,, a fanatic was not only assured of 
a passage to paradise, but also gained immortality in 
tribal history as a sai n t 1 y war r ior hera. Fr'am
Loralai, in .1.904, the British Political Agent wrote;
11There i s a good deaI of latent f anat ici sm i n t he 
valley. Persons who have committed fanatical 
o u t r a g e s a t - e s till 1 o o k e d la pan as h e r o e s a n d t h e i r 
crimes forrn the subject of songs on 
festive oc casions".93
The religious and heroic connotations of q h a z e, 
m a d e s u c: h a n a c t o f v i o 1 e n c e u s e f u 1 t o t h o s e h a r bour in g 
a sense of material injury or suffering deprivation., as 
it. provided a spiritual sanction to a negative act 
against society. Thus the Marri and Kakar ou t r a g e s 9* 
o c. c u i" r e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f F ami n e a n d d r o u g h t b e t w e e n 
1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 0 . Host of the fanatics also came from the 
p o o r e s t. sect i o n o f t r i b a 1 s o c i e t y . A s J a rn e s B r o w n e ,
Agent to the Governor General, recorded in 1396s"The
army of solitary qahazas is almost. solely recruited 
from the poorest and most ignorant c l a s s 11.98 Starving 
t r i b e s m e n c o u 1 d have f o u n d gjraza an attractive solution 
to the burden of living. They were also more vulnerable 
to manipulation by the religious exhortations of 
mu 11a he nursing grievances against the government, or 
essentially hostile to the ruling Ang 1 o--Chr i stan coterie 
in Baluc histan.<5><5> The pLire destruction envisaged in 
g haza 1 ed Hughes Bulier to eonc 1 u.de i n the Census of 1901
!' A f a n a tic" s rn i n d a 11 i. t u d e a p p e a r s to r e s e rn b I e t h a t o f 
t h e a n a r c: h i a t i n E u r o p e 1 „ 1 ° °
B o i- d e r C o n f 1 i c t s
I n a soc i et y w he r e v i ole nc e was on 1 y a n i mp li Ise 
a w a y , t h e p r o b 1 e m o f r a ids a n d f e li d s a 1 o n g t h e b o r d e r 
a r e a s s k i r t i n g A f g h a n i s t a n a n d P e r s i a a s s u rn e d 
a d d i t i o na 1 e >; t er na I ove r t ones t h r oug h t he i nvo 1 vernent of 
f a r e :i. g n power s .i n t he po 1 i t i cs of t r .i ba 1 conf 1 i c t., f or 
t h e p r o m o t i o n o f n a t i o n a .1 i n t e r e s t s . C o n t a c t wit h 
British India, Afghanistan, and Persia, gave Baluchistan 
a frontier ringed with political disputes and rivalries, 
which was a natural breeding ground for friction and 
e x c e rc ises in political su bve rsi o n .
T rap p e d again s t t he e x p a n d i ng ma rg i n s of Br i t i s h 
I n d i a , the A rn i r o f A f g h a n i s t a n ^ f o r i n s t a n c e , c o u 1 d n o t 
r i sk di rect conf rontat ion wi th Br itain; i nstead he 
p r e f e r r e d t o d e stabilize B r i t i s h p o w e r 1 o c a 11 y o n t h e 
f r o n t i e r , b y s p i n n i n g a w e b o f t r i b a 1 t e n s i o n , i n w h i c h 
hie hop ed t o ent a ng 1 e Br i t i sh bo r der aut hor i t .ies. 
Between 1889--1890, the Amir pursued a subversive 
s t r a t e g y o f d e p 1 o y .i n g A f g hi a n i r r e g u 1 a r t r o ops i n a r e a s 
bordering on Chaman, Zhob, and Pi shin, with the purpose 
o f h a r a s s i n g o f f i c i a 1 s a n d t r i b e s 1 i v .i n g i n t In e 
n e i g h b o u r h o o d „ 1 ° 1 . .1 n A f g h a n i s t a n h e k e p t u p a n t i - El r i t i s h
fee 1i ngs by p reachi ng j i h a d „ In t hi s way t he Ami r hoped
to keep the Afghan tribes poised for aggressive action; 
he also calculated that without a real war to release 
t h e m o u n t i n g t e n s i o n , s o m e o f t h e p e n t - u p e n e r g y w o u 1 d 
e pend i t s e 1 f i n t r i b a 1 r a i d s a c r o s s t h e 0 u e 11 a - p i s h i n 
fr ont i er. The Ami r 's mai n a 11i es i n this war of nerves 
were the poor nomadic Achakzai tribesmen who lived on 
both sides of the Afghan— Efaluch borderland. Trapped 
i n p ove r1 y :i the t r i be c ou 1 d be induced t o r a i d f o r
material gains., and the Afghan Governor of Shorawak 
took up the opt i on of encourag i ng Achakzai raids a 1ong 
the Quetta frontier, through 1891-1892. loSB The 
Ac hakz a i s d u 1y looted mail c ar r i er s , trad i ng c a r a v a n s , 
and merchant shops, thereby opening a new artery of 
violence on the? far edge of the Quetta-Fishi n frontier. 
The raiders had the advantage of melting away with their 
1oot i n A fg h a n te r r i to r y , outside t he 1 i m i ts of 
Baluchistan jurisdiction. As long as Kabul remained 
host i 1 e , such ra.i ds wou 1 d cont i nue to feed vio 1 ence in
the system.. As the Political Agent for Q u etta Pi shin
wr ot e i n .1.904 , t he adm i. n i st r at ion of t he D i st r i c t .
was difficult as it marched 1 for a considerable distance 
w i t h t h e t e r r i t o r :i. e s o f a s e m i - c .i v i 1 i s e d s t a t e ,
whose subjects cannot be dealt with directly," and with
whom no H at i sfactoi- arrangements for the settlement
n poss i b 1e u 1. 0 3
The Perso Baluch borderland in the west was also
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prey to the cross currents of border violence. In the 
labyrinth of sand hills which covered this part of the? 
f r o n t i e r „ m a r a u d i n g 1 1- i b e s f o u n d e a s y h i d e o u. t s f a r f r o m 
the reach of central governments. Persia's traditional 
w r i t ove r t he bo r de r land ha d a 11 but f a de d , lea v i ng t he 
r e g i o n f r e e f o r t r i b a 1 e p 1 o its, m a k i n g it a 
' v e r i t a b 1 e A 1 s a t. i a f o r t h e b o r d e r o u. 11 a w " . 1 ° ^
The Damanis of Persian Sarhad typified the case 
of a problem tribe operating outside the circle of 
central c o n t r o l . Prom their mountain base in the Safed- 
Koh, the Damanis descended with annual regularity to the 
plains of the River Mashkel on the B r i t i s h Baluchistan 
s i de a f t he bor der , to 1 i f t 1 i vest oc k f r om t he 1 oca 1 
Reki t r i b e s m e n . 105 Persian authorities did little to 
curb Damani raids. After 1896, the opening of the 
Nush k i -Se .i. st a n t r a de r out e u nc ave r e d new t a r g et s f o r 
D a m a n i r a i d e r s . I n 19 01 t h e D a m a n i s e n t e r e d C h a g a i , 
attacked the trade route, injured people., and carried 
away merchandise. They also made common cause with 
po 1 i t i ca 1 male:ontents f ram Ba 1 uc i"ii s t a n , i n or de!•" to make 
biqger .joi nt rai ds ac:ross t he border . For si x mont hs in 
1.900 they continually raided western Baluchistan,
killing twenty four persons, wounding nineteen, and
plundered property to the extent of Rs. 83,832.
Behind the picture of Damani violence lay the
3. a r ger p rob 1 ern of F‘er s i a n a11 i tu.des. 0 n Pe rs la's part^
3. ea v i ng t he bor der as a desa late hau nt f o r r o b ber 
tribes was dictated by the lack of resources to crush 
t h e m , a n d t h e n eed t o k e e p t h e B r i t i s h e m b r □ i 1 e d i n 
border conf1icts. As C.E» Yate, Agent to the Governor-
Ganera 1, poi nted out i n 1901, the 1 aissez f ai re attitude
of the Persian Government encouraged the notion of 
asylum on the Persian side of the border, and was an 
open invitation for tribesmen dissatisfied in 
Baluchistan to turn into "rebels on every little 
p r o v ac a t ion, defy 1oca 1 a ut horities, a n d t a ke refu g e i n 
Persia".107 Moreover the problem, he felt- had 
progressed beyond that of mere asylum:
118 o f a r t h e b o r d e r d i s t r i c t o f P e r s i a h a s s e r v e d 
only as an asylum to... outlaws, but now the 
i m m u n i t y f r o m p u n i s h m e n t w h i c h t h e c o u n t r y 
offers, owing to the connivance of the local 
P er s i a n aut ho r i ti e s , has em bo 1de ne d t he 
i n h a b i t a n t s t o p r o c e e d t o a c t u a 1 a g g r e e:> s i o n
a g a i n s t B a 1 u c h i s t an" . 1 °e
Persia's attitude suggests she was trying to contain
B r i t i s h p o w e r i n B a 1 u c h i s t a n h e h i n d a p r .i c k 1 y b o r d e r o f
t r i b a 1 d i s s e n t » A b a r r i e r o f d e s e r t a. n d f i g hi t i n g t r i b e s
was Persia's political answer to the inexorable British
drive westwards, in the form of trade routes, railways
a n d new p o 1i t ic a 1 d i strie t s „
T h e v o 1 a t i 1 i t y o f t h e B a 1 u c h i s t a n b o r d e r 1 a n d
was also stoked by the ano.ma.ly, that the political
f ront i er d i d not co i nc i de w i t hi t he et hni c one, and t he
same tribal group often lived on both sides of the 
border. The ethnic: reality of tribal patterns and
in o v e m e n t s c: o n s t r a i n e c! t h e s o c: i a 1 m a p o f t h e b o r d e r 1 a n d , 
d e s p i t e f o r m a 1 1 i n e s o f p o 1 :i. t i c a 1 s e pet r a t ion. T y p i c: a 1
0 f the t r i bes who tra d i ti□n a 11y pursued 1i fe s t y 1es 
e >; n 1 a i t i ng r esour c es on e i t her s i de of t he bor de r . wer e 
the nomadic: powi ndahs (one who travels on foot)lo<3>, 
from upper Afghanistan who spent part of the year on 
t h e I n d i a n p 1 a i n s . T h e need t o f i n d a 11 e r n *a t e w i n t e r 
pasture for the flocks and additional markets for their 
products meant that every autumn about ‘'30,000 of these 
hardy warriors, merchants and graziers I i.e.the
pow i ndahs li wit h a bout 60, 000 c ame 1 s 1 a den w i t h t he
produce of Khorasan fight their way down to Dera Ismail 
Khan and scatter throughout India, reconvening in 
s p r i n g F o r t h e w i n t e r j o u r n e y . " 11 ° Bu t t h e r o ut e o f 
t h e m i g r a t. i o n a c r o s s t h e G o m a 1 s t r a i n e d 1 o c a 1
r esour c e s . In pai-1 i c u 1 a r , the extra p r essure of huma ns 
and livestock on the slender resources of 2hob. was a 
source of endemic conflict between the pow i n d a h s , and 
t h e 1 o c a I M a n d o !< h el t r i b e s rn e n o f Z h o b , c o m p e t i n g f a r 
access to pasture and water,. Such competition
1 nt ens i f i ed c!u r i ng pe r i ocls o f droug hi:, as i n 19051906, 
leading to increased conflicts between rival
gi-oups. 11J- Pcwindahs a 1 so had to combat raiding
attacks by Waziri tribes whose country fringed the Gomal 
route, and for whom passing caravans were compulsive
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t a !■” g e t s ^  The arms d p ag ea nt r y of: the p ow i n da hs 
hard-pressed passage across the Gomal stairway, led
ft!•■!. IvicMahon to 1 eave a pen p i c:ture s
"First of all came their advance party of fighting 
m e n , a rmed I:o t he teet h wi th gu n s , p istols,
swords, and shields, those on horseback often 
armed w i t h a 1 ong 1 ance i n addi t i on to t hei r at her 
m a r t i a 1 e q u i p m e n t " . 113
Behind this armed escort would follow strings of camel, 
c a t t i e , w o m e n a n d child r e n „
P o 1 i t i c a 11 y t hi e m i g r a t ions m i r r o r e d t h e s t r a i: e g i c 
exploitation of the powi ndah status as nomads on the
■frontier, marginal to the control exercised by the 
B a 1 u c h i s t. a n G o v e r n m e n t „ T h i s c o m p a r a t i v e f r e e d o m f: r o m 
state jur i sdi ct ion was t he powi n dabs'" opportuni ty to 
prosecute old feuding rivalries with impunity. For
e x a m p 1 e , o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e N a s i r s a n d S u 1 e i m a n 
K11e 1s ( two powi ndah groups), was acute. The ri v a 1ry 
was rooted i n Afghan poll t; ics, and Ami r Abdur Rahinan's 
coercive policy of confiscating the lands of the Nasirs, 
i n r e t a .1 i a t i o n f a r t h e :i. r p o 1 i c y o f d i s s e n t t a w a r d s 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 a u t h o r i t y i n !< a b li 1 s u p p o r t o f the B r i t i s h 
f a !•• c e s d u r i n g t h e s e c a n d A f g h a n W a r , a n cJ r e f u s a 1 t o j:) a y 
revenue Su bseque n11 y t he Ami r r ed i st r i huted the 
confiscated lands among the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais, who 
agreed to pay revenue. The lost lands became the source 
of permanent feuding tension between the tribes, and
in :LB82 the Nasirs took revenge by killing forty five
Su. 1 e i man !<hie 1 t r i besmen on t he Ba 1 uc h i stan -f r ont ier 
du r i ng t hie c ou. r ise o f t he i r a n nua I m :i. g r a t i o n . 1 J He r e 
the Nasirs were using frontier territory, outside the 
Amir"s control, and their own migrant status, to settle 
o 1d s c o res by t he ap p 1i c ati o n o f fo r c e » In effec t t ri ba1 
migrations blurred the line of political sepcu-at i an on 
the frontier,negated state authority,and exposed the zone 
a testing ground for conflicting claims and feuding justic
Cone 1 us i on
As a tribal society existing deep in the heart of
a strategic frontier, Baluchistan was a catchment area 
for various strains of political tension,. Tribes and 
g o v e r n m e n t s s t a k e d t e r r i t o r :l. e a n d p u r s u e d i n t e r e s t s o f t e n 
at variance with each other, which created the ingredients
f o r c o m p e t i t i o n a n d c o n f 1 i c t = T hi e f r o n tie r was ringed 
b y f i g h ting t r i b e s f n e n , r e a d y to pi u n d e r f o i" p a I i t i c s o r 
profit, at the instigation of Persia or Afghanistan,
fencing to keep at bay the expanding tribal and
t e r r i t o r i a 1 ma r g i ns of Br i t i sh I nd i a » To t hie Ido r ider 
noi'Tiad t hie new snvi r onment of co 1 on .i a 1 r u 1 e def i ned by 
the cultivator, merchant trader, and government 
official, offered a world of instant spoils, ready for 
pic k i n g ; t hi i s m a d e e n d e m i c: f r i c: 1 1. o n t hi e r e a 1 i t y o f
political expansion in the outer reaches of
In t he i nt erna1 socia1 scheme, t h0 t ri b a 1 
structure of Baluchistan was captive to the feuding and 
raiding principles which dictated the acquisition of 
p o w e r i n t h e p o 1 :i. t i c: a 1 p r o c e s s , a n d t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n a f 
material resources- Politically motivated segmentary 
opposit ion^and the economics of scarcity sustained a 
web of competing and conflicting group relations, in 
w h i c h f o r c e w a s t h e t o u c h s t o n e f a r s u c c e s s o r d e f e a t A  
s y n c h r o n o u s c u 11 u r a 1 i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i n v i o 1 e n c e w a s 
per f ect.ed by t he compu 1 s i ve r i tua 1 s o f i zzat anc:l shar m «
The v i o 1 e n t con t; o u r s of tribal s o c i e t y h e 1 d 
di stur bi ng i mp 1 i cat i o n s 0 ne d irec t consequence was a 
h i g h 1 y a r m e d p o p u 1 a t i o n . A s a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a 1 r e p o r t 
descri beds
"The Baluchis---always move about armed with a
v a r  i o u s  a s s o r t m e n t  o f  c u 1 1 e r y  i n  t h e i r "
w a i s t b a n d s , a n d a m a t c h 1 o c k , w h o s e e f f e c t i v e 
range is about 100 yards, slung over the 
s h o u 1 d e r . F r o m y o u. t h u p the B a 1 u c h i s a r e 
accustomed to bear the burden of a formidable and 
weighty armament, so that they are inured to it- 
T h e i r 1 i v e s a r e s p e n t i n p e 11 y s I-:; i r m i s h e s ; t h e i r 
o n 1 y a m u s e m e n t i s q u a r r e 11 i n g w i t h t h e
ne i g h bou rs1 « 1155
In t hi s m i 1i ta n t soc i a 1 milieu t he i nt r u s i o n of 
t he imper ia 1 f actar oc:casiona 1 1 y sharpened t he
competitive basis in tribal survival patterns- Thus 
the restriction of new imperial boundaries pressed hard 
o n t he damest i c ec o nomy of c: er t a i n t r i bes by e c 1 u d i ng
t hem f!-am o 1 d rai di ng h aunts, and f:ore i ng t hem to lose
the addi t io na1 i ncorc\e f:rom p 1undered 1o o t . Thi s mount i ng
210
p r e s s i.i r e fo r c 0 d t h e M a r r i 0 i n t o v i o 1 e n t c o n f 1 :L c t wit h 
t h e L u. n i s 1 x ** a s t h e y p r o s p 0 c 10 d f o r a d d .i t: i 0 n a I 
r 0 s o u r c 0 s i n t h 0 n 0 i g h b o n r i n g 1 a n d s o f w 0 a k 0 r P a t h a n 
t r i bes „ B r i t i s h i n10 r f e r e nc: e i n tribal -fen ds f o r 
i inp0!•- i a 1 ends, as i n t h0 cas0 a-f Z hob , x% '7 10 nd0 d t o 
d 0 stabilize t r i b a 1 p o 1 i t i c s b y c a us (ncj rec u r r 0 n t
leadership struggles, which often embroiled neighbouring 
tribes, thereby extending the area of conflict, 
multiplying tensions, and engendering a local crisis.
T h 0 mat u r i n g of a c r .i s i s i n t u r n . legit imis e c J f u r t h 0 r 
intervention by the imperial power, so that in conclusion 
the issue was no longer just one of resolving the 
10 a d 0 r s h i p q u e s t i o n , b u t t hi e w i d e r o n e o f the s li r v i v a 1 
o f 1 1- i b a 1 i n d 0 p 0 n d 0 n c e i n a n i m p 0 r i a 1 m a t r i x .
M o r 0 f u n d a in 0 n t a 11 y t h e f 0 u d i n g a n d r a i d i n g 
structures of tribal society articulated confrontation 
w :i. t h i m p e r i a 1 o r d 0 r , every t :i. m e t h e v i o 1 e n c 0 of g r o u p 
struggles was externalised and aimed at wider social 
and political targets. Such patterns of competition and 
conflie:t a 1 so m.irror0 d a way of life, sp0cif:i.c to the 
tribal norms of honour and free choice unhampered by the 
fetters of political control from central authority; as 
a sovereign unit each tribe determined its own political 
and economic strategy for survival. The politica1 
culture of tribal society therefore spelled a special
problem for any external power attempting to structure
the apparatus of government control. As Alfred Lyall 
recognised!
"We have to realise the fact that the conquest of 
t h e s e w i 1 d h i g h 1 a n d s i s a ne w s o r t o f
u n d e r t a k .i n g , m a t e r i a 1 1 y d i f f e r e n t f r o m o u r
previous c□nquests in India. Hitherto w& havs
o n 1 y h a d t. o o o n t e n d o n t h e I n cl i a n p 1 a i n s w i t h
... disorganised rulerships; we have overturned 
them .... with the passive acquiesence. . .of a 
majority of the people...most of whom welcomed 
t h e a d v e n t o f p e a c e a n d o r d e r 1 y g o v e r n m e n t « . . B u t
t h e h i g hi 1 a n d t r i b e s d o n o t w i s h f o r a r d e r 1 y
g o vernment; they desire a bove all t h ing s free dom, 
a n d i t i s m o s t i m p r o b a b 1 e that f o r rn a n y y e a r s t o
come they will be content to be ruled by
fore igners". 11m
The p o 1i ti ca I d i st a nc e bet wee n i mperi a 1 or de r
an d tr i ba1 soc i et y . was mag n ifi e d by incompatible
cultural perspectives. While a tribesman gloried that 
the "Baluch who steals and murders secures heaven for
s e v e n g e n e r a t i o n s o f h i s f a r e f a t h e r s " 11 v , a B r i t i s h
official reflected, "Such a code of right and wrong 
cannot but seem full of moral ano.madl.ies to the European 
rn i n d , a n d f o r t h e m o s t p a r t e n t i r e 1 y
i ncomprehensi b1e ".1
The arabesque of violence created by custom and 
c o n f 1 i c t i n t r i b a 1 B a 1 u c h i s t a n t h e r e f o r e s e t t h e 
p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e p r o b 1 e m o f i n t e r n a 1 c o n t r o 1. T r i b a 1 
models articulated norms, at odds with the imperial 
i d e o 1 o g y o f  s u b j e c t i o n , cj r cl e r , a n d discipline. T h e 
sc r ip t  for  rewri t ing this culture of conflict in the 
language of compliance became the :'civ:i.lising m i s s i o n -"
i 11 B a 1 l i c h :i. s t a n . H e r e i n t r i b a I t e r r a i n ^ w h ere v i o 1 e n ce w a s 
the social norm., the imperial v e n t u r e  was c o n s t r u e d  as 
a mor a 1 sa far i i nt o an under wor 1 d of 1 a p sed va 1 u e s A s  
John M a l c o l m  e x p l a i n e d  to a young P o l i t i c a l  o f f i c e r  in 
ni n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  India :
' I f: r ous i ng yourse 1 f to what be 1 ongs to yolar 
qualities and pretensions, you take a view of the 
large tracts and the wild tribes assigned as a 
noble field for mental and bodily exertion, as 
o n e i n w h i c h y o u c a n d o y o u r s e 1 f c r e d :i t., y o u r 
country good, and bring blessings on your name by 
c o n v e r t i n g t o o r d e r a n d c i v ilisatio n t h o u s a n d s of
m i s e r able r o b b e r s , w h o , w h i 1 e t h e y a r e w r e t c h e d
themselves, are a bane to society, you will 
elevate your own character and promote the views 
and interests of Government. 1,12:1
Implicit in such advice was the e t h n o  centrism of the
nineteenth century empire builder and the ideological
t emp e r of h i s t i r n e w  h i c h e nc ou r aged t he r ec o nst r uc t i o n
o f t h e n o n - w e s t o n w e s1 e 1- n t e r m s , and t h e c o n s c i o u s
cultivation of artificial models of order and discipline
to "civilise" t he p r i m i t i v e " „ I n Ba 1 uc h i start, t he
tribal paradigm of compulsive violence provided the
p r e t e x t f a r a n i rn p e r i a 1 e x p e r :i. m e n t i n s o c i a 1 c o n t r o 1 ,
designed to neutralise the dangers articulated by the
tribal system.
And Tribal Society., 1 876-1905 m
Coneept and I n i t 1ation
As a "land of the vendetta and blood ■read"1,
Baluchistan was a volatile area for testing theories of
imperial control- Here the wild tribes and bleak landscape
seemed to fuse into a menacing social scape, captive? to
the dictates of ritual violence. As one nineteenth
century' British account described:
"Beyond [the administered frontier! lies a country 
inaccessible, inhospitable, barren, rugged, 
savage in the highest degree, and the inhabitants 
seem to partake of the nature of the soil. They 
are the only things it can well support. They 
have their wild virtues; but their hand is against 
every man and every m a n ’s hand is against them. 
They have no government other than a tribal one, 
and that too, most imperfectly obeyed... They are? 
hardy, brave, merciless and revengeful".*
This anarchic definition of tribal society^ bred the
axiom that. the mission of imperial control was a
reformist one, to divorce the tribesman from his
p ri m i t i vi s m . As Lor d S a 1 i s bu r y put its 11We must
gradually convert to our way of thinking in matters of
c :i. vi 1 i sat i on t. hese sp lend i d t r i bes " . 3 Sue h per cep t ions
which rested on the? ideological supposition, that the
imper :i.a 1 -~t r i ba 1 encounter was a strugg 1 e between
civilisation and barbarism,4 envisaged the issue of
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c: o n t r a 1 a s a s e i " i e s o f rest r i c t ions o n t h e b e h a v i o u r i a I 
mandates of tribal society. The censure of tribal 
standards which was implicit in any text of imperial 
control made its application a surgical exercise, 
cutting out those anarchic parts of the tribal anatomy, 
which did not fit the physical structure of imperial 
discipline. As one Member of Parliament pointed out to 
his Forward minded peers:
"Their [the tribes! internal a f f a i r s . . .are murder 
and robbery, and if you attempt to effectively 
control them you must interfere with their 
internal affairs to the extent of destroying their 
internal affairs altogether. Your sole mission 
would be to put an end to their national 
industries - blood letting and loot."*5
The structure of political control in Baluchistan 
evolved within the general matrix of imperial values, 
but its specific style and content were inspired by
Robert S a n d e m a n "s perception of the imperial tribal
relationship. Bandsman's early career in the Indian 
army from 1856--1866 bred a military minded approach to 
the tribal problem. One of his contemporaries 
rervmr^&sU "His [Sandemand instincts were always those 
of a soldier, rather than a civilian; his methods were 
of the 'rough and ready order', and as such, commended 
themselves to the people who were not yet prepared for a 
f u 11 draught of c i v i 1isation".A Like his mi 1 itary 
peers, Sandeman believed that the key to the pacification 
of the tribal frontier, was the institution of a strong 
dictatorial form of government, capable of enforcing
order while being sensitive to tribal needs. The 
apparatus of government control was to be buttressed by 
military force. Sandeman was particularly aware of the 
efficacy of a state system which operated by force or 
the threat of force, in an area like Baluchistan, where 
violence flourished in the hot house environment of 
tribal society. As he wrote to Alfred Lyall, Secretary 
to the Foreign Department, 1880, "I need not say that 
the troops are the backbone of all political 
arrangements and that without their moral support I am 
badly off".7’
The coercive basis of state authority was intended 
" to induce tribes... to behave well and settle down 
to peaceful pursuits", and make them "feel that we are 
in the position of their masters, and able to punish 
them, should the necessity arise. The headmen will 
then be our willing adjutors and work for themselves and 
us".® The? master "subject relationship implicit in this 
scheme of imperial-tribal relations reverted to the 
paternalist tradition in Indian administration, upheld 
by Munroe, Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Metcalfe who saw 
"...t he d i v i s i on of soc i et y i nt o r u 1er s and r u 1ed as a 
natural ordering... which envisaged submission to 
authority as necessary to the anarchic nature of man. 
Power to them was not a delegation of natural rights 
from the people, but rather a trust imposed by an
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inscrutable P r o v i d e n c e ".*9 The Paternalist concept
of government as a simple unitary structure,
combining executive and judicial power in the same
official, was also Sandeman's blueprint for the
government of Baluchistan; here the problem of tribal
militancy outlined the need to structure an
administrative apparatus, which would function as an
efficient command structure to police society,
unhampered by the bureaucratic delays which characterised
more complex government systems. This considerat ion was
at the heart of the simple executive? style government
developed in Baluchistan, with the Agent to the
berth the.
Governor-General functioning a s A head of the government 
and the highest judicial authority in the province. 
Below him the Political Agents and tribal chiefs acted 
as intermediaries to implement central control at the 
mass level in tribal society.
While the authoritarian bias in government was 
intended to coerce tribesmen into physical submission, 
Sandernan was perceptive enough to realise that to ensure 
a long life for imperialism in Baluchistan, he needed to 
tutor the tribal mind to accept dependence. In support 
of this view he always maintained: "You cannot tame a
Pathan or Baluch by 'zor ' , that is to say, merely 
by coercion and threats. . „ you may •’hammer' them as much 
as you please, but though you may cow them for a time,
the men to whom a blood -feud is a cherished hereditary 
possession will be even with you when an opportunity 
o c c u r s ". 10 To tame the tribal mind and turn the
instinct for opposition into collaboration, Sandeman 
opted for monetary inducements. He believed that by 
giving the tribes government service and allowances, he 
would weave tribal interests into the imperial fabric, 
making a separatist tribal motif unattractive and u n ­
rewarding. Advocating that the empire should turn 
employer he wrote; "The system X would urge of giving 
employment to the tribesmen and enlisting their
interests in our side, has been the guiding principle, 
by following which a way has been discovered out of the 
many difficulties by which I have been s u r r o u n d e d " , 11
The use of employment to domesticate the tribal 
fringe of India was not new. Herbert Edwardes, 
Commissioner of Peshawar, 1853, had advocated it strongly 
in the Punjab after the Sikh w a r s .12 Sandeman himself 
claimed to be the only true disciple of Edwardes, 
Nicholson, Abbot, James, who were men of the first 
generation of the Punjab school, involved in the early 
phases of frontier settlement.13 In Sind as well,
Eastwick, Political Agent, Upper Sind, introduced tribal
service in 1839, and John Jacob, who supervised the 
Upper Sind Frontier from 1847-1858, expanded the system 
to inv o1ve more t r i b e s . 1* But while the idea of
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e m p 1oyment had f 1 oated i n f ron t ier p o 1i t i c s , before 
S a n d e m a n 7 s time, its application was restricted to the 
correction of deviant behaviour on the part of 
individual tribes. It was not systematically exploited 
to complete the encapsulation o-f trans-frontier tribal 
society within the imperial matrix. Sandeman retrieved 
the principle of tribal service from erratic use, 
stretched its potential, and turned it from an 
occasional instrument of tribal control into the corner 
stone of his administrative structure for Baluchistan.
S a n d e m a n 7s main point of departure with past 
versions of tribal service lay in his exclusive choice 
of the tribal chief as the recipient of government 
allowances; the distribution of employment and money 
through the tribal ranks was to be left to the c h i e f s 7 
discretion. This view was probably prompted by the 
unsatisfactory balance sheet of past payments by Sind 
and Punjab officials to predatory minded individuals in 
a tribe who often master- minded destructive raids, 
but were not themselves traditional figures of authority 
in the tribal system, on the assumption that this would 
buy peace for the frontier against tribal incur si cans. 
Between 1848— 1853, as Bugti raids battered the frontier, 
Punjab and Sind officials had bought off the most 
notorious of the? gang leaders with service allowances 
and jag.irs (land grants). But such payments had a
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spiral effect in breeding tension, for they encouraged 
other ambitious individuals to take up raiding in the
belief that the E-fritish would be forced to pay to buy
them out as well, 1=5 The sequel to this cycle of events 
was unsatisfactory. First, there was a renewed spate 
of raids on the frontiers and secondly cash handouts to 
individual tribesmen led them to rival the wealth and 
status of the traditional chief, leading to the erosion 
of his authority in the t r i b e - T h e  Bugti chief even 
made a personal admission to the British that the
wealth which the turbulent spirits of the tribe had
accumulated had turned their heads, leaving him 
powerless to check their plundering- "I did all I 
could", he said,"and when I found myself helpless I sat 
in my house and let things take their c o u r s e "-1'7
Sandeman attempted to break free from such 
counter-productive payments by negotiating always with 
the chief, so that a government subsidy would work 
towards strengthening the traditional structure of 
authority in tribal society. In 1867 when Sandeman first 
started his system of tribal service on the Dera Ghazi 
Khan f r o n t i e r , 10 he deliberately distributed money 
and service to the Marri tribe through their traditional 
chief Ghazzan Khan. About forty Marri tribesmen were 
taken into service., and pavd Rs.600 annually to keep 
open communications between Marri headquarters in Kahan,
Baluchistan, and Punjab outposts. In return -for the 
payments the Marris were to abstain from raiding the 
south Punjab frontier. The success of the scheme 
protected this part of the Punjab frontier, and in 1872 
the Government of India was encouraged enough to 
increase the subsidy for employing Marri and Bugti 
tribes to Rs 32,040, under Sandeman's m a n a g e m e n t . 19 
Tribal duties involved police and intelligence work 
in the frontier area between Baluchistan, Punjab, and 
Sind. Analysts of the Sandeman system attributed its 
success to the strategic support it extended to tribal 
chiefs, which enlisted them on the side of the imperial 
drive against frontier violence. As one observer of
frontier politics noted: "The keystone of the radical
change which was introduced by Sandeman was the 
recognition of the hereditary chiefs, and headmen, and 
exacting their resp o n s i b i 1ities...and allowing no crime 
to go unpu n i s h e d ".250 Sandeman remained committed to 
this principle in his career, believing in the concept 
that tribes internally unified under one central command 
would provide the raw material for an ordered society, 
while intra-tribal fragmentation would only lead to 
rabid competition and disorder.
Sandeman's support for the tribal chiefs was part 
of a wider blueprint to use the traditional framework of 
the tribal structure in designing a model of political
control for Baluchistan. The internal scheme of 
section leaders commanding the allegiance of section 
members, seemed ideal for Sandeman"s purpose of using 
an indigenous leadership structure to police the 
tribal scene. In this way tribal resources could 
be invested in the interests of imperial order. As 
Sandeman would say, "Accord the local chiefs respect and 
honour, and let tribal disputes and complaints be 
settled as far as possible by... committees of leading 
men. This is a vital point in tribal m a n a g e m e n t ".21 
Sandeman also valued tradition as a useful screen to 
mask the hard reality of foreign rule. He urged: "Work
as far as possible, through existing institutions and 
in conformity with existing usage... Be as ubiquitous as 
you can, and influence as much as you can but interfere 
i n det ail as little as possible". ",T:s
Sa n d e m a n s  traditionali st ap p r oac h i n
Baluchistan, which sought political control without the 
expense of social change, was in keeping with the 
restoration of what Lewis D. Wurgaft has described as 
the ? O r i e n t a l a p p r o a c h  to Indian policy, and the 
conservative treatment of Indian administrat ion in the
post Nut i ny per i.od. " As initiated by Lor d Canni ng i n t he?
immediate aftermath of the Mutiny", Wurgaft points out, 
"such a policy assumed that only a loyal landholding 
class could anchor Indian society in its sustaining
traditions and forestall the anarchy and revolt 
engendered by the liberal approach to imperial 
a dmini s t r a t i o n ".33 Sandemarv"s vision of harnessing the 
traditional powers and privileges of tribal chiefs to the 
yoke of British rule in Eialuchistan suggested a 
similar concern for political survival rather than social 
exper iment.
The political conservatism which informed 
late nineteenth century imperialism/ was consciously 
responsive to current evolutionary argument. In 
particular the theory of Social Darwinism with its 
vision of a world defined by polarities like the 
civilised and primitive, progressive and backward, 
leaders and led, encouraged the view that western 
imperialism was the fruit of a superior civilisation, 
whose members were destined to dominate the less 
developed races in the colonies. Based on Charles 
Darwi n ? s pr i nc ip1es of natural s e 1ect ion and s u r v i v a 1 of 
the fittest, Social Darwinism sought to structure human 
development in a biological framework, stressing the 
inherent linkage between race^ civilisation, and 
social p r o g r e s s .®4 Within this orbit of ideas, the 
empire was symbolic of racial and cultural superiority, 
a n d i t s u 11 i mate mission the i. rrv ? rtf Orient of , ; su b j ec t 
people in the colonised tracts of Asia and Africa. Thus 
the language of the colonial administrator was usually
charged with moral o v « r i o n e 5  — In 1887, Rivers 
Thompson, then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal^referred to 
the advent of a higher civilisation taking over in India 
through the peaceful coercion and moral ascendancy of 
the British, s**5 T. H. Hoidich,-$je Br it ish traveller and
explorer in the late nineteenth century, articulated the 
cultural bias in imperial dominance:
"The right of the White man to fill the? earth and 
subdue it has always been unquestioned because it 
is based on the principle that his dominance and 
lordship tends to the betterment of the world 
and straightens out the highways for peace and 
the blessings of peace and civilisation to 
f o i l o w ."* *
Sandeman himself was a creature of the ethno­
centric attitudes which shaped the concept of western 
imperialism. His attitude towards tribal society was 
predictably patronising: "What are my views" he
conjectured,"but simply those which every Christian man 
or woman ought to feel towards their less fortunate 
n eighbours".87 Trapped in its tribal image,
Baluchistan was 'primitive' in the Social Darwinian 
sense: a culture defined by feuds and raids seemed to 
constitute its own argument in favour of imperial 
reform. In particular, Sandeman exploited the nexus 
between violence and tribalism to give imperialism a 
c i v i 1 i s .i ng and humani tar i an role on t he f r ont i e r . He 
commonly described tribesmen as "predatory by training, 
usually at feud with one another, capable of combining 
against a common enemy, have not been thoroughly
subdued by force in the field". r-2<a In this turbulent 
arena, Sandeman conceived his mission as one of creating 
a "peaceful province in place of a congeries of fighting 
t r i b e s ".39 The confiscation of tribal independence;, he 
believedjwould be compensated by the British moral 
obligation to give them a better form of government and
guide them towards social s a l v a t i o n .30 He felt that a
policy which did not aim at civilising the tribes could 
ne.*vej-*be successful. In S a n d e m a n ’s concept^ therefore, the 
images of empire and tribe mirrored the opposition
between order and anarchy. The enforcement of stability 
and order in a tribal milieu was vital for the
structure of physical discipline it enforced, and also 
as a cultural medium for transmitting ’civilising 
i nfluences’ to a primitive society.
T he Sandema n System; Structure and F o r m .
The model of political government in Baluchistan 
merged the Political Agency system, operational in the 
Indian States, with an assortment of tribal service 
cadres designed to re-educate society in the norms of
imperial order. The king pin of this hybrid structure
was the Agent to the Governor-General. In the official 
scale, he was ranked as a second class resident; but his 
inferior status was compensated by a wide range of 
executive powers, free from the bureaucratic restrictions 
which hemmed in provincial governments in British India.
'*? K.“
Both the limited nature of the tribal experience wi th 
centralised government, and Baluchistan's location in 
the militarily vital northwest frontier of India., 
dictated the need for a strong but simple government 
apparatus., allowing for the concent rat ion of
p o 1itical,c i v i I , and mlitary powers in the office of the 
Agent to the Governor-General.31 The Agent to the 
Governor-General therefore not only dictated political 
s t r a t e g y 5, and directed provincial government, but he 
also functioned as the highest court of appeal. 
Savouring the taste of unfettered power at his disposal 
Jim Biddulph, while officiating as Agent to the 
Governor-General in 1882, wrote that his work involved 
political, administrative, and judicial work of all 
k i nds n
"We have no codes or regulations in our judicial 
proceedings, though we stick to Indian rules 
where Indians are concerned. Each case in which 
the people of the country are concerned is dealt 
with on its merits, and our decisions would 
horrify the Lord Chancellor at times. Sometimes 
we hang a man for murder, and sometimes we fine 
him * - ' Rs 500. We are in fact the arbitors and 
enforcers of the local laws and customs, and the 
result is eminently sat isf a c t o r y " .
To the institutional powers of the Agent to the 
Governor-General, Sandeman added his own informal 
influence over tribesmen. His contemporaries like Charles 
Aitchison,Foreign Department Secretary until 1878 and then 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab <1879-1884), observed 
his work at close quarters, and wrote? "He knows 
personally all the leading men, and has great influence
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over them . The people are. .. learning respect -for law 
and order... For this we have mainly to thank Sir Robert 
Sandeman whose personal influence is something 
marvellous".33 S a n d e m a n ’s intimacy with the tribes 
stemmed from his preferance for "seeing with his own 
eyes" a majority of the disputed tribal cases.34 This 
gave him a clear insight into tribal society;, and also 
left the tribes with an understanding that their conduct 
was under constant scrutiny by the Agent to the 
Governor- G e n e r a l . "There was no use in fighting Senaman 
Sahib", was a common tribal saying, "he knew everything 
and turned up everywhere".33 With a finger always on 
the tribal pulse, Sandeman soon acquired a legendary 
reputation for tribal management. Reviewing S a n d e m a n ’s 
tribal strategy in 1898, Curzon reflected that it had been 
one of "mingled courage and c o n e i 1i a tion, ...of confidence
...and acquiring the friendship of the tribes...Sir 
Robert Sandeman was one man in a generation...".3 * 
Politically such a reputation allowed Sandeman to take the 
initiative in tribal mana g e m e n t ,at times without prior 
sanction from the Government of India, or even stretch a 
directive from Calcutta beyond its intended limits. As 
the Viceroy Lord L a n s d o w n e , wrote in 1891 about 
Sandeman: "He is sometimes a little difficult to manage
and inclined to take an ell when he is given an inch, 
but I have no doubt that his system of managing the 
frontier tribes is a sound one".3'7' But there were
others who were less generous about S a n d e m a n ’s new power 
in Baluchistan and his place in the political limelight. 
Accusing Sandeman of usurping the centre stage in tribal 
politics, Oliver St.John, Officiating Agent to the 
Governor-General in Baluchistan, 1886-1887, contended 
that Sandeman had practically taken "the place of the 
Khan as head of the Baluch or Brahui Confederacy".3 ®
The Agent to the Governor-General had under him 
five Political Agents to carry on the work of local 
government in the British administered section of 
Baluchistan, Drawn from the Indian Political Service, 
these Agents combined administrative functions with 
political duties, and their official ranking was 
comparable to that of Deputy Commissioners in India. In 
order to induce men of a suitable calibre to make a 
frontier life their career, the Government of India made 
special allowances of Rs.400 and Rs.300, for the 
Political Agents of Guetta-Pishin and Sibi 
respectively.349 Great stress was laid on the character 
and motivation of the Political Agents. As Sandeman put 
its".,.the success of the administration of this frontier 
depends on the individuality of the officers under me, 
and their special fitness for their work ".4-0 As the 
style of government was personal, transfers were 
infrequent in the Service, in order to encourage the 
Political Agent to become familiar with the tribes and
and their special problems, in the district under his 
charge.A1
There were fifteen Native Assistants or Extra- 
Assistant Commissioners to support the work of 
government in Baluchistan. The most powerful of these 
officials was the Assistant in charge of the Marri-Bugti 
t r i b e s , who was a member of the Ba 1 Liehistan Provincia 1 
Service, and administered these two tribes on behalf of 
the Political Agent Sibi.*2 Since service above the
Passes was unpopular with Indians, the Government of 
India was careful to grade the Extra Assistant 
Commissioners on the Punjab scale, with salaries 
starting from Rs.300 and rising to Rs . 650 per m onth.43
The tribal tier in the administrative apparatus, 
was structured over a period of time in the context of 
specific political and social problems. S a n d e m a n ’s 
primary strategy here, was to use tribal resources to 
fight the g o v e r n m e n t ’s battle against feuds and raids. 
The incorporation of tribesmen into government service 
was therefore as much an administrative measure as a 
social experiment; at. stake was the future of imperial 
control and the re-ordering of tribal society.
An early blueprint for the system of tribal 
service evolved in response to pressure from the
Military Department, which wished to reduce its annual 
budget and troop commitments in Baluchistan. In 1882 
E.F.Chapman, Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief in
India, r iroLci -£he Baluchistan Government that
the Military Department wished to withdraw from the 
numerous minor military posts dotted about the country, 
from the Khojak Pass to Thai Chotiali, and from the 
Sind— Kalat frontier to Sibi, which should be handed over 
to local levies.44 But the equation between a reduced 
military presence, an experimental system of levies, and 
stability on the tribal front was not easily resolved. 
Waterfield, officiating for Sandeman in the early part 
of 1882, agreed in principle that troops should be 
withdrawn from minor posts, which were too weak for 
purposes of offence, and only served as irritants and 
symbols of foreign rule to the population.*® But an 
examination of the scheme under the microscope of local
tribal politics, revealed essential flaws. As early as 1880 
Sandeman had alerted Alfred L y a l 1,Secretary to the Foreign 
Department, that troops were essential for the management 
of the Achakzai and Kakar tribes who dominated the Pishin
frontier and the Khojak Pass.** Historically sensitive
to external control, such tribes were always poised to 
exploit any indication of weakness on the part of alien 
rulers. Thus in 1879-1880, when British reverses in 
Afghanistan led to withdrawal of British troops on the 
Pishin frontier, the Panezai Kakars rose in revolt and
murdered the local British officer Captain Showers. 
Sandeman had no hesitation in linking this instance of 
tribal militancy to the erosion of the milit a r y  
p r esence i n P i sh i n . * ’7
An additional trouble spot for a future levy scheme 
was Thai Chotiali, where the tribal social pattern 
mirrored victim—predator relationships. Here
sedentary Shadozai and Tarin tribes lived under the 
constant threat of violence from neighbouring marauding 
tribes like the Harris, Bugtis and Kakars. Sandeman had 
already communicated to Donald Stewart, the Commander- 
in-Chief, that the military garrison in Thai Chotiali 
was essential for keeping the Harris under control, and 
vital for preserving the peace in eastern 
Baluchistan.*® Levies drawn from the Shadozais and 
Tar ins would prove ineffective against the
super ior f ight ing strength of the Marr is, Bugt is, and 
Kakars; alternatively to use the latter as levies in 
Thai, without military supervision, would be like 
"setting the wolf to guard the s h e e p f o l d " . **9. This view 
was endorsed by Brigadier General S.Edwardes, Commanding 
Quetta District, who feared that entrusting local posts 
to levies would be like "baiting the jungle for 
t: igers" »530
The dialogue between the Military Department and
the Baluchistan Goverment, ended on a note of compromise 
in December 1882, when Sandeman returned to office. 
Working out the balance between troops and levies, 
Donald Stewart and Sandeman agreed that military 
detachments would be maintained in Thai Chotiali, 
Pishin, Shahrig, Sibi, Quat, and Q u e t t a ; ® 1 at the same 
time troops would be withdrawn from a string of minor 
posts - viz, Shahpur, Pu la.j i , Lehr i , Hannam, Gulistan, 
Khushdil Khan, Kach, Ziarat, Harnai, Nari, Chaman - 
which would be taken over by levies.32 Thus Sandeman 
saved the "military b a c k b o n e ’ of his future political 
arrangements in Baluchistan.
S a n d e m a n ’s agreement with the Military effectively 
cleared the groundwork for a regional levy scheme to 
materialize, and in March 1883, the Government of India 
directed him to submit formal proposals for the necessary 
tribal arrangements. A committee drawn from local 
Baluchistan officials was appointed under S a n d e m a n ’s 
direction to draw up the new scheme. The committee
submitted its report in August 1883, which recommended 
the disbanding of the Baluch Guides ( formed on the Sind
frontier in 1838, mainly to act as scouting parties for
troops, and later in 1876 transferred to the Baluchistan
G o v e r n m e n t ) , in order to raise money for the new
scheme.
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The scheme outlined by the committee essentially 
sought to structure levy service? in the framework of the 
traditional tribal system. The tribal unit in 
Baluchistan, with its combination of sections and 
leaders, provided an internal chain of vertical command, 
based on the unilinear delegation of authority. 
Sandeman used this hierarchical structure of leadership 
within the tribe, to institute a chain of responsibility 
extending from the chief through the headmen of 
different sections, in order to create a graded service 
system, with well defined figures of authority to c o ­
ordinate the work of tribesmen in policing themselves. 
The king-pin of the system was the tribal chief, highly 
valued by Sandeman for guiding him through the 
intricacies of tribal society. As he put its"Just as in 
any difficult country the inhabitants of the locality can 
serve as a guide, so among the tribesmen the only men I 
have found able to point out the most practicable 
solution of any involved local question are the tribal 
leaders".
In order to give the tribal chief a material stake 
in political collaboration with the British Government, 
Sandeman appointed him as head of the tribal levy, with 
a personal allowance, in return for which he had to 
maintain and equip a certain number of tribesmen for 
police and administrative duties.8*® Appointment of
t r i b e s m e n t o s u b o r d i n a t e t i e r s o f 1 e a c J e r s h i p i n t h e 
service, bearing the ranks of r e s s a l d a r , jem a d a r , and 
duff a da r , was controlled by the tribal chief, acting in 
concert with the mukaddam or section head. The guiding 
rule for such appointments was that the ressaldars were 
to be selected from the family of the chief; the 
jemadars from the families of the mukaddams of the 
more important sections; and the duffadars from the 
families of the less important section heads-®* In this 
way Sandeman ensured that tribal hierarchies would be 
entrenched in the political constitution of the service, 
and the tribal leadership would be the chief beneficiary 
of government money and patronage, thereby tilting the 
social balance in favour of aristocratic priv/lege and 
authority.
The new service scheme operated on the principle 
of tribal responsibility, which was really a formula for 
rewarding conformist behaviour on the part of tribes, 
subscribing to the norms of colonial government, while 
penalising dissent and recalcitrance- Money invested in 
the tribes was intended to give them a " direct interest 
in behaving in an orderly manner, for tribal service 
must depend primarily on the good conduct of the 
t r i b e 11-®'7' It was impressed on tribal chiefs that 
service had been granted on condition that "the peace of 
the country and ...freedom... from raiding is
strictly ma i n t a i n e d . .. in the event of any serious 
raiding, the whole will be liable to be s t o p p e d 11.5363 In 
cases of theft, robbery, and murder, headmen were 
required to provide information on the offender, 
surrender him to the government if possible, or pay the 
cost of the damage done. But if chiefs or headmen
themselves were involved in injurious acts, they would 
forfeit their service.®9 The assumption that loss of 
service would prove a sufficient deterrent against 
social disruption, rested on an unflattering estimate 
of tribal character: "The Baluch is eminently an
avaricious savage", wrote Theodore Hope in the Foreign 
Department, "and his pocket when you can get at it is I 
believe, the most vulnerable point he possesses".*0
In outlining the levy system, there was a 
conscious attempt on the part of its authors, to express 
the service structure in a tribal idiom. Tribal 
responsibility was interpreted as a derivative of 
earlier forms of collective service associated with the 
political/mi 1itary function of the tribe as a corporate 
unit of social survival. The collective nature of tribal 
responsibility was duly stressed through the assertion 
that the distribution of service was to be regarded as 
securing the services of the whole tribe, and not merely 
those whose names were entered in the service roll. 
Levy posts were to serve as "rallying paints for the
tribe as a w h o l e " , * 1 while service in the system would 
give vigorous life to the traditional concept of the 
tribe as a collective entity, since service in the 
system would act as a useful reminder of the active 
service dut ies tribal responsi bi 1 i ty entailed.. * 22
Tribesmen were also assigned to serve in their own 
tribal areas in order to preserve the territorial 
identity of a particular tribe. By adding a tribal 
dimension to local government, Sandeman claimed that his 
system of service had given Baluchistan "local self- 
government in a far higher degree than it exists in 
India".*3
In reality however, S a n d e m a n 9s administrative 
patent did not mirror an even exchange of power between 
officialdom and tribesmen. The tribal niche created in 
local administration was hemmed in by powers exercised 
by the Political Agent over the levies. While 
tribal leaders could nominate men to the service, 
their appointment was subject to confirmation by the 
Political Agent. The Political Agent also supervised the 
work, pay, and maintenance: of the levies.. The
relationship between the Political Agent and the levies 
therefore turned on official dominance and tribal 
subordination. As the Foreign Department explained:
"Levies are tribal bodies under tribal authority, 
and not commanded by British o f f i c e r s . ..Such 
bodies, have however a tendency to pass insensibly
under the control of Government officers, 
especially when such officers are appointed to 
? inspect t h e m 9 and the basis of tribal 
responsibility remains in theory, after it has 
ceased in pr actice".64
Tribal service was broadly divided into three 
categories - Political, Telegraph, and Postal, with an 
ancillary Revenue establishment. Political service 
covered the law and order duties associated with the 
operation of tribal responsibility; it was the bedrock 
of the service system and absorbed the largest share of 
the funds allotted for tribal payments. Political 
payments were made to "tribes of importance in the 
Baluchistan Agency".*® The importance of a tribe was 
usually determined by its record for militancy, and the 
strategic value of the territory it inhabited,
particularly its proximity to lines of communication.
Thus semi-"nomadic raiding tribes like the Harris, Bugtis 
and Kakars were subsidised at higher rates than 
sedentary groups like the Kasis and Durranis.
The militant image of the Marri tribe, gleaned
from its savage reputation on the Sind-Punjab frontier, 
and the exposure of the Harnai-Oandhar trade route to
its depredations, led Sandeman to observe: "The Marri
clan are to this frontier, what the Afridis are to the 
Peshawar frontier. If the Harris are well in hand, the 
peace of the Bolan Pass and other trade routes is 
secured, as also is the safety to the Punjab and Sind
fron t i e r s " .** The strategic profile of the Marri tribe 
qualified them to earn Rs.5,490 per month, in return for 
which they maintained twelve posts, manned by 163 
tribesmen, for safeguarding communications between Sibi, 
Harnai, and Thai Chotiali.*7 Sporting si mi liar 
traditions of violence, with strategic price tags on 
their lands, other tribes like: the Bugtis received
R s . 1,390 per month for guarding the Dera Bugti road; the 
Panezai Kakars who dominated the Chappar Pass at the 
entrance of the Harnai valley, were paid Rs.500 per 
month to maintain twenty horsemen on guard duty; and the 
Dumar Kakars wedged between the Bolan and Harnai routes, 
conveniently located for raiding caravans on the upper 
Bolan, were paid Rs. 430 per month to curb their own 
r a i di ng preoccupations. *®
Among the Kakars the Achakzais of Ouetta—Pishin 
absorbed the largest share of political payments. The 
poorer landholding sections of Achakzai tribesmen were 
chronically implicated in raiding activities along the 
Khojak route. The problem was particularly acute for the 
Baluchistan Government, as the trade from Shikarpur to 
Oandhar passed along the Khojak route, through the
centre of Achakzai country. As Sandeman arguing for the 
sanction of the Achakzai service in 18S4 observed, 
they were "not only a powerful tribe but also a
a notor ious 1 y troub 1 esome o n e " . To neutrali.se
t h e A c: hi a k z a i threat, t hi e t r i b e w a s g i v e n Rs. 2004 p e r 
month and held responsible for the safety of passes 
leading from the Khojak Amran Range to Pishin,, One 
hundred and ten Achakzais were employed in the service, 
entrusted with safeguarding the Baluchistan -Qandhar 
front ier. 7,0
The service allotted to the Harris, Bugtis, and 
Kakars was recommended by the Levy Committee and 
sanctioned by the Government of India in 1884. Later in 
1887 Sandeman extended the system to the Khetran Baluch 
who were-: assigned Rs.975 per month for safeguarding the 
Dera Ghazi Khan—Pishin Road.'7'1 Between 1886-1889, 
Sandeman introduced tribal service informally among the 
Zhob Kakars, who received Rs-910 per month to abstain 
from raiding the Thai Chotiali border, and also as part 
of a wider strategy to forge new links between Zhob and 
British Baluchistan."7*
While tribal militancy commanded a high price 
on imperial scales, corresponding financial ratings for 
sedentary tribes like the Kasis, Durranis, Yasinzais, 
and the Pishin Sayids, were contrastingly low; their 
allowances ranged from Rs.145 to Rs.263 per month.-73 
Their relative prosperity and pacifism ruled them 
out from posing any violent threat to the political 
order, and the Baluchistan Government was therefore
Linder no pressure to pay them high sums of money.'74
The Sandeman system also invested in personal
payments to tribal chiefs, to give them a vested
interest in political collaboration with the Baluchistan
Government, and help remould the tribal environment in
the image of colonial order. Thus the liarri chief,
Meherulla Khan, received Rs.730 per month, and his son
Rs. 320 per month. The object of such payments, as the
Foreign Department
"...to train up the son of the Marri Sirdar to 
habits of command and a position of importance in 
his own tribe...and a knowledge that it is in his 
interest to prevent plunder and to act in 
accordance with the wishes of the government"."7®
The intended aim here was to make the traditional figure
of chiefly authority more powerful in the internal
context of the tribe, and increase his ability to
enforce order among common tribesmen. At the same time
such payments instituted external monetary clamps on the
tribal leadership, underscoring their new economic
bondage to the colonial order.
Among other important chiefs who received personal 
allowances, were the Bugti chief who was paid Rs.965 per 
month; the Achakzai chief received Rs- 550 per month; and 
where the sardar-khel was fragmented as among the 
Jogezais of Zhob, the money was divided among leading men 
Shahbaz Khan, Shingul, and Saifulla Khan - each of whom
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received Rs-SOO, Rs- 315., and Rs. 100 respectively.'7'^
While the political basis of tribal service 
constituted the fulcrum of the Sandeman system, the 
latter also provided employment for tribesmen in the 
more routine administrative work of the Telegraph and 
Postal Service and Revenue Service. The former employed 
six hundred and five men at a cost of Rs . 9,457-13-4 per 
m onth;’7”7' and the latter engaged sixteen mounted 
horsemen, at a cost of Rs.370 per month, to assist in 
revenue collection, to communicate with headmen and 
summon parties to dispute or tribal quarrels, and 
perform escort duties for officials when required."'® 
The Panezai Kakars, Marris, and Achakzais were mainly 
recruited in the Telegraph Service, as the telegraph 
wire passed through their country from Thai Chotiali to 
Quetta. And while the payments were intended to secure 
purely routine tasks like carrying the post or 
protecting the wire, they were not without political 
significance, for the Baluchistan Government viewed them 
as an additional financial hold on the "predatory habits 
of tribes", designed to s e c u r e ; "the safety of life and 
property on the roads through the d i s t r i c t ".^
In addition to the main corpus of local levies 
employed in the task of internal control, a sem i ­
military model of the system was developed along the
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the Baluchistan borderlands with Afghanistan, the North 
West Frontier Province, and Persia. This branch of
tribal service, known as the Levy Corps, was intended to 
function as a border patrol unit to guard the main 
points of entry into Baluchistan. The Military
Department viewed it as an armed screen to seal the
frontier against raids, and also as a possible way to 
exercise a measure of control over very remote border 
outposts. As E.F. Chapman, Quarter-Master General in the 
Indian Army, 1887, pointed out, ■ * . the Levy Corps was 
to be part of a defence structure which "...rests upon 
a system under which we look forward at an early date to 
identifying the tribal inhabitants of the border region 
with ourselves in closing it to an e n e m y ’s advance, 
while the avenues leading directly through it to points, 
which to us may become of great importance^.are opened 
out for forward movement whenever this becomes 
necessary".®0 In British Baluchistan there were two 
organ i sat ions of Levy Corps. The? first of these the 
Zhob Levy Corps, was instituted by Sandeman in 1890, to 
protect Baluchistan from Waziri raids across the? 
GamaI, and hostile action from Afghan tribes, east
of the Durand line.*31 The second one was the Chagai
Levy Corps, which started operating in southwest 
Baluchistan from 1897, mainly to hold the frontier 
against the destructive raids of the Persian Baluch 
tribes, and also to protect the newly opened Quetta-
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S 0 i s t a n t r a d e r □ u t. e » ® *
The composition of the Levy Corps mirrored the same 
political and social priorities which had dictated the 
structure of the District Levies. According to a 
directive from Sandeman in 1890, tribal chiefs were to 
nominate men for the service, and also appoint a member 
of the sardar-khel to undertake the leadership of the 
corps.®3 Tribesmen in service wore uniform, carried 
arms, and served under a British commanding officer. 
Although primarily intended for para—mi 1itary border 
duties, the Political Agent was allowed to use the Levy 
Corps, to enforce internal order if necessary.®4 The 
political use of the Corps aimed at providing strategic 
support for the chiefs in the work of tribal government. 
The Levy Corps was therefore another measure to inflate 
the tribal chief^s power in society, which was the 
sheet anchor of the Sandeman system of social control.
Synchronous with tribal service, Sandeman 
provided a judicial platform for conflict resolution by 
reconvening the tribal j i r q a , which was a council of 
tribesmen dispensing justice according to tribal 
customs.®” In the political context of British rule, 
the j i rqa became an institutional forum for justice, 
blending custom with colonial legal form. The primary 
unit in the Baluchistan j i r q a was an ad-hoc Council of
Elders selected from headmen and sa y i d s ; two or more 
such men were appointed to the j i rga tribunal, with the 
disputant parties nominating equal numbers of their own 
representatives to achieve a rough parity of 
representation on the adjudicating body; and all 
nominations had to be approved by the Political 
A g e n t . T h e  ad-hoc j i rga functioned at a local level, 
and tried to settle family and subsectional disputes, 
related to murder or adultery, in an attempt to contain 
violence at the initial stages of a quarrel.
The Standing District and Joint Jirgas constituted 
the second stratum in the judicial hierarchy. Operating 
at the inter— tribal level, they represented permanent 
tribunals, composed of chiefs and section leaders. A 
case was usually referred to a Joint J i r g a , if the 
judgement on it? seemed likely to affect the 
administration of two agencies or districts, or 
relations between two major tribes. Official 
representation at this level of j irqa decision making 
was mandatory.®'7
The residue of unresolved local and district 
cases, in particular politically destabilizing blood 
feuds between tribes^was referred for arbitration to the 
Shahi Ji rqa , which met twice annually at Sibi and 
Quetta. Composed exclusively of tribal chiefs, it
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functioned as the high court of the j i rga system from 
which an appeal against an award could only be lodged 
with the? Agent to the Governor-General.®0 One official 
served as President of the tribunal;, thus completing the 
sequence? of government representations at each 
successive level in the jirga hierarchy.
Sandeman believed that the high tribal profile of 
the j i rga wouId make it a particularly s u c c e s s f u 1 
instrument for conflict resolution. He wrote:
"A tribal j i rga ...possesses many advantages. It 
commands the confidence of the tribes themselves, 
and the decisions thus given are therefore 
treated with great respect. Each case is
thoroughly sifted...The investigation gives us an 
insight into the? condition.. « of the tribe,, and 
is a guide in fixing such fines and conditions as 
c i rcumstances demand. " . ****
I n a mo r e practical ve i n howeve r , t he
effectiveness of the j i rq a in regulating social
co nf 1 .i ct was secured t hroug h its financial link w i t h
the levy service. As the Viceroy, Lord Hardings^ 
stressed at a later date in 1911, to a gathering of 
tribal chiefs in Quetta, they could not expect to
enjoy the privrleges of self-regulation through the 
jirga without f u 1f i 11ing their obligations, the most 
important of which was tribal responsibility for 
detecting and preventing crimes.*90 Thus if a tribe 
refused to surrender a convicted tribesman, or opposed 
the execution of a jirga settlement, they could be 
coerced by withholding their services and payments. The
same sanction of confiscating service money was 
applicable to a tribal chief if he refused to implement 
a j irga verdict. As Sandeman maintained, "It is always 
possible to inflict a severe punishment by the temporary 
or permanent withdrawal of the Service enjoyed by the 
S i r dar or t r i be " . 491
Economic coercion and the text of tribal custom 
were not the only determinants of the j irqa system, for 
it also operated within the legal framework of the 
frontier Crimes Regulation. This Regulation allowed the 
Political Agent, in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, 
to withdraw any civil or criminal case from a civil 
court and refer it for decision to a j i r g a .
In a criminal case the Deputy Commissioner in concert 
with the j i rga could impose sentences of up to fourteen 
years rigorous imprisonment. *93i The Deputy Commissioner 
could also banish from the district any tribesman 
suspected of being a fanatic, or involved in quarrels 
which could lead to a blood feud. However the most 
punitive clauses of the Regulation allowed the Deputy 
Commiss ioner and the j i rqa to take securities far 
keeping the peace, from families and factions/ likely to 
be involved in blood feuds. If a life was taken , while 
such a bond was in force, the-? group forfeited its 
sureties. If tribesmen ordered to give sureties for 
the good behaviour of a kinsman were? unable to do so,
they were sent to prison for a time.**3 Such a Draconian 
code, which put maximum pressure on tribesmen not 
actually guilty of crimes, but only related on the basis 
of family or tribe to someone guilty of misdemeanour, 
was the ?E*ible of Baluchistan-’, and condoned by those 
who applied it, as a means which "saved thousands of 
lives and often stopped blood feuds starting".***
"•"he j i rga was therefore not just a forum for- 
regulating social conflict on the basis of customary 
law. Its underlying link with the levy service, and 
articulation of the legal mandates of the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation, gave it a new punitive dimension, far- 
removed from traditional dispute settlement procedures. 
According to custom a ruling chief or savid could order 
the cessation of hostilities, but the act of settlement 
was always voluntary, resting on the willingness of the 
parties to reach an agreement.**®. And such agreements 
did not preclude the aggrieved party from taking 
revenge at a later date. In place of this occasional 
and consensual style of dispute settlement, the new 
j i rqas dispensed rigid sentences which had to be 
enforced. As a later Agent to the Governor-General 
noted:
"Our machinery -for settlement Lof disputes!] by a 
Council of Elders ...is an extraneous imposition 
... among the Pathan tribes, no machinery 
existed for * - - obtaining a
settlement ... the act of settlement was a purely 
voluntary one... Under our system settlements
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are now enforced in every case either by customary 
compensation, fine or imprisonmentl,.<?A
From the rulers-' point of view the j irga was therefore
a particularly useful apparatus for implementing a
coercive-: and unpopular conflict resolution policy,
through the medium of a primarily tribal adjudicating
body. As Sandeman wrote in 18SS: "Under the j irga system
the primary responsibility for, and the odium
necessarily attendent upon^ the decision of civil and
criminal cases is thrown upon the individual sirdars and
the tribes, who highly prise the privilege of deciding
cases by j i r g a 11.
The lirga system and tribal service gave 
structural form to S a n d e m a n ’s vision of political and 
social control in Baluchistan. Converts to the Sandeman 
creed were inspired to claim: "In E-faluchistan the main
principle underlying the whole of the administrative 
methods is to maintain the tribal system and administer 
justice according to tribal custom and usag e".90 But 
the idea of the Sandeman system, preserving the 
anthre>.pological purity of tribal form, disguised the 
measure of self-interest which patterned the imperial- 
tribal relationship. Despite the concession to tribal 
custom, the Sandeman system was essentially a form of 
external pressure, ensuring the encapsulation of tribal 
society through strategies of political and economic
2 4 8
penetration. But the reality of alien rule forced the 
tribes in turn, to make certain choices, which ranged 
from alliance with the ruling power? to manipulation of 
its material resources, and limited dissent. The 
imperial-tribal connection therefore unlocked its own 
impetus for change, realigning and modifying the 
structural and normative contours of tribal society.
The Sandeman System and Tribal O r d e r .
The Sandeman system unlocked an experimental 
period for the exercise of leadership and authority in 
tribal society. Sandeman's golden rule of using tribal 
chiefs to control society, led him to perceive the 
archetypal Baluch chieftain, functioning like a powerful 
figure of central authority, as the ideal model of 
tribal leadership. This consideration led him to impose 
figures of central authority even in tribal systems, 
where such centralisation of power was customarily 
a b s e n t .
The process of centralising power in the context 
of a Pathan tribe like the Achakzais yielded
particularly ambiguous results. In the fluid political 
world of the Achakzai Pathans, the kh a n - k h e l or family 
of ruling chiefs was internally divided and exercised 
power commensurate with a particular chief's personal 
influence. The elder branch of the khan-khel - the
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the Barkhurdar Kahol- which exercised power in 
Afghanistan, and a younger branch™ the Arzbegi Kahol™ 
located in Pishi n .c?<9 In 1879 Sandeman, in need of a 
representative figure to institute tribal service in 
Pishin, negotiated with Aslam Khan Arzbegi, and gave 
him responsibility for operating guard duties in 
Pishin. Writing about this appointment, Oliver 
St.John, (later Agent to the Governo r - G e n e r a l ) , pointed 
out: "The post was understood to give him the headship
of the tribe in Pi shin, and business with them was 
managed through h i m " . 100 But by 1883, it was clear 
that the newly constituted chief of the Achakzais had no 
real influence in the tribe. He had no authority over 
Achakzais on the Afghan side of the border who were 
organised under their own headmen; even internally in 
Pishin, St.John found him politically ineffective in 
controlling the t r i b e . 101 The frequency of Achakzai 
raids in Pishin and the Khojak underscored the 
inability of the chief to control the t r i b e . 102 The 
Baluchistan Government therefore dismissed him from his 
position, and installed a more senior member of the 
Arzbegi Kahol, Haji Sarbuland Khan, as head of 
the tribe. But his management of the tribe and 
service was short-lived, for he retired in favour of his 
neophew, Abdul Hamid K.han^in 1883. 10:5
In recognising Abdul Hamid Khan as the new chief,
and head of the levy service, the British believed they 
were acquiring another pliant intermediary between 
government and tribe. But Abdul Hamid Khan embarked on a 
controversial course, when he attempted to use his new 
position of power to subvert British administrative 
control. He courted tribal support by refusing to 
arrest Achakzai offenders, and leaving tribal levies 
unsupervised in their routine police work, and rejecting 
any form of control by district authorities in tribal 
a f f a i r s . 10"* In opting to defy the British, Abdul 
Hamid Khan probably hoped to graft a real tribal power 
base to his leadership, by appealing to the matrix of 
Pathan values, which stressed the independence of the 
tribe, political loyalty to the clan, and rejection of 
external control, rooted in Pathan traditions of dissent 
against foreign domination.
The British were now .left with the unedifying 
t rut h t hat t he exper i merit of subs i d i z .i ng t he political 
authority of one leader in the Achakzai context, had led 
to the tribal rejection of imposed authority as in the 
cases of the ineffective Aslam Khan who was unable to 
control the tribe, or the manipulation of such authority 
to negate British control, as exemplified by Abdul Hamid 
Khan. In the circumstances the policy of controlling 
the Achakzais through a central chief was abandoned, in 
favour of dealing with the tribe through the m a 1 iks or
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heads of sections who were the customary power brokers 
in the tribe. The Achakzai levy service was according!y 
redistri buted« A b d u 1 Hami d Khan lost his c e n t r a 1 
position in the tribe, and only retained control of the 
levies serving in the? Gulistan area of Quetta-Pishin; 
his cousin Ghulam Haidar was given charge of the Toba 
levies; and the Achakzai levies in Pishin passed under 
the direct supervision of the local o f f i c i a l s . 1055 This 
epilogue to the attempted Sandemanisation of the
Achakzai group proved that the standard patent of a
powerful chief underwriting social order could not be
applied uniformly across the tribal board in
Baluchistan, and was essentially flawed in relation 
to political systems structured on segmental division, 
and the plural leadership of petty chiefs or headmen.
In west Baluchistan, however, the Sandeman system 
had a more favourable trial. The variable here, was the 
Baluch tribal mode?!, with a central chief dominating the 
power structure. E-fut the strength of this leadership 
had waned under long term feuding conflicts, which left 
the chiefs with an ever decreasing margin of power to 
exercise within the system. In Nushki the feuding 
conflict turned on the struggle between the Rakhshanis 
and Mengals to acquire land rights and political power, 
which was covertly encouraged by the Khan of Kalat to 
keep the rival chiefs weak and d i v i d e d . 10** In 1896,
A.H.McMahon, the British Boundary C o m m i s s i o n e r , observed 
that constant tribal feuds had eroded the position 
and local standing of the chiefs considerably; he wrote: 
"...the authority of the tribal c h i e f s . ..has 
been reduced to almost n il".10'7’ He also pointed out 
that the most critical index of the chiefs losing power 
in the tribes was the increasing trend among headmen 
and ordinary tribesmen to refer disputes for settlement 
across the border to Afg h a n i s t a n . 10® In neighbouring 
Chagai, the Sinjerani chief reinstated to power by the 
British in 1896. 10,9 had little influence, partly due to 
the long Afghan occupation of the district, when he was 
forced to live as a powerless refugee in British 
Baluchistan, and also due to his own weakness of 
character. As McMahon wrote: "The Chief, naturally a
weak man, has been a refugee from his country for 
many years and is wanting in personal influence over his 
tribe. To leave him alone to look after this large 
tract of country would be to abandon it to ana r c h y " . 110
To arrest the decline of chiefly power in west 
Baluchistan, Hugh Barnes, then Agent to the Governor- 
General, and reputed to be a "devoted disciple of 
S a n d e m a n " ,111 extended the system of tribal allowances 
to Nushki and Chagai. But the grant of personal 
allowances to the Mengal and Sinjerani chiefs, was tied 
to the abolition of certain customary economic
privileges. The Mengal chief traditionally levied tolls 
on merchandise passing through Nushki. This taxation
was unpopular with the British for it discouraged 
merchants from using the newly opened Nushki—Seistan 
trade route. Consequently the Baluchistan Government 
abolished the Mengal chief's right to levy customs dues, 
and he was given in exchange a compensating allowance of 
Rs.7000 per y e a r . 112 Similarly, the Sinjerani chief 
was divested of his traditional sardari right to take 
revenue at one-sixth, which Webb Ware the local British 
Agent believed pressed too heavily on the tribesmen; in 
return he was compensated by a personal allowance of 
Rs.320 per y e a r . 113
Monetary allowances gave the chiefs new
financial support, while tying them to the self-interest 
of their imperial patrons. Essentially such payments 
altered the texture of tribal leadership, by partly 
divorcing the status of headship from its traditional 
economic base, resting on tribal taxes and revenues. 
This forced a qualitative change, which made the tribal 
leader, in the words of Webb Ware, "a paid Government 
se r v a n t " . 114 He described how the Mengal chief had now 
"enlisted himself unreservedly" on the British side, 
with the result that not a single caravan was attacked 
on the trade r o u t e . 11® In the Sinjerani case, McMahon 
was equally optimistic, that the remantling of the
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c h i e f ’s authority in the supportive framework of British 
power, would allow him "to regain influence over his 
t r i b e " , 11A The main thrust of British policy in west 
Baluchistan was therefore to extend the Sandeman system 
to shore up chiefly authority, even while it trimmed the 
sources of tribal income, on which the independence of 
such authority traditionally depended,, The exchange of 
customary dues for good behaviour money implied that 
the leadership was now partially captive to the colonial 
order, and typecast as a convenient instrument for 
assisting the peaceful penetration of western 
.Baluchistan by the British imperial process. Thus by 
rolling back the boundaries of traditional chiefly 
privilege, and instituting new controls of sefvice and 
allowance in the tribal scheme, the application of the 
Sandeman system mirrored more effectively the
encapsulation of tribal society by a superior colonising 
power, rather than an exercise in the preservation of 
original tribal tradition and form.
The strategy of providing a traditional chief 
with an extra-tribal platform of support was also a 
recipe for promoting discord and dysjunction in intra- 
t r i ba 1 r e 1 at i o n s , A 11 i ance with t. he Br i t i sh i nvest ed 
a chief with new sources of income and wealth. His 
headship of the levy service defined his role as a power 
broker between government and tribesmen, and made him a
patron of tribal service, which further increased the 
existing margins of privilege that set the tribal chief 
apart from ordinary tribesmen. The influx of power at 
the leadership level in the tribal scheme could
encourage a chief to isolate himself from popular
support., on the conviction that he could rely on 
external material resources to sustain his position of 
dominance?. Evidence of such a contradiction developing
between the leadership and the tribal mass- may be
£
observed in the pattern of conflict and crisis which
came to a head in the Marri tribe in 1898.
%
Traditionally the Marris allowed their chief to 
levy a sheep and goat tax from flockowners, as well as
K
penalties and fines in the case of adulteries, murders, 
and thefts, calculated on a percentage share of the 
compensation awards.. But in the climate of colonial 
collaboration, with its artificial props for chiefly 
authority, the Marri chief flouted custom by converting 
personal dues from tribesmen into a collective right, 
which was exercised by all the members of the
sa r d a r-khel, or the ru 1 .i ng c h i e f ? s family. As
the sardar-khel imp1ernented this coercive policy, 
popular unrest mounted, and a tribal petition to the
British authorities in 1898 demanded redress against
the extortionate practices of the Marri leadership, 
which were itemized as the forcible levy of fines,
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the exaction of penalties, and the seizure of sheep by 
f o r c e . 117 Such acts inevitably increased the economic 
burden on tribesmen subsisting in marginal conditions, 
and additionally hard-pressed by the poor harvest of 
1897-1898.
Seeking relief from their hardships, the Marris 
started to desert their settlements by the close of 1898, 
and migrated to Afghanistan in search of alternative 
land and pasture. The choice of migration rather than 
rebellion to express discontent stemmed from the t r i b e -’s 
semi-religious veneration for the chief. As one 
official explained:
"The Chief is too weak and indolent to do his work 
properly, but he is considered a holy man and 
though his people are frequently disgusted by the 
avarice of his family and the ill treatment they 
receive from him, they are still attached to him 
personal ly " . 1113
The migrations were a. form of tribal censure of 
their leadership, but they also touched off an 
administrative crisis through the desertion of levy 
posts. Under pressure the Marri chief admitted his 
inability to stop the exodus, and it appeared as though 
the political sructure on which S a n d e m a n -’s apparatus of 
control rested was on the verge of collapse,, H. Wylie, 
officiating as Agent to the Governor-General in 1898, 
warned that the Marris were regressing into anarchy; he 
wrote:
"The Baluch tribes are united under one chief whose
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orders they o b e y . . . If therefore a body of 
B aluchis...quits the country under the leadership 
of discontended persons. ... the entire clan feels 
the Chief's authority has been set at defiance, 
and the deserters have scored a poipt... If 
nothing is done... a general spirit of lawlessness 
and independence of all authority will be 
e n gendered".11 v
Self-interest. now forced the Baluchistan
Government to intervene, and redraw the line between
privilege and protection, by defining the exaction of
tribal dues as a personal prerogative of the ruling
chief and not the collective right of the members of
the sar dar-khel. 1 ° But the history of power”,
/
oppression and desertion in the Marri tribal context 
had highlighted the problem of over inflating the chief's 
dominance in society. It laid bare the .negative 
function of the Sandeman system in giving the chief 
extra-tribal resources, which encouraged him to ignore 
and later exploit mass tribal interests. By feeding new 
powers at one end of the tribal scheme, the Sandeman 
system in effect destabilized the internal balance 
between successful leadership and voluntary
contractual following on which the political system of 
the Baluch essentially rested. *
Among some Pathan tribes, such as the Panis and 
Khajaks of Sibi,the chiefs confined service nominations 
entirely to their own relations and personal dependants, 
which caused dissatisfaction among the rest of the t r i b e s ­
men and headmen unrepresented in the s e r v i c e . 1® 1
Another weakness in the system derived from the 
overlap between the organisational principles of tribal 
responsibility and tribal service. The levy scheme of 
1S84 had attempted to compartmentalise the two areas, by 
distinguishing tribal/political payments which rested on 
a collective commitment to law and order, from definite 
service payments for carrying the post or collecting 
r e v e n u e . 12® But in practice such distinctions proved to 
be paper exercises, for service men were freely inter­
changeable between political, postal, railway, and 
revenue duties. To the tribes there was only one 
service with different duties, and men could move from 
one branch to another with the chiefs' c o n s e n t . 123 As 
the boundaries between different service areas became 
blurred through the free exchange of work men, the vital 
area of tribal responsibility inevitably locked into 
the wider system of routine administrative wofk. This 
gave the tribes valuable leverage against any future 
attempt by the government to shrink their area of 
employment, as they could threaten to stand aloof on the 
political front, involving tribal responsibility and law 
and order commitments. Thus in 1886, when the 
completion of the Sind-Pishin railway made Marri and 
Kakar postal sowars redundant, for the post could be 
carried more efficiently by the railway, Sandeman was 
afraid to discharge them because he feared they would 
resort to raiding.1®* In the circumstances they were
re employed as railway guards. But as the Foreign
Department noted!
"The natural inference which the tribe will draw 
from this matter is that we are afraid to
discharge men once employed or to reduce service 
once given, and that we cannot put up a telegraph 
or lay a rail without paying them in some form to 
do s o " . 1*®
Tribesmen could therefore manipulate the system by 
playing on old fears of violence and aggression.
Ambiguities in the system also allowed tribesmen 
to evade service duties, and permitted irregular ities in 
enlistment procedures. From the start in 1884 the 
tribal chiefs did not keep records of the' men who 
actually enlisted. The pay bills for levies therefore 
did not show the names of the men who enrolled for duty. 
While the chiefs drew money for men they were 
theoretically required to employ for services, there was 
no paper evidence to corroborate the procedure. As 
W.Lee Warner, Officiating Under Secretary in the Foreign 
Department^pointed outs
"The abjection to the system is that ...blackmail 
is paid to Chiefs who supply men. No one knows 
who the men are, and therefore no names can be 
g i v e n . ..Under the Baluch system there is no 
guarantee that the men are fit or that they 
ex ist " . 1* <&
A few years later in 1888, St.John noted that it was the 
exception to find even half the appointed number of men 
on guard duty in some levy posts,, The tribal chiefs 
only presented the full complement of men when a
political officer visited the district, yet they drew 
full allowances all the year a r o u n d .1*-7 Nearly two 
decades later in 1905, the Political Agent in Quetta- 
Pishin wrote that the system now harboured 
khana nasheens (i.e. men who stayed at home), who were 
tribesmen "in receipt of pay and do nothing... some of 
these recipients of pay have grown to look upon
themselves as pensioners with family rights of
inheritance" . 152,3
The Sandeman system tolerated this margin of
manipulation , since the main concern of government in 
Baluchistan was to "keep the Pathan and Baluch tribes in 
a contented frame of m i n d ".1**7 But this gave substance 
to the arguments of critics like St.John, who claimed
that the system stood suspended, "halfway between the
payment of blackmail pure and simple to the tribes, in 
considerat ion of their refraining from robbing and 
murder, and the £c.rf'pt6Vm;er\‘t] certain tribesmen
as government servants to perform fixed duties for 
regular s e r v i c e ."130 The Viceroy Lord Duffer in was 
also sceptical; he observed!
"Our present position in Baluchistan is the result 
of a system of wholesale bri b e r y ...n o r . is it... 
certain... in Baluchistan that the foundations of 
local popularity which we have laid would stand 
the pressure of a d v e r s i t y".131
In defence of his system Sandeman stressed that
concessions were always balanced by tribal commitments
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to the law and order requirements of empire*., As he 
explained to Lord Salisbury^ ' _ his blueprint for^ 
political control in Baluchistan rested on "peace and 
good will as opposed to ... one of coercion pure and 
simple". 1322 But balancing the scheme on a tribal 
consensus, as the critics pointed out, inevitably 
exposed the system to the caprice of tribal intention. It 
left a margin of control in tribal hands, which 
individuals could exploit to some degree with tacit 
official consent, based on the assumption that it was a 
small price to pay for the larger reward of pacifying 
tribal society as a whole in Baluchistan.
Sandemanism and the Tribal Economic O r d e r .
As the Sandeman system chased the image of a tribal 
society devoted to peaceful pursuits, it altered 
traditional economic strategies, and the corpus of 
values linked to such lifestyles. For tribesmen the 
Sandeman system of control underscored the opposition 
between feuding/raiding activity and their new political 
commitment to government. In particular the principle 
of tribal responsibility was designed to strike at the 
heart of the feuding and raiding network by making the 
tribes collectively r e s p onsib1e for a n o n ~ v i o 1ent s o c i a 1 
order. But poor tribes like the Marri* and Bu g t i s ;who 
had traditionally relied on the raid as an economic safety 
valve, were now forced to find a compensating source?
*7>
of income. Under pressure the Marris turned increasingly 
to agriculture. New areas were opened up for 
cultivation in Marri-Bugti country, at Kahan, Mand, 
Philawar, Kohlu, Gambol, Badra and Quat Maridai. l'n Quat 
Mandai in Marri country, grain production reached an 
annual high of 8000 maunds, one-twelfth of which was 
remitted in revenue to the British Government. Bruce, 
Political Agent for Thai Chotiali wrote in 1889: " The 
Marris and Bugtis are rapidly expanding their 
cultivation, and consequently depending less on their 
flocks., and the precarious livelihood obtained by 
p l u n d e r ".133 There were also reports of different 
sections of the Harris trying to establish proprietary 
rights to the lands being newly developed. 1:34
The increasing sedentarization of the Marris and 
Bugtis in turn encouraged new agrarian trends in 
neighbouring Sibi. There was an influx of tribesmen 
into Sibi from the surrounding country, including those 
who had fled in the past to escape from raids. As a 
result of re-population the area under cultivation 
increased from 4,556 acres in 1880 to 12,000 acres by 
1885. As grain production mounted the value of the land 
revenue yield rose from Rs.73,000 in 1885 to over a lakh 
in 1890.13S A similar picture of increasing land 
revenue in Thai Chotiali, mounting from Rs.20,480-8-10 in 
.1.882 to R s . 48, 967-12-3, i n 1889 13* a 11ested to the new
agrarian turn in tribal society. From Thai Chotiali, 
Bruce was quick to link the changing tribal scene to the 
success of Sandemanisms "Feuds and raids are suppressed 
and the people are able to cultivate their lands in 
peace mainly through the instrumentality of our tribal 
s e r v i c e " . 137 In western Baluchistan as well, the trial 
of the Sandeman system encouraged recolonisation. In 
1899 Wylie reported that the plains of Chagai were 
attracting a steady stream of tribal migrants from the 
neighbouring upland regions.130 Official reports also 
claimed that in Nushki, where two-thirds of the 
arable land had remained idle due to feuds and 
ownership disputes, there were signs of an agrarian 
r e c o v e r y ,139 as the system of tribal control forced 
chiefs and tribes to abstain from violence through the 
promise and threat of subsidies and fines.
The Baluchistan Census Report of 1901 also
indicated an expansion in the agricultural sector, and 
linked an upward trend in population growth to changing 
subsistence patterns. Between 1899 and 1901, the 
population figures increased from 115,362 to 167,804, 
showing a percentage increase of 45/C. Explaining this 
increase the Report contended that earlier checks on 
population, such as exclusive dependence on erratic 
rainfall and cattle breeding, and the constant 
losses through violent death, were considerably
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mitigated in the p o e t - 1876 period by the greatly 
extended agricultural sector andffteprosperity it 
engendered. tA,c>
The expansion of the agricultural base in tribal 
society was socially significant, since it implied a 
corresponding contraction of the pastoral lifestyle, so 
integral to the sub-culture of feuds and raids which 
defined the traditional tribal identity. In choosing to 
become agriculturists, tribesmen were also moving closer 
towards a peasant identity, in the form of the small 
cultivator tied to the soil, and dependent on a fixed 
agricultural income. Essentially the sedentarization of 
tribes through increased dependence on agriculture
harboured the seeds of de?t r i ba 1 i zat i o n . An early 
indication of this social mutation was evident in the 
changing text of tribal values, steadily retreating from 
the old cultural norms of the rewards and reprisals 
ideology, towards the new materialism of the Sandeman 
era.
The Sandeman System and Attenuation of Tribal Norms
The corrosive? impact of the Sandeman system on 
tribal norms was overtly manifest in jirqa awards, which 
reflected new atttudes towards blood feuds, vengeance, 
status, and honour, themes which touched the ideological 
core of the tribal system. Perhaps the most radical
instance of" an altered tribal perception, was the
verdict of the Shahi Jirqa on the Marri-Luni conflict of 
1 8 9 6 . James Browne, then Agent to the Bovernor- 
General, believed that the high margin of human 
victims claimed by the feud, required the main offenders 
to serve more than the customary seven years that a 
j i rqa sentence would impose. He favoured fourteen years 
imprisonment under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 
wanted the j irqa to endorse his decision. The j i rqa 
duly approved his recommendation, and James Browne 
now observed:
"In my opinion the National Parliament Cthe j i r q a 1 
has now by its rep 1 ies... shown that it has; 
advanced with the times, by recognizing! a n d 
recommending that the British Government should 
and must, in such cases, inflict heavier 
punishments than any jirqa could award. The 
S a rda rs have wisely recognised that it was 
essential to place such powers in British hands 
for the good of the country, and the repression of 
national failings inconsistent with the better 
social conditions which time is gradually 
deve 1 oping in Ba 1 u c h i s t a n " . 1
In consenting to B r o w n e ’s definition of feuding violence
as a national failing, the chiefs were at least
theoretically discarding the old social mould of conflict
and opposition, which was also a symbolic battleground
for winning prestige, honour, and status, the valued
trophies of tribal culture.
The attrition of tribal norms relating to honour 
and status was also evident in the new commercial 
outlook which matured in the wake of Sandeman's drive to
purge violence from the tribal system by cash 
incentives. At the sharp end of this strategy was the 
tribal blood feud ritual which turned on retaliatory 
killing as the most respected way of salvaging the 
honour of the v i c t i m ’s group. Honour distilled from 
violence was the old cultural standard of the 
tribal group, which the Sandeman system sought to 
negate, by popularizing monetary compensations, as the 
new and more civilized way of retrieving social prestige 
in a feuding situation. Thus as a matter of policy, 
jirqa awards encouraged iwazana (compensation) or 
sharmana (dishonour) money, for the aggrieved party 
in the case of blood feuds. That the practice of 
commuting blood vengeance obligation to blood money soon 
gained popularity,was attested by the insistence on cash 
payment for the loss of a life rather than any other form 
of c o m p e n s a t i o n . 143 The usual rate of such compensation 
was R s . 1,500 per victim? but among some tribes, like the 
Sanzar Khels^blood price escalated to R s . 3 0 0 0 , which 
poorer tribesmen could not afford to pay. This suggests 
that monetary gain and a commodity mentality were 
replacing old tribal perceptions which equated one life 
with another, rather than a lucrative? cash sum, Also the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation laid particular stress on 
gaining cash securities from families and factions 
■For prevent i ng outbreaks of feudi ng vio 1 e n c e . 1 <|,es I n 
practice this led to a surfeit of inflated cash securities
which emerged as the new monetary index of social 
position, with the tribesmen viewing the bonds as 
status symbols of prestige and h o n o u r . 144
In the area of adultery based violence as well, 
the new social accent was on cash compensation rather than 
the traditional vengeance killing in vindication of 
honour. The compensation claimed and awarded by the 
.j i rqa was usually higher than the amount of bri de-price 
originally paid by the aggrieved man for the wife now 
charged with adultery. The compensation sum varied from 
Rs.600 to R s . 1,500, among different tribes, based on local 
custom, the age and circumstances of the guilty woman.The 
lure of this material sum encouraged tribesmen to accuse 
their wives of adultery even if they were not guilty . In 
1917 a Brahui j i rqa in Quetta, alluded to the practice 
of men accusing their wives of adultery in order to gain 
com p e n s a t i o n .147 Such accusations were further 
assisted by tribal custom which did not require legal 
proof of the w i f e ’s guilt. Here tribesmen were 
exploiting custom and the? j i r q a sytem in pursuit of 
monetary gain. A commercial outlook was thus taking 
root in tribal society, as the symbolic compulsions of 
izzat and sharm receeded from the traditional 
constructs of social life.
2 6 8
Cane 1ud ing P e rspective
The encapsulation of social conflict through the 
Sandeman system essentially mirrored the compression of 
tribal norms to fit the colonial framework in
Baluchistan. As an intrusive model of state power, it 
was consciously designed to intervene in strategic areas 
of tribal politics. The text of intervention hinged on 
the supposition that the tribal chiefs were "a nucleus 
of law and order in the midst of general lawlessness," 
who "must in order to hold their own, enjoy ... constant 
political and occasional military support. This means 
that we tithe British!] must mix ourselves in internal 
tribal politics and be ready to intervene by force at 
critical moments when the party which leans upon us 
requires our a s s i s t a n c e" . 140
Intervention in the tribal political process 
involved the constant shoring up of the chiefly model, 
and the recycling of tribal material to breathe new life 
into existing forms of leadership and authority. 
Internally, the coupling of new colonial privileges with 
chiefly authority exacerbated conflict and opposition 
in the tribal system, as in the case of the Marris and 
Achakzais, or conversely it led to the greater 
centralisation of authority and suppression of feuds as 
in the case of the western Baluch tribes. Therefore, 
whether the Sandeman system was a formula for political
cohesion or fissive opposition depended to some extent 
on the tribal variables within which it had to operate.
At the political heart of SandemaiVs mo d e l ^ h o w e v e r , 
was the strategic design to realign the balance of power 
between the colonising power and the tribal leadership. 
To ensure the hemegony of the Political Agent without 
alienating the chiefs, Sandeman needed a dependent 
leadership, strapped into the material benefits of 
patronage and allowances, but with a compensating
freedom to exercise control in the internal tribal 
scheme. Such a system allowed imperial authority to 
dominate a tribal scape managed on its behalf by semi- 
autonomous tribal chieftains. In particular, the
c ons ci ous c u 11 i vatian of a r i st ocr a t i c p r i v i 1eg e in the 
tribal system helped to marginalise political dissent, 
by preventing the chiefs from becoming serious centres 
of disaffection. S a n d e m a n ’s vision to conquer with as 
little bloodshed and leaving as few scars as possible, 
in fact left the history of colonial Baluchistan blandly 
free from the turmoil of conflict and confrontation, 
which coloured the imperal-tribal experience in other 
p a r ■(:. s o f t h e f r o n t i e r ■ A s 0 3. a f C a r o e o b s e r v e d 5
"If there is to be a criticism of the Sandeman 
system , it must be that it has proved too 
statics in the village the pace of life and 
thought was scarcely quickened by seventy years 
of Britsh rule. Elsewhere the Englishman can 
c 1 a im t hat i n hi s d e a 1i ngs with t he Pat hans he 
has kindled a flame and posed a challenge. The
spark more often than not has burnt into a fire, 
but what of that? The fire gives light and heat, 
and is not d e a d 11.
But there we;re others who interpreted the absence
of conflict and challenge in Sandeman's Baluchistan as
the real measure of his success. In their opinion
the tranquility of Baluchistan was a testament to the
flowering of the civilising mission on tribal soil..
As Denys Bray put it:
"Sandeman's mission was to bring peace where there 
was chaos, and thus to uphold the King's peace 
throughout the land, and to foster its
development through indigenous agency on 
indigenous lines".1550
R.I. Bruce, Sandema.n's close political associate in Dera
Ghazi Khan and later Baluchistan, also testified to the
pacification and civilisation of the Baluch border
tribes, as the real contribution of the Sandeman
system. 1151 Evidence of increased sedentar i zat ion among
tribes, re-population of villages, and increased
cultivation seemed to corroborate the reformist vein in
Sandemanism, intent on reclaiming tribal society from
its primeval pursuits of "anarchy, murder, and
robb e r y ". 1S3a As Frederick Roberts put it, the
experience of imperial subjugation worked to impress the
tribal mind with "the wonders of civilisation". 1S53
S e e p t i c s 7h o w e v e r , preferred to believe that the 
miracle of peace in Baluchistan was achieve?d by money. 
It was pointed out that subsidies and allowances
271
shackled tribesmen to imperial resources, allowing the 
seduction of money to stifle any real tribal opposition 
to a foreign regime. The Foreign E>epartment observed 
that it had heard from officials serving in Baluchistan, 
"the same story of liberal expenditure on tribes", and that 
"Sir Robert rules by m o n e y ".134 In defence of his 
system Sandeman would point out that it was "unfair to 
expect t r i b e s - t o  do your w o r k ... unless you make it 
worth their while, and having given the quid be careful 
to exact the q u o " . lsa But even if there? was an even 
exchange between work and payment, the Sandeman system 
was more expensive than tribal service? in other areas, 
and Baluchistan was a heavily deficit province, T.C.Coen 
points out that the levy system in neighbouring Dera 
Ghazi Khan worked more inexpensively and efficiently 
than the Baluchistan system, because? it was implemented 
through maliks or minor headmen rather than 
tumandars or c h i e f s „ 1 But such a comparison seems 
to ignore the variable, that Baluchistan had an inbuilt 
structure of politically powerful chiefs, whom it would 
have been unwise to leave unsubsidized in the interests 
of economy,
S a n d e m a n ’s structural approach of using tribal 
hierarchies to institute leadership, rank, and authority 
in the internal management of the levy service, was also 
criticised for being of only limited use to control
societies organised on the Baluch tribal model. It was 
urged that such a system would not work in the context 
of Pathan societies, where the tribes had no rigid 
hierarchies. As A.Singer put it: "Sandeman’s successors
ignored the huge differences in tribal organisation. 
Baluch tribes had a tradition of leadership and could be 
approached through the structural hierarchy. The 
eastern Pushtuns would accept no such
intermediaries".137 At the heart of this criticism was 
the belief that the consent of a Baluch chief to any 
proposal implied a seal of approval by his t r i b e 5 but 
among Pathans where .leadership was more diffused, 
consent on the part of a few headmen would not 
necessarily mean approval by the tribe. 1SS<3
In his time, Sandeman did not accept such ethnic 
limitations to his scheme, which he felt had succeeded 
among the Pathans of Que?tta--Pishin, Sibi, and Zhob, and 
had been extended to the Gomal Waziris and Shiramis. 
Asserting the universality of his tribal system he 
wrote:
"It is no mere theory. It is born of the calm 
confidence which arises from experience and 
leads to success. We have made a commencement 
with the Nazir is... let us avoid nerveless 
vacillation and maintain a firm continuity of 
act ion",
But the Waziri uprisings in 1894 and 1898 seemed to 
confirm the suspicions of those who did not believe that 
the Sandeman system could be applied with success among
the Pathans of the northwest -frontier. The Naziri 
verdict however was not accepted as a final judgement by 
those who still favoured the Sandeman system. They 
could still argue that the system only needed another 
Sandeman to make it work and produce more compliance 
than c o n t r adiction. 160 But such assumptions in turn 
fostered a new negative, by suggesting that the Sandeman 
system rested more? on personality than principle.
In the final stocktaking the Sandeman system 
hinged on political and economic compulsions, leavened 
by personal charisma, and sustained always by the threat 
of military force in the background. The tribal chief 
was recast as the policeman of the new social order, 
enforcing submission through the powers of patronage 
and punishment, conferred on him by imperial rule. 
Hemmed in by such constructs, the tribal commitment to 
the? Sandeman system was perhaps dictated more by 
compulsion than consent. Summing up S a n d e m a n 7s tribal 
solution, O.Caroe observed dismissively:"Without 
penetration, concentration of force, and support of the 
m a 1i ks the Sandeman system is the merest j u n k ". 1 ^ 1
But a deconstruct ion of the model does less than 
j u :i t i c e t o t h e -f a c t t h a t t h e b a s i e g u i d i n g principles 
of S a n d e m a n ’s experiment at least created a truce 
between tribes and empire in Baluchistan.
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Sandeman ascribed this fledgling compromise to a 
political prescription which mixed coercion with 
concession. As he stressed;
"My object is, and always has been to establish a 
policy of conciliatory intervention, as opposed 
to either coercion or inactivity, but conciliation 
alone without an outward exhibition of strength 
to enforce obedience, should occasion arise, 
will never be sufficient to enforce obedience.., 
on the f r o n t i e r " . 162
And the fact that imperialism had a less stormy passage
in S a n d e m a n 7s Baluchistan than any where else on the
frontier seemed to prove the emperical validity of the
model for at least one? tribal corner of the? Indian
Emp ire.
But S a n d e m a n s  tr iba 1 so 1 ut ion worked pr imar i 1 y in 
the imperial interest to create a stable frontier 
zone untroubled by social change and political dissent. 
The preoccupation of expressing government control in a 
tribal idiom was part of a conscious drive to keep 
Baluch society locked in an antique tribalism, 
forestalling its transition to what D.Bray 
deprecated as another "law ridden p r o v i n c e . ..with its 
political institutions westernizing more and more into 
English m o u l d s ".1^ 3 Serving the classic imperial 
concern for law and order, the Sandeman system 
aspired at. most for "social amelioration, not social 
c h a n g e " . 164 S a n d e m a n 7s vision was therefore 
a limited one, which pioneered no new cultural
•frontiers in Baluchistan, and seemingly left the tribes 
out of step with the new political consciousness 
maturing in British India. The social re-modelling which 
accompanied Sandemanism stimulated changes within the 
tribal system, without revolutionising the system 
itself. Wrapped in the ideology of empire, the 
Sandeman system was essentially a medium -for grafting 
alien control in an uncertain tribal environment. It 
manipulated tribal consent to create an image of 
political consensus, which underpinned colonial rule in 
Baluchistan, and became part of the Sandeman mystique 
that coloured the annals of empire. Musing on the
political passivity of Baluchistan in 1911, Lord 
Hardinge then Viceroy, could therefore observe with 
satifact ion:
"It was curious to see English ladies, wives of 
officers etc., living in bungalows, quite 
unprotected within two miles of the Afghan 
frontier stones. This state of peace is I 
believe largely due to good management, and I only 
wish I could say the same of the North West 
Front ier".1
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Chapter V
Tr i bal Land S t ructures a nd British Reve nue  P ol icy
In the material context of British Baluchistan,
the imperial demand on tribal revenues was intended to
underscore political authority in a poor but volatile
frontier zone, without adventuring into the 
controversial ground of wringing an economic surplus 
from the land. Such a demand was perceived more in the 
nature of a material tribute levied on a subject
territory,, to serve as a symbol of mastery in a captive 
society. As a Member of Par 1iament stated;"It is of the 
utmost importance to exact tribute however small. That 
is a tangible sign of superiority which has a great mc^al 
force on the Asia t i c ".1 A revenue model which would
s e r v 0 a s a metaphor for political power did not aspire
towards radical change. ItS main purpose was 
utilitarian; to simplify and unify,, in the interest of 
economy, the myriad of landholding patterns traced by 
ecological variables, the political imperatives of 
Afghan imperialism, Kalat State power, and
the tribal structure. An analysis of this
revenue strategy, however requires a preliminary
examination of the tribal land structures, which
defined the social matrix of its operation.
Ecology and the Dy namics of R u ral P r o p r ietorship
The semi--arid environment of Baluchistan with its 
mixture of abundant land and scarce water, exerted a 
critical impact in determining the social ownership of 
rural resources,, As the scanty rainfall made water a 
scarce commodity, the ownership of land without access 
to a karez (underground water channel), spring or 
stream was economically less viable for tribesmen. Land 
appreciated in value according to its proximity to 
permanent sources of water. While irrigated and non- 
irrigated land was permanently divided among owners, the 
critical point for the owner in irrigated lands was the 
share he possessed in the water-supply, making 
proprietorship in irrigated tracts synonymous with the 
possession of water shares. Rights in the use of 
water formed the basis of patt.idari holdings in 
Baluchistan, which constituted the most common tenurial 
f orm i n t he region. The acc ret ion of pat t i dar i water 
shares devolved on a system, whereby a karez or stream 
was divided into so many s habana-roz or days and nights 
of irrigation, and a man would possess one,or two or half, 
or quarter of a shabana-roz as the case may be. Each 
sJxab^.a— roz. was again subdivided into p a r t s , the 
usuaI di vision being into si xteen namaz- i- diqar (further 
subdivision of a s h a r e ) , each namaz — i- d i q a r representing 
one and a half hours of w a t e r .12 The number of
proprietors in a kare z , spring or stream was usually
small, the quantity of water being limited. In this 
manner private rights came to exist in water,, and the 
sale of land usually related to the purchase of shares 
in water. Proprietorship in any specific group of 
tribal villages also varied on the basis of karez 
lands and rain crop lands. Thus karez land would be 
held by one body of proprietors and rain cultivated land 
by another. This separation arose from the practice 
whereby the whole or part of the landholding community 
possessing cultivable land called in outsiders to assist 
in making a karez. Consequently these outsiders shared 
only in the land irrigated from the karez so made, and 
had no rights on the rain crop lands, which
continued to be divided among the original proprietary 
body'«3
The critical impact of water shares in dissolving 
old and creating new proprietary rights in the land was 
evident in the status changes which affected the
Shadozai and Tarin Kakars in Thai Chotiali, linked to 
the alienation of irrigation rights. Byr the turn of the? 
eighteenth century, the Tar ins, the original proprietors 
of land and water in Thai, were unable to meet their 
revenue payments to Gandhar, mainly due to contracting 
c u 11. i vat i on i n du.c ed by t he f r equent Mar r i raids wh i c h 
laid waste the grain fields.^ Under pressure the Tar ins 
sold their shares in the Thai and Hanambar streams,and
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lands irrigated by them to Shado, a wealthy Kakar from 
Bor i^  on condition that he would pay the? revenue demand 
to Qandhar. By acquiring these water shares, the 
Shadozais gained a monopoly over the only sources of 
permanent water in Thai. By contrast the dispossessed 
Tar ins were now confined to rain crop cultivation which 
was insufficient for subsistence, and they were forced 
to supplement their income by working as tenant 
cultivators on Shadozai lands. At the start of 1880 the 
Tar ins were paying half their produce as rent to 
Shadozai landlords. The Shadozais also took one-sixth 
of the produce of the Hassani tribe for allowing them to 
use the waters of the Hanambar stream , and one-sixth as 
well from the Lunis for their use of the hill 
torrents.® Ownership of water sources therefore 
allowed the Shadozais to dominate the local economy, 
consolidate their position as landlords, and manipulate 
the Tar ins, Hassanis, and Lunis, as subordinate 
ten a n t /rent ier g r o u p s .
While ecological constraints elevated the 
significance of water rights in the ownership scheme, 
systems of land tenure we?re consciously designed to 
meet the requirements of imperial and tribal structures, 
in the political field. The? start of Afghan imperialism 
in the mid-eighteenth ce?nt.ury forced an early 
accommodation between intrusive models of rural elitism
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fostered by imperial patronage, and tribal systems of 
landholding based on ties of sectional and lineage 
membership. Set in this dual framework, land structures 
in Baluchistan carried the mark of imperial 
restructuring and traces of customary tribal forms of 
land ownership.
Political Systems and Landholding
Afghan policy encouraged three broad categories of 
landed privilege to develop in Baluchistan - namely 
zami ndar i . .jag i r , and muaf i estates. The key to such 
privileges turned on ethnic/familial ties with the Afghan 
ruling dynasty, service to the state, and religious 
sanctity of particular Islamic groups. As economic 
priv lege bought political loyalty, the favoured 
groups were essential props for the Afghan imperial 
structure in Baluchistan. The Afghans could only keep 
alive the thread of dominance in Baluchistan, an 
outlying region of their empire, by creating a local 
power structure with vested i nterests in the conti nuance 
of Afghan rule. The Afghan process of instituting new 
hierarchies in tribal society may be viewed through a 
brief resume of how selected tribal groups acquired 
za m i. ndar i „ jag i r , and muaf i rights in the land.
The term z a m i ndar i in Baluchistan defined a 
pr i vi 1 eged landho1der with heredi tary proprietary
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rights in the land. He was in fact the primary z a m i n d a r , 
defined by E.Stakes as "the landholder having immediate 
7 p r o p r i e t a r y 7 dominion over the s a i l ",6 The progression 
of Kasi Pat h a n s , near Quetta, to prosperous zami ndar i 
status started in the mid-eighteenth century, when they 
acquired proprietary rights in fifteen villages near 
Quetta, from the Emperor Ahmad Shah Durrani, on the 
basis of familial links with the ruler. The? Kasis also 
obtained privileged rates of revenue assessment on their 
lands., viz. one-sixth of the produce in stream irrigated 
lands and one-tenth on karez l a n d s a s  opposed to 
standard Afghan rates of one-third and one-sixth in 
stream and karez lands respectively.7 When Durrani 
power started to ebb at the close of the eighteenth 
century, and Quetta reverted to the control of the Kalat 
S t a t e f the exist i ng ba t a i arrangements were commuted to
a fixed payment known as za r i k a lan q , to be? remitted in
cash and kind, and assessed at the lower rate of one- 
twelfth. 13
The Kasis paid the new demand by dividing the sum 
among the seven major sections of the tribe. According 
to tribal custom, Kasi lands were divided in equal 
shares among the seven major sections. Each share was 
then subdivided among constituent sub-groups and 
major families, who allocated individual plots to adult 
males, which descended in equal shares to the? owners
s o n s .<5> In this way individual propr ietary r ights 
c r y s t alii se d .i. n original c: ommu na 1 ho 1 d i ng s . Kas i 
landholders used tenant cultivators to work their plots, 
•from whom they collected rent at two-thirds of the 
produce,. From the two-thirds taken as rent, the Kasis 
paid the one-twelfth required to the Kalat State, and 
the balance constituted their proprietary s h a r e , 40 As 
the state demand was fixed, and batai was levied on old 
and new cultivation alike, the Kasi zamindars prospered 
by appropriating increases in the agricultural surplus. 
The constraints of a light fixed revenue demand,and an 
elastic rent str ucture?weighted the zari kalanq svstem 
in favour of zami ndar i profit at the expense o-f tenant 
c u 1tivators.
The strength of landed privilege in rural society 
was reinforced by the prevalence? of jag i r estates, which 
were revenue-free tracts of land granted by Afghan and 
Kalat rulers to certain chiefs and their tribes for 
political and military services rendered to the state. 
Principal jaqirdars in the Quetta area were the chiefs 
of the Raisani and Shahwani Brahui tribes, who acquired 
s .i x teen an (j f i f t e e n karezes r espectively, as r e v e n u e ~ 
free grants from Masir Khan of Kalat in the eighteenth 
century. These? re venue-free grants also confirmed 
hereditary proprietary titles in land and water for the 
recipients. In exchange for these privileges., the
Shahwani and Raisani chiefs had to maintain a contingent 
of fighting tribesmen, ready to render military 
assistance to the Kalat State when nece s s a r y . 11
As revenue takers and proprietary owners the 
Shahwani and Raisani chiefs levied revenue? on their 
estates, at the rate of one-sixth of the produce on 
irrigated lands and one-tenth on rain crop cultivation., 
on tenant cultivators drawn from the ranks of Bazai 
K a k a r s .12 But the cultivators were subjected to other 
extortionate impositions. Thus the Raisani chief levied 
a cess called 1awaz i m a , at the rate of thirty seers of 
wheat on one karez , and eighty seers on another at the 
spring harvest for personal u s e .13 The Brahui chiefs 
also exercised certain quasi-sovereign rights on the 
cli 11 i v a t o r s , which involved sursat, (forced supplies) and 
begar (forced labour)-14 Such forms of extra-economic 
coercion mirrored Brahui dominance in the political 
system of the Kalat State, and the elitist status of 
the Brahui chiefs as the ruling caucus in the post- 
Afghan period;, which allowed them to exploit at will, 
the poorer and more vulnerable sections of the Pathan 
t e n a n t c u 11 i v a t o r s .
r ights in the land a 1 so or igi nated 
as remuneration for government service. Three families 
of Dli r r a n i Afghans - K i 1 a Dur r a n i s , K o t w a s , and I sma 1 z a i
Populzais - held twenty-two estates in Quetta revenue- 
free as jagi rdars and in proprietary right as well. The 
grant of these concessions dated back to the reign of 
Ahmad Shah Durrani, who conceded revenue-free estates on 
the Hanna stream to his waz i r (minister) Shahwali Khan 
Durrani, the ancestor of the Durrani families in 
Quetta. 1=5 The? linkage between jag i rs and government 
service reappeared in the case of the Barozai sardar- 
khel of S i b i . A sanad from Ahmad Shah Durrani. in 1753, 
assigned the task of local government in Sibi to Ismail 
Khan the Barozai chief, and his brother Mohammad Khan. 1<£> 
The Barozai chief was also empowered to remit the land 
revenue of Sibi to Q a n d h a r . As the Afghan demand was 
fixed at R s . 10,000 per annum, and the Barozai chief 
collected by batai at the rate of one-fourth of the 
produce, 17 he? was in a position to appropriate for 
personal use any surplus accruing in revenue collection. 
Additionally, the Afghan Government chose to pay the 
Barozai chief for the lucrative task of revenue 
collection, by awarding him .ja g ir concessions in the 
land. Thus in the Sanqan area of the Sibi District, the 
Barozai sa,rd[aJi;j_k.he 1_ was allowed to retain for persona 1 
use one-eigth of the local crop yield. Additionally the 
sardar-khel was granted 13,464 acres of land revenue- 
free in the Kurk region of the Sibi D i s t r i c t . 1® Thus 
the examples of the Quetta Durranis and the Barozai 
sa r da r - k hel in Si b i ill List r at e how ministerial off ice
was the passport to landed privilege in tff.e period °-f'
dLOfVi r n» tc
Jag irdadari structur es in Baluchistan thereto re 
inter locked with Afghan and Kalat political systems. 
Situated at the geographical periphery of the Afghan 
Empire, Baluchistan was an area where Afghan rulers 
sought to exercise influence rather than direct control. 
Within this concept of imperial t*ul& the patronage 
of Pathan jagirdars in Baluchistan, with ethnic and 
political loyalties to Kabul^ served as a reliable? medium 
to channel Afghan dominance? in the region, as a 
counterpoise to B a 1uch-Brahu i political pretensions. 
Subsequently in the period of Brahui ascendancy, the 
principle of decentralisation ? which marked the 
confederate structure of Kalat politics,*'* allowed the 
accretion of magnate privileges in the land on a 
permanent basis. F?aisan i and S ha h w a n i J.a.g.i.rs essentia 11 y 
mirrored the economic basis of local autonomy in the 
Brahui confederacy. The imperatives of Afghan
imperialism and Kalat State structure therefore 
encouraged the development of t e r r i t o r i a l 1y defined 
p e r m a nent jag i r dar i holdings, w h .i c h were political! y 
a u t o n o m o u s . In this respect the jagirs in Ba 1uchistan 
differed from the j ag i rs assigned in Mughal India to 
imper j.a 1 servants or £!liL!XsabdFars in lieu of the ir  
s a 1 ar i e s „ Desc r i b i ng t he funct i on of the M u g h a 1 j ag i r 
or revenue-free land grant, I.Habib notes:"The governing
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c I a s s □ f t h e M u q h a .1 E m p i r e o b t a i n e d it s i ncome m a i n 1 y 
•from these assignments. T he jag i rdars were usua 11 y 
fMI3^_bdaris , ho 1 ding ranks (m a n s a b s ) bestowsd upon 
them by the Emperor".2 0 . The Mughal jagir was neither 
hereditary nor transferable; it was specifically 
d e s q i n ed to prevent jag i rdars from developing local 
power bases which could threaten imperial authority. In 
t he centralised scheme of the Mughal Emp i re j ag i rdars 
were required to function as imperial servants drawing 
fiscal emoluments from the land. By contrast, the 
historical underdevelopment of central government in 
B a 1uchist an permitted j ag i r dari holdings to emerge as 
focul points of local power, combining landed privilege 
w :i. t h po 1 i t i ca 1 aut o n o m y .
Privileged landholdings in Baluchistan also 
i n c 1 u d e d 1 a n d held a s m li a. f i , o r f r e e h o 1 d , e x e m p t f r o m 
revenue payment, on the basis of specific religious5, and 
t r i b a 1 criter i a . T he say i ds wer e t he main r e 1i g i aus 
group, with a sacred ancestry from the Prophet, to enjoy 
such muafi lands, which .included a special share of 1 and 
and water, a portion of the agricultural produce, and 
revenue remissions on the lands in their possessions.
The aver age cash v a 1ue of such a m u a f i var i ed from 
Rs . 2Q--Es 100 a year.521. The say i ds o f  Pi shin were the 
largest of such groups; they held one-third of the land 
and water in Pishin revenue-free, often acquiring through
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purchase the lands of tribesmen who defaulted in their 
revenue payment- Subsequently the lands became revenue- 
free as they became part of sayid ho l d i n g s-36:2 In 
this manner religion was linked to the economics of 
p r of i t able land h o 1d i n g -
Tribal headmen or maliks also received economic 
concessions from the Afghan Government, for serving as 
revenue collectors or arbitrators in land disputes. 
For their work, headmen would either receive grain and 
cash payments,, or revenue-free shares in land and 
water- Mal i ks in Pi shin for instance., received payments 
amounting to Rs-399-13-3 in cash; 495 maunds and 15 
seers of g r a i n .533 And in Gue11a thiirteen sha b anaroz 
of water were held by the headmen r e venue-free.24
Revenue exemptions on a minor scale were often 
made by the ruling Afghan or Kalat State power to tribes 
with a history of militancy. The hill Achakzais of 
Guetta-Pishin for instance were never subjugated by the 
Afghans- As a result of their independent status, the 
Achkazais paid no taxes, except for the sardar-khel who 
made a t.oken cont r i but ion of one-tenth on their- karez 
holdings near Pishin-38® In a similar manner the Marris 
and Bugtis, lying outside the effective political reach 
of the Kalat State, escaped the fetters of a state 
r e v e n u e s t r u c t u r e .
The enclave of privileged landholdings in rural 
society contrasted sharply with the great mass of tribal 
proprietary holdings, which consisted of small plots 
of lands worked by owner cultivators. These small 
holdings dated back to the original occupation of the 
land by different tribes, first for grazing and then for 
cultivation, which subsequently led to the division of 
land among tribal sections in proportion to the number 
of families, followed by the parcelling of family 
holdings into individual shares for each male member of 
the group. Individual tribesmen also acquired land as 
compensation for losses incurred during blood feuds, 
as well as through purchase, and in lieu of bride- 
p r i c e .'26 The need to give every new male member a 
share in tribal lands meant that the size of such
h o 1d i ng s tended to be s m a 11, r a ng i ng f rom four t o
sixteen acres per holding. Here the owner cultivators 
pa .i d the usua 1 Afg han rates of revenue - o n e t h i r d  on
s t r e a m i r ri gated 1a n d , one-s i x t h on k a r ez lands, a nd
one-tenth on rain crop cult i vat ion. By the turn of the 
nineteenth century most tribal lands had subdivided into 
permanent individual holdings, with the exception of the 
Marri Baluch lands where the communal principle of 
ownership was the accepted norm.
Ac c o r d i ng t o tr a d i ti o n a 1 practice in Ma r r i 
society, one-sixth of all lands acquired by the tribe
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through battles and feuds was set apart as the chief's
share or sar dar i-baksh. The cumulative effect of such
accretions was the development of an entailed estate
called paqi which became the inalienable heritage of the
c hieftaincy,38® Apart from this single concession to
private ownership, the rest of the Marri lands were held
on a collectivist principle. Rights in pastoral land
were collectively held by the tribe as the
political unit. Lands for agricultural use were
subdi vi ded among the three ma jor sect ions of the tr i b e .
Within each section, land shares were further subdivided
i nt o f i ve allot, me n t s , o ne o r mo r e going to t he
subsectional grouping according to the numerical
strength of its constituent family groups. At the
level of the family group, the allotted shares were
ITcct Tve re
split up into as many holdings^needed to give every male 
member a share in the land. The distribution of plots 
was determined by lots, and at the end of every ten 
years there was a new redistribut ion to adjust shares 
to a ny i nc r ease o r dec r ease in t he t r .i b e ’s ma 1 e 
p o p u l a t i o n , I n  the Marri scheme therefore, individual 
tribesmen were allowed to use a fraction of the communal 
land o n a periodical basis, rat he r t ha n ac q u i r i ng 
permanent possession of any particular section of the 
land. The inheritance from father to son entailed the 
transfer not of land rights in a particular area, but 
lineage and sectional membership, which carried the
accompanying right to utilise tribal lands.
The triple heritage of the Afghan, Kalat, and 
tribal land systems, therefore traced an uneven pattern 
of ownership and exchange in rural society. 
Collectively, this hybrid syste^m of land control 
sustained three main areas of social contradict ion, 
arising from the exploitative structure of landlord— 
tenant relations, the polarisation of society into 
landed magnates and an under-class of poor owner 
cultivators, and the economic disparity between lands 
paying fixed cash revenues and those trapped in produce 
payments.
The 1andlord-tenant contradict ion was sharpest in 
the zamindar and j a g i r da r estates of Quetta and Sibi, 
where relations of uneven exchange between landowner and 
cultivator were formalised in a variety of crop sharing 
agr eeme nt s « T radi t i o n a 11y f i ve elerne nt s we re taken into 
account in dividing the crops land, water, draught 
animals, seed and labour. Since most of the tenants 
only supplied manual labour, while the landlord supplied 
the other essentials, their share was evaluated at a
mere one fourth of the produce.30 The status of these
tenants bordered close to that of rural wage 
earners, as the small share of the produce the?y retained 
was more in the nature of payment for their labour by
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the landlord. In some of the large estates near Quetta 
t he 1 a n d 1ord kept 13/181 h „ and the tenant o n 1y 5/ 181 h .,
of the crop, with l/18th» being further deducted from
the tenant's share as his contribution towards government 
r e v e n u e .31 Criticisng this system of rents, Sandeman 
w r o t e :
"In the Quetta valley itself there is no fair 
system of taxation... some of the large
proprietors treat many of their cultivators... 
very unfairly . They take a very large share of
the produce, and as the demand for grain is much 
larger than the supply, large sums of money are 
being realised by these men. "358
A marginally more secure group of lathband or 
conditional tenants were confined to rain crop lands. 
These tenants by their own expense and labour had broken 
up waste or rain crop land and converted them by 
embankme nt s or dams i nt o jsa i.l_abha lands i r r i gat ed by 
flooding from torrents. In return for this investment, 
such tenants were given occupancy rights in the land,
and were allowed to retain half the share of the 
produce. These tenants could mortgage or sell their
or: cup ancy r i g ht s , with t he lan d 1 or d reser v i ng t he
right of pre-emption in castas of a l i enation.33 But
these privileges were neutralised to some extent by the 
erratic rainfall in Baluchistan, which made flood water 
o n 11 ivat ion a s p e c u 1 at i ve and risky v e n t u r e .
But the really vulnerable group of tenants were 
those who worked on the jag ir estates of the Brahui
chiefs performing free of cost services such as the 
supply of fuel and transport of the landlords' grain, 
which amounte d _ i n practice to a form of 1 abour r e n t . 
These workers were tenants-at-will or taazqars, who had 
no rights extending beyond the harvest, or at most the 
year, and could be ejected as soon as they had harvested 
the crop.34 In the traditional economy therefore, 
tenancy conditions and rent structures trapped tenants 
in a subsistence level existence, providing a pool of 
cheap and captive labour for jag i rdars and zami ndars 
to exploit, and perpetuate their monopolistic control 
of social resources.
The cleavage between privelege and u n d e r p r i v /lege 
in landed society was further magnified by the 
economic depression of s m a 11 owner cuItivators.
T: he restricted acreage of owner 
cultivator holdings precluded them from functioning with 
sufficient profit margins. The community was barely 
sufficient in grain production, and usually depended on 
supplementary pastoral sources of income to survive on 
t he land. Duri ng per i o ds of droug ht t hose w i t hout 
irrigable land had to migrate in search of work to Quetta 
Pi shin, and Harnai, swelling the ranks of rural wage 
earners. The problem of uneconomic holdings was 
further aggravated by the state system of conceding 
pr :i. v i .1 eged revenue rates and remissions to zami ndars and
j ag i r da r s , w h i c h rn e a n t t h at s m a 11 landholders p a i d h i g h e r 
rates of taxat ion. While t he Kasi zami ndars paid a mere 
one-1we 1 ft l"i .i n rev e n u e , t he b ma 11 owner cu 11 ivator paid 
one-third. The uneven incidence of revenue rates which 
passed the main burden of state taxation to the small 
ho 1 der , was a rec i pe far st. ructur i ng pe rmane nt 
inequalities in the land, by allowing one group to 
profit regularly from the agricultural surplus, while 
forcing the direct producers to eke a bare existence 
on minimal incomes. C.H„ Masson, the English traveller 
who visited Baluchistan in 1827, noted that the people 
were "most beggarly dressed "3 3 , they lived in blanket 
tents made from goats' hair with a minimum of household 
items. ::s<fa
The dual system of taking revenue in kind by 
bat a i , i n s o m e  a r e a s , and 1evying a f ixed cash 
assessment in others, also fostered disparate levels of 
prosperity among cultivators. This structural anomaly 
was rnost mar ked in thie revenue arrangernents o-f P:i.shi n . 
Here revenue farming was a relic of an earlier system, 
known as qha m - i- n a u k a r . which had required landholders 
to supply men to the Persian and Afghan armies, instead 
of paying land tax. The Persian ruler Nadir Shah first 
imposed this system on the Tar ins of Pishin in 1739, 
during the course of his raiding mission to India. After 
him Ahmad Shah Abdali continued the s y s t e m . 3'7 But
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slibs©qla0 n 1 1 y , as t h© Af g han Emp i r© started to 
disintegrate!, the Qandhar Government had less use for 
men at arms, and in 1816, a tax of 28 Qandahari Rupees 
was imposed., per head of the 802 service men that the 
Tar ins had customarily furnished. Between 1842 and 1863 
a group of Tar ins emigrated from Pishin, and the rest 
of the tribe had to make up the shortfall to the 
government, by paying entirely in cash for the 802 men 
or in kind at standard Afghan rates. The Tar ins decided 
to pay in kind for 560 men, and for the remaining 242 
revenue continued to be paid in c a sh.3 ® This mixed 
arrangement set the pattern of revenue collection in 
Pishin; in irrigated tracts the Afghans imposed a fixed 
assessment, and in rain crop lands b a t a i was collected 
at the usual Afghan rates. This duality fostered an 
economic imbalance between the two categories of revenue 
paying v i11 a g e s . Since batai was an e 1 ast i c concept of 
taxation;, which allowed the state to take a share from 
o 1 d a nd new c la 11 i vat i on a like, t he batai villages were 
soon in the position of contributing a larger share of 
the revenue demand than those paying a fixed 
a s s e s s m e n t . I n fact when t. he British arri ved i n P i sh i n 
t Iney f o la n d the ba t a i sec t o r paying t wo-t h i r ds o f t he 
land revenue.3 *9 The rising curve of the state demand 
siphoned profits out of the batai sector;, while fixed 
assessment areas prospered from acclamulating unt:axed 
surpluses. As Sandeman observed;
"Under the present system the batai villages 
which contribute the greater part of the Government 
revenues, are becoming continually weaker under 
their burdens and their produce? is falling off; 
while cultivation in the villages paying a fixed 
assessment has extended and is extending 
without the least profit to Government".4°
Br i t i sh Revenue Poliey
The traditional revenue scheme, marked by
disparities in taxation and wealth accumulation, seemed
ripe for reform to local British officials. In addition
to the problem of structured inequalities, the system of
collecting revenue by b a t a i seemed untenable, since
every threshing floor had to be? watched at harvest time
by poorly paid subordinates, gave opportunities for
fraud on the? part of cultivators and peculation on the
part of o f f i c i a l s . D e p r e c a t i n g  the contradict ions it
harboured, Sandeman concluded that the traditional
system was "complicated, unequal in its incidence and
productive of fraud, and often attended with hardship to
t he p e o p 1e ".
Believing in the panacea of a light, uniform 
assessment to cure imbalances in the existing system, 
Sandeman favoured a low revenue rate, to be applied 
across the board on all categories of land,
irrespective of their water supply and differential
levels of productivity. The proposed rate was based on 
the principle of the North Western Provinces Settlement, 
wh i c: h f i xed t he gover nment sha r e at ha 1 f t he r ent rate
at wh i c: h land was lent to t he? tenant cultivate? r . As 
r e n t s in B a I u c h i s t a n v a r i e d f r a m o n e - h a 1 f , t w o -1. h i r d s t  o 
a third of the gross produce, the new taxation could be 
fi xed between one-fourth and one-sixth of the 
gross produce.43 The lower rate of one-sixth was 
selected by Sandeman to make the change from the Afghan 
system easier for tr ibesmen. Bear i ng in mind
the abuses of batai Sandeman also pressed for 
conversion to a cash settlement fixed for five years.44
But Sande m a n ’s experimental line ran counter to 
the curve of conservative opinion in the Foreign 
Department. In the context of a frontier, tribal zone 
like Baluchistan, it was axiomatic for the Government of 
India to s tress; that custom and convention should 
dictate the nature of economic policy.*13 Not everyone 
shared Sandeman's conviction that uniformity was the 
g o 1 d e n m e a n i n r e v e n u e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n A  s one of f i c i a 1 
stressed^ the inequalities which appeared unjust and
arbitary to Sandeman might prove economically
defensible, in the sense that differential rates like
on e  tenth on karez lands,, and one-fifth on stream
irrigated lands, really reflected the higher capital and 
1aboui- i nvestment i n kar e z 1ands as opposed to st ream 
water c u 11 i va t i o n , w h i c h c a 11e d fo r a 1owe r ra t e t o keep 
i. n c: e n t i v e a 1 i v e i n t h e karez s e c t r . * * S a n d e m a n s  
other idea of introducing a cash settlement was
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dismissed as a monstrous suggestion which "rigidly 
imposed might ruin the people"..'"-*7' The consideration 
here was that the uncertain rainfall in Baluchistan 
made cultivation risky';, so that a crop assessment which 
fluctuated with the outturn, thus spreading the risk- 
more equally between the revenue payer and state, seemed 
more suitable than a fixed cash assessment. There was 
also fear that without plenty of currency in the market 
the imposition of cash payments would become a heavy tax 
on the peop le.4S
While the debate dragged inconclusively between 
continuity and change, a tentative move was made in 1881 
for standardisation, on pragmatic grounds of economy and 
efficiency. The need to economise in provincial 
administration after the second Afghan war, meant that 
some simplification was needed of the existing revenue 
structure with its assortment of taxes, to reduce the 
establishment cost of working a laborious and complex 
system- Thus the medley of old taxes was swept away, 
in favour of a one-sixth rate to be levied on all batai
lands of Quetta-Pishin, Sibi, and Thai Chotiali, in the
hope that this would make revenue administration less 
time consuming, and therefore more cost effective for
Io ca1 g ove r n m e n t . But jag i r , zari__ kal a n q , and
m u a f i estates were exempted from the new rate?, as the
government had no wish to i nterefere with the p r i v 11eged
2 9 8
holdings of tribal chiefs and headmen whose support they 
courted in the political field. The introduction of 
cash assessments was also postponed in the interests of 
caut ion.
The impact of one-sixth on batai lands beween 
1881-1883 was uneven in material terms- Paradoxically
Wf t c_h
the new rate did not remove the i n e q u a l i t i e s A Sandeman 
had marked for elimination. One contrary effect was to 
raise the level of taxation for revenue payers, even on 
batai .land's which were previously taxed at one-third. 
This antfjri'G-l y resulted from the Afghan custom of 
setting a formal rate of one-third, but collecting a much 
lower amount in p r a c t i c e .  in Sibi for instance the real 
value of the revenue yield at one-third was 
approximately Rs.36,845 per annum. But the Afghan 
Government was far away and too lax in its exercise? of 
control to extract the full amount. In the event, it 
chose to farm out the revenue of Sibi to the Barozai 
chiefs for R s .10,000.®° By way af contrast in 1881 
when Sandeman started to collect revenue, he realised the 
f u 11 a m o u n t o f t h e s t a t e s h a r e “, the v a I u e o f t h e 
collection amounted to R s . 33,929, which was a 
considerable increase gin what was paid in Afghan times. 
In Sibi the rising demand was off-set by an increase in 
the cultivable area from 4,556 acres in 1878 to 9031 
acres in 1882a i , mainly due to the cessation of Marri
raids as a result of British rule,. But the picture was 
less promising in other areas- In Quetta-Pishin, rain 
crop land had never paid more than one-tenth to the 
Afghans. Here? one-sixth was not only a steep rise, but 
i t also coincided with a per iod of d r o u g h t , which 
affected the district between 1879-1883, to become an 
oppressive burden for cultivators, so that revenue 
collection actually fell below the one-tenth enforced by 
the Afg hans-815:2 In rain crop areas of Thai Chotiali as 
well, the new demand entailed hardship, by eroding the 
marginal surplus on which the small landholder-
depended for survival- In 1881 for instance the local 
agricultural yield was 52,264 maunds of grain, of which 
the government share estimated at one-sixth amounted to 
7,992 m a u n d s , 1eav ing a ba 1ance of 44,272 maunds or about
11 maunds per head of po pulation.5,33 This was a minimal 
amount for a man to support his family and livestock for 
a year. One-sixth was in effect over taxing owner 
c u 11 i vat o i-s in ra i n crop 1 ands „
In some irrigated tracts, the levelling effect of
t he new rate se ve i- e d o 1 d ecanomic t i es bet ween
2i!0ilJfJs.!2's and the di rect producers. When on e - si xth was 
i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e s t r e a m i r r i g a t e d areas o f T In a 1 
Chot. i a 1 i in 1880-1881, L.uni and Hassani cu 11 i vators 
refused to pay their traditional rents to the Shadozai 
zamind a r s , on the ground that they should not have
to pay r evenue t w i c e » 0 T . Du k e , t he? F'o 1 i t i c: a .1 Agent
for Thai Chotiali effected a compromise, which forced 
the Hassanis and Lunis to pay one-tenth of the produce to 
the Shadozais (.instead of the previous one-sixth), after 
contributing the government share of on e — sixth. The net 
effect of the new demand was to increase the amount paid 
by the Lunis and Hassanis, while it reduced the rental 
income for Bhadozai 1 and lords.15 ^  As 0» T. Duke observed, 
that the new demand had only seemed to damage "the 
general interests of the proprietors without any 
particular advantage to the cultivators".®*
SandemarTs drive to standardise payments, also sucked 
in tribes like the Kakars of Kach, Kowas, and Amadan, 
who had never paid land tax, into the circle of revenue 
paying subjects. T r a ditional1y these Kakars would 
supply a number of men to the Qandhar court to be 
employed as falconers and grooms. This obligation was 
later commuted to the payment of a fixed annual sum, or 
naukr i amounting in the case of Kowas to Rs» 240 and 
Amadan to Rs.60, while no demand was levied on Kach.®*6’
Kakar headmen usually co11ected this amount forcefu11y 
from Tar in cultivators and remitted the sum to Qandhar.
I n 1879, t h e T a r i n s t o o k a d v a n t a g e o f t h e c: h a n g e t o 
British rule, to default in their customary payments to 
the Kakar hea d m e n . C o n s e q u e n 1 1y there was a shortfall 
in the amount of revenue remitted by the Kakars to the
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Br i t i sh au thor i t i e s , for which Captain W y 1 ie„ the 
Revenue Collector, Fined the Kakars and Tar ins Rs.100 
each, and made both groups equally responsible for 
paying half the amount of the traditional tax.®'7 The 
pressure continued to mount on the Kakars, when Sandeman 
abolished the naukri tax in 1881, and imposed on e —sixth 
in Kowas and Amadan. For Kakar tribesmen who had never 
paid anything more than a token tax to Qandhar, most of 
which they had collected from the Tar ins, this enforced 
tran s i t i o n i n t o full fledge d revs nue paying sli b j  sc t s of 
the British Government was a sharp and expensive break 
with the past. The simmering resentment took a violent 
turn, during the autumn of 1881 when the Kakars rose in 
rebellion,, mu r der e d t he C o 11ec t o r , bu r nt sever a 1
settlements, and disrupted revenue collection. Sandeman 
chose to punish the? Kakars by fining them, and forcing 
all Kakar villages^ even if they were? revenue— Free like 
Kach^to pay tax. But from the Kakar point of view, the 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n p r o v e d t hat w .i t h o u t tribal co n s e n t i t 
would be impossible to collect one-sixth of the produce. 
Writing from the scene of the? trouble, Duke emphasized 
that without the presence of troops, which would only 
fuel more resentment, the new demand could not be 
enforced.30 The Government was therefore left with no 
opt ian but to resort to a 1ump assessment of 1000 maunds 
of grain per year on the villages, an amount acceptable 
to the headmen.®9
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The verdict of over-assessment and violence 
discredited Sandeman"s first attempt to alter the 
traditional pattern of rents and revenues. In the 
Foreign Department, his application of one-sixth was 
criticised for subverting the Afghan system of rents, 
and for proving too rigid to accommodate the differences 
in produce yields based on .i r r igated/non- i r r igated 
lands.60 Tribesmen also clamoured for a reversion to 
the Afghan system. As J.Biddulph, Officiating Agent to 
the Governor-General in 1882, noted i "The people 
Ctribesmen] often spoke to me of the heavy revenue paid 
...and begged they might pay no more to us than to the 
Afghan rulers.
But merely resetting revenue strategy in the old 
grooves of custom and convention was not an adequate 
solution. In 1884, Afghan revenue rates were 
reintroduced, but the old problem of over-assessment 
continued, since the British insisted on collecting the 
full amount of the rate in force, whereas the Afghans 
had been content with a fraction of the real value of 
the yield, and tolerated irregular ities in payment.**
In Pi shin for instance, the enforcement of the customary 
one-third on irrigated lands, between 1884-1885, more 
than doubled revenue payments, and made the exercise 
highly unpopular with tr ibesmen.*3 In fact the general 
discontent with the g o v e r n m e n t ’s rigid enforcement of the
Af ghan s y s t e m , forced t hie aut hor i t .ies to employ cavalry 
soldiers to assist in watching the crops, and dividing 
the grain heap at the time of collection. Such a 
system which brought in its train guards, mud seals on 
t h e g r a i n h e a p s , a n d res t r i c: t i v e supervisio n , a pa p e ared 
punitive to tribesmen, and friction ensued,, Between 
April to May 1887 clashes occurred between tribesmen and 
sowars he 1 p i ng revenue co 11 ect ion in Thai Chot .ia 1 :L and 
E-fori, and Loralai, as a result of which four soldiers 
were killed.** Q.St. John, then Agent to the Governor- 
General, described this chapter of tribal militancy 
as a "sign of war against the tax gatherer". ***
The tensions which matured in the aftermath of the 
Afghan solution; proved the fallacy of attempting to 
insulate revenue policy in the shell of ambiguous custom. 
A reformist note was audible even in the Foreign 
Department, where b a t a i and the recourse to military 
coercion was deplored:"From a civil point of view it 
does look very shocking ... that revenue should be 
collected out of a new country which we profess to treat 
gent 1 y by m i 1 i tary a i d " . ** Be 1 ievi ng t he moment hatd
come f or c h a n g e , S t . John p r op osed t. he subst .i. t ut i on of a 
fixed cash assessment for irrigated lands of the batai 
villages, and complete exemption from taxation for areas 
of rain crop cultivation, where the yield was too 
speculative to burden the cultivators with t axes.67
Th.i. s wo li 1 d nat an 1 y equa 1 i se the revenue burden between 
batai villages and those under a light fixed assessment, 
but would also do away with the cost and military 
coercion invo1ved in batai collections. The Government 
of India accepted the proposal, but modified the tax 
exemption on rain crop lands which it viewed as 
over liberal, in favour of a fluctuating assessment 
based on annual crop yields. This revised version was 
to be applied first to Quetta-Pishin and later to other 
areas of Baluchistan.*®
But before the plan could be implemented, Sandeman 
returned to Baluchistan in 1SS8, and immediately 
d i sag ree d w i t h the reforms a u 1 1i ne d by St.John, his a r c h 
critic. Once again he argued for standardisation and 
deprecated a piecemeal process of change involving one* 
distr ict at a t i m e . He used the excuse of int.rodue i ng 
revenue arrangements in the newly occupied area of Zhob, 
t o s u g g e s t t hi a t t hi e r e s h o u Id be no inequalities in the 
taxation structure between tribes and districts, which 
might lead to resentment and friction. Since a thinly 
c u 11 i vated area 1 i ke Z h o b , wi t h an i nsecure agr i c u 11 u r a 1 
base, was unsuitable for a fixed cash settlement, it 
meant that bat ai would have to be imposed at the low 
rate of one-siKth.*9 But Sandeman added that the Zhob 
Kakars could not be taxed at one-sixth, if their Kakar 
kinsmen in Pi shin continued to pay a fixed light cash
assessment, as this would fuel discontent and lead to 
violence. Sandeman was in effect saying that to make 
taxation acceptable in Zhob, he would have to impose 
one-sixth in Quetta-Pishin as well. As he argued;
1' 11 i s i ncumbent for us to have a uniform revenue 
system of a nature people will understand. If we 
treat ai 11 alike in this respect, no one will
object. But it will cause great heartburning 
and jealousy if we take revenue in kind from one 
part of the c o u n t r y . ..and not from another".70
Aware that his scheme contradicted the revenue 
strategy favoured in the Foreign Department, Sandeman 
presented the latter with a fait a c c o m p l i , by ordering 
the revenue collection of 1890 to proceed on the basis 
of one— sixth by ba t a i . The need to keep Sandeman"s 
author i t.y i n"to*c~t i n Baluchistan averted
any cancellation of the order, by the Foreign
D e p a r t m e n t , b u t t; hi e r e w a s official cone e r n that
S a n deman's bid f o r u n .i. f o r m i t y entailed a 1 e v e 11 i n g
strategy which aimed to dismantle privileged tenures in 
Ba 1 uc h i st a n 7 J-
The most dramatic impact of S a n d e m a n ’s initiative 
in 1890 occurred in the area of privileged holdings. In 
t he zari kalanq lands of Quetta f or i n s t a n c e , 7 * Kas:i. 
landlords had prospered for a long time from the very 
low revenue demand they paid, so that "many were 
realizing yearly large sums over and above the revenue 
paid by them."7'3 Sandeman argued that it could not be 
the object of government to "create a wealthy race of
rnalik.s to the cle1r.im0 nt of its own r0 v 0 nues and loss of 
the people"..'74 Therefore, he was only correcting the 
situation by taking one-sixth from the cultivators, and 
allowing nothing more to be taken from them.’753 But as 
the Revenue Commissioner pointed out*, such a proposition 
was "equivalent to a general dispossession of all the 
landlords and the transfer of their rights to the 
t e n a n t s " .'7A The controversial implications of the 
measure soon surfaced in Kasi lands, where the landlords 
faced a kind of rent revolt, as tenant cultivators on 
karez lands refused to pay one-sixth to them as well as 
to the government. By investing money and labour for some 
time in karez cultivation these tenants had acquired 
occupancy rights in their lands. In 1890 they took advantage 
of the new ambiguity in their position, resulting from 
the dua 1 c 1 aims of the state and Kasi _zam1 ijidars on thei r 
cultivation, to reject Kasi titles to proprietorship in 
karez tracts. Insisting they were the real owners of 
the kar e z e s , they maintai ned that that Kasi za mindars 
were only revenue engagers on behalf of the Kalat State.
In turn the Kasi landlords stressed that part of the 
one-sixth they collected from the tenants was their 
P  ropr i et ary share.77 But the karez c u 11 i v at o rs won 
the argument by insisting that they could not pay taxes 
twice without being pauperised; if the government wished 
to collect one-sixth from them, they could not continue 
as rent paying tenants of Kasi landlords. The Revenue
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Commissioner thereof ore had no option but to reject Kasi 
t i 1 1 es to the karez holdings in dispute and confer"red 
full proprietary status or\ the c u l t i v a t o r s . T h e  
ruling was formalised in 1894, so that the end result of 
the process of change which had started in 1890 left the 
Kasi landholders with the loss of status and income as a 
result of the new and higher demand.
While the levelling impact of one-sixth seemed to 
open the door to tenant ambitions, the 
pursuit of titles in the land was not new. In the 
revenue-free estates of the Durrani tribe near Quetta 
for instance, Yasinzai tenant cultivators had been 
consolidating their position for a long time. The
Durranis themselves had helped the growth of tenant power, 
by allowing the Yasinzais freedom to make, sell and 
mortgage karezes as they w i s h e d . The h.istory of
long possession coupled with the increasing exercise 
of physical dominion over the soil, whetted Yasinzai 
ambitions for proprietary titles in the lands they 
worked.. Thus in 18 79 when the British Government, 
started to acquire and pay compensation for land required 
to build the? Quetta cantonment, both Durranis and 
Yasinzais laid claim to compensation money on the basis 
of previous ownership.. The British concluded that the 
Du. r r a n i s held leg a 1 t i 1 1 e t o t he lands, but i n p ract i c e 
t h e I a n cJ w a s h e 1 d a n d w o r k e d b y t h e Yasinzais. A s a
result the Durranis received one-third of the 
compensation money, and the Yasinzais the remaining two- 
thirds.? an award which fanned Yasinzai aspirations, 
more than it protected Durrani rights.®0
The Yasinzais were therefore well poised to capture 
proprietary rights in the land, when Sandeman introduced 
his flat rate of revenue collection in 1890. Like the 
tenants on Kasi lands, the Yasinzais now had the 
opportunity to refuse paying rent to the Durrani 
landholders on the ground that they could not pay 
revenue twice to the state and to the Durranis. In 
support of their stand to withhold rents, the Yasinzais 
insisted that the Dur rani s were merely jag .i rdars or 
assignees of revenue, without any proprietary status 
in the land.®1- The Durranis objected to this subversion 
of titles, and as a result of the growing friction, the 
government had to suspend the collection of one-sixth. In 
its place, one-tenth was collected,and the rest left to be 
divided between the Durranis and Yasinzais on the 
basis of custom. But this proved unsatisfactory as it 
imposed a double? demand on the cultivators, and in 1894 
the Re?venue Commissioner worked out a new settlement 
based on a resolution of the festering proprietorship 
dispute? in the land. In order to reconcile Yasinzai 
claims with Durrani rights he used the principle of 
superior-inferior proprietors, to define status in the
1 and B I n karez lands a 1 a mil k i vat (super ior
proprietorship ) was granted to the Durranis, and adna 
m i1k i vat (i nfer i o r p ropri et or ship) to the Yasinzais.®3 
Subordinate proprietors would pay the government 
revenue, half of which the government would return to 
the Durranis on account of their right of superior 
proprietorshi p - hug up- i - a 1 a — mil klya-i*. A p a r t f r o m 
this sum, the Durranis could make no further claims on 
the subordinate proprietors! the Durranis would have no 
powers to dispossess the Yasinzais or interfere with 
their water shares in the karezes„ In irrigated lands 
equal shares in land and water were assigned to the Durranis 
and Yasinzais in proprietary right, and each party was 
held separately responsible for paying the government 
revenue fixed on his share.03 This absolved the 
gover nment f rom hav i ng ta a 3. ienate a share of .i ts 
revenue in irrigated lands as well.
The erosion of differentials continued in
neighbouring Pishin, where the imposition of one-sixth 
dissolved the light fixed cash assessment associated 
w i t h the a ham "i-na ukar system.04 Half the Pi s h i n 
Tar ins and all the Barshore Kakars used to pay cash in 
lieu of military service, which did not amount to more 
than a tenth of the produce,. As Barnes, the Revenue 
Commissioner^ pointed out the effect of one-sixth here 
would be 11 to treble and quadruple their
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p a y m e n t s . ..People have a sentimental attachment to their 
old customs,, and they must be terribly disgusted at the 
change. " .
Between 1890-1894 therefore, British policy veered
out of the fucpM of the custom and
convention p W o f }’tl.Win economic strategy. Differentials in
rents and payments inherited from the past were swept
away to reshape taxation in a standardised mould. In the 
*
process, privileges were trimmed and tenant rights 
encouraged, which left customary tenures of the region 
permanently subverted. The effect of concluding sub­
settlements with under proprietors deprived
traditional landholding elites, like the Durranis^ of 
their status and rental income from the land. It also 
formalised the upward mobility of tenant groups seeking 
new proprietary status in the land. For other tribes 
in poor hilly tracts like Zhob, who had never paid 
anything more than protection money to a locally powerful 
chieftain, one-sixth exposed them for the first time to 
the rigours of state taxation. The only groups which 
had reason to welcome the change were those tribesmen in 
Quetta and Pi shin who used to pay batai previously at 
one-third, for their payments were now reduced half, 
and tenant cultivators in karez tracts who now had a 
proprietary stake in the 1 and .
The Government of India however did not view the 
revenue measures devised in the period between 1890-1894 
as a permanent solution. Ideological hostility to
bata i 1 ’ as a bad form a f r evenue d e m a n d "m ** st ill h e 1d 
ground in the Foreign Department. There was also 
apprehension that the increased demand on many of the 
tribes wonId make British r u 1e u n p o p u 1a r . "It seems to 
me to be doubtful wisdom", the Revemue Commissioner 
deliberated, "to risk making them look back with regret 
to the time of the Afg h a n s " . Fears of tribal 
discontent were well founded, for petitions soon flowed 
from the Tar ins and Kakars of Pishin to cancel S a n d e m a n ’s 
orders. From Quetta Kasi zamindars even offered 
to double t he i r old f i x e d p ayme nt s to avo id paying 
bat a i . ®cp ivloreover when Sandeman passed away in 1892, 
the a n 1 y i nf 1 uent ia3. voice in favour of the 1890 
e x p e r imen t: wa s s i 1 e nc e d .
The Revenue Commissioner gave an early indication 
of change, when he communicated to the Agent to the 
G o v e r n o r -- Gene r a 1 in 1892, t h a t batai would s e r v £-:■ i t s 
purpose by functioning as a gauge or table to measure 
outturn of villages on which future fixed assessments 
for set periods would be based. Areas less vulnerable 
to crop fluctuation like Quetta, Pishin, and Sibi, would 
serve as trial grounds for the new measure.*90 In 
pursuit of his new objective, the Revenue Commissioner
had to establish a principle of assessment which would 
reconcile the imbalance between land and water resources 
in the agro-economy. Since water was the scarce 
commodity, he concluded, that for a tribesmans
"The ability to pay depends on the amount of 
water each possessed, and the only safe course 
is, in my opinion, to fix a lump assessment on 
the water, i.e., on each flowing karez or other 
source of irrigation"*91
Thus the fixed cash assessment for Baluchistan was
primarily distributed over individual holdings
according to the shares in water they possessed for
irrigation purposes. The standard taken for this new
assessment was the estimated cash value of one-sixth of
the gross produce. One-sixth corresponded to the rate
of revenue already in force in Baluchistan ; it also
approximated in many cases to the value of half the
rental and net assets of the landholder, which was
usua 11y t he b a sis of assessments i n t he India n
provinces. In a typical large k a r e holding in Quetta^
after the costs of cultivation were deducted from the
landlord’s share of the rent (usually two-thirds of the
gross p r o d u c e ) , the value of half his net assets was
roughly equivalent to the government, revenue demand of one-
sixth of the gross prod uce.92 The settlement therefore
aimed to leave the landholder with a moderate surplus
over and above the government demand.
The cash settlement of 1897 in Quetta, based on very low
ffiarI-:;0 t prices (th 0 cost of grain was ca 1 c u I a ted at R s . 1-2 
per maund, while the actual price was higher, usually 
Rs.3-4 per maund) worked out to Rs. 56,000. This was 
further reduced to Rs. 51, 875,<5>3 although bat a i 
collections in 1896 had yielded Rs.62,000 in revenues, 
because in official terms, the assessment was viewed as a
"Political rather than a revenue
s e t t l e m e n t ....A 1 1 sorts of allowances will have 
to be made for tribal and political considerations 
... The amount concerned is small, the term is 
short (ten years) and the settlement of the tract 
and the contentment of the people our first 
object". ^
The problem of crop fluctuation in khushkaba lands was 
resolved by foregoing the demand in years of 
negligible production, and collecting batai if there was 
a good harvest, which usually occurred once in five 
y e a r s . cp!S
Despite the intended moderation of the scheme, its 
internal distribution on individual holdings was not 
accurately linked to paying capacities. In particular 
the uniformity of incidence per irrigable acre made the 
demand more heavy for less productive tracts, in 
comparison to the richer agricultural belt around Quetta 
with better water and soil conditions. Besides, the 
distribution of demand on the basis of water shares 
weighted the system in favour of large landholders, as 
it ignored the-: differential in profits and productivity 
accruing from the actual extent of the area under
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cultivation- Large landholders could hope to benefit 
from this system, where taxation did not increase in 
ratio to the larger cultivable area? by contrast it left 
the small proprietor relatively disadvantaged by not 
taking into account the small amount of land usually at 
his disposal for cultivation. As a result, the primary 
beneficiaries of the new settlement were the Kasi 
zami ndars who possessed the most fertile? lands near
Quetta, making their assessment in real terms lighter 
than those subsisting in marginal conditions. Easy 
access to the Quetta markets also helped the Kasis to 
maximise their profits from cultivation.**'6’ At the same 
time the demand pressed heavily on small proprietors 
o c c u p y i nq 1 e s s fertile t r acts, at a cl i s t a n c e from 
Quetta, increasing their hardship and indebtedness, C. 
Archer, the Settlement Officer , noted in 1909, that 
"debt was heaviest in Baleli and Kuchlak where the 
incidence seems very h e a v y ", The Baleli area suffered
from poor soil conditions, while Kuchlak area was 
situated at a considerable distance from Quetta town, 
which meant that local cultivators could n o h a c c e s s  theA
only urban market of the District, This configuration 
of poor resources made t he same incidence of revenue 
wh i c h was very 1i g ht i n t he Kas i c o n t e x t , a weighty 
burden for cultivators in Kuchlak and E<aleli.
The problem of indebtedness, however, was not just
1 :i. nked to over a s s e s s m e n t . Signi f icant. 1 y , the Q u e t1a
settlement coincided with a period of urban growth; as 
t he Que11 a t ow n and c a ntonme nt exp a n d e d , t he popu 1 at i o n 
doubled between 1895 to 1908, from 12,650 to 18,039.**® 
Urbanisation created an expanding market for fruit and 
vegetables, in particular potatoes, which rose sharply 
in value from Rs . 3-6-0 per maund in 1895 to R s . 5-4-6 in 
1908.. By contrast the price of wheat only climbed from 
Rs . 2-6-6 to R . 3-4-0 in the same period.**** The lucrative 
nature of market gardening meant that land was diverted 
from grain production to fruit and potato cultivation. 
Between 1895-1896, the area under wheat crop decreased 
from 67 per cent, to 66 per cent; maize fell from 12 per 
cent to 7.9 per cent, while potatoes and fruit 
cu 11 i vat ion increased in ac:reage f rom three t.o five per 
c e n t . x ° ° W hi i 1 e m a r k e t g a r d e n i n g o f f e r e d s h o r t t e r m 
profits to landholders near Quetta, in the long term it 
diminished the water-supply of the region, since fruits 
and vegetables needed three times more water than grain 
product ion.101 In the local context this was particularly 
serious, for the practice of karez irrigation caused a 
progressive reduction of the underground water table. 
Inadequate snowfall during the winters between 1895-1902 
also compounded the problem by not allowing enough ground 
water to accumulate. These factors farced a contraction 
in the irrigable area, which showed a net decrease of 
416 acres by 1908, while another 899 acres which
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f o r m e r .1 y h a d a n assured w a t e r - s u p p 1 y were now under 
precarious irrigation - 1052
The drying up of water resources affected many a r e a s , 
including the estates of the Durrani and Brahui
j aq i r d a r s , where 1 a ndowner s i nc u r r e d co ns i de r ab 1 e 
expenditure attempting to open new sources of irrigation 
without any real success- This wastage of capital
forced many proprietors to live for some time before
harvest on borrowed mone?y , or run up accounts with the
village bunnia, which were settled in grain at harvest 
time on terms exceedingly favourable to the lender-103 
By 1909 the total culturable land subject to sale in 
Quetta was 7.1.4 acres, worth two lakhs in value- Mortgage 
figures on agricultural land showed a debt of two and a 
h a 1 f 1 a k h s , cove r i n g 3, 739 a c: res o f a b_i and 16 7 o f 
khuskaba land. 104 About R s - 1,79,000 was owed to local 
agriculturalists and Rs.46,000 to moneylenders or 
outsiders. The low land sale statistics, 714 acres out 
of a total cultivable area of 97732 acres, showed there 
was no rapid transfer of land from indigenous holders to 
outsiders. 1015 This sluggish movement of land was 
artificially sustained by legal restrictions on 
a 1 :i. enation o f land to n o n a g  r i cultura 1 i sts - 1 °*
Caught in the spiral of indebtedness and 
contracting cultivation, most landowners we?re unable to
extract maximum profit from an unvarying cash demand at 
a time of rising market prices. In Quetta for instance 
the average price of wheat was Rs„3 per maund as opposed 
to Rs.2 in Indian m a r k e t s . 107 But reduction in the 
irrigable area and falling grain production left 
landholders with no surpluses to sell at high market 
rates. In fact between 1897--1908, the government was 
forced to grant revenue remissions amounting to R s . 7,894 
to ease the burden on landholders.100 In such 
conditions the main exploiters of the market were the 
middlemen or retailers in grain trade. They had the 
advantage of meeting market demand by selling cheap 
imported grain at the high retail prices current in 
Quetta, with good profit margins for themselves. The 
government was sufficiently concerned that the rise in 
prices had translated into profits for the middlemen, 
and fe.lt there was strong ground for considering, "the 
imposition of an income tax on the mercantile classes in 
Baluchistan, who seem to absorb entirely to themselves 
the profits in which the landholders and the Government 
might legitimately expect to part ic ipate" . los>
In neighbouring Pishin, the new cash settlement 
a 1so p r e s sed h e a v i 1y on small ow ner c u 11 i vat o r s , who 
held the bulk of the land. The new demand introduced in 
1896 constituted a twelve percent increase on previous 
rates of payment, and coincided with a period of drought
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which lasted from 1895 to .1897. Collection of revenue 
at a higher rate, at such a time? led to serious hardship 
and many tribesmen emigrated to Afghanistan, lured by 
the A m i r :’s promise of free land g r a n t s , 110 The mounting 
hardship forced the government to reduce the existing 
settlement by fourteen percent in 1900, But in real 
terms this only adjusted the demand to what Pishin 
cultivators had paid prior to 1895, The adjustment was 
too fractional to allow landowners to benefit from 
sizeable surpluses, and grain production was barely 
sufficient for local consumption. The original 
optimism that E<ritish rule would rescue Pishin from 
being "a desolate w a s t e " ,111 and that the fine soil only 
needed some water "to make it laugh with a h a r v e s t " , 112 
proved an illusion by the end of the nineteenth century. 
Only two minor irrigation works, the Khushdil Khan 
reservoir, and the Shebo Canal were in operation, which 
b e t w e e n t h e m h a r d 1 y i r r i g a t e d 6000 acres, 113 a n d made 
the Agent to the Governor-General despair that even by 
1904 he? could not. make these works pay, and jj ndluccj the 
return of one percent per annum on the capital outlay of 
the p r o j e c t - 11* While the scarcity of water reduced the 
cultivable area, the pressure? of population growth led 
to lands being more minutely subdivided every year, which 
progressively reduced the size and profitability of 
holdings. As the Agent to the Governor-General noteds 
"T he P i shin p e o p 1e ar e ver y p oor and have muc h
cliff icu 11y in 1 ivi ng on the preduce of thei r 1 a n d s " . 11 *
The drought of 1897 to 1901 also made the cash 
settlement uneconomic in S i b i, Traditionally under 
batai the assessment was made on the actual produce, 
allowing the landholder to share the risk of a bad 
harvest equally with the state. With the introduction 
of a fixed cash assessment, the small Tarin proprietors 
in Sibi, found they had no insurance against the 
climatic vagaries which affected cultivation. The 
draught underscored the oppressive nature of a rigid 
and fixed settlement, as cultivation contracted, while 
revenue payers were forced to pay a fixed demand. 
Increasingly tribesmen had to borrow to pay the demand, 
and by 1901 small holdings were heavily m o r t g a g e d . 116 
There was passive resistance to the cash settlement, 
and tribesmen demanded a return to b a t a i . In 1900 the 
Revenue Commissioner attempted to calm the situation by 
reducing the settlement by 5.5 per cent, but it had no 
effect as tribesmen continued to press for a return to 
the traditional system of collection in k i nd.11'7’ The 
strength of tribal feeling suggests. that there was 
little spare cash in the local economy to support a cash 
settlement. Most tribal settlements were too far from 
any urban market, and the Sind-Pishin Railway which 
skirted the borders of Sibi, to develop into supply 
s o u r cr. e s f o r la r b a n o r r a i 1 w a y c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e a b s e n c e
of such developments inhibited the emergence of a 
sizeable money economy which would have eased the 
t. r a n s i t i o n t o a c a s h s e 1 1 1 e m e n t .
The linked problems of a cash demand, the non-' 
availability of water, and the impoverishment of 
landowners, were also starkly evident in the Nasirabad 
tahsil. Here cultivation depended on the waters of the 
Begari and Desert Canals of the Sind system. While the 
waters of the Desert Canal allowed cultivators in eastern 
Nasirabad to meet the state demand, assessed at Rs.1.2 
lakhs, in the western sector the progressive drying up of 
the Begari Canal led to water shortages. In consequence 
some villages could only support patchy cultivation, 
others turned into wasteland, and by 1903 only fourteen 
vi 11 ages had adequate water for cu11ivation,, 1113 Reduced 
to extremities, some large landholders like chiefs of 
t h e J a i n a 1 i a n d LJ m rani t r i b e s , i n v e s t e d R s « 40, 000 i n 
excavating a branch course from the Begari Canal, which 
soon ran dry, and investors were unable to even recover 
the capital e x p e n d e d . 11*7 Such landowners were now 
forced to borrow money to meet the state demand, and 
bear other expenses like advancing seed grain to 
tenants--at-~wi 11. By 1906 a majority of landowners were 
in debt . They usually contracted written agreements 
with moneylenders c a 11ed mukhtarnamas , which allowed 
the possession of land with the mortgagor, but the
mortgagee was entitled to take half or more of the 
o c c u p a n t s ’ produce in repayment of his debt. Small 
landowners tended to borrow more informally on the basis 
of b a t a i „ whereby the moneylender retained half or more 
of the p r o d u c e . 120 This system of lending favoured the 
rural creditor , as he? could squeeze the maximum
profit from the landowner, without incurring the problems 
of ownership and cultivation in Nasirabad. Thus m o ney­
lenders were slow to foreclose on debts. Between 1878 to 
1903', only 280 acres of land were sold with possession 
to Hindu moneylenders, while 72, 1877 acres of land were 
under u s u fructory/batai mortgages. In 1903 the 
Baluchistan Government banned the execution of 
usufructory mortgages, but this only led to an increase 
in batai m o r t g a g e s . 1 --1 Squeezed between an unvarying 
state demand and commitments to the moneylender, the 
landowner virtually had no choice but to survive on
borrowed money, and perpetuate his economic bondage to
the creditor. This unfortunate sequel showed that the
imposition of a cash demand in a zone without sufficient 
water was virtually a recipe for impoverishment. Only 
the moneylenders extracted profit from a captive 
clientele of indebted landowners.
In more remote areas like Loralai and Zhob where 
irrigable land was very limited and tended to fluctuate 
annually, the government introduced i jaras or temporary
cash assessments, as opposed to a cash assessment fixed 
for def i nite periods or .jamabast. In the Sinjawai 
t a h s i 1 of Lora lai, a minimal cash demand of R s . 13,421 
was imposed on an irrigable area of 7,280 a c r e s . 1--2 
Such statistics however were deceptive, for within the 
irrigable area, a certain proportion of the land was
cultivable once in five years which lowered
productivity. At the same time the culturable area
itself was static, but was forced to accommodate a 
rising population. The increased human pressure on the 
land inevitably led to fragmentation, creating a
honeycomb of small proprietary holdings eking a 
marginal existence. This subsistence level existence 
m e a n t .  t h e r e  w a s  n o  s u r p  1 u s  t o  c o n v e r t  i n t o  p r o f i t s  a n d  
cash currency, to meet even the lightest of cash demands. 
Here as elsewhere in Baluchistan therefore, the 
proprietor had to borrow to meet the state cash demand, 
and the result was greater indebtedness. As the 
Sett 1ement Report noted in 1901:
"The landed proprietors in S i n j a w a i ...are generally 
in straitened circumstances as is evident by the 
fact t hat t he i r mortgage 1i ab i 1i t ies are near 1y 
eq ua 1 t o t he y e a r 1y r eve nue demand o f t he w h o 1e 
t a h s i l , while? the area under mortgage is about 
one-fourth of its total irrigable area. 11123
The attempted monetarization of the economy through
tr iaI cash demands therefore stalemated in the
d e p !■•' e s s i o n o f debt, and p o v e r t y .
A similar experiment with a temporary cash
assessment in the Hindubagh area of Zhob was equally 
unsuccessful. Although demand was lowered from the value 
of the annua 1 batai yie 1 d of R s „ 20, 000, to R s „ 9 , 8 5 3 8 - 0  
it was still burdensome for tribesmen. 1:24 The cone (apt 
of a cash settlement was a new experience for tribesmen. 
And while the cash demand itself took account of the 
annual fluctuations in crop production, the tribesmen 
were not prudent enough to reserve the surpluses from 
good years to meet the shortfalls of a bad year. As one 
official noted;
"They do not fully appreciate their gains in good 
years and howl for remissions in bad years. 
Naturally thriftless they are apt to spend the 
proceeds of their harvests before paying their 
land revenue and thus gradually become involved 
with money 1 e n d e r s . " 1
A cash demand was also bound to press heavily in an
area where the average size of holdings was under twenty
ac r e s ; p r oduct i on was meag r e , t here was little surplus
to sell, and most cultivators supplemented their income??
f r o rn t h e p r o c e e d s o f f 1 o c k o w n i n g . 12 ** The S e 1 1 1 e m e n t
Officer noted in 1906, that it was hard to find a man in
the locality who possessed a thousand or five hundred
rupees in cash. 1 re'";' Lack of markets and communications
also led to a scarcity of ready cash in the local
ec o n a m y . I n suc h c i r cumst a nc es the wor k i ng of a cash
demand on 1 y st imu 1 at.ed bor rowi ng „ As t.hie Sett 1 ernent Report
o f 19 0 5 c o n c 1 u d e d s
11As t.he peop 1 e possess 1 ittie or" no cash they are 
obliged to borrow money from the Hindu 
shopkeepers for payment of revenue, and in
satisfaction thereof to give them grain at lower 
rates when the time for harvest c o m e s " . 120
While the net impact of a cash demand on irrigated 
tracts was to drive landowners deeper into debt., in rain 
crop lands where revenue was still taken in kind - by 
batai which was a division of the produce, after 
harvesting, or tash kis involving appraisement of the 
standing crop to be divided in shares between the 
government and revenue payer - the material condition of 
the people was even more depressed. Theoretically it 
seemed that the collection of revenue in kind would 
mitigate the higher risk of cultivation in areas 
dependent on rain water, by spreading the risk of a bad 
yield more equally between the government and the 
revenue payer. E<ut in reality, such calculations were 
completely upset by the severe drought which lasted
from 1896 to 1900, and brought cultivators in rain crop 
areas to the brink of starvation and famine. In drought 
stricken areas of Sibi, whole villages were depopulated; 
while those cultivators still trapped in their homes 
starved for lack of food. As the Political Agent 
r exported s
MI found ample evidence of scarcity approaching to 
famine...The grain bins were quite empty...the 
people were living on a sort of gruel ...made? of 
wheat flour, w h i c h . .. most of them could only 
afford to touch every second d a y " . 132*5'
In central Zhob tribesmen emigrated in large numbers to
Afghanistan on a scale "almost unkown in the past",.130
To the west, in Nushki, Chagai, and Western Sinjerani
country the severity of the drought meant that the
introduction of revenue measures had to be postponed.
The District Officer reported:
"Little? or no rain has fallen west of Nushki for 
... two year m m a aL per cent of the livestock of 
the district have perished... wherever I went 
I... found the same scarcity p r e v a i l i n g . . .several 
tumans were reduced to sustaining life on the 
roots of the? dwarf palm and on ’khamu'' and
•’label- roots indigenous to sandy deserts -• and at.
two, at least, of my thanas I found colonies of 
starving children dependent on the charity of the 
sowars for their f o o d " . 131
Scarcity was further sustained by the rising prices 
of essential commodities. Price rises were fuelled by 
the prohibition of grain exports from Afghanistan, and
the freedom to export grain to India from Baluchistan. 
Middlemen and grain merchants perpetuated conditions of 
scarcity, not by holding back grain from the
market, but sending it out of the country. E-fy stoking 
the short supply, local prices were kept artificially 
high, and grain merchants could profit from selling 
cheap Indian wheat at the inflated Baluchistan market 
price? s. Repeated requests from the Efaluchistan
of f i c ia 1 s to prohi i b i t the export of grain were re? jected 
by the Government of India, on the ground that the 
proposaI was opposed to the accepted p o 1icy of n o n - 
interference with private trade. 13=3 The priority here 
was economic theory and not people, while a society 
edge d p e r i 3. o u s 1 y c 1 o s e t o f amine.
Cone 1us ion
The ma i n point of British revenue policy to
restructure the traditional system through new rates of 
assessment,, created no new margin of social prosperity 
for the rural poor. Initial attempts at uniformity and 
standardisation had only inflated the demand, left the 
tribal economy severely depressed, and even c a u s e d - .  . 
armed clashes between tribesmen and revenue collectors. 
The subsequent, experiment with fixed cash assessments 
proved equally negative, as the lack of money in the 
tribal economy forced both big landholders and small 
owner cultivators to borrow heavily to meet the cash 
demand, and the result was increasing indebtedness to 
11"ie money 1 e n de r .
But the indebtedness of the large landholder or 
tribal chief could not be viewed as just an unwelcome 
e c o n o m i <:: s t a t. :i. s t i c „ P o 1 i t i c a 1 1 y the S a n d e m a n s y s t e m w a s 
too deeply (enmeshed in the intricacies of using the 
t r i ba 1 c h i ef s as p r op s t o sup p or t Br i t .i s h r u 1 e , t o r i s k 
t. he i r i mp ove ris hme n t a n d host, .i 1 i t. y . T h .i s political 
commitment to sustain a landed aristocracy led to
concessions on t he economic front, to shore
LlP e-st ates t hreatened w i t h dec 1 i ne.
I n 1879 t:he jaq i rs of the Barozai chiiefs of Sangan 
and Kurk in the Sibi District had a joint cash value of
Rs.5,500» But by 1900, fragmentation of shares among 
members of the sardar-khel had reduced the value of the 
chief's share to half the 1879 valuation., To halt this 
depreciation , the Baluchistan Government altered the 
system of distributing revenue shares among members of 
the tribe. In the event of a tribesman dying without 
a son, the government decreed that his share would go 
abso lutel'/ to the head of the tribe. Even if a 
landholder died leaving sons, one-"third of the 
i nher i tance wou 1 d pass to t he tribal chief, wh i. 1 e if t he 
share of any holder fell below the sum of Rs.30 per 
annum, it would be stopped and allowed to revert to the 
chief..133 Such a strategy of making the chief richer 
at the expense of the? tribe was clearly dictated by the 
political importance ascribed to the tribal head in the 
Sandeman system of government.
Chieftaincies were also cushioned by new economic 
privileges. In Zhob, for instance, the sardar-khel of 
the Jogezais was propped up by revenue-free 
land grants, grain allowances, and exemption from paying 
grazing tax; the total value of such concessions 
amounted to Es,8 , S C O . i:s+ Yet Bangal Khan, head of the 
s a r d a r - k h e 1 and the main recipient of such concessions 
used to be the "scourge of Zhob and Thai Chotiali 
Districts. " 13=5 He had been an ally of Dost Muhammad of 
Z ho b , d u r i ng the t r o u b 1 e s o f 1889, which ha cl 1 e d t o a
British punitive expedition against the K a k a r s . 13A The 
priv?leges extended to him were intended to dissuade him 
from reverting "to his former way of life",13'7’ and to 
meet the rising cost of his personal expenditure. It 
was really a bribe, masquerading as official policy., to 
buy out influential figures of dissent in tribal 
soc i e t y .
The alienation of revenues in a poor tribal 
economy to sustain chiefly lifestyles was socially 
hardly defensible. The extortionate basis of chiefly 
authority was often tacitly condoned. For instance the 
chief of the Khetran tribe exacted certain dues, like 
taking the pick of the livestock from every flockowner, 
imposing burdensome duties on traders, and a political 
tax on Hindus, which even Sandeman condemned as being 
"notoriously unjust and e x t o r t i o n a t e " . 13® But nothing 
was done to abolish the dues until 1888, when the 
decision to collect revenue from Khetran tribesmen made 
it necessary to reduce their traditional payments to the 
chief, And even then, abolition was cushioned by a cash 
allowance of R s . 1,800 per a n n u m , 139 the cash equivalent 
of the old dues. As the chief was already in possession 
of revenue-free land grants and service allowances, the 
official unwillingness to revoke a source of exploitative 
fringe income without compensation, mirrored the 
priority of the government to reinforce the outline of
chiefly power with new colonial resources, to ensure the 
cont i nui ng subor di nat: ion of corn/non tr i besmen to t hei r 
hereditary leaders.
In western Baluchistan, where local chiefs virtually 
confined their activities to consuming tribal resources 
to further political rivalries and feuds, external 
support was critical in shoring up their crumbling 
powers. A typical example was Ali Khan,the chief of the 
Sin.jera.ni Baluch, whom the British reinstated in Chagai 
in 1896.140 Almost immediately Ali Khan Sinjerani 
claimed past privileges in the form of revenue-free titles 
to large areas of cultivable land in Chagai, and at the 
same time started taki ng sardari dues from tr i besmen, 
which included one-sixth of the gross produce in 
land, and livestock from each family, as an annual 
contribution, and on ceremonial occasions. His coercive 
methods of collecting revenue led to frequent clashes 
with 1o c a 1 tri b e s m e n , who viewed a visit from his sowars 
"much in the same light as... that of a flight of 
1o o u s t s "„1 * 1 In addit ion he exercised the old s a rdar i 
practice of appropriating any rain crop land near Chagai 
•for his own use, which deprived local nomads of their 
customary reliance on khushkaba cu 11 i vat ion t.o 
supplement their pastoral incomes.142 The chief's 
exploitation of local resources was matched by a 
callous indifference to the welfare of the area; as Webb
W a r e p o i n t e d a li t :
"I cannot recall any instance when the sirdar has 
come forward voluntarily either to check raiding
assist the Mai h T a h s i 1 d a r , or increase
c u 11 i vati o n ". 1
Despite the le of the chief, and the
knowledge that he was a man "without any moral force of 
character and entirely in the hands of his numerous 
relatives, who play upon him in the manner which best 
suits their individual intere st",144 the Baluchistan 
f5overnment confirmed his revenue-free status, and gave 
him a monthly cash allowance of Rs-350 to preserve him 
as a symbol of authority on the local scene. •t'e|-5S
In addition to the revenue-free status of tribal 
chiefs, smaller land grants and monetary allowances 
were made t cd headmen and _malj,i;:s, and also to re 1 ig ious 
leaders 1 i ke pjj;‘s and s a y i d s „ By 1901, the annua 1 
v a 1 u e o f t h e r e v e n u e alien a ted in f r e e 1 a n d g r ants 
was R s .88,783, while the total receipts for 1and revenue 
amounted to six l akhs.144 Such a policy suited the 
interests of a government committed to the idea of 
achieving political control, through a captive? 
leadership tied by material interests to the colonial 
order. T r a n q u i 1 izing the chiefs through material 
benefits prevented them from developing into sources of 
disaffection, leaving any measure of popular discontent 
leader less and powerless to engage in sustained
conf rontat i o n » Sporadic violence?, passive resistance, 
petitions, and emigrations X4V~7 articulated the 
hardship experienced by common tribesmen, but there 
were no large scale armed uprisings.,
But while t he propp i ng up of t r i b a 1 chi efs suited 
the political structure of colonial rule, such a policy 
also underwrote the economic dominance? of tribal chiefs, 
and perpetuated old inequalities in the land structure. 
Thus even in 1905, the vast majority of tenants in 
irrigated lands were still bazaars or tena n t s - a t —w i 11, 
who had no vested rights in the land, and were employed 
seasonally, "likely to be ousted at any time" by the 
landowner.140 The insecurity of traditional tenures 
was matched by a rent structure dictated by custom 
rather than by the amount of the government demand and 
the price of produce. The Settlement Officer for Quetta 
noted in 1907 that the commonest form of rent payment 
was still a two-1 h i r ds share of t he produc e , with t he 
tenants providing bullocks, plough, and labour, and the
landowner the seed- Other extra economic forms of
coerc ion 1i ke s u rsat (farced supplies) and beqar 
(f ortied 1 abour ) were not revo ked, The comb i ned pressures 
of insecure tenures, high rents, and oppressive dues 
imposed a crippling burden on tenants, who were enmeshed 
in permanent poverty . As The Baluchistan 
Ad minis t ration Report for 190S 1909 describeds
"Tenants  at- will are often deeply involved in debt
and live a hand to mouth e x i s t e n c e . .. the Hindu 
bunnia keeps a running account with the 
cultivator on the security of the latter’s crop 
and at each harvest receives a part of the grain 
heap as interest, with such amount as the 
cultivator can pay towards the reduction of- the 
pr i nc ipal " . 1!SO
Most tenant lands were? mortgaged with possession until 
both interest and principal were paid.
The other major consequence of sustaining elitist 
interests in the land was that nearly one percent of 
the revenue? was locked up in maintaining adequate 
incomes for tribal chiefs, and that the main burden of 
revenue payment was shifted on small cultivators 
struggling to survive. In Sibi and Zhob, the majority 
of revenue payers were small owner cultivators, who also 
made-? up just under half the tax paying papulation in 
Q u e t t a - P i s h i n . C o n f i n e d  to small proprietary 
holdings, without resources to employ under-tenants, for 
these owner cultivators the landlord role remained 
subordinate to their main function as agriculturalists. 
With slender cash resources, and virtually no surplus 
to sell, their exposure to fixed cash settlements in 
irrigated tracts, was premature and ill conceived. The 
Revenue Commissioner described their miserable condition 
in 1901;
"The material condition of the people is 
distinctly poor;-., in some villages the land is 
heavily mortgaged The reason may be
a 11 ri b ute d in pa rt t o the fact t hat t he
assessment to which they have been subject for
a number of years has pressed hardly on them.
Du.ri n g the year it became necessary to extend the 
cash assessment, and I was surprised to find how 
much passive resistance the extension
excited. ... the people begged that they might be 
allowed to pay by batai ...the cash assessment was 
by no means a popular arrangement". 1552
On rain crop lands material existence was
perennially haunted by the spectres of starvation and
scarcity. While drought, increasing population, and the
morcellat ion of small holdings, led to underproduct ion
and an endemic insufficiency of material products, the
problem of scarcity was compounded by the official
reluctance to invest in irrigation projects, which could
have? secured a higher proportion of cultivation and
extended a safety net for tribesmen living on lands
dependent exclusively on rain water . The annual sum of
R s . 50^000^ extended for agricultural loans in
Baluchistan, was barely adequate for covering advances
r equ i red for routine ag r i c u 11 ura 1 needs 1i ke seed and
plough bullocks; there? was no surplus left to undertake
irrigation projects. This stringent attitude was
dictated by official prejudice? against the tribal
ability to manage money. As one official put it:
"No outlay of capital could be mare 
dangerous...the B i 1uch zamindars are a w i 1d 1o t , 
and we require special guarantees that the? money 
is properly expended... The Biluch administration 
w i11 be a Sahara in which takavi C ag r i c u 11ur a 1 
1 oans 1 will be 1 ost forever " . 1533
In the circumstances, reliance on rain crop land as the
sole? source? of income continued to mean impoverishment,
and those unable to subsist on the land swelled the
ranks of landless tenants. As a tribal saying put it:
"Land no doubt ...is a flock that never dies;but
rain crop cultivation... is mighty like hunting 
the wild ass. If rain crop land is all the family 
possesses, it is hopeless to rely on so precarious 
a source of livelihood".155*
In altering old patterns of assessment the British 
had strained the traditional system without modernising 
it sufficiently to benefit from the change. Exposure
of underdeveloped tribal economies to cash settlements 
and market forces had only exacerbated the problems of 
debt and poverty. Except for a few landowners, notably 
the Kasisj, near the town of Quetta, the vast majority 
either had little surplus produce or were too far from
any market centre, to profit from a fixed cash demand
and rising market prices. As most landholders had 
to borrow to meet the state demand, the only visible 
beneficiaries of the new economic order were the grain 
merchants and the moneylenders. While tribal chiefs and 
other privileged landholders had a political safety net 
in the form of government subsidies and revenue-free 
concessions in the land, for the majority of small 
proprietors there was no insurance against the lack of 
cash resources and ecological constraints, which eroded 
the real value of landed incomes as a source of
survival. Migration and casual work as tenant
cultivators on more prosperous estates were often the 
only alternatives for those unable to eke a living from 
their proprietary holdings. For tenant cultivators
without proprietary titles in the land, the economic: 
prospect was even more bleak. The vast majority on 
irrigated lands had no security of tenure, while 
conditional tenants with heritable occupancy rights were 
confined to rain crop lands where they had to struggle 
against the odds of climate and environment. But even 
the relatively secure conditional tenants were under 
pressure from the rising value of land prices which 
threatened their traditional stake in the land, Far 
instance, in earlier times an owner of rain crop land 
would often assign a proprietary share in the land 
embanked for purposes of cultivation, to the conditional 
tenant who had undertaken the task of embankment. But as 
the price of agricultural land rose from Rs. .109 per aero?? 
in 1897 to Rs. 176 in 1907, 113=5 the landowner found it 
increasingly profitable to retain his property, and 
preferred not to alienate proprietary rights in the land 
to conditional ten a nt s . As the B a l u c histan
A d m i nistrat ion Report for 1 9 0 8 :L909 noted;
"The system is fo-.lU'n^ into disuse as the value 
of land appreciates, and the person making the 
embankment now ordinarily acquires heritable 
occupancy rights as ’ lathband t e n a n t ’ , on a fixed 
rent consisting of a share of the produce". 1S5&
The traditional malaise of privilege juxtaposed 
- w i ’■ poverty, indebtedness, underproduct ion,
scarcity, and famine, therefore continued to linger on 
the economic scene? under British rule. As one official 
noted, in the mainstream of tribal poverty, "Only the
men in receipt of cash and grain allowances from
Government enjoy an established p r o s p e r i t y " . 1®'7. Under a
politically' inspired revenue management system, the
economic view in Baluchistan at the end of 1905 still
revealed the customary contours of a produce based
material exchange system, controlled by landed
hierarchies, preserved from the past, to sustain the
*
elitist structure of power and privilege on which 
colonialism gambled for survival. As colonial economics 
reinforced tradition, the overarching power of custom 
contained change , and kept society moored in the 
inequalities of the past.
The juxtaposition of empire and tribe in 
Baluchistan. mirrored in microcosm the exploitative 
assertion of imperial power in the alien setting of a 
subject society. The idea of dominion in Baluchistan, 
had matured in the official mind in proportion
to the late Victorian obssession with the empire, 
its designs and dilemmas, dreams and distortions. 
An imperial solution for Baluchistan was premised 
on official interpretations of a political
configuration, which confirmed the Russianization of 
central Asia, the fragility of the Afghan bastion, and 
the instability of the turbulent tribal belt on the 
strategic north western tip of India; factors which 
cumulatively seemed to spell a reducing margin of safety 
for the empire, as a section of official opinion had 
always feared., This pessimism was perhaps masked by the 
aggressive pursuit of outer frontiers and extended 
boundaries by the seers of the Forward school. In the 
chase for a scientific frontier, imperial self- 
confidence was perhaps as much as at stake, as a new 
mi Iitary-strategic defence line for India.
In the text of imperial strategy, Baluchistan 
with its barren mountains and bleak deserts was a 
c 1 a s s i c 1 cd c u s f a r s t r u c t u r i n g a f r o n t i e r b a r r :i. e r , w h i c: h
would act as a deterrent for invading armies, provide a 
protective shell for the kernel of empire in India, and 
serve as a forward platform to bear the weight of an 
aggressive external policy against neighbouring Persia and 
Afghanistan if required. Quetta was the keystone in 
this imperial scheme. As T.H. Hoi dieh summarised:
"Quetta... controls the railway to Nushki and the 
road to Seistan. Seistan is dominated by 
Q u e t t a . „„ Quetta also dominates the head of the 
Pishin valley and the long lateral frontier line 
of the Zhob valley reaching northward to the 
G o m u 1 gateway of t he fronti e r ". 1
The lease of Quetta from the Kalat State was followed
by the acquisition of Pishin, Chaman, and Chagai from
Afghanistan. Zhob, Sibi, and Marri-Bugti country,
were cemented into the imperial structure, and detached
from the influence of Kalat and Afghanistan. In the
west, Nushki was absorbed, as a centre for promoting
trade and covert political action, designed to foil
Russian penetration in sou.thetxst Persia. As the logic
of empire and the scientific frontier dismantled the old
tribal state of Kalat, and shr edded the residue of
Afghan influence among the Baluch tribes, a new and
politically fragmented Baluchistan took shape and form.
The partition of Baluchistan into directly administered
and Agency territories on the one hand, and a Native
States sector on the other owning nominal allegiance to
Kalat, completed the piecemeal dismemberment of a regional
identity', leaving in its place a complex of tribal and
temporal jurisdictions which could be warped more easily
to bend Baluchistan to the dictates of- imperial 
strategy-
A reconstituted and militarised Baluchistan was 
also intended to circulate the message of a new balance 
of power on t hie front. ier . Wi t h bot h Qandhar and F:‘ersian 
Seistan now within striking distance of British Indian 
forces as a result of the railheads at Chaman and 
Nushki, the Government of India gained a frontier 
designed more for aggression than defence. The ultimate 
aim of such a policy vis a vis Afghanistan and Persia, 
was perhaps as Curzon described to check the Russians who 
were "visibly nibbling at one and biting hard at the 
ot h e r " .22 But the immediate and intended effect was to 
reorder* Baluchistan as a threat and warning to miscreant 
allies, or potential local enemies to desist from 
conspiring against the British Empire. The paranoia of 
imperial self-defence therefore surfaced as a predatory" 
strategy' of ambition and power, pursued at the expense 
of frontier tribes and the vulnerable neighbouring 
states of Afghanistan and Persia.
The imperial argument for re— negotiating the 
political identity of Baluchistan. was matched by a 
local commitment to new, extended political margins, 
which were uncompromisingly 'f o r w a r d ’ in concept and 
execution.. San deman set the new style, by manipulating
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local p o 1 i t i c s , r ec r li i t i ng mem be r s o-f o ne t. r i be t o lead 
punitive expeditions against another often its traditional 
e n e m y , a n d e x p 1o i t i ng the not ion of i mper i a 1 cr i s i s , 
conjured by the Great Game and the Russian challenge, to 
float annexationist schemes targeted on the acquisition 
of new strategic tribal lands. At stake was personal 
ambition and provincial power. and the eclipse of the
conservative Punjab style of frontier government, in
favour of the new Baluchistan system always searching for 
the far frontier and the distant tribe. This friction 
of personality and politics on the provincial scene, was 
summed up by the Viceroy Lord Lansdowne writing to Lord
Connemara, Governor of Madras, in 1890s
"The two Administrations CPunjab and Baluchistan] 
are jealous of each other, and favour widely 
different policies. L y a l l ’s IIL i eutenant- Governor 
of the Punjab] one idea is to build a wall which 
Sandeman will not be able to climb. Sandeman is 
for as little masonry as possible, and at least 
one foot beyond the boundary line?".3
As tribal resources became the building material for
imperial spheres of influence, protectorates, and
leases, Sandeman's political adventurism turned into a
a gr aveyar d far t ri b a 1 i ndependenee.
If strategic gain was the talisman which drew 
imperial forces into Baluchistan, the primitivism of 
tribal society, unmediated by civilising influences ?
encouraged the reformist rhetoric of empire
building. The invincibility of the h/est was strong
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in imperial polemic; as Lytton candidly
museds
"And lastly, is not either war and conquest, or 
this system of agencies;, interference, and
ultimate control, the inevitable process of 
the advance of c i v i 1isation in contact with
barbar i s m ".4
Viewed through the prism of biological determinism, and 
perceived as primitive in the Darwinian sense, tribal 
Baluchistan was a natural victim for imperial censure. 
Pre-colonial Baluchistan was in imperial estimations;, a 
lost land ruled by the primeval passions of vendetta 
and blood feuds; it was a p 1ace " of utter lawlessness; 
and bad and wild characters , and fanatics and would-be 
assassins, prowled about all over ... u n c h e c k e d " ,53 The 
deconstruct ion of tribalism was matched by a strong 
conviction in an imperial formula for human behaviour, 
based on western definitions of law and order, 
discipline, and the subjection of society to government 
control. Transplanting this vision on tribal soil was 
the crucial mission of Sandemanism in Baluchistan,
As the rule of law was considered the pillar of 
civilised society Sandeman"s political solution for 
Ba 1 uc hi sI:an hinged on purg i ng the tribal st ru.cture of 
its miltant code, in order to reconstruct its social
i dent i ty on imper .ia 1 terms. Pax Br itannica not on 1 y
frowned on the traditional pursuit of feuds and raids, 
but i t even c:onscr i pted t r i besmen to po 1 i ce t hsmsel v e s .
A corpus of restrictive imperial directives replaced the 
informal and consensual operative rules of tribal life. 
Rewards and reprisals instituted a style of dissent 
management, which shackled tribal behaviour patterns, at 
odds with the imperial blueprint for a stable 
frontier society . In the interests of caution 
and continuity^ ruling elites were deliberately 
preserved as convenient fronts for colonial administration. 
Money and privilege encouraged tribal chiefs to abandon 
traditional leadership roles associated with military 
prowess, combative skills, and the ability to rule on 
the basis of political consensus within the tribe. The 
new colonial props for chiefly authority sapped the need 
for oi"di nary tribal s u p p o r t , divorced the el i t.es f rom 
c:ommon t r i b e s m e n , and b 1 ur red the 1 i ne between aut hor i ty 
and tyranny in the tribal structure- It also encouraged 
intra-tribal conflict between rival leaders competing 
for power and the new spoils of colonialism.
If fault lines were appearing on the political 
surface of tribal society, they did not seem 
particularly problematic to the British as the 
equilibrium between empire and tribe remained steady,
The paternalist idiom of rule seemed safe in the 
contract between the Baluchistan Government and the 
tribal chief to exchange allegiance for local autonomy, 
subsidies and allowances for tribal order and
subservience to imperial direction. Functioning at the 
sensitive borderline beween empire and tribe, the 
tribal chief became the recipient of imperial favours, 
as well as a conduit for transmitting the ideology of 
imperial authority and dominance in tribal society. In 
this seemingly reciprocal relatio n s h i p , the terms of 
exchange were essentially unequal and h i e r a r c h i c a l , for 
the tribal chief assumed a subordinate - client •- status 
in the structure of the relationship. Captivated by 
the material incentives of collaboration, tribal leaders 
lost the compulsion to challenge imperial authority;
instead there was more elite competition and violent 
scrambles for the new rewards of leadership in the 
colonial scheme. As violence was internalised within 
the tribal system, it fragmented the unity of the tribal 
structure bending it to the growing pressure of imperial 
authority; at the same time internal rifts gave the 
empire an opening to assume the role of arbiter in 
conflict situations, thereby allowing it to impose its 
jurisdictional boundary more intrusively upon tribal 
institutions. Pol itical consensus in Baluchistan 
therefore mirrored the legitimation of empire, and the
s t e riIi sat i o n of t r i b a 1 elites t o p r e se r ve the
artificial symmetry of the imperial.tribal order.
Concern for stability and the status-quo narrowed 
the spectrum of social options pursued by the
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Eialuchistan Government. S a n d e m a n ’s archaic vision of 
tribal society, as a timeless,, contactless vacuum, 
endorsed a -form of social existence quarantined from 
change and alternative social models. Images of 
loyal tribal chiefs and revitalized tribal institutions-, 
serving as indigenous arteries of control, were 
carefully propagated to keep alive the notion of 
consensual government in Baluchistan based on tribal 
participation. Sandeman-’s apologists insisted without 
much substance, that the tribal tier in local government 
established in Baluchistan "... self-government in many 
ways in advance of that, which existed... in India",6 
In reality Sandeman-’ s political model was only a guise 
for keeping tribesmen penned up behind static cultural 
boundaries. This suited imperial interests, as it 
effectively insulated Baluchistan from the nationalist 
politics current in India. But for Baluchistan, the 
social price was indefinite suspension in a hybrid 
tribal-colonial structure, which looked to the past to 
define its identity, indifferent to any timetable for 
future change. The logic of such a policy was to freeze 
society in its own cultural past, and imprison the 
tribal image in a museumized reconstruct ion of an older 
reality. Even when the Sandeman era had become history, 
Malcolm D a r 1ing^serving in the Punjab Government, could 
still writes
" here in what was virtually a part of
Baluchistan , was the true 
his native fastness 
soph:i. st i cat i ons of moder n 
Biblical appearance and 
i nt er est i ng st u d y ^
Baluchistan was E-fritish
the west. It was acquired 
empire when autocracy and 
pass i ons of g o v e r n m e n t , and
E-fa Inch - the Baluch in 
untouched by the 
life. With his almost 
customs he was an
I ndia’s last frontier in 
in the late afternoon of
ortho d o xy we re t he r u 1i ng 
the tradition of liberal 
the dust of the Mutiny, 
by the fear of losing 
of the empire, and
Raj from the 
this negative 
substitute for 
a threat to 
uneconomic frontier zone 
t he f u 11 mea su r e of t his
Government investment was 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 c o n t r o 1 a n d 
The dark side 
of economic and 
new source of income 
employment in the Levy 
wage structures and 
.10 and 
sowar s r espect i v e 1y ) 
and a cor r espond i ng 
pos i t i ons by 1905„3
reform a dim memory, buried in 
Imperial priorities were dictated 
p owe r , &nsu ring t he lifespan 
protecting the privileged view of the 
political summit of the sub-continent. In 
vision, law and order was a rational 
development, and modernisation discarded as 
the imperial structure. An 
1 i k e B a 1 u c h i s t a n t a s t e d 
def& ns i ve i mperialism. 
di r ect e d e x clusively t o secu r i ng 
asserting s t r a t e g i c - m i 1itary superiority. 
of this picture was the neglect 
educational developments. The only 
made a v a i 1 a b 1e to t r i besmen was 
Service. But even here, static 
r i s i ng c:ommodi ty p r i ces; deva 1 ued incomes ( E
Rs.25 per month for sepoys and 
sufficiently' to induce? resignations,
1 ac k of compet i t i on for serv i ce
At the same time the rigorous extraction of compensation
money from the community for offences committed by an
individual tribesman transformed collective
responsibility into a punitive sentence for tribesmen
chronically hard-pressed to survive.. The harsh economics
of late Sandemanism in Baluchistan led many tribesmen
to view emigration as the only route to escape
financial ruin. For the majority who remained the
prospect was bleak. Raiding was no longer a legitimate
opti on for s u p p 1ement i ng t he t r i b a 1 i n c o m e „ O n 1v the
arid land remained as a source of subsistence, stalked
by scarcity, drought, indebtedness and a rising revenue
♦
demand. Sac i (sty was polarised between a privileged 
minority of tribal chiefs and headmen, cushioned by 
revenue-free land grants and a 11o w a n c e s , and the vast 
majority of small owner cultivators and tenant workers, 
forced to bear the main brunt of the revenue demand on
marginal resources . Exploitative rent structures
derived from the past, types of serfdom, and the 
insecurity of the landless tenant cultivator, were 
passively tolerated. The most vulnerable section of 
tribesmen therefore remained trapped in the circle of 
coercive custom, while having to adjust to the new
revenue demands of the E-faluch.ist.an Government. Social
contradictions were compounded by underdevelopment. Little 
was done to improve productivity in the region by way of 
liberal agricultural loans to individual cultivators, or
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government irrigation projects to increase the water- 
supply. Environmental risks to cultivation remained 
as high as always; the clue to survival lay in the 
tr i b e s m a n ' s sk ill and pat ience i n trapp .i ng the few drops 
of precious rainfall in bands or earth built dams 
in order to raise occasional crops. Seeing this 
evidence of the t r i b e s m a n ’s unequal struggle against 
nature., Arnold Toynbee was moved to observe in the 
course of a journey across Baluchistan, "...a gabar band 
on the chance of a catch~crop; that is heroism 
i n d e e d " . **
While tribesmen remained stranded in p o v e r t y , 
there was conspicuous government expenditure on 
mi 1itary— strategic requirements. In 1807, the Viceroy 
Lord Dufferin estimating the cost of the Forward Policy., 
just in terms of railway development in Baluchistan, 
observed that the military rail link to Chaman; pointing 
-VojvavxK Q a n d h a r , had "cost nearly four millions, and as 
as many lives as a pitched battle used to do in early 
d a y s ".,10 Even in imperial calculations such expenditure 
could only be rationalised from the perspective of the 
Russian threat to India. But as later shifts in global 
politics led to the conclusion of the Anqlo-Russian 
Convention in 1907, the old logic of the Forward Policy., 
seemed largely an anachronism . The cerebral arabesques 
of the prophets and pundits of the Forward Policy,
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had after all conjured a phantom war fought exclusively 
on paper with pen and ink., documents., memoranda., and 
rhetoric- As the futility of the Forward Policy stood 
exposed., the axioms of the old Sandeman era gave way to 
the sceptical reappraisals of a later Viceroy,, Lord 
Hardinge* who looked at the same Chaman rail link in 
1911 and realised that it led ndwhere ; he wrotes
"I visited Chaman., the outpost of our empire, and 
I looked with curi o sity taut without envy over 
the plains of Afghanistan to Candahar, I saw 
there a complete lot of railway stores for a line
to Candahar and I thought to myself how mad
anybody would be to want expansion in this 
direction when we have so much to do at home to 
develop what we have g o t ".'-11
Because its aims were primarily defensive and 
strategic;, imperial expansion into Baluchistan
was essentially superficial and empty. The bleak logic 
of military railways* fortified posts, and political 
ascendency capped imperial policy. This vision of 
empire was essentially flawed, for it divorced the
exercise of power from social need, and left the reality 
of imperial rule enmeshed in strands of self-interest 
and the seduction of continental dominion. The imprint 
of S a n d e m a n 1' 5 peace in Baluchistan was stained by the 
cultural stagnation of tribal society and the politics 
of dependence enforced by imperial ideology; it was
brittle and negative, captive to the past. As one 
otaserver described in 1905:
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"In the course of more than a quarter of a century 
this primitive condition, Cof B a l u c h i s t a n 3 
though modified, has not disappeared, and 
barbarian prejudice and pugnacity are still factors 
which have to be constantly reckoned w i t h " - 1*
Sandeman's Baluchistan, upheld as a memorial to the 
imperial passion for substituting order and progess in 
place of anarchy and turbulence, commemorated an 
idealized view of the past. In reality, tribesmen were 
trapped in a desertscape of scarcity and struggle, 
poverty and deprivations the options were few, and the 
canvas of tribal life offered a narrow forum to resolve 
old contradict ions and unlock a new future.
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